Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1866884
P. Millett, Christopher R Isaac, Irina Rais, P. Rutten
ABSTRACT Although synthetic biology and biological engineering are often portrayed as emerging disciplines, there is over a decade of experience in their interactions with biosecurity. The International Genetically Engineered Machine competition (iGEM) brings together nearly 6000 students on multidisciplinary teams to engineer biology following synthetic biology’s “design, build, test, and learn” cycle. During its fifteen-year existence, iGEM has been affected by biosecurity and in turn has affected it. This article describes four specific case studies at iGEM, highlighting their implications for biosecurity, and proposes ways to improve relevant biosecurity procedures and practices. It showcases how embracing engineering approaches and principles can help to structure efforts to strengthen biosecurity.
{"title":"The synthetic-biology challenges for biosecurity: examples from iGEM","authors":"P. Millett, Christopher R Isaac, Irina Rais, P. Rutten","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1866884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1866884","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although synthetic biology and biological engineering are often portrayed as emerging disciplines, there is over a decade of experience in their interactions with biosecurity. The International Genetically Engineered Machine competition (iGEM) brings together nearly 6000 students on multidisciplinary teams to engineer biology following synthetic biology’s “design, build, test, and learn” cycle. During its fifteen-year existence, iGEM has been affected by biosecurity and in turn has affected it. This article describes four specific case studies at iGEM, highlighting their implications for biosecurity, and proposes ways to improve relevant biosecurity procedures and practices. It showcases how embracing engineering approaches and principles can help to structure efforts to strengthen biosecurity.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"443 - 458"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44902001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1823102
S. Drobysz
ABSTRACT This article looks at verification and implementation as two aspects of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) that Ray Zilinskas had identified as weaknesses. Based on his predictions and suggestions to develop a comprehensive and effective verification regime, the first part of this article offers some reflections on the status and prospects of BWC verification. It provides a brief overview of persisting controversies surrounding aspects Zilinskas discussed, and considers the effectiveness of the BWC despite the absence of verification, including verification “alternatives” that Zilinskas had also anticipated. The second part of this article focuses on the national legislative implementation of the BWC. This topic has received less attention in Zilinskas’s publications but remains an important component of the BWC regime, with expanding obligations to adopt laws and regulations relating to biological weapons, yet persisting gaps in national legal regimes.
{"title":"Verification and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention","authors":"S. Drobysz","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1823102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1823102","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article looks at verification and implementation as two aspects of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) that Ray Zilinskas had identified as weaknesses. Based on his predictions and suggestions to develop a comprehensive and effective verification regime, the first part of this article offers some reflections on the status and prospects of BWC verification. It provides a brief overview of persisting controversies surrounding aspects Zilinskas discussed, and considers the effectiveness of the BWC despite the absence of verification, including verification “alternatives” that Zilinskas had also anticipated. The second part of this article focuses on the national legislative implementation of the BWC. This topic has received less attention in Zilinskas’s publications but remains an important component of the BWC regime, with expanding obligations to adopt laws and regulations relating to biological weapons, yet persisting gaps in national legal regimes.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"487 - 497"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1823102","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45055424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1865629
G. Kraatz-Wadsack
ABSTRACT This article provides a brief overview of the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) regime in Iraq in the biological-weapons area. As an integral part of the formal ceasefire arrangement in 1991, the United Nations Security Council established an international verification regime encompassing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and some ballistic missiles. The verification regime was built on two mutually supportive pillars. One pillar related to disarmament validation, i.e., verifying that all prohibited weapons, facilities, and related items and certain ballistic missiles in Iraq were destroyed or rendered harmless, and all past weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) activities had ceased. The second pillar was ongoing monitoring to continuously verify that non-proscribed activities were not being diverted to reconstitute WMD programs. Biological-weapons disarmament and OMV in Iraq provide an example of an effective system that may serve as a reference point for future efforts.
{"title":"Monitoring and verification in the biological-weapons area","authors":"G. Kraatz-Wadsack","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1865629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1865629","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article provides a brief overview of the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) regime in Iraq in the biological-weapons area. As an integral part of the formal ceasefire arrangement in 1991, the United Nations Security Council established an international verification regime encompassing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and some ballistic missiles. The verification regime was built on two mutually supportive pillars. One pillar related to disarmament validation, i.e., verifying that all prohibited weapons, facilities, and related items and certain ballistic missiles in Iraq were destroyed or rendered harmless, and all past weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) activities had ceased. The second pillar was ongoing monitoring to continuously verify that non-proscribed activities were not being diverted to reconstitute WMD programs. Biological-weapons disarmament and OMV in Iraq provide an example of an effective system that may serve as a reference point for future efforts.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"499 - 505"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1865629","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46848771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1852751
G. Epstein
ABSTRACT The 2017 US National Security Strategy asserts that, “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned,” pointing to actions that Russia and China have taken to reassert their influence and attempt to change the international order. Such a shift has implications for biodefense. It suggests an increased likelihood of the development and potential use of biological weapons by states, which had been downplayed by those who have been more concerned about non-state biological-weapons programs. State program access to expertise, facilities, and resources implies a greater level of technological sophistication than would typically be credited to non-state actors, influencing the requirements for national biodefense programs to detect, characterize, respond, to, and attribute a biological attack. States also could have missions for biological weapons that differ from those intended by terrorists.
{"title":"Biodefense and the return to great-power competition","authors":"G. Epstein","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1852751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1852751","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The 2017 US National Security Strategy asserts that, “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned,” pointing to actions that Russia and China have taken to reassert their influence and attempt to change the international order. Such a shift has implications for biodefense. It suggests an increased likelihood of the development and potential use of biological weapons by states, which had been downplayed by those who have been more concerned about non-state biological-weapons programs. State program access to expertise, facilities, and resources implies a greater level of technological sophistication than would typically be credited to non-state actors, influencing the requirements for national biodefense programs to detect, characterize, respond, to, and attribute a biological attack. States also could have missions for biological weapons that differ from those intended by terrorists.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"409 - 414"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1852751","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45092303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1858621
Glenn Cross
Understanding states’ perception of biological-weapons (BW) utility is key to understanding the motivations behind states’ development, possession, and use of these weapons. The calculations underlying a determination of utility are complex, having to balance threat perceptions, national scientific and industrial capacities, diplomatic relations, and the importance of prohibitory norms. Case studies of the former US and British offensive BW programs, beginning in World War II, illustrate how perceptions of BW utility evolve under wartime circumstances. The US case also illustrates how perceptions of BW utility heightened during periods of international tension, namely the Korean War and early in the John F. Kennedy administration. Both the US and UK examples also demonstrate how possession of nuclear weapons affected perceptions of BW utility and the role of BW in military doctrine. Given the prohibitions on BW development and possession, BW utility today is limited to small-scale, covert operations, including assassinations, much like the recent assassinations and attempted assassinations conducted by North Korea and Russia. Unlike chemical weapons, BW have the additional characteristics of delaying the onset of effects, mimicking natural diseases, and foiling attribution efforts.
{"title":"Wrestling with imponderables: assessing perceptions of biological-weapons utility","authors":"Glenn Cross","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1858621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1858621","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding states’ perception of biological-weapons (BW) utility is key to understanding the motivations behind states’ development, possession, and use of these weapons. The calculations underlying a determination of utility are complex, having to balance threat perceptions, national scientific and industrial capacities, diplomatic relations, and the importance of prohibitory norms. Case studies of the former US and British offensive BW programs, beginning in World War II, illustrate how perceptions of BW utility evolve under wartime circumstances. The US case also illustrates how perceptions of BW utility heightened during periods of international tension, namely the Korean War and early in the John F. Kennedy administration. Both the US and UK examples also demonstrate how possession of nuclear weapons affected perceptions of BW utility and the role of BW in military doctrine. Given the prohibitions on BW development and possession, BW utility today is limited to small-scale, covert operations, including assassinations, much like the recent assassinations and attempted assassinations conducted by North Korea and Russia. Unlike chemical weapons, BW have the additional characteristics of delaying the onset of effects, mimicking natural diseases, and foiling attribution efforts.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"343 - 366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1858621","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42672379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1853910
Filippa Lentzos
ABSTRACT At a time of heightened concern about potential future biological-weapons threats, this article considers how the international community can use the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention framework to strengthen compliance monitoring of rapidly increasing dual-use capacities around the globe. It presents three conceptual layers within the treaty regime which states can draw from to inform their compliance judgments: one legally binding, one politically binding, and one wholly voluntary. The article outlines how these were established and how they have been used so far, and argues for an incremental, inclusive, practical, and forward-looking approach to evolving these structures to better manage perceptions of the intent behind dual-use capacities, and to further trust between states.
{"title":"Dual-use biology: building trust and managing perceptions of intent","authors":"Filippa Lentzos","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1853910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1853910","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT At a time of heightened concern about potential future biological-weapons threats, this article considers how the international community can use the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention framework to strengthen compliance monitoring of rapidly increasing dual-use capacities around the globe. It presents three conceptual layers within the treaty regime which states can draw from to inform their compliance judgments: one legally binding, one politically binding, and one wholly voluntary. The article outlines how these were established and how they have been used so far, and argues for an incremental, inclusive, practical, and forward-looking approach to evolving these structures to better manage perceptions of the intent behind dual-use capacities, and to further trust between states.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"517 - 523"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1853910","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47732291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1872968
C. McLeish, Joshua R. Moon
ABSTRACT Concerns that biological weapons will be used has focused attention on the need to develop a capability to independently investigate any allegation of use. The United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism is one such tool, and efforts to revitalize and strengthen it have acknowledged a wide range of technical difficulties to overcome. This article emphasizes another aspect of the investigatory process: communicating the findings of an investigation. The article frames the investigation report as more than a technical recounting of what the investigators did and found, regarding it instead as the means by which the policy-making audience “makes sense” of the allegation. Drawing on literatures associated with science policy and “boundary objects,” the article reflects on the guidance provided thus far and suggests there has been an implicit move toward seeing the reports as “boundary documents.” The suggestion made here is that this implicit recognition should be now made explicit so that the critical position of the report is better appreciated. This has implications for the training of rostered experts.
{"title":"Sitting on the boundary: the role of reports in investigations into alleged biological-weapons use","authors":"C. McLeish, Joshua R. Moon","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1872968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1872968","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Concerns that biological weapons will be used has focused attention on the need to develop a capability to independently investigate any allegation of use. The United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism is one such tool, and efforts to revitalize and strengthen it have acknowledged a wide range of technical difficulties to overcome. This article emphasizes another aspect of the investigatory process: communicating the findings of an investigation. The article frames the investigation report as more than a technical recounting of what the investigators did and found, regarding it instead as the means by which the policy-making audience “makes sense” of the allegation. Drawing on literatures associated with science policy and “boundary objects,” the article reflects on the guidance provided thus far and suggests there has been an implicit move toward seeing the reports as “boundary documents.” The suggestion made here is that this implicit recognition should be now made explicit so that the critical position of the report is better appreciated. This has implications for the training of rostered experts.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"525 - 540"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1872968","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49608140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1843252
W. Carus
ABSTRACT The concept of “biological terrorism” predates the provenance of the term. Prominent anarchist intellectuals as well as sensationalist journalists alike promulgated the concept of deliberate disease during the last half of the nineteenth century. However, their published works do not reflect an accurate understanding of the biological sciences. In fact, the most accurate writings on disease as a weapon came not from anarchists or journalists, but from science-fiction writers.
{"title":"Perspectives on “bioterrorism” in the nineteenth century: the philosophy of mass destruction, fake news, and other fictions","authors":"W. Carus","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1843252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1843252","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The concept of “biological terrorism” predates the provenance of the term. Prominent anarchist intellectuals as well as sensationalist journalists alike promulgated the concept of deliberate disease during the last half of the nineteenth century. However, their published works do not reflect an accurate understanding of the biological sciences. In fact, the most accurate writings on disease as a weapon came not from anarchists or journalists, but from science-fiction writers.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"267 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1843252","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49349365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1878666
M. Chevrier
ABSTRACT The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are key components of the international arms-control landscape. Yet the two conventions differ widely, particularly in the ways that are available to treaty parties to resolve any questions about compliance with the treaties. Both contain language concerning consultation and cooperation, but the CWC also has extensive procedures available to investigate allegations of noncompliance. This article reviews these differences in the conventions and explains, in part, how and why they came about. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has engaged in several consultations regarding compliance issues, but the OPCW publishes virtually nothing about the topics of the consultations or their frequency, findings, or conclusions. An exception, perhaps, is the OPCW’s work regarding Syrian use of chemical weapons (CW). Moreover, thus far, no treaty party has called for a challenge inspection to officially investigate perhaps the most serious allegations of treaty violations: Syrian and Russian alleged use of CW. The BWC states parties conducted one formal consultation raised by Cuba, alleging that the United States dropped biological agents on the island nation from airplanes to cause an animal epidemic. The consultation reached no official conclusion. The article goes on to praise the work of Raymond Zilinskas debunking the allegations through a careful scientific review of the Cuban claims. The article discusses the consequences of secrecy surrounding the CWC consultation process and laments that the BWC does not have the institutional capacity to carry on the type of analysis that Zilinskas undertook discrediting the Cuban allegations.
{"title":"Compliance mechanisms and their implementation: the contrast between the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions","authors":"M. Chevrier","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1878666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1878666","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are key components of the international arms-control landscape. Yet the two conventions differ widely, particularly in the ways that are available to treaty parties to resolve any questions about compliance with the treaties. Both contain language concerning consultation and cooperation, but the CWC also has extensive procedures available to investigate allegations of noncompliance. This article reviews these differences in the conventions and explains, in part, how and why they came about. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has engaged in several consultations regarding compliance issues, but the OPCW publishes virtually nothing about the topics of the consultations or their frequency, findings, or conclusions. An exception, perhaps, is the OPCW’s work regarding Syrian use of chemical weapons (CW). Moreover, thus far, no treaty party has called for a challenge inspection to officially investigate perhaps the most serious allegations of treaty violations: Syrian and Russian alleged use of CW. The BWC states parties conducted one formal consultation raised by Cuba, alleging that the United States dropped biological agents on the island nation from airplanes to cause an animal epidemic. The consultation reached no official conclusion. The article goes on to praise the work of Raymond Zilinskas debunking the allegations through a careful scientific review of the Cuban claims. The article discusses the consequences of secrecy surrounding the CWC consultation process and laments that the BWC does not have the institutional capacity to carry on the type of analysis that Zilinskas undertook discrediting the Cuban allegations.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"475 - 486"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42017790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1865632
K. Nixdorff
Biological processes occur within complex, vital physiological systems. Systems biology seeks to understand how physiological systems function as a whole, integrating information about interactions in a biological system through computer-assisted modeling, aiming to identify relationships not found within individual biological units. Coupled with advances in the life sciences and computing power, this research is yielding an enormous amount of information about specific targets of vital physiological processes, and enabling predictions about how these targets may respond to a disturbance or change in signaling. This information can be greatly beneficial in treating complex diseases. It also has extended the spectrum of potential threat agents to include bioregulators, which to a great extent regulate the functioning of the nervous, endocrine, and immune systems. There is potential for misuse of the knowledge gained from these studies, and improved methods of targeted delivery of biochemicals make them more feasible weapons agents. Moreover, biochemical security concerns in systems biology are embedded within the larger domain of cyberbiosecurity. There remains a need for proactive approaches to the formulation of biochemical-security-oversight policy that would encompass developments at this interface of the life sciences and information technology.
{"title":"Developments in systems biology: implications for health and biochemical security","authors":"K. Nixdorff","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1865632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1865632","url":null,"abstract":"Biological processes occur within complex, vital physiological systems. Systems biology seeks to understand how physiological systems function as a whole, integrating information about interactions in a biological system through computer-assisted modeling, aiming to identify relationships not found within individual biological units. Coupled with advances in the life sciences and computing power, this research is yielding an enormous amount of information about specific targets of vital physiological processes, and enabling predictions about how these targets may respond to a disturbance or change in signaling. This information can be greatly beneficial in treating complex diseases. It also has extended the spectrum of potential threat agents to include bioregulators, which to a great extent regulate the functioning of the nervous, endocrine, and immune systems. There is potential for misuse of the knowledge gained from these studies, and improved methods of targeted delivery of biochemicals make them more feasible weapons agents. Moreover, biochemical security concerns in systems biology are embedded within the larger domain of cyberbiosecurity. There remains a need for proactive approaches to the formulation of biochemical-security-oversight policy that would encompass developments at this interface of the life sciences and information technology.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"459 - 473"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1865632","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41966929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：