Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1795600
David D. Palkki, Lawrence C. Rubin
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurdish civilians in 1987 and 1988 is among the most morally troubling events in the latter half of the twentieth century. Most of the questions surrounding the attack, including why, when, and how, have been addressed in path-breaking research by Joost Hiltermann and other researchers from Human Rights Watch. However, even as more records and internal documents from the period have come to light, one question remains unresolved: Did Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s leader, directly order the gassing of Iraqi Kurds? This study reassesses the Halabja attack of 1988—in particular, Saddam’s thinking and behavior relating to the attack—in light of the post-2003 evidence. It synthesizes insights from the Iraqi records at the Conflict Records Research Center and Stanford University; debriefings of Iraqi principals, which the authors obtained in response to Mandatory Declassification Review requests; recent memoirs of Iraqi and US officials; and other previously unexplored sources. Although these records provide no direct proof that Saddam Hussein issued an explicit order to gas Halabja, it is clear he created a command environment in which the indiscriminate gassing of Iraqi Kurds was considered permissible and even desirable.
{"title":"Saddam Hussein’s role in the gassing of Halabja","authors":"David D. Palkki, Lawrence C. Rubin","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1795600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1795600","url":null,"abstract":"Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurdish civilians in 1987 and 1988 is among the most morally troubling events in the latter half of the twentieth century. Most of the questions surrounding the attack, including why, when, and how, have been addressed in path-breaking research by Joost Hiltermann and other researchers from Human Rights Watch. However, even as more records and internal documents from the period have come to light, one question remains unresolved: Did Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s leader, directly order the gassing of Iraqi Kurds? This study reassesses the Halabja attack of 1988—in particular, Saddam’s thinking and behavior relating to the attack—in light of the post-2003 evidence. It synthesizes insights from the Iraqi records at the Conflict Records Research Center and Stanford University; debriefings of Iraqi principals, which the authors obtained in response to Mandatory Declassification Review requests; recent memoirs of Iraqi and US officials; and other previously unexplored sources. Although these records provide no direct proof that Saddam Hussein issued an explicit order to gas Halabja, it is clear he created a command environment in which the indiscriminate gassing of Iraqi Kurds was considered permissible and even desirable.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1795600","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48976810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2021.1978156
M. Onderco, Michal Smetana, Sico van der Meer, Tom Etienne
ABSTRACT Even if most European countries have not yet joined the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the treaty has been salient in a number of national settings. In the Netherlands, the TPNW enjoys broad societal appeal, and the Dutch parliament has, on a number of occasions, called on the government to explore options for joining the treaty. In this piece, we empirically study Dutch attitudes toward joining the TPNW. Our findings indicate that a majority of the Dutch would prefer to accede to the TPNW only if nuclear-weapon states or other NATO allies also joined, although unilateral accession received relatively strong support among the youngest respondents, women, and voters supporting the left-wing parties. The most popular option is to join the TPNW at the same time that the nuclear-weapon states do, which seems to be a rather distant prospect in the current international-security environment.
{"title":"When do the Dutch want to join the nuclear ban treaty? Findings of a public opinion survey in the Netherlands","authors":"M. Onderco, Michal Smetana, Sico van der Meer, Tom Etienne","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2021.1978156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.1978156","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Even if most European countries have not yet joined the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the treaty has been salient in a number of national settings. In the Netherlands, the TPNW enjoys broad societal appeal, and the Dutch parliament has, on a number of occasions, called on the government to explore options for joining the treaty. In this piece, we empirically study Dutch attitudes toward joining the TPNW. Our findings indicate that a majority of the Dutch would prefer to accede to the TPNW only if nuclear-weapon states or other NATO allies also joined, although unilateral accession received relatively strong support among the youngest respondents, women, and voters supporting the left-wing parties. The most popular option is to join the TPNW at the same time that the nuclear-weapon states do, which seems to be a rather distant prospect in the current international-security environment.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45464043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-12DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1799569
D. Blagden
What are the potential deterrence advantages for new states seeking to acquire long-range conventional precision strike (LRCPS)? Using the case of Poland, this article argues that such LRCPS proliferation offers two possible deterrent benefits. First, LRCPS strengthens its possessors’ ability to threaten aggressors with costs in the form of both counterforce denial and countervalue punishment, thereby reducing dependence on great-power allies’ extended-deterrence commitments. Second, it provides a new center of retaliatory decision proximate to the threat, thereby strengthening the credibility of great-power allies’ extended-deterrence commitments. However, while LRCPS capabilities may indeed bring certain advantages, they may also exacerbate political hostilities, incentivize escalation, and lack the survivability and penetrability needed to generate the envisioned deterrence effects. Thus, the overall consequences of such proliferation for strategic stability and associated international security are ambiguous, meriting a case-by-case analysis. If LRCPS is pursued nonetheless, meanwhile, then a countervailing combination of operational and strategic measures may be employed to reduce both first-strike temptations and adversaries’ broader fears.
{"title":"Strategic stability and the proliferation of conventional precision strike: a (bounded) case for optimism?","authors":"D. Blagden","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1799569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1799569","url":null,"abstract":"What are the potential deterrence advantages for new states seeking to acquire long-range conventional precision strike (LRCPS)? Using the case of Poland, this article argues that such LRCPS proliferation offers two possible deterrent benefits. First, LRCPS strengthens its possessors’ ability to threaten aggressors with costs in the form of both counterforce denial and countervalue punishment, thereby reducing dependence on great-power allies’ extended-deterrence commitments. Second, it provides a new center of retaliatory decision proximate to the threat, thereby strengthening the credibility of great-power allies’ extended-deterrence commitments. However, while LRCPS capabilities may indeed bring certain advantages, they may also exacerbate political hostilities, incentivize escalation, and lack the survivability and penetrability needed to generate the envisioned deterrence effects. Thus, the overall consequences of such proliferation for strategic stability and associated international security are ambiguous, meriting a case-by-case analysis. If LRCPS is pursued nonetheless, meanwhile, then a countervailing combination of operational and strategic measures may be employed to reduce both first-strike temptations and adversaries’ broader fears.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1799569","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42594209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-14DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1795368
Tong Zhao
Conventional long-range strike weapons of US allies may exacerbate Chinese concerns about the survivability of its small nuclear arsenal against a precision pre-emptive strike from the US-led coali...
{"title":"Conventional long-range strike weapons of US allies and China’s concerns of strategic instability","authors":"Tong Zhao","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1795368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1795368","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional long-range strike weapons of US allies may exacerbate Chinese concerns about the survivability of its small nuclear arsenal against a precision pre-emptive strike from the US-led coali...","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1795368","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42570979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1827840
K. Bowman, J. Husbands
ABSTRACT Major efforts to engage scientists in issues of biosecurity in the United States and internationally began in the early 2000s in response to growing concerns about terrorists using weapons of mass destruction and the mailing of anthrax-laced letters in October 2001. This article draws on the literature about the “science of science communication,” including research on framing, to examine the strategies used to try to raise awareness and create support for policies and practices to address public concerns about biosecurity issues within scientific communities. Engagement strategies framed as an inherent part of the broader social responsibilities of the scientific community have shown the promise of being more effective than those framed in terms of legal and regulatory requirements and an emphasis on security alone. The article draws on the case of the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP), the global network of academies of science and medicine, and its relationship with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), with additional examples from other national and international scientific organizations.
{"title":"Engaging scientists in biosecurity: lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention","authors":"K. Bowman, J. Husbands","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1827840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1827840","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Major efforts to engage scientists in issues of biosecurity in the United States and internationally began in the early 2000s in response to growing concerns about terrorists using weapons of mass destruction and the mailing of anthrax-laced letters in October 2001. This article draws on the literature about the “science of science communication,” including research on framing, to examine the strategies used to try to raise awareness and create support for policies and practices to address public concerns about biosecurity issues within scientific communities. Engagement strategies framed as an inherent part of the broader social responsibilities of the scientific community have shown the promise of being more effective than those framed in terms of legal and regulatory requirements and an emphasis on security alone. The article draws on the case of the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP), the global network of academies of science and medicine, and its relationship with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), with additional examples from other national and international scientific organizations.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1827840","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43406632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1823621
R. J. Beedham, Carwyn Davies
ABSTRACT Between 1940 and the late 1950s, the United Kingdom had a limited biological program to provide a retaliatory capability should UK forces be attacked using biological warfare (BW). Aspects of BW defense have been investigated from 1940 up to the present day. Techniques, processes, and equipment used within biological research programs are recognized to have dual-use applications; aerobiology is one such dual-use area. Research during these offensive and defensive eras of the UK BW research program has contributed to aerobiological science, leading to a number of positive changes in some areas, including laboratory safety; understanding of infection by the aerosol route; and survival, detection, and identification of airborne pathogens. This article will discuss the historical contributions made to aerobiology science, the global contemporary legislation that governs dual-use research, and a modern case study based upon this type of investigation. The article will contribute to our understanding of the dual-use aspects of a BW program.
{"title":"The UK biological-warfare program: dual-use contributions to the field of aerobiology","authors":"R. J. Beedham, Carwyn Davies","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1823621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1823621","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Between 1940 and the late 1950s, the United Kingdom had a limited biological program to provide a retaliatory capability should UK forces be attacked using biological warfare (BW). Aspects of BW defense have been investigated from 1940 up to the present day. Techniques, processes, and equipment used within biological research programs are recognized to have dual-use applications; aerobiology is one such dual-use area. Research during these offensive and defensive eras of the UK BW research program has contributed to aerobiological science, leading to a number of positive changes in some areas, including laboratory safety; understanding of infection by the aerosol route; and survival, detection, and identification of airborne pathogens. This article will discuss the historical contributions made to aerobiology science, the global contemporary legislation that governs dual-use research, and a modern case study based upon this type of investigation. The article will contribute to our understanding of the dual-use aspects of a BW program.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1823621","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43659398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2021.1964755
M. Leitenberg
ABSTRACT From 1949 until 1988, the Soviet Union conducted a nearly continuous campaign of false allegations of biological-weapon (BW) use by the United States. In 1995, senior Russian military officials revived this pattern of false allegations, which continues to the present day. Russian officials amplified the campaign after the US government funded the transformation of former Soviet BW facilities in the Commonwealth of Independent States under the Nunn–Lugar program. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in China in January 2020 prompted a very greatly expanded Russian-government BW-related disinformation effort. This paper aims to present a reasonably comprehensive account of these activities and to assess their significance. The Russian government under President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated open disdain for both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
{"title":"False allegations of biological-weapons use from Putin’s Russia","authors":"M. Leitenberg","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2021.1964755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.1964755","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT From 1949 until 1988, the Soviet Union conducted a nearly continuous campaign of false allegations of biological-weapon (BW) use by the United States. In 1995, senior Russian military officials revived this pattern of false allegations, which continues to the present day. Russian officials amplified the campaign after the US government funded the transformation of former Soviet BW facilities in the Commonwealth of Independent States under the Nunn–Lugar program. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in China in January 2020 prompted a very greatly expanded Russian-government BW-related disinformation effort. This paper aims to present a reasonably comprehensive account of these activities and to assess their significance. The Russian government under President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated open disdain for both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43677378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1889105
K. Vogel
I first met Ray Zilinskas in 1998, when I was fresh out of graduate school, a young and impressionable postdoc in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, as it was then known. When we were first introduced, I was a bit intimidated, as he was a well-known former bioweapons weapons inspector in Iraq, but Ray was always gracious and kind. He had a heart for students and young scholars, always welcoming newcomers into the “Monterey Mafia.” Ray also had an adventurous spirit—whether as an UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspector or visiting former Soviet bioweapons facilities and interviewing former bioweaponeers, Ray always liked being in the middle of the action on bioweapons policy issues. He held many important policyrelated posts during his career, working at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment and the UN Industrial Development Organization, and also serving as a consultant to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Department of State on matters pertaining to biological and toxin arms control, nonproliferation, and bioterrorism. Ray joined the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in 1998, and subsequently became the director of its Chemical and Biological Weapons Program. In addition to his many publications and policy engagements, Ray also took a turn in Hollywood, serving as an advisor to the FX television show The Americans, helping the writers to draft plotlines involving dangerous biological agents. I followed all of Ray’s work, particularly his writings on the Soviet biological weapons (BW) program, including the hefty tome The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History, co-authored with Milton Leitenberg and Jens Kuhn. Ray and I both attended an international conference at the former bioweapons facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan in 1999, when the facility was first opened to the public. I remember Ray mentioning that part of his interest in the Soviet BW program related to his own personal history; his parents were Lithuanians who had gone into exile after the Soviets invaded the country in 1940. Zilinskas was born in Estonia, raised in Sweden, and then immigrated to the United States as a teenager (never quite losing his Swedish accent). Ray worked as a clinical microbiologist for several years before going on to the University of Southern California to obtain his Ph.D. in international relations. His dissertation focused on security policy issues raised by genetic engineering. From the start, his work was engaged with the security and ethical issues raised by advances in the life sciences.
{"title":"Introduction to the special issue in honor of Raymond A. Zilinskas","authors":"K. Vogel","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1889105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1889105","url":null,"abstract":"I first met Ray Zilinskas in 1998, when I was fresh out of graduate school, a young and impressionable postdoc in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, as it was then known. When we were first introduced, I was a bit intimidated, as he was a well-known former bioweapons weapons inspector in Iraq, but Ray was always gracious and kind. He had a heart for students and young scholars, always welcoming newcomers into the “Monterey Mafia.” Ray also had an adventurous spirit—whether as an UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspector or visiting former Soviet bioweapons facilities and interviewing former bioweaponeers, Ray always liked being in the middle of the action on bioweapons policy issues. He held many important policyrelated posts during his career, working at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment and the UN Industrial Development Organization, and also serving as a consultant to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Department of State on matters pertaining to biological and toxin arms control, nonproliferation, and bioterrorism. Ray joined the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in 1998, and subsequently became the director of its Chemical and Biological Weapons Program. In addition to his many publications and policy engagements, Ray also took a turn in Hollywood, serving as an advisor to the FX television show The Americans, helping the writers to draft plotlines involving dangerous biological agents. I followed all of Ray’s work, particularly his writings on the Soviet biological weapons (BW) program, including the hefty tome The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History, co-authored with Milton Leitenberg and Jens Kuhn. Ray and I both attended an international conference at the former bioweapons facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan in 1999, when the facility was first opened to the public. I remember Ray mentioning that part of his interest in the Soviet BW program related to his own personal history; his parents were Lithuanians who had gone into exile after the Soviets invaded the country in 1940. Zilinskas was born in Estonia, raised in Sweden, and then immigrated to the United States as a teenager (never quite losing his Swedish accent). Ray worked as a clinical microbiologist for several years before going on to the University of Southern California to obtain his Ph.D. in international relations. His dissertation focused on security policy issues raised by genetic engineering. From the start, his work was engaged with the security and ethical issues raised by advances in the life sciences.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43957270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1819690
Kavita M. Berger, Rocco J. Casagrande
ABSTRACT This article explores emerging science and technology advances relevant to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and existing and needed frameworks for their identification, risk assessment, and evaluation of benefit. Threats from biological weapons continue to be a major concern as state and non-state actors have developed, used, or expressed interest in these types of weapons. International nonproliferation instruments and related efforts in health security, specifically the 2005 International Health Regulations and the 2014 Global Health Security Agenda, recognize deliberate biological incidents as one of three threats to address (the others being natural and accidental biological events). To date, these instruments and their subsequent regional and national-level implementation efforts focus primarily on pathogens and toxins as biological threat agents. Unlike the other instruments, the BWC focuses on preventing the diversion of peaceful and prophylactic uses of biology to the development, production, stockpiling, or dissemination and delivery of biological weapons. Accordingly, the BWC recognizes the importance of scientific and technological advances in enabling different actors to develop or disseminate biological agents, altering the risk profile of deliberate biological threats. To identify and discuss advances that may affect implementation of the BWC, the US National Academy of Sciences and the BWC Implementation Support Unit conducted or sponsored several activities to explore science and technologies that may be most relevant to the BWC. However, the biotechnology landscape continues to change drastically, expanding the focus of security risks beyond pathogens and toxins to include other biological data and materials, such as synthetic organisms. Factors promoting the development of biotechnology capabilities include new funders and funding models, practitioners from other disciplines leveraging the tools of biology, new nations investing in the biological sciences, and research leveraging advances in engineering, computer, data, materials, physical, and chemical sciences. These advances may reveal new capabilities that significantly alter biological nonproliferation efforts, including both new security threats and benefits to society.
{"title":"Twentieth-century nonproliferation meets twenty-first-century biotechnology","authors":"Kavita M. Berger, Rocco J. Casagrande","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1819690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1819690","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores emerging science and technology advances relevant to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and existing and needed frameworks for their identification, risk assessment, and evaluation of benefit. Threats from biological weapons continue to be a major concern as state and non-state actors have developed, used, or expressed interest in these types of weapons. International nonproliferation instruments and related efforts in health security, specifically the 2005 International Health Regulations and the 2014 Global Health Security Agenda, recognize deliberate biological incidents as one of three threats to address (the others being natural and accidental biological events). To date, these instruments and their subsequent regional and national-level implementation efforts focus primarily on pathogens and toxins as biological threat agents. Unlike the other instruments, the BWC focuses on preventing the diversion of peaceful and prophylactic uses of biology to the development, production, stockpiling, or dissemination and delivery of biological weapons. Accordingly, the BWC recognizes the importance of scientific and technological advances in enabling different actors to develop or disseminate biological agents, altering the risk profile of deliberate biological threats. To identify and discuss advances that may affect implementation of the BWC, the US National Academy of Sciences and the BWC Implementation Support Unit conducted or sponsored several activities to explore science and technologies that may be most relevant to the BWC. However, the biotechnology landscape continues to change drastically, expanding the focus of security risks beyond pathogens and toxins to include other biological data and materials, such as synthetic organisms. Factors promoting the development of biotechnology capabilities include new funders and funding models, practitioners from other disciplines leveraging the tools of biology, new nations investing in the biological sciences, and research leveraging advances in engineering, computer, data, materials, physical, and chemical sciences. These advances may reveal new capabilities that significantly alter biological nonproliferation efforts, including both new security threats and benefits to society.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1819690","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48332735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1866321
R. Petersen
ABSTRACT During World War II, the Polish resistance movement used chemical and biological weapons (CBW) against the Third Reich. The use of CBW against the Third Reich most likely originated in a secret Polish biological-weapons program, which existed in the 1930s and went underground after the September 1939 German invasion. Between 1940 and 1942, a unit of the Polish resistance movement named WKZO (Wielkopolskie Kierownictwo Związku Odwetu—the Greater Poland Leadership of the Union of Retaliation) conducted CBW sabotage in the German-annexed area Reichsgau Wartheland and its main city Posen (today’s Poznań). By investigating the use of CBW by the WKZO until its destruction in 1942, it is possible to demonstrate how these weapons were made and used. The article also describes the German reaction, including what defensive measures the German high command took to meet the threat of CBW.
{"title":"The covert battlefield: Doctor Witaszek, the WKZO, and the Polish use of biological and chemical warfare against the Third Reich","authors":"R. Petersen","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1866321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1866321","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT During World War II, the Polish resistance movement used chemical and biological weapons (CBW) against the Third Reich. The use of CBW against the Third Reich most likely originated in a secret Polish biological-weapons program, which existed in the 1930s and went underground after the September 1939 German invasion. Between 1940 and 1942, a unit of the Polish resistance movement named WKZO (Wielkopolskie Kierownictwo Związku Odwetu—the Greater Poland Leadership of the Union of Retaliation) conducted CBW sabotage in the German-annexed area Reichsgau Wartheland and its main city Posen (today’s Poznań). By investigating the use of CBW by the WKZO until its destruction in 1942, it is possible to demonstrate how these weapons were made and used. The article also describes the German reaction, including what defensive measures the German high command took to meet the threat of CBW.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1866321","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48355580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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