Nonproliferation Review最新文献

{"title":"Oliver Meier and Maren Vieluf respond","authors":"Oliver Meier, Maren Vieluf","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2093515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2093515","url":null,"abstract":"describe as the dominant tendency of nationalist-populist leaders to “weaken international alliances and multilateral institutions.” Instead, in this case the Ukraine war has had the dramatic effect of strengthening NATO and the European Union, bolstering transatlantic unity, and prodding the United States to reconsider the value of the International Criminal Court. Stalemate in the UN Security Council forced a creative move to a UN General Assembly vote under the Uniting for Peace principle to condemn Russia, while the UN Human Rights Council took the rare step of standing up to a great power and expelled Russia. In other words, Putin’s war has brought about precisely the outcomes he has sought to counter. It has strengthened, rather than weakened, multilateralism and international institutions. Needless to say, however, if Donald Trump were president now instead of Biden, this outcome would have been very different. There would be no Ukraine and no NATO, at least in their current forms. Trump would have given Ukraine to his friend (and creditor) Putin and pulled out of NATO. Two nationalist-populist leaders of great powers, working in tandem, could indeed likely dismantle the transatlantic institutional order.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41403581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Michael Cohen, Senior Lecturer, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University","authors":"Michael Andrew Cohen","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2093510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2093510","url":null,"abstract":"almost a decade, this stability and consistency in Indian nuclear policy calls into question arguments about how nationalist populism could impact nuclear policy. The consequences of nuclear-policy changes are grave, and we must be careful in assessing possible dangers. This might suggest that even minor indications of future changes be treated seriously, and the authors are correct to flag potential dangers from nationalist-populist leaders. Nevertheless, there is also a risk in exaggerating the danger. Most importantly, we must not ignore more important sources of nuclear danger and proliferation. In the contemporary world, this danger is rooted in aggressive authoritarian states that are increasing the insecurity of their smaller, weaker neighbors, thus leading to greater consideration of nuclear weapons for self-defense in East Asia and the Middle East. Focusing on the wrong danger may prove to be more problematic for nuclear stability.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60027978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Birth of a treaty: the inside story of New START","authors":"Paul Meyer","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2045792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2045792","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44286084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nina Tannenwald, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Brown University","authors":"N. Tannenwald","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2093513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2093513","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43371420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"High drama and mixed results in Syria","authors":"H. Notte","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2021.1974174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.1974174","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45417016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strengthening controls on Novichoks: a family-based approach to covering A-series agents and precursors under the chemical-weapons nonproliferation regime","authors":"S. Costanzi, Gregory D. Koblentz","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2021.2020010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.2020010","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Novichoks, also known as A-series agents, are nerve agents developed in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Once obscure chemicals, they garnered a great deal of attention after their employment in the attempted assassinations of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 2018 and of Alexei Navalny in 2020. Novichok agents were not originally featured in the schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which are intended to support the treaty’s verification regime and declaration requirements. However, following the Skripal incident, the CWC schedules were amended to include Novichok agents. Furthermore, precursors for their synthesis were added to the Australia Group’s (AG) list of chemical-weapons precursors. In this article, we evaluate the recent revisions of the CWC schedules and the AG precursors list, identify the remaining weaknesses of both lists, and make recommendations for further amendments. We recommend strengthening the coverage of the CWC schedules by adding families of Novichok agents with guanidine branches. This is particularly important in light of the Navalny incident, since that incident appears to have involved a guanidine-bearing Novichok agent currently not covered by the CWC schedules. We also propose an approach to the control of Novichok precursors by the CWC and the AG based on families of chemicals rather than individually enumerated chemicals.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42333276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Innovation acceleration, digitization, and the crisis of nonproliferation systems","authors":"Amy J. Nelson","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2021.2022898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.2022898","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Nonproliferation systems comprise agreements designed to work in concert to manage specific security risks. New technologies, however, are exacerbating these risks by perforating controls and evading regulations while revealing limitations in the utility of these tools for managing threats from emerging dual-use technologies. This article first looks at how regime augmentation and control-list modernization have worked as solutions to past challenges for nonproliferation systems. Second, it argues that new drivers of this risk are creating near-unmanageable conditions. These drivers include the increased rate of production of novel technologies; the digital format of newer technologies, as well as the digitization of existing weapons technologies, platforms, and systems; and the diffusion and latency these drivers facilitate. Finally, the article assesses the feasibility of control-list modernization as a solution to risks posed by rapidly emerging and evolving dual-use technologies today. It argues that nonproliferation efforts should endeavor to preserve the control systems currently in place while simultaneously pursuing complementary measures to mitigate the effects of the digital diffusion of dual-use technologies.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47079989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nuclear India and the Changing Landscape of Escalation in Southern Asia","authors":"R. Akhtar","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2021.1996683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.1996683","url":null,"abstract":"The theory of the nuclear revolution posits that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, coupled with the ease with which mutual second-strike capabilities can be obtained and secured, has made mutual vulnerability an undeniable fact. This reality has made military victories impossible to achieve in a conflict between two nuclear-armed states. As a result, the status quo is easier to maintain, given that the security of a state in possession of survivable and secure second-strike capabilities is guaranteed. This, according to the theory, is the case because nuclear weapons attenuate or even eliminate the rather destabilizing security dilemma that has hitherto increased mistrust between rivals and competitors. The size of an adversary’s arsenal, or the overall military imbalance, becomes irrelevant. Moreover, nuclear superiority does not matter under conditions of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Overall, the theory posits that nuclear weapons make states more secure. Further, by eliminating the quest for winning a series of security competitions, they help to make the world safer. That countries with nuclear weapons hold hostage things that other nuclear states value is an indication that mutual vulnerabilities induce general stability. If states were to accept MAD, their proclivities to use force as an instrument of foreign policy might decline significantly. That would have payoffs in the form of infrequent crises and increased cooperation between states. With nuclear weapons making superiority— whether conventional or nuclear—less decisive, powerful states are hamstrung in acting punitively against weaker states. In a fundamental difference from conventional wars, a state cannot achieve deterrence by denial by threatening to attack its enemy’s armed forces, given its adversary’s ability to achieve deterrence by punishment by retaliating. The archetypal example of this phenomenon is the nuclear-tinged rivalry between Washington and","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45510518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Wizardly History of Nuclear Weapons","authors":"Š. Ganguly","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2097703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2097703","url":null,"abstract":"After the use of nuclear weapons against Japan, the eminent American strategist Bernard Brodie presciently wrote, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now its chief purpose must be to avert them.” Ever since then, this key proposition has formed the basis of nuclear deterrence. Despite Brodie’s fundamental insight, a range of American strategists and policy makers nevertheless planned on the use of nuclear weapons in the event that deterrence failed. To that end, they engaged in endless debates about the appropriate configuration of American nuclear forces to ensure both that deterrence would prevail and that, if it did not, the United States would prevail over its principal nuclear-armed adversary, the Soviet Union. Much of the history of the nuclear age has been covered in earlier works. McGeorge Bundy’s masterful account, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, not only dealt with the US–Soviet nuclear rivalry but also provided capsule accounts of various other states that went on to acquire nuclear weapons. Beyond this history of the nuclear age, the historian Gregg Herken, in Counsels of War, dwelt on the plethora of scientists, scholars, and analysts who shaped American nuclear strategy from the genesis of the nuclear age to the heights of the Cold War. Shortly before the publication of Herken’s book, Fred Kaplan had published a similar volume, The Wizards of Armageddon. Of necessity, Kaplan’s new work, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals and the Secret History of Nuclear War, covers some of the same ground. Many of the same characters who had populated his previous work turn up again in the present book. However, the principal focus of the newer volume is the evolution of American nuclear strategy. The book deals much more explicitly with the debates, arguments, and bureaucratic politics underlying the development of particular nuclear-weapons systems and the strategies for their deployment and possible use. Kaplan’s mastery of the particulars of the history, politics, and technologies is extraordinary. He provides detailed and granular accounts of key personalities, specific turning points, and important epochs. In this regard, the book is markedly different from Lawrence Freedman’s magisterial work The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, which is an academic examination of the progression of nuclear thinking. Kaplan’s book begins with a discussion of the US plans to acquire a nuclear force. As Kaplan describes it, the early stages involved hauling and pulling between various military organizations shortly after the use of the first atomic bombs at the end of World War II. It is fascinating to learn that, at the outset, neither the Navy nor the Army was especially","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47291617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Preserving the nuclear taboo after a nuclear first-use event: a nuclear ethical analysis","authors":"T. E. Doyle","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2065124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2065124","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to Nina Tannenwald, the nuclear taboo is a deeply held moral norm against the first use of nuclear weapons. If the nuclear taboo is violated by a country engaging in nuclear first use, how might the taboo be preserved and nuclear restraint restored? An analysis contrasting the logic of nuclear deterrence with the logic of the nuclear taboo offers reasons why the nuclear taboo cannot be preserved if the response to nuclear first use is nuclear reprisal. Instead, the preservation of the nuclear taboo would require a combination of diplomatic, economic, and conventional military responses. Nuclear reprisal might restore nuclear deterrence, but it would also validate the role of nuclear weapons in national or alliance security policy. Taboo enforcement cannot rely on the very behaviors the taboo prohibits.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45828818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}