Pub Date : 2017-08-25DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006454
Angela Cummine
China is the only country in the world with two sovereign investment vehicles dedicated to managing excess foreign reserves for return, not just safety and liquidity. As the investment profile and behaviour of both funds align with the aims of the government's economic agenda, it is tempting to view China's two sovereign funds as part of a coordinated effort to further state investment policy. However, analysis of the origin of China's multi-sovereign investor regime shows that this approach is primarily a product of intense bureaucratic rivalry within the Chinese public service, rather than a considered strategy of the sponsoring government. This rivalry had a detrimental impact on aspects of the CIC's institutional design and early investment decision making. Comparison of the CIC, China's flagship sovereign investor, to its peer Asian funds in Korea and Singapore reveals that relative to regional reserve investment corporations, the CIC lacks robust mechanisms to achieve effective arms-length governance from its state sponsor. Reforms to the Chinese sovereign fund to ensure greater clarity of mission and alignment of purpose with internal decision making would ensure Chinese exceptionalism in sovereign investment transitions from cautionary to exemplary.
{"title":"A tale of two sovereign funds: China's exceptionalism in sovereign wealth management through CIC and SAFE","authors":"Angela Cummine","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006454","url":null,"abstract":"China is the only country in the world with two sovereign investment vehicles dedicated to managing excess foreign reserves for return, not just safety and liquidity. As the investment profile and behaviour of both funds align with the aims of the government's economic agenda, it is tempting to view China's two sovereign funds as part of a coordinated effort to further state investment policy. However, analysis of the origin of China's multi-sovereign investor regime shows that this approach is primarily a product of intense bureaucratic rivalry within the Chinese public service, rather than a considered strategy of the sponsoring government. This rivalry had a detrimental impact on aspects of the CIC's institutional design and early investment decision making. Comparison of the CIC, China's flagship sovereign investor, to its peer Asian funds in Korea and Singapore reveals that relative to regional reserve investment corporations, the CIC lacks robust mechanisms to achieve effective arms-length governance from its state sponsor. Reforms to the Chinese sovereign fund to ensure greater clarity of mission and alignment of purpose with internal decision making would ensure Chinese exceptionalism in sovereign investment transitions from cautionary to exemplary.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"191-211"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43551590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-25DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006452
P. Hubbard, P. Williams
Not all of China's SOEs have evolved equally. To understand modern SOEs the paper contrasts the giant centrally owned firms in the energy and utilities sectors under the control of the central state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in Beijing - some of which have financial resources comparable to medium-sized countries - with the tens of thousands of provincially and locally owned SOEs that have survived reform with various degrees of state ownership and across all sectors. The paper finds that giant central SOEs may be politically important to Beijing, but most SOEs are provincial and local businesses operating in competitive, rather than monopolistic, environments. Instead of dealing with SOEs as a class, the challenge for policymakers is to deal with market structures that undermine competition, and to regulate socially harmful behaviour, irrespective of the ultimate owner of the capital involved.
{"title":"Chinese state owned enterprises: an observer's guide","authors":"P. Hubbard, P. Williams","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006452","url":null,"abstract":"Not all of China's SOEs have evolved equally. To understand modern SOEs the paper contrasts the giant centrally owned firms in the energy and utilities sectors under the control of the central state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in Beijing - some of which have financial resources comparable to medium-sized countries - with the tens of thousands of provincially and locally owned SOEs that have survived reform with various degrees of state ownership and across all sectors. The paper finds that giant central SOEs may be politically important to Beijing, but most SOEs are provincial and local businesses operating in competitive, rather than monopolistic, environments. Instead of dealing with SOEs as a class, the challenge for policymakers is to deal with market structures that undermine competition, and to regulate socially harmful behaviour, irrespective of the ultimate owner of the capital involved.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"153-170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42551055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-25DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006458
A. Lumsden, Lizzie Knight
Australia's national interest is well-served by having a foreign investment regime that has the right balance between flexibility and certainty. One highly successful aspect of that policy has been the ability to use conditional approvals to ensure that applicants behave in a manner that is consistent with the national interest. The government's new legislation is an ambitious and important attempt to modernise the 40-year old foreign investment rules. We consider the new legislation successfully builds on the system including a conditional approval regime that has been improved to reflect best regulatory practices and support ongoing investment.
{"title":"Australia's foreign investment approval regime: a new way forward","authors":"A. Lumsden, Lizzie Knight","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006458","url":null,"abstract":"Australia's national interest is well-served by having a foreign investment regime that has the right balance between flexibility and certainty. One highly successful aspect of that policy has been the ability to use conditional approvals to ensure that applicants behave in a manner that is consistent with the national interest. The government's new legislation is an ambitious and important attempt to modernise the 40-year old foreign investment rules. We consider the new legislation successfully builds on the system including a conditional approval regime that has been improved to reflect best regulatory practices and support ongoing investment.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"232-243"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48668420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-25DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006457
Michael Gestrin
This paper empirically examines the proposition that SOE and POE cross-border investments are different. It does so by comparing all M&A by SOEs and POEs (with a value greater than USD 5 million) undertaken between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 2013. This amounts to more than 200,000 deals collectively valued at USD 50 trillion. The main objective is to identify differences in the ways that privately-owned and state-owned enterprises expand into international markets using M&A, a primary vehicle for international direct investment.
{"title":"A comparative study of cross-border mergers and acquisitions by privately- and state-owned enterprises","authors":"Michael Gestrin","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006457","url":null,"abstract":"This paper empirically examines the proposition that SOE and POE cross-border investments are different. It does so by comparing all M&A by SOEs and POEs (with a value greater than USD 5 million) undertaken between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 2013. This amounts to more than 200,000 deals collectively valued at USD 50 trillion. The main objective is to identify differences in the ways that privately-owned and state-owned enterprises expand into international markets using M&A, a primary vehicle for international direct investment.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"139-152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45901137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-25DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.086051
Christopher J Pokarier
Why did Australia, historically open to overseas capital, turn to restrictive policy in the early 1970s, only to significantly liberalise again from the mid-1980s? Furthermore, why has the regulatory apparatus of Australia's Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), established in the illiberal mid-1970s, been little changed over the last four decades, despite a return to relative openness? The paper finds that the initial illiberal turn arose from the changing sectoral and country-of-origin mix of foreign investment, a less liberal domestic and international ideational climate FDI, and from oppositional policy entrepreneurship. Liberalisation followed growing external imbalances, elite neo-liberal ideational change and transformative public leadership. The FIRB mechanism placated populist economic nationalist sentiment while allowing liberal policy in general, yet also tailored to the public and private interest logics of specific investment proposals. Remaining sectoral restrictions reflect both private interest influences and sector-specific public interest sensitivities.
{"title":"Australia's foreign investment policy: an historical perspective","authors":"Christopher J Pokarier","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.086051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.086051","url":null,"abstract":"Why did Australia, historically open to overseas capital, turn to restrictive policy in the early 1970s, only to significantly liberalise again from the mid-1980s? Furthermore, why has the regulatory apparatus of Australia's Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), established in the illiberal mid-1970s, been little changed over the last four decades, despite a return to relative openness? The paper finds that the initial illiberal turn arose from the changing sectoral and country-of-origin mix of foreign investment, a less liberal domestic and international ideational climate FDI, and from oppositional policy entrepreneurship. Liberalisation followed growing external imbalances, elite neo-liberal ideational change and transformative public leadership. The FIRB mechanism placated populist economic nationalist sentiment while allowing liberal policy in general, yet also tailored to the public and private interest logics of specific investment proposals. Remaining sectoral restrictions reflect both private interest influences and sector-specific public interest sensitivities.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"212-231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1504/IJPP.2017.086051","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48046373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-25DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006449
S. Armstrong, Sam Reinhardt, Tom Westland
Until 2005, Australia's foreign investment regime treated all investment sources on a non-discriminatory basis but since then some important preferential exemptions to screening have been introduced. Bilateral deals with the USA and New Zealand more than quadrupled the threshold to A$1.078 billion for investments that must be screened by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB). This represents a major liberalisation towards investment from those countries, given that a vast majority of investment is below the A$1 billion threshold. Some new rules regarding investment have also been introduced in those bilateral agreements which only apply to the signatories of those deals. The piecemeal changes to the foreign investment regime through bilateral trade and economic agreements have occurred without a clear strategy set forth and further piecemeal changes threaten to impact the operation and function of the regime with implications for confidence in Australia maintaining an open investment environment.
{"title":"Are Free Trade Agreements Making Swiss Cheese of Australia's Foreign Investment Regime?","authors":"S. Armstrong, Sam Reinhardt, Tom Westland","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006449","url":null,"abstract":"Until 2005, Australia's foreign investment regime treated all investment sources on a non-discriminatory basis but since then some important preferential exemptions to screening have been introduced. Bilateral deals with the USA and New Zealand more than quadrupled the threshold to A$1.078 billion for investments that must be screened by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB). This represents a major liberalisation towards investment from those countries, given that a vast majority of investment is below the A$1 billion threshold. Some new rules regarding investment have also been introduced in those bilateral agreements which only apply to the signatories of those deals. The piecemeal changes to the foreign investment regime through bilateral trade and economic agreements have occurred without a clear strategy set forth and further piecemeal changes threaten to impact the operation and function of the regime with implications for confidence in Australia maintaining an open investment environment.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"290-303"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42546479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-25DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006456
R. Mendelsohn, A. Fels
Australia's foreign investment regime arguably has four primary objectives. Its purpose is to: facilitate the flow of inbound foreign investment; screen investment for its potential to damage the Australian national interest; reassure the Australian people that foreign investment is consistent with the national interest; educate foreign investors about Australian laws, regulations, and community standards. This paper uses a strategic framework developed by Moore (1995) at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government to assess whether Australia's foreign investment regime is delivering on its four main objectives. We ask if the regime could offer greater public value to the Australian people were changes to be made to its structure and operation. We conclude that the foreign investment regime is very far from dysfunctional. We argue, however, that more public value may accrue from bringing the regime into line with accepted principles of good governance. We also propose that additional value may be generated by creating a specialist body to educate foreign investors and provide them with ongoing assistance in adjusting to the Australian environment. We suggest that these responsibilities could, in the alternative, be readily assigned to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade consistent with its existing mandate.
{"title":"A strategic analysis of the Australian foreign investment regime and the prospect of reform","authors":"R. Mendelsohn, A. Fels","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006456","url":null,"abstract":"Australia's foreign investment regime arguably has four primary objectives. Its purpose is to: facilitate the flow of inbound foreign investment; screen investment for its potential to damage the Australian national interest; reassure the Australian people that foreign investment is consistent with the national interest; educate foreign investors about Australian laws, regulations, and community standards. This paper uses a strategic framework developed by Moore (1995) at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government to assess whether Australia's foreign investment regime is delivering on its four main objectives. We ask if the regime could offer greater public value to the Australian people were changes to be made to its structure and operation. We conclude that the foreign investment regime is very far from dysfunctional. We argue, however, that more public value may accrue from bringing the regime into line with accepted principles of good governance. We also propose that additional value may be generated by creating a specialist body to educate foreign investors and provide them with ongoing assistance in adjusting to the Australian environment. We suggest that these responsibilities could, in the alternative, be readily assigned to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade consistent with its existing mandate.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"244-276"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42155097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001689
A. Anttiroiko
This article discusses three success stories of good governance, those in Finland, New Zealand and Singapore, and their ability to serve as benchmarks or models for developing countries seeking to eradicate corruption. The analysis shows that Finland and New Zealand are evolutionary cases with low-profile anti-corruption policies, whereas Singapore is a revolutionary case with an array of institutionalised anti-corruption measures providing a fast track to good governance. At first glance the latter case may appear appealing to developing countries, but in the current economic situation the case of Singapore is difficult to replicate as diminishing growth prospects undermine the viability of this option. In this sense the balance naturally leans towards the evolutionary 'social change' model, which is a cost-effective though slow path towards good governance. Whatever the preferred development path, it is vital that developing countries emulate and adapt success stories on their own terms. This ensures a sufficient degree of ownership and justification for the context-sensitive adjustment, dissemination and implementation of new ideas for controlling corruption.
{"title":"Emulating models of good governance: learning from the developments of the world's least corrupt countries","authors":"A. Anttiroiko","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001689","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses three success stories of good governance, those in Finland, New Zealand and Singapore, and their ability to serve as benchmarks or models for developing countries seeking to eradicate corruption. The analysis shows that Finland and New Zealand are evolutionary cases with low-profile anti-corruption policies, whereas Singapore is a revolutionary case with an array of institutionalised anti-corruption measures providing a fast track to good governance. At first glance the latter case may appear appealing to developing countries, but in the current economic situation the case of Singapore is difficult to replicate as diminishing growth prospects undermine the viability of this option. In this sense the balance naturally leans towards the evolutionary 'social change' model, which is a cost-effective though slow path towards good governance. Whatever the preferred development path, it is vital that developing countries emulate and adapt success stories on their own terms. This ensures a sufficient degree of ownership and justification for the context-sensitive adjustment, dissemination and implementation of new ideas for controlling corruption.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"21-35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66662226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001691
Juhana Hukkinen, M. Virén
This paper deals with the debt-growth relationship using several time-series tools. The idea is to find out whether the inverse relationship between these variables can be detected without imposing any functional forms on the estimating relationship and whether the relationship does indeed reflect some nonlinear features. Thus recursive correlations with different orderings of the time-series are computed using the Reinhart and Rogoff panel data. After that, recursive correlations are re-estimated with data that are cyclically adjusted to reflect the structural features of the two variables. The nature of the relationship is also scrutinised using several variable-parameter estimation techniques (Kalman filter, logistic functional form and recursive estimation). Finally, some causality analyses are carried out using various transformations of the data up to the point of cross-sections of data. The analysis shows that the inverse relationship between growth and debt is indeed quite robust and tends to support the 'toxic debt' hypothesis rather than the cyclical debt accumulation hypothesis. Yet the causality issue remains largely unresolved.
{"title":"How toxic is public debt","authors":"Juhana Hukkinen, M. Virén","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001691","url":null,"abstract":"This paper deals with the debt-growth relationship using several time-series tools. The idea is to find out whether the inverse relationship between these variables can be detected without imposing any functional forms on the estimating relationship and whether the relationship does indeed reflect some nonlinear features. Thus recursive correlations with different orderings of the time-series are computed using the Reinhart and Rogoff panel data. After that, recursive correlations are re-estimated with data that are cyclically adjusted to reflect the structural features of the two variables. The nature of the relationship is also scrutinised using several variable-parameter estimation techniques (Kalman filter, logistic functional form and recursive estimation). Finally, some causality analyses are carried out using various transformations of the data up to the point of cross-sections of data. The analysis shows that the inverse relationship between growth and debt is indeed quite robust and tends to support the 'toxic debt' hypothesis rather than the cyclical debt accumulation hypothesis. Yet the causality issue remains largely unresolved.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"53-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66662236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-01DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001700
Subhash Kumar
Global climate change, energy consumption patterns and economic growth are major issues nowadays for the developing world like India. Owing to global threat of climate change, the Indian economy experiences big challenges to maintain its high growth rate if switched to the clean energy generation for environmental sustainability. In this situation, there is urgent need to formulate solid policy and account for the cost of CO2 mitigation, i.e., effect on GDP. This paper addresses these situations by using MARKAL-MACRO energy model to develop different scenarios up to the year 2045. The result show that the carbon intensity per GDP decreases 2.5% annually during the period 2005 to 2045. The marginal abatement costs vary between 14-245 US$/tC and GDP decreases from 0.12% to 2.4% for the reduction rate between 5% to 50% compared to reference case. Since economic growth remains the priority, it would be more realistic for India to make continuous efforts to reduce carbon emissions by implementing sustainable energy technologies gradually and playing an active role in the international carbon mitigation cooperation mechanism.
{"title":"A MARKAL-MACRO modelling approach to estimate carbon mitigation cost in India","authors":"Subhash Kumar","doi":"10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10001700","url":null,"abstract":"Global climate change, energy consumption patterns and economic growth are major issues nowadays for the developing world like India. Owing to global threat of climate change, the Indian economy experiences big challenges to maintain its high growth rate if switched to the clean energy generation for environmental sustainability. In this situation, there is urgent need to formulate solid policy and account for the cost of CO2 mitigation, i.e., effect on GDP. This paper addresses these situations by using MARKAL-MACRO energy model to develop different scenarios up to the year 2045. The result show that the carbon intensity per GDP decreases 2.5% annually during the period 2005 to 2045. The marginal abatement costs vary between 14-245 US$/tC and GDP decreases from 0.12% to 2.4% for the reduction rate between 5% to 50% compared to reference case. Since economic growth remains the priority, it would be more realistic for India to make continuous efforts to reduce carbon emissions by implementing sustainable energy technologies gradually and playing an active role in the international carbon mitigation cooperation mechanism.","PeriodicalId":35027,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"86-101"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66662591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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