Pub Date : 2022-05-30DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2064516
R. Gibbons, Todd Robinson
In 1991, international inspectors discovered Iraq’s clandestine nuclear-weapons program. In seeking this capability, Iraq was violating its commitment to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. After this discovery, the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency worked to improve nuclear safeguards so that secret nuclear-weapons activities would be more easily detected in the future. One of these improvements was the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. This article explores the value of the Additional Protocol and argues that it is the strongest signal available to states that they support the nuclear nonproliferation regime and have benign nuclear intentions. The article then assesses the reasons why several notable holdout states remain.
{"title":"Twenty-five years safer? Assessing the IAEA’s Model Additional Protocol and its role in international politics","authors":"R. Gibbons, Todd Robinson","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2064516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2064516","url":null,"abstract":"In 1991, international inspectors discovered Iraq’s clandestine nuclear-weapons program. In seeking this capability, Iraq was violating its commitment to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. After this discovery, the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency worked to improve nuclear safeguards so that secret nuclear-weapons activities would be more easily detected in the future. One of these improvements was the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. This article explores the value of the Additional Protocol and argues that it is the strongest signal available to states that they support the nuclear nonproliferation regime and have benign nuclear intentions. The article then assesses the reasons why several notable holdout states remain.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"297 - 318"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41324005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2043598
Daniel Salisbury
In October 2020, a parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers Party showcased a range of new weapons systems, including a new large intercontinental ballistic missile. The same weekend saw the release of a fascinating documentary film directed by provocative Danish filmmaker Mads Brügger, entitled The Mole: Undercover in North Korea. The film consists of footage—much of it filmed undercover—that was shot over a period of 10 years. It tells the story of a retired Danish chef’s infiltration of the Korean Friendship Association (KFA), an international organization that seeks to promote the ideology, history, and culture of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and defend the country from its critics. The story culminates in the exploration of plans for a series of sanctions-busting deals: constructing an underground arms factory on a Ugandan island, shipping oil to North Korea, and supplying arms to unspecified customers of Pyongyang through a private arms dealer. This review essay seeks to contextualize the film’s contents, consider the insights it offers into North Korea’s arms dealing, and examine a number of questions that arise.
{"title":"Of moles and missiles: anatomy of a North Korean arms deal?","authors":"Daniel Salisbury","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2043598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2043598","url":null,"abstract":"In October 2020, a parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers Party showcased a range of new weapons systems, including a new large intercontinental ballistic missile. The same weekend saw the release of a fascinating documentary film directed by provocative Danish filmmaker Mads Brügger, entitled The Mole: Undercover in North Korea. The film consists of footage—much of it filmed undercover—that was shot over a period of 10 years. It tells the story of a retired Danish chef’s infiltration of the Korean Friendship Association (KFA), an international organization that seeks to promote the ideology, history, and culture of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and defend the country from its critics. The story culminates in the exploration of plans for a series of sanctions-busting deals: constructing an underground arms factory on a Ugandan island, shipping oil to North Korea, and supplying arms to unspecified customers of Pyongyang through a private arms dealer. This review essay seeks to contextualize the film’s contents, consider the insights it offers into North Korea’s arms dealing, and examine a number of questions that arise.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"199 - 211"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48799318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2093512
J. Hymans
more possible for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Here as elsewhere, nationalist-populist rhetoric may be the effect of policies that are caused by more important causal factors: nationalist populism may be more effect than cause. Regarding President Donald Trump contradicting the 2019 US Missile Defense Review (pp. 14–15, 19), one can argue that such unpredictability can under some conditions rationally serve US interests. Regarding Defense Secretary James Mattis and General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inserting themselves into the nuclear-weapons chain of command to prevent the worst excesses of President Trump (p. 15), can we confidently say that these excesses resided in Trump’s nationalist populism and not a range of other biases and idiosyncrasies? The finding that (nationalist?) populists are more likely to communicate via Twitter is fascinating, although whether this makes their threats and assurances more or less credible (and dangerous) is an open question. The claim that nationalist populists are more likely to damage institutions underpinning global order is also important. President Trump walking away from the Iranian nuclear deal in 2018 is cited as an example—as is President Putin’s annexation of Crimea and President Trump’s approach to NATO (pp. 17–18)—but here again, it is not clear that it is Trump’s nationalist populism doing the work. It would be interesting to see an analysis of all such policies over a longer period of time and the role of nationalist-populist leaders in causing them. Erdogan’s reliance on personal diplomacy to acquire a Russian missile-defense system (p. 19) is one case among many in which leaders prefer to meet, exchange information, and get to know other leaders personally, and the role of nationalist populism here needs to be further explored. Ultimately, Meier and Vieluf call for “more empirical data” and “specifics of nationalist populists’ policies in a more comprehensive and systematic manner” (p. 22). I hope that the comments in this response might serve as a starting point for that effort and help Meier and Vieluf and others continue this important and promising research.
{"title":"Jacques E. C. Hymans, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Southern California","authors":"J. Hymans","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2093512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2093512","url":null,"abstract":"more possible for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Here as elsewhere, nationalist-populist rhetoric may be the effect of policies that are caused by more important causal factors: nationalist populism may be more effect than cause. Regarding President Donald Trump contradicting the 2019 US Missile Defense Review (pp. 14–15, 19), one can argue that such unpredictability can under some conditions rationally serve US interests. Regarding Defense Secretary James Mattis and General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inserting themselves into the nuclear-weapons chain of command to prevent the worst excesses of President Trump (p. 15), can we confidently say that these excesses resided in Trump’s nationalist populism and not a range of other biases and idiosyncrasies? The finding that (nationalist?) populists are more likely to communicate via Twitter is fascinating, although whether this makes their threats and assurances more or less credible (and dangerous) is an open question. The claim that nationalist populists are more likely to damage institutions underpinning global order is also important. President Trump walking away from the Iranian nuclear deal in 2018 is cited as an example—as is President Putin’s annexation of Crimea and President Trump’s approach to NATO (pp. 17–18)—but here again, it is not clear that it is Trump’s nationalist populism doing the work. It would be interesting to see an analysis of all such policies over a longer period of time and the role of nationalist-populist leaders in causing them. Erdogan’s reliance on personal diplomacy to acquire a Russian missile-defense system (p. 19) is one case among many in which leaders prefer to meet, exchange information, and get to know other leaders personally, and the role of nationalist populism here needs to be further explored. Ultimately, Meier and Vieluf call for “more empirical data” and “specifics of nationalist populists’ policies in a more comprehensive and systematic manner” (p. 22). I hope that the comments in this response might serve as a starting point for that effort and help Meier and Vieluf and others continue this important and promising research.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"44 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42402875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2075642
G. A. Cross
On the surface, these three books by Anthony Rimmington promise a great deal; most any serious research into the murky world of the Soviet, and later Russian, biological-weapons (BW) programs deserves serious consideration. The Soviet BW program was not a focus of much scholarly attention until the early 1990s, with the defection of two prominent scientists from the Soviet Union’s BW enterprise (Biopreparat), Vladimir Pasechnik and Kanatzhan Alibekov (more commonly known as Ken Alibek), and the later publication of Soviet biological-weapons scientist Igor Domaradskij’s memoirs in 2003. Also of note is Soviet chemical-weapons scientist Lev Fedorov’s often-overlooked monograph on the subject, published in Moscow in 2005. Until Rimmington’s, the most recent scholarly work on this topic was Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas’s magisterial 2012 work on the program, Zilinskas’s 2016 paper for the National Defense University (NDU), and his 2018 book with Philippe Mauger.
{"title":"The long, cloudy history of Moscow’s BW program","authors":"G. A. Cross","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2075642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2075642","url":null,"abstract":"On the surface, these three books by Anthony Rimmington promise a great deal; most any serious research into the murky world of the Soviet, and later Russian, biological-weapons (BW) programs deserves serious consideration. The Soviet BW program was not a focus of much scholarly attention until the early 1990s, with the defection of two prominent scientists from the Soviet Union’s BW enterprise (Biopreparat), Vladimir Pasechnik and Kanatzhan Alibekov (more commonly known as Ken Alibek), and the later publication of Soviet biological-weapons scientist Igor Domaradskij’s memoirs in 2003. Also of note is Soviet chemical-weapons scientist Lev Fedorov’s often-overlooked monograph on the subject, published in Moscow in 2005. Until Rimmington’s, the most recent scholarly work on this topic was Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas’s magisterial 2012 work on the program, Zilinskas’s 2016 paper for the National Defense University (NDU), and his 2018 book with Philippe Mauger.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"227 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46732132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2021.1964752
E. Ifft
ABSTRACT Arms control has increasingly become threatened by compliance issues. Viewed individually, these issues might be expected and should not be cause for alarm. However, the list of agreements with unresolved issues has grown too long to ignore. The US State Department’s 2021 arms-control-compliance report calls attention to this problem. Recent casualties include the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. Although the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has been renewed, even the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is under stress because of the view, shared by many states, that there has been a failure to implement its key nuclear-disarmament obligation. Many are advocating a move to less formal arms-control arrangements that are politically but not legally binding. However, these bring their own set of compliance problems—in particular, lack of effective verification regimes and dispute-resolution mechanisms. The current approach to compliance issues is failing. These issues need more urgent, high-level attention if the world is to avoid this threat to international peace and security.
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Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1876976
Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley
Dennis Gormley passed away on October 15, 2020, and I still can’t find the words to capture the sense of loss that I’ve been feeling ever since. Dennis was my husband and my best friend. For the past 17 years we were, as he liked to say, “joined at the hip,” working, traveling, laughing, and enjoying life with friends and family, always together. His passing created a big void in my life, but the outpouring of letters from former students, friends, colleagues, and perfect strangers reminded me that my sadness was shared by many and that his life and work will have a lasting impact on the security field and on the lives of those who crossed his path. For many, Dennis is known as the world’s leading expert in cruise missile proliferation; sometimes he was introduced as the “king of cruise missiles.” His natural modesty made him wince at these grandiose titles but they were well deserved, and I particularly liked the second one, because if he was king, that made me queen of something. Dennis was indeed a forward thinker, often ahead of the curve as far as identifying security challenges. His bookMissile Contagion, published in 2008, elevated the threat of landattack cruise missiles to the level of collective consciousness, influencing how the United States and other countries think about this threat. His authority on cruise missiles was such that, at a conference overseas where he was invited as a speaker, a foreign government official asked him if he would authorize the sale of American cruise missiles to his country! In reflecting on why Missile Contagion has had such a profound impact on understanding the cruise missile threat and why so many researchers, including myself, continue to reread the book to remind themselves of specific details or technical information, I realized thatMissile Contagion was in fact a microcosm of Dennis’s extraordinary career. In this journal of nonproliferation record, I would like to highlight aspects of Dennis’s career that informed his approach to security challenges and gave him broad and deep knowledge that, as long-time friend and colleague at the University of Pittsburgh Phil Williams put it, allowed him to merge technology, politics, and strategy in a way few other people did. In reading Dennis’s writings, one cannot help noticing the elegance and clarity of his prose. Dennis was always fascinated by the written word, and he often said that he owed his longstanding interest in good writing to Sister Benedict, an 89-year-old nun in his Catholic school, who hammered into her pupils the importance of writing well and without errors, even during mathematics lessons. But the clarity of Dennis’s writing is also due to his extraordinary career that spanned more than 50 years as a practitioner
{"title":"Dennis M. Gormley: an extraordinary career, a kind and generous man","authors":"Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1876976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1876976","url":null,"abstract":"Dennis Gormley passed away on October 15, 2020, and I still can’t find the words to capture the sense of loss that I’ve been feeling ever since. Dennis was my husband and my best friend. For the past 17 years we were, as he liked to say, “joined at the hip,” working, traveling, laughing, and enjoying life with friends and family, always together. His passing created a big void in my life, but the outpouring of letters from former students, friends, colleagues, and perfect strangers reminded me that my sadness was shared by many and that his life and work will have a lasting impact on the security field and on the lives of those who crossed his path. For many, Dennis is known as the world’s leading expert in cruise missile proliferation; sometimes he was introduced as the “king of cruise missiles.” His natural modesty made him wince at these grandiose titles but they were well deserved, and I particularly liked the second one, because if he was king, that made me queen of something. Dennis was indeed a forward thinker, often ahead of the curve as far as identifying security challenges. His bookMissile Contagion, published in 2008, elevated the threat of landattack cruise missiles to the level of collective consciousness, influencing how the United States and other countries think about this threat. His authority on cruise missiles was such that, at a conference overseas where he was invited as a speaker, a foreign government official asked him if he would authorize the sale of American cruise missiles to his country! In reflecting on why Missile Contagion has had such a profound impact on understanding the cruise missile threat and why so many researchers, including myself, continue to reread the book to remind themselves of specific details or technical information, I realized thatMissile Contagion was in fact a microcosm of Dennis’s extraordinary career. In this journal of nonproliferation record, I would like to highlight aspects of Dennis’s career that informed his approach to security challenges and gave him broad and deep knowledge that, as long-time friend and colleague at the University of Pittsburgh Phil Williams put it, allowed him to merge technology, politics, and strategy in a way few other people did. In reading Dennis’s writings, one cannot help noticing the elegance and clarity of his prose. Dennis was always fascinated by the written word, and he often said that he owed his longstanding interest in good writing to Sister Benedict, an 89-year-old nun in his Catholic school, who hammered into her pupils the importance of writing well and without errors, even during mathematics lessons. But the clarity of Dennis’s writing is also due to his extraordinary career that spanned more than 50 years as a practitioner","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"261 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47855401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2021.1946271
H. Notte, S. Bidgood, N. Sokov, Michael Duitsman, William Potter
ABSTRACT This article identifies the principal drivers of Russian military innovation involving five novel nuclear, conventional, or dual-capable delivery systems—Avangard, Burevestnik, Poseidon, Kinzhal, and Tsirkon—and analyzes the interplay between these drivers over the course of the innovation process. It does so by means of a structured, focused comparison of the five systems and their progression to date, distinguishing “innovation” from concepts like “invention” and “diffusion,” and defining the stages of an innovation life cycle. The article also distills prior research on Soviet weapons innovation and investigates its continued validity. The analysis finds external factors to be central in driving innovation, specifically Russian threat perceptions around (1) US missile-defense development and (2) the development of Western conventional warfighting capabilities. It also discusses the roles of a range of internal factors, including industry and high-level political support for specific systems, the availability of Soviet-legacy research and engineering initiatives, and the appeal of anticipated industrial and ancillary benefits from the development of specific systems. Cooperation between design bureaus and other industry players is also examined, as is the role of status considerations in driving innovation. Finally, the relative importance of individual factors in explaining innovation is shown to differ across the systems. The structured comparison identifies the continued validity of certain aspects of past studies on Soviet military innovation, while also bringing to light new insights about contemporary Russian weapons innovation.
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Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2093507
R. P. Rajagopalan
In their essay “ Upsetting the Nuclear Order: How the Rise of Nationalist Populism Increases Nuclear Dangers, ” Oliver Meier and Maren Vieluf highlight some important aspects of nationalist-populists ’ decision-making styles and argue that they could lead to greater nuclear danger and undermine the global nuclear order. The authors also challenge the traditional notion of responsible and irresponsible nuclear-weapon states. These aspects of nationalist-populist leaders ’ in fl uence on nuclear decision making have not been studied in any detail before; the article thus represents an important con-tribution to the academic literature on nuclear decision making and nuclear danger. Despite its importance as a fi rst cut, there are a number of drawbacks in the argument. It is undoubtedly true that nationalist-populist leaders have shown a distinct attitude toward foreign and defense policies and choices. But whether this also impacts nuclear-weapons decision making is a bit more uncertain because that decision-making remains a signi fi cantly distinct arena for policy makers. More signi fi cantly, the choice of national-ist-populist leaders — former US President Donald Trump, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin — is questionable. That Chinese President Xi Jinping is not categorized as a nation-alist-populist leader is surprising. While there may not be an electoral process that keeps Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, Xi and the CCP appear conscious that the legitimacy of the party is maintained by the policies of Xi and his party. They have carefully used populism in pushing their policies, even if the manner in which Chinese public perceptions are managed may be di ff erent. Xi ’ s anti-corruption drive, for instance, was propelled primarily by careful use and nurturing of public anger. In foreign policy, the CCP has again carefully nurtured and managed public opinion to gain support for policy. The manner in which China responded to South Korea after the latter ’ s decision to deploy the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile-defense system is a case in point:
Oliver Meier和Maren Vieluf在他们的文章《扰乱核秩序:民族民粹主义的兴起如何增加核危险》中强调了民族民粹主义决策风格的一些重要方面，并认为它们可能导致更大的核危险，破坏全球核秩序。作者还挑战了负责任和不负责任的核武器国家的传统观念。民族主义-民粹主义领导人对核决策的影响的这些方面以前没有被详细研究过;因此，这篇文章对核决策和核危险的学术文献作出了重要贡献。尽管它作为第一个削减很重要，但在这个论点中也有一些缺点。毫无疑问，民族主义-民粹主义领导人对外交和国防政策和选择表现出了鲜明的态度。但是，这是否也会影响核武器的决策还不太确定，因为对决策者来说，核武器的决策仍然是一个明显不同的领域。更重要的是，选择民族主义-民粹主义领导人——美国前总统唐纳德·特朗普、英国首相鲍里斯·约翰逊、印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪和俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京——是值得怀疑的。他们小心翼翼地利用民粹主义来推动自己的政策，尽管管理中国公众看法的方式可能有所不同。在外交政策上，中国共产党再次小心翼翼地培育和管理公众舆论，以获得对政策的支持。在韩国决定部署美国末段高空区域防御系统(THAAD，萨德)后，中国对韩国的反应就是一个很好的例子。
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Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2021.2113134
D. Horner
In this issue’s opening article, Oliver Meier and Maren Vieluf focus on a category of politicians that they label “nationalist populists,” some of whom have come to lead nucleararmed states. Meier and Vieluf argue that such leaders “undermine the nuclear order and increase nuclear dangers in novel, significant, and persistent ways” through their words and actions. Because their thesis has significant implications for scholarship and policy, we asked four other experts—Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Michael Cohen, Jacques E. C. Hymans, and Nina Tannenwald—to comment on the article. In his response, Hymans describes the article as “agenda-setting.” We think that’s a well-chosen term for an essay that launches a discussion of an important topic, rather than offering the final and definitive word on it. We look forward to seeing how that discussion transpires. Meier and Vieluf wrote before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but their ideas take on added meaning in the wake of that event. That is equally true of other articles in this issue —for example, the piece in which Hanna Notte, Sarah Bidgood, Nikolai Sokov, Michael Duitsman, and William Potter track and analyze innovations in Russia’s strategic arsenal. Mining Russian-language sources, declassified intelligence documents, and satellite imagery, they identify the principal drivers of Russian military innovation by focusing on five novel nuclear, conventional, or dual-capable delivery systems. In their second jointly authored article to appear in this journal, Stefano Costanzi and Gregory D. Koblentz discuss flaws in current control lists for chemical-weapons agents and their precursors. These gaps were highlighted by Russia’s use of Novichok, or “A-series,” nerve agents in the poisonings of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 2018 and Alexei Navalny in 2020. Costanzi and Koblentz propose a “family-based” approach that involves adding not just a single overlooked nerve agent and its precursors to control lists, but instead identifying groups or “families” of deadly chemicals, encompassing agents that may remain secret or that might be created in the future. David D. Palkki and Lawrence Rubin re-examine Saddam Hussein’s role in the use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988. They consider whether Saddam directly ordered the attack, closely analyzing records such as transcripts of US interrogations of former senior Iraqi officials after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Palkki and Rubin do not find unambiguous evidence of an explicit order from Saddam to carry out the attack, but they conclude that he had created a “command environment” that promoted such actions. Similar questions may arise in the context of war crimes allegedly perpetrated by the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—or, for that matter, those of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. Returning to the nuclear realm, Thomas E. Doyle II addresses a question that may seem less theoretical than it used to: if
在本期的开篇文章中，奥利弗·迈耶和玛伦·维鲁夫重点关注了一类被他们称为“民族民粹主义者”的政治家，其中一些人已经领导了拥有核武器的国家。Meier和Vieluf认为，这些领导人通过他们的言行“以新颖、显著和持久的方式破坏核秩序，增加核危险”。由于他们的论文对学术和政策有重大影响，我们邀请了另外四位专家——拉杰斯瓦里·皮莱·拉贾戈帕兰、迈克尔·科恩、雅克·e·c·海曼斯和尼娜·坦南瓦尔德——对这篇文章发表评论。在他的回应中，海曼斯将这篇文章描述为“议程设置”。我们认为，对于一篇文章来说，这个词是一个很好的选择，它引发了对一个重要话题的讨论，而不是对这个话题给出最终的、决定性的结论。我们期待着看到这一讨论如何进行。Meier和Vieluf是在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之前写的，但他们的想法在事件发生后被赋予了额外的意义。本期的其他文章也是如此——例如，汉娜·诺特、萨拉·比古德、尼古拉·索科夫、迈克尔·杜特曼和威廉·波特追踪并分析了俄罗斯战略武器库的创新。通过挖掘俄语资源、解密的情报文件和卫星图像，他们确定了俄罗斯军事创新的主要驱动因素，重点关注五种新型核、常规或双重能力的运载系统。Stefano Costanzi和Gregory D. Koblentz在本刊发表的第二篇联合撰写的文章中讨论了目前化学武器制剂及其前体控制清单的缺陷。俄罗斯在2018年和2020年分别毒害谢尔盖和尤利娅·斯克里帕尔和阿列克谢·纳瓦尔尼的案件中使用了诺维乔克(Novichok)或“a系列”神经毒剂，凸显了这些差距。科斯坦齐和科布伦茨提出了一种“基于家族”的方法，不仅要在管制清单中增加一种被忽视的神经毒剂及其前体，而且要确定致命化学物质的群体或“家族”，包括可能保密或可能在未来制造的物质。David D. Palkki和Lawrence Rubin重新审视了萨达姆·侯赛因在1988年对伊拉克库尔德城镇哈拉布贾使用化学武器中所扮演的角色。他们仔细分析了2003年入侵伊拉克后美国对伊拉克前高级官员的审讯记录，并考虑萨达姆是否直接下令发动袭击。帕尔基和鲁宾并没有找到确凿的证据证明萨达姆下达了实施袭击的明确命令，但他们得出的结论是，他创造了一个促进此类行动的“指挥环境”。类似的问题可能出现在叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德(Bashar al- assad)的部队据称犯下的战争罪行的背景下，或者就此而言，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir Putin)在乌克兰犯下的战争罪行。回到核领域，托马斯·e·道尔二世(Thomas E. Doyle II)提出了一个似乎不像以前那么理论化的问题:如果一个国家在战争中使用核武器，打破了自1945年广岛和长崎原子弹爆炸以来一直存在的“核禁忌”，那么世界其他国家如何才能恢复核克制并保持这一禁忌?从伦理学家的角度提出的处方可能与军事战略家的传统观点不一致。
{"title":"From the editor","authors":"D. Horner","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2021.2113134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.2113134","url":null,"abstract":"In this issue’s opening article, Oliver Meier and Maren Vieluf focus on a category of politicians that they label “nationalist populists,” some of whom have come to lead nucleararmed states. Meier and Vieluf argue that such leaders “undermine the nuclear order and increase nuclear dangers in novel, significant, and persistent ways” through their words and actions. Because their thesis has significant implications for scholarship and policy, we asked four other experts—Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Michael Cohen, Jacques E. C. Hymans, and Nina Tannenwald—to comment on the article. In his response, Hymans describes the article as “agenda-setting.” We think that’s a well-chosen term for an essay that launches a discussion of an important topic, rather than offering the final and definitive word on it. We look forward to seeing how that discussion transpires. Meier and Vieluf wrote before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but their ideas take on added meaning in the wake of that event. That is equally true of other articles in this issue —for example, the piece in which Hanna Notte, Sarah Bidgood, Nikolai Sokov, Michael Duitsman, and William Potter track and analyze innovations in Russia’s strategic arsenal. Mining Russian-language sources, declassified intelligence documents, and satellite imagery, they identify the principal drivers of Russian military innovation by focusing on five novel nuclear, conventional, or dual-capable delivery systems. In their second jointly authored article to appear in this journal, Stefano Costanzi and Gregory D. Koblentz discuss flaws in current control lists for chemical-weapons agents and their precursors. These gaps were highlighted by Russia’s use of Novichok, or “A-series,” nerve agents in the poisonings of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 2018 and Alexei Navalny in 2020. Costanzi and Koblentz propose a “family-based” approach that involves adding not just a single overlooked nerve agent and its precursors to control lists, but instead identifying groups or “families” of deadly chemicals, encompassing agents that may remain secret or that might be created in the future. David D. Palkki and Lawrence Rubin re-examine Saddam Hussein’s role in the use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988. They consider whether Saddam directly ordered the attack, closely analyzing records such as transcripts of US interrogations of former senior Iraqi officials after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Palkki and Rubin do not find unambiguous evidence of an explicit order from Saddam to carry out the attack, but they conclude that he had created a “command environment” that promoted such actions. Similar questions may arise in the context of war crimes allegedly perpetrated by the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—or, for that matter, those of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. Returning to the nuclear realm, Thomas E. Doyle II addresses a question that may seem less theoretical than it used to: if","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"1 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48440786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1864932
Oliver Meier, Maren Vieluf
ABSTRACT Nationalist populists as leaders of states that possess nuclear weapons undermine the nuclear order and increase nuclear dangers in novel, significant, and persistent ways. Such leaders talk differently about nuclear weapons; they can put nuclear policy making and crisis management in disarray; and they can weaken international alliances and multilateral nuclear institutions. The rise of nationalist populists in nuclear-armed states, including some of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, shatters the presumed distinction between responsible and irresponsible nuclear powers and complicates attempts to heal rifts in the international order. Policies to wait out populists or to balance their influence in multilateral institutions seem to have had limited success. A sustainable strategy to deal with the challenge posed by populists would need to start by recognizing that we can no longer assume that nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of some states but not in others’.
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