The Gibson Guitar Corporation based in Tennessee was raided by federal agents twice for importing prohibited wood products. The raids, especially the second, attracted much public attention and had even led for calls from some members of Congress for a change. The case examines the Lacey Act, the allegations of wrong doing, and the question of trade and domestic job creation at the expense of environmental stewardship.
{"title":"Trade Interference or Good Environmental Stewardship: The Case of Gibson Guitar and the Lacey Act","authors":"Charles A. Rarick","doi":"10.18034/AJTP.V2I1.554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18034/AJTP.V2I1.554","url":null,"abstract":"The Gibson Guitar Corporation based in Tennessee was raided by federal agents twice for importing prohibited wood products. The raids, especially the second, attracted much public attention and had even led for calls from some members of Congress for a change. The case examines the Lacey Act, the allegations of wrong doing, and the question of trade and domestic job creation at the expense of environmental stewardship.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120959780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides a conceptual framework for the national rubber policy in India based on the inherited characteristics of the rubber sector and issues surfaced during the past two decades of trade policy reforms. Historically, the inherited interdependence observed between a vibrant NR production segment and a highly developed rubber products manufacturing industry had been unique and nurtured for achieving the twin national objectives of self-sufficiency and import substitution. In practice, the efficacy of the policy interventions had been prefixed by a very high degree of domestic market orientation and protection to both segments from external competition. However, growing exposure to external competition through the multilateral and RTA routes during the past two decades left serious strains on the harmonious relationships prevailed in the rubber sector. The strains of market integration are increasingly witnessed in the domestic market than in the export markets. A major casualty of these changes has been the interventionist policy approaches which guided the growth dynamics of the sector during 1947-91. Therefore, a comprehensive national rubber policy is expected not only to recognize the strategic importance of sustaining a self-reliant rubber sector but also to identify the inherent strengths and accumulated weaknesses of the embedded structure to capture synergies in the era of market integration.
{"title":"Transcending the Regional Trappings of Natural Rubber Cultivation and Challenges of Evolving a National Rubber Policy in India","authors":"T. Kadavil","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2620593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2620593","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a conceptual framework for the national rubber policy in India based on the inherited characteristics of the rubber sector and issues surfaced during the past two decades of trade policy reforms. Historically, the inherited interdependence observed between a vibrant NR production segment and a highly developed rubber products manufacturing industry had been unique and nurtured for achieving the twin national objectives of self-sufficiency and import substitution. In practice, the efficacy of the policy interventions had been prefixed by a very high degree of domestic market orientation and protection to both segments from external competition. However, growing exposure to external competition through the multilateral and RTA routes during the past two decades left serious strains on the harmonious relationships prevailed in the rubber sector. The strains of market integration are increasingly witnessed in the domestic market than in the export markets. A major casualty of these changes has been the interventionist policy approaches which guided the growth dynamics of the sector during 1947-91. Therefore, a comprehensive national rubber policy is expected not only to recognize the strategic importance of sustaining a self-reliant rubber sector but also to identify the inherent strengths and accumulated weaknesses of the embedded structure to capture synergies in the era of market integration.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116805985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The most dynamic component of the conservation movement in the United States for the past three decades has been land conservation transactions. In the United States, land conservation organizations have protected roughly 40 million acres of land through transactions. Most of these acres have been protected using conservation easements. Climate change threatens the vast conservation edifice created by land conservation transactions. The tools of land conservation transactions are, traditionally, stationary. Climate change means that the resources that land conservation transactions were intended to protect may no longer remain on the land protected. Options to purchase conservation easements (OPCEs) have long played a modest but important role in conservation law practice. In the world climate change is creating, with its substantial uncertainties and shifting windows of opportunity, OPCEs can serve more complicated and strategic purposes. The ability of OPCEs to serve important roles in protecting land in the context of uncertainty would be significantly increased if state legislatures amend current conservation easement statutes to (1) specifically recognize OPCEs, (2) immunize OPCEs from a range of potential common law challenges, (3) guarantee the durability and transferability of OPCEs, and (4) integrate OPCEs into the burgeoning body of conservation easement law. These statutory amendments would do for OPCEs what conservation easement statutes have done for conservation easements: transform them into an essential multi-purpose tool for conservation in a changing world.
{"title":"Enhancing Conservation Options: An Argument for Statutory Recognition of Options to Purchase Conservation Easements (OPCEs).","authors":"Federico Cheever, Jessica Owley","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2598298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2598298","url":null,"abstract":"The most dynamic component of the conservation movement in the United States for the past three decades has been land conservation transactions. In the United States, land conservation organizations have protected roughly 40 million acres of land through transactions. Most of these acres have been protected using conservation easements. Climate change threatens the vast conservation edifice created by land conservation transactions. The tools of land conservation transactions are, traditionally, stationary. Climate change means that the resources that land conservation transactions were intended to protect may no longer remain on the land protected. Options to purchase conservation easements (OPCEs) have long played a modest but important role in conservation law practice. In the world climate change is creating, with its substantial uncertainties and shifting windows of opportunity, OPCEs can serve more complicated and strategic purposes. The ability of OPCEs to serve important roles in protecting land in the context of uncertainty would be significantly increased if state legislatures amend current conservation easement statutes to (1) specifically recognize OPCEs, (2) immunize OPCEs from a range of potential common law challenges, (3) guarantee the durability and transferability of OPCEs, and (4) integrate OPCEs into the burgeoning body of conservation easement law. These statutory amendments would do for OPCEs what conservation easement statutes have done for conservation easements: transform them into an essential multi-purpose tool for conservation in a changing world.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127754344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Comment on Stewart Estate v. TAQA North Ltd, 2013 ABQB 691 - freehold oil & gas lease preserved through shut-in royalty clause, based on lack of market for natural gas.Typically an Alberta freehold petroleum and natural gas lease continues for a defined period (the primary term) and so long thereafter as leased substances are produced from the leased lands or the lessee satisfies specified lease conditions. In exchange for the lessee’s rights to explore for and produce leased substances, the lessor receives a royalty. This arrangement works satisfactorily (in the main) when leased substances are produced. Circumstances, though, may disincline the lessee to produce and incline the lessee to shut-in a well, particularly when the well is productive of natural gas. For example (especially if the well is in a new or little developed location), pipelines may have to be constructed, there may be no nearby pipeline system to connect to, or there may be no readily available processing plants; purchase contracts must be secured. Unlike oil, natural gas cannot simply be trucked to another location for disposition. The most convenient means for storing the natural gas pending changed circumstances is to leave it in the ground. To preserve both a lease and its finances, a lessee may seek to rely on lease provisions permitting a well to be shut-in and for the lease to be continued on the payment of shut-in royalties. A lessee would favour an expansive approach to shut-in provisions. In contrast, a lessor would understandably prefer to receive royalties on actual production (which presumably would be greater than shut-in royalties) or to have the lease terminate so that a lessee with a more aggressive or economical approach to production could be found. A lessor would favour a restrictive approach to shut-in provisions.
对Stewart Estate诉TAQA North Ltd, 2013年ABQB 691案的评论——基于天然气缺乏市场，通过关停特许权条款保留的永久保有油气租约。通常，艾伯塔省的永久保有石油和天然气租赁将持续一段规定的时间(主要期限)，此后只要从租赁土地上生产出租赁物质或承租人满足特定的租赁条件。作为承租人勘探和生产租赁物质的权利的交换，出租人获得特许权使用费。当生产租赁物质时，这种安排(主要)令人满意。然而，在某些情况下，承租方可能不愿意进行生产，并倾向于关井，特别是当该井生产天然气时。例如(特别是如果油井位于一个新的或欠发达的地区)，可能需要建造管道，附近可能没有管道系统可以连接，或者可能没有现成的加工厂;采购合同必须有保障。与石油不同，天然气不能简单地用卡车运到另一个地方进行处理。在环境发生变化之前，储存天然气最方便的方法是将其留在地下。为了维持租约和资金，承租人可能会寻求依赖租约条款，允许关井，并在支付关井特许权使用费的情况下继续租赁。承租人将倾向于采用一种扩张性的方式来处理关闭条款。相比之下，可以理解的是，出租人更愿意获得实际生产的特许权使用费(这可能比关闭特许权使用费要高)，或者终止租赁，以便找到一个更积极或更经济的生产方式的承租人。出租人将倾向于对关闭条款采取限制性措施。
{"title":"Litigating Shut-In for Lack of a Market: A Comment on Stewart Estate v. Taqa North Ltd","authors":"W. Renke","doi":"10.29173/alr295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/alr295","url":null,"abstract":"Comment on Stewart Estate v. TAQA North Ltd, 2013 ABQB 691 - freehold oil & gas lease preserved through shut-in royalty clause, based on lack of market for natural gas.Typically an Alberta freehold petroleum and natural gas lease continues for a defined period (the primary term) and so long thereafter as leased substances are produced from the leased lands or the lessee satisfies specified lease conditions. In exchange for the lessee’s rights to explore for and produce leased substances, the lessor receives a royalty. This arrangement works satisfactorily (in the main) when leased substances are produced. Circumstances, though, may disincline the lessee to produce and incline the lessee to shut-in a well, particularly when the well is productive of natural gas. For example (especially if the well is in a new or little developed location), pipelines may have to be constructed, there may be no nearby pipeline system to connect to, or there may be no readily available processing plants; purchase contracts must be secured. Unlike oil, natural gas cannot simply be trucked to another location for disposition. The most convenient means for storing the natural gas pending changed circumstances is to leave it in the ground. To preserve both a lease and its finances, a lessee may seek to rely on lease provisions permitting a well to be shut-in and for the lease to be continued on the payment of shut-in royalties. A lessee would favour an expansive approach to shut-in provisions. In contrast, a lessor would understandably prefer to receive royalties on actual production (which presumably would be greater than shut-in royalties) or to have the lease terminate so that a lessee with a more aggressive or economical approach to production could be found. A lessor would favour a restrictive approach to shut-in provisions.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124323337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper addresses public participation from the angle of access to justice, when the activities of multilateral development banks affect water resources.
当多边开发银行的活动影响到水资源时，本文从诉诸司法的角度讨论公众参与。
{"title":"Justice by Any Other Name? The Grievance Mechanisms of Multilateral Development Banks","authors":"V. Richard","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2433921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2433921","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses public participation from the angle of access to justice, when the activities of multilateral development banks affect water resources.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123646331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After several decades of improvement, water quality in the United States is getting worse, and the problem is primarily caused by run-off from non-point sources, such as farms and urban development. These non-point sources have never had regulatory mandates in the Clean Water Act, and have proven very difficult to control. With little likelihood of comprehensive statutory changes, the EPA and the states that administer the Clean Water Act have looked to other regulatory means to address this problem. One of the most prominent has been the use of markets in pollution (particularly for nutrient pollution from run-off) to provide incentives for control. In short, the agencies and the regulated private sector have latched on to the possibility of highly regulated sources (such as industrial emitters) paying largely unregulated sources (such as agricultural lands) to reduce run-off into the nation’s water bodies. In theory, this is consistent with the regulatory push towards efficiency and using markets as rational arbiters of pollution control. While this theory has been used on many small scales over the last 15 years, recently the EPA and many states have announced a reliance on it at a very large scale in order to reverse water pollution decline, particularly in large water bodies with dead zones, like the Chesapeake Bay. While I believe these markets could work in theory at this scale, I do not believe the administrative agencies have addressed problems with doing so. Because of the similarity in problems concerning environmental integrity and efficiency between non-point agricultural runoff and biological offsets in a carbon trading system, I believe that much of the analysis of addressing these offsets from a series of legislative proposals could provide a regulatory template for dealing with non-point source agricultural pollution. This article proposes such a regulatory template based on these ideas.
{"title":"C(r)ap and Trade: The Brave New World of Non-Point Source Nutrient Trading and Using Lessons from Greenhouse Gas Markets to Make It Work","authors":"V. Flatt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2269784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2269784","url":null,"abstract":"After several decades of improvement, water quality in the United States is getting worse, and the problem is primarily caused by run-off from non-point sources, such as farms and urban development. These non-point sources have never had regulatory mandates in the Clean Water Act, and have proven very difficult to control. With little likelihood of comprehensive statutory changes, the EPA and the states that administer the Clean Water Act have looked to other regulatory means to address this problem. One of the most prominent has been the use of markets in pollution (particularly for nutrient pollution from run-off) to provide incentives for control. In short, the agencies and the regulated private sector have latched on to the possibility of highly regulated sources (such as industrial emitters) paying largely unregulated sources (such as agricultural lands) to reduce run-off into the nation’s water bodies. In theory, this is consistent with the regulatory push towards efficiency and using markets as rational arbiters of pollution control. While this theory has been used on many small scales over the last 15 years, recently the EPA and many states have announced a reliance on it at a very large scale in order to reverse water pollution decline, particularly in large water bodies with dead zones, like the Chesapeake Bay. While I believe these markets could work in theory at this scale, I do not believe the administrative agencies have addressed problems with doing so. Because of the similarity in problems concerning environmental integrity and efficiency between non-point agricultural runoff and biological offsets in a carbon trading system, I believe that much of the analysis of addressing these offsets from a series of legislative proposals could provide a regulatory template for dealing with non-point source agricultural pollution. This article proposes such a regulatory template based on these ideas.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127728594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-02-21DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-0440-5.CH025
Diane-Laure Arjaliès, Cécile Goubet, J. Ponssard
The ability of companies to turn an environmental constraint into a source of strategic opportunities is a controversial topic in published research. The article, which is based on a comparative study of the CO2 emission reduction strategies implemented by the cement and chemical industries, shows that companies’ freedom to adopt a proactive approach to sustainable development is severely constrained by the characteristic features of the sector, in terms of its dependence on natural resources, of flexibility in the composition of the business portfolio, and of the structure of the downstream sector.
{"title":"Strategic Approaches of CO2 Emissions: The Case of the Cement Industry and Chemical Industry","authors":"Diane-Laure Arjaliès, Cécile Goubet, J. Ponssard","doi":"10.4018/978-1-5225-0440-5.CH025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-0440-5.CH025","url":null,"abstract":"The ability of companies to turn an environmental constraint into a source of strategic opportunities is a controversial topic in published research. The article, which is based on a comparative study of the CO2 emission reduction strategies implemented by the cement and chemical industries, shows that companies’ freedom to adopt a proactive approach to sustainable development is severely constrained by the characteristic features of the sector, in terms of its dependence on natural resources, of flexibility in the composition of the business portfolio, and of the structure of the downstream sector.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123720481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The subsidiarity principle of water resources management suggests that water management and service delivery should take place at the lowest appropriate governance level. The principle is attractive for several reasons, primarily because: 1) the governance level can be reduced to reflect environmental characteristics, such as the hydrological borders of a watershed that would otherwise cross administrative boundaries; 2) decentralization promotes community and stakeholder engagement when decision-making is localized; 3) inefficiencies are reduced by eliminating reliance on central government bureaucracies and budgetary constraints; and 4) laws and institutions can be adapted to reflect localized conditions at a scale where integrated natural resources management and climate change adaptation is more focused. Accordingly, the principle of subsidiarity has been welcomed by many states committed to decentralized governance, integrated water resources management, and/or civic participation. However, applications of decentralization have not been uniform, and in some cases have produced frustrating outcomes for states and water resources. Successful decentralization strategies are heavily dependent on dedicated financial resources and human resource capacity. This article explores the nexus between the principle of subsidiarity and the enabling environment, in the hope of articulating factors likely to contribute to, or detract from, the success of decentralized water resources management. Case studies from Haiti, Rwanda, and the United States’ Florida Water Management Districts provide examples of the varied stages of decentralization.
{"title":"Subsidiarity in Principle: Decentralization of Water Resources Management","authors":"R. Stoa","doi":"10.18352/ULR.267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18352/ULR.267","url":null,"abstract":"The subsidiarity principle of water resources management suggests that water management and service delivery should take place at the lowest appropriate governance level. The principle is attractive for several reasons, primarily because: 1) the governance level can be reduced to reflect environmental characteristics, such as the hydrological borders of a watershed that would otherwise cross administrative boundaries; 2) decentralization promotes community and stakeholder engagement when decision-making is localized; 3) inefficiencies are reduced by eliminating reliance on central government bureaucracies and budgetary constraints; and 4) laws and institutions can be adapted to reflect localized conditions at a scale where integrated natural resources management and climate change adaptation is more focused. Accordingly, the principle of subsidiarity has been welcomed by many states committed to decentralized governance, integrated water resources management, and/or civic participation. However, applications of decentralization have not been uniform, and in some cases have produced frustrating outcomes for states and water resources. Successful decentralization strategies are heavily dependent on dedicated financial resources and human resource capacity. This article explores the nexus between the principle of subsidiarity and the enabling environment, in the hope of articulating factors likely to contribute to, or detract from, the success of decentralized water resources management. Case studies from Haiti, Rwanda, and the United States’ Florida Water Management Districts provide examples of the varied stages of decentralization.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130041242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China's National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee have not yet passed a national wetland protection law, nor has the State Council passed national regulations on wetland protection. The lack of national law on this subject matter poses great challenges to “effectively regulate the behavior of and relationships between the various stakeholders (for example, different levels of governments, the industrial sector, and the public)”. Although 18 out of 34 provinces in China have issued local regulations for wetland protection as of November 2013, it will be difficult to enforce them due to the lack of national laws. In order to push for passage of a national law, the State Administration of Forestry adopted national rules on wetland protection titled the Management Rules on Wetland Protection on March 28, 2013. This country report seeks to provide an introduction to this new legal tool for wetland protection in China.
{"title":"China's New National Rules on Wetland Protection","authors":"Yanmei Lin, C. Yue","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2517481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2517481","url":null,"abstract":"China's National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee have not yet passed a national wetland protection law, nor has the State Council passed national regulations on wetland protection. The lack of national law on this subject matter poses great challenges to “effectively regulate the behavior of and relationships between the various stakeholders (for example, different levels of governments, the industrial sector, and the public)”. Although 18 out of 34 provinces in China have issued local regulations for wetland protection as of November 2013, it will be difficult to enforce them due to the lack of national laws. In order to push for passage of a national law, the State Administration of Forestry adopted national rules on wetland protection titled the Management Rules on Wetland Protection on March 28, 2013. This country report seeks to provide an introduction to this new legal tool for wetland protection in China.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121765241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Invasive exotic species are a reality in all ecosystems. These biological invaders disrupt ecological patterns and cause billions of dollars in economic damage. Justifiably, governments are stepping up their response. However, while many invaders are considered unmitigated ecological disasters, a number of species have become important and controversial parts of the regional economy. In the Laurentian Great Lakes, the invasive species issue has been addressed through a number of unilateral and multilateral attempts at the state, national, and international level. This “law of the lakes” has evolved towards the implementation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 2012, which uses a framework-protocol basis to combat the problem through a preservation-focused ecosystem approach. The management of water and fisheries in the African Great Lakes has similar problems addressing invasive species. However, states in this region have responded to the threat differently, particularly as it pertains to economically viable invasive fish species. Various state-level legislation and policy shows that the invasive threat is acknowledged, but follows a conservation management approach, which hopes to maintain the essential economic opportunities that the invasive species provide for area residents. The experiences of the Laurentian Great Lakes in moving their invasive species management forward can be used as a template to update and focus the response in the African Great Lakes.
{"title":"Laurentian and African Great Lakes: Different Strategies in the Fight Against Invasive Species","authors":"S. Mckenzie","doi":"10.18060/20959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18060/20959","url":null,"abstract":"Invasive exotic species are a reality in all ecosystems. These biological invaders disrupt ecological patterns and cause billions of dollars in economic damage. Justifiably, governments are stepping up their response. However, while many invaders are considered unmitigated ecological disasters, a number of species have become important and controversial parts of the regional economy. In the Laurentian Great Lakes, the invasive species issue has been addressed through a number of unilateral and multilateral attempts at the state, national, and international level. This “law of the lakes” has evolved towards the implementation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 2012, which uses a framework-protocol basis to combat the problem through a preservation-focused ecosystem approach. The management of water and fisheries in the African Great Lakes has similar problems addressing invasive species. However, states in this region have responded to the threat differently, particularly as it pertains to economically viable invasive fish species. Various state-level legislation and policy shows that the invasive threat is acknowledged, but follows a conservation management approach, which hopes to maintain the essential economic opportunities that the invasive species provide for area residents. The experiences of the Laurentian Great Lakes in moving their invasive species management forward can be used as a template to update and focus the response in the African Great Lakes.","PeriodicalId":346805,"journal":{"name":"Natural Resources Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115092175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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