Pub Date : 2023-01-05DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2148994
J. Wirtz
{"title":"A guide to the proliferation universe","authors":"J. Wirtz","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2148994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2148994","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48502031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-17DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2123578
Matt Bowen, N. Miller, Richard M. Nephew
{"title":"Sanctions as a deterrent to nuclear testing","authors":"Matt Bowen, N. Miller, Richard M. Nephew","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2123578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2123578","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43983174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2128579
Robert J. Hughes
Incidents of noncompliance with existing multilateral arms-control treaties and subsequent enforcement actions can help to inform the design of future treaties. This article uses examples of noncompliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, and 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to identify factors that have determined the nature of compliance-enforcement actions. The punitivist model of treaty design and enforcement is introduced and is used alongside the established transformationalist and managerialist models to analyze incidents of noncompliance and identify factors shaping compliance-enforcement actions. Two such factors are found to play important roles: the scale of acts of noncompliance and the identity of the perpetrator. The scale of the act of noncompliance dictates whether the compliance-enforcement actions specified in the treaty text are followed. Responses to large-scale acts do follow the treaty-specified actions, while the small-scale acts analyzed in this article all elicit a managerialist response of consultation and cooperation, regardless of actions stipulated in the treaty text. In all cases, the identity of the perpetrator is crucial: the permanent members of the UN Security Council and their allies are fundamentally impervious to punitive measures.
{"title":"Noncompliance and punishment: lessons from multilateral chemical, biological, and nuclear arms control","authors":"Robert J. Hughes","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2128579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2128579","url":null,"abstract":"Incidents of noncompliance with existing multilateral arms-control treaties and subsequent enforcement actions can help to inform the design of future treaties. This article uses examples of noncompliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, and 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to identify factors that have determined the nature of compliance-enforcement actions. The punitivist model of treaty design and enforcement is introduced and is used alongside the established transformationalist and managerialist models to analyze incidents of noncompliance and identify factors shaping compliance-enforcement actions. Two such factors are found to play important roles: the scale of acts of noncompliance and the identity of the perpetrator. The scale of the act of noncompliance dictates whether the compliance-enforcement actions specified in the treaty text are followed. Responses to large-scale acts do follow the treaty-specified actions, while the small-scale acts analyzed in this article all elicit a managerialist response of consultation and cooperation, regardless of actions stipulated in the treaty text. In all cases, the identity of the perpetrator is crucial: the permanent members of the UN Security Council and their allies are fundamentally impervious to punitive measures.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45817309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2023.2180234
A. Kelle
ABSTRACT This article analyzes the shifting focus of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) during the first 25 years of its implementation, from the verification of destruction of declared chemical-weapon (CW) stockpiles to the attribution of CW use. The article identifies the repeated use of chemical weapons by Syria and the resultant creation of a new attribution norm under the CWC as a critical juncture in the regime’s evolution. Repeated calls for accountability for the use of so-called Novichok nerve agents for assassination purposes serve as the first manifestation of the new attribution norm. The article further outlines steps CWC states parties should take in the context of the Fifth CWC Review Conference in May 2023 to prepare the CW-prohibition regime for its next 25 years of operation by (1) adapting the implementation of key regime norms following the anticipated completion of CW destruction later in 2023 and (2) incorporating the investigation and attribution work of the Investigation and Identification Team into the programmatic work of the OPCW.
{"title":"The CWC at 25: from verification of chemical-weapons destruction to attribution of their use","authors":"A. Kelle","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2023.2180234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2023.2180234","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article analyzes the shifting focus of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) during the first 25 years of its implementation, from the verification of destruction of declared chemical-weapon (CW) stockpiles to the attribution of CW use. The article identifies the repeated use of chemical weapons by Syria and the resultant creation of a new attribution norm under the CWC as a critical juncture in the regime’s evolution. Repeated calls for accountability for the use of so-called Novichok nerve agents for assassination purposes serve as the first manifestation of the new attribution norm. The article further outlines steps CWC states parties should take in the context of the Fifth CWC Review Conference in May 2023 to prepare the CW-prohibition regime for its next 25 years of operation by (1) adapting the implementation of key regime norms following the anticipated completion of CW destruction later in 2023 and (2) incorporating the investigation and attribution work of the Investigation and Identification Team into the programmatic work of the OPCW.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48835550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2130457
A. Stulberg, Jonathan P. Darsey
There is much ado nowadays about the flagging commercial nuclear industry in the United States. Although the country maintains the largest global fleet of reactors, more than one-third operate at a loss, and the industry is on pace to lose more than 20 percent of its generating capacity by 2050. This crisis is unfolding as Russia’s stateowned nuclear industry has become the largest global supplier of new nuclear reactors, driven by its build-own-operate export model and Russian government financing for international reactor projects. This financing is “large (in total amount provided), cheap (with low interest rates) and long-lived (with long repayment periods).” Not surprisingly, many US nuclear officials, policy experts, and corporate leaders fear that without concerted government intervention, the US nuclear industry is teetering on the precipice of irrelevance as a strategic global supplier, just as the prospects for long-term strategic confrontation with Moscow are materializing with Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. Advocates justify US government intervention by arguing that the domestic nuclear industry is a “key national security enabler,” ensuring US-origin fuel for the nuclear navy, as well as a pillar of the promotion and enforcement of Washington’s nonproliferation objectives. The industry’s link to nonproliferation is due to long-standing US laws mandating that any country wishing to conduct business with an American nuclear firm must have a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in force with the US government. These “123 agreements,” named for the section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act that describes their form and function, establish the legal framework for any future nuclear cooperation with the United States. This framework includes delineating the scope of nuclear technology, material, and equipment that the United States is willing to provide under the agreement, as well as defining the terms, conditions, and restrictions
如今，美国商业核工业的衰落引起了很多争论。尽管该国拥有全球最大的反应堆群，但超过三分之一的反应堆处于亏损状态，到2050年，该行业的发电量将减少20%以上。随着俄罗斯国有核工业成为全球最大的新核反应堆供应商，这场危机正在展开，这得益于俄罗斯自建自用的出口模式，以及俄罗斯政府为国际反应堆项目提供融资。这种融资“规模大(提供的总金额)、成本低(利率低)、寿命长(还款期长)”。毫不奇怪，许多美国核官员、政策专家和企业领导人担心，如果没有政府的协调干预，美国核工业作为全球战略供应国的地位将岌岌可危，就像弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)在乌克兰发动战争，美国与莫斯科之间的长期战略对抗正在成为现实一样。支持者为美国政府的干预辩护，认为国内核工业是“关键的国家安全推动者”，确保了美国原产的核海军燃料，以及促进和执行华盛顿不扩散目标的支柱。该行业与核不扩散的联系是由于美国长期以来的法律规定，任何希望与美国核公司开展业务的国家必须与美国政府签订有效的双边核合作协议。这些“123项协议”以1954年《原子能法》(Atomic Energy Act)中描述其形式和功能的部分命名，为今后与美国的任何核合作建立了法律框架。该框架包括划定美国愿意根据协议提供的核技术、材料和设备的范围，以及确定条款、条件和限制
{"title":"Recasting the geopolitics of US–Russian commercial nuclear rivalry by embracing strategic complementarity","authors":"A. Stulberg, Jonathan P. Darsey","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2130457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2130457","url":null,"abstract":"There is much ado nowadays about the flagging commercial nuclear industry in the United States. Although the country maintains the largest global fleet of reactors, more than one-third operate at a loss, and the industry is on pace to lose more than 20 percent of its generating capacity by 2050. This crisis is unfolding as Russia’s stateowned nuclear industry has become the largest global supplier of new nuclear reactors, driven by its build-own-operate export model and Russian government financing for international reactor projects. This financing is “large (in total amount provided), cheap (with low interest rates) and long-lived (with long repayment periods).” Not surprisingly, many US nuclear officials, policy experts, and corporate leaders fear that without concerted government intervention, the US nuclear industry is teetering on the precipice of irrelevance as a strategic global supplier, just as the prospects for long-term strategic confrontation with Moscow are materializing with Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. Advocates justify US government intervention by arguing that the domestic nuclear industry is a “key national security enabler,” ensuring US-origin fuel for the nuclear navy, as well as a pillar of the promotion and enforcement of Washington’s nonproliferation objectives. The industry’s link to nonproliferation is due to long-standing US laws mandating that any country wishing to conduct business with an American nuclear firm must have a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in force with the US government. These “123 agreements,” named for the section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act that describes their form and function, establish the legal framework for any future nuclear cooperation with the United States. This framework includes delineating the scope of nuclear technology, material, and equipment that the United States is willing to provide under the agreement, as well as defining the terms, conditions, and restrictions","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45151145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-28DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2125157
Sidra Hamidi, C. Murphy
ABSTRACT In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration condemned Iran’s use of nuclear-fuel-cycle technologies while endorsing sensitive nuclear activities in South Korea. The politics behind this difference may appear self-evident, but maintaining this policy was premised on a complex interaction between technology and politics. This paper examines both US and international definitions of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing and finds an incoherence between technical definitions and policy implementation. Definitions of enrichment are narrow, as they refer to a very specific set of material processes. But the Bush administration applied a capacious standard when debating what it meant for Iran to “suspend” enrichment-related activities. On the other hand, definitions of reprocessing are capacious, implicating many different processes that can be interpreted as reprocessing. And yet the Bush administration applied a narrow standard as it sought to assist South Korea’s pyroprocessing efforts. By positing a reciprocal relationship between technology and politics, this article challenges both the position that technical solutions can solve entrenched political conflicts, and also the simplified narrative that great-power politics trumps shared technical and legal standards. Interpretive conflicts over technical standards are shaped by politics, and yet technical contestation also limits and bounds political manipulation.
{"title":"A tale of two fuel cycles: defining enrichment and reprocessing in the nonproliferation regime","authors":"Sidra Hamidi, C. Murphy","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2125157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2125157","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration condemned Iran’s use of nuclear-fuel-cycle technologies while endorsing sensitive nuclear activities in South Korea. The politics behind this difference may appear self-evident, but maintaining this policy was premised on a complex interaction between technology and politics. This paper examines both US and international definitions of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing and finds an incoherence between technical definitions and policy implementation. Definitions of enrichment are narrow, as they refer to a very specific set of material processes. But the Bush administration applied a capacious standard when debating what it meant for Iran to “suspend” enrichment-related activities. On the other hand, definitions of reprocessing are capacious, implicating many different processes that can be interpreted as reprocessing. And yet the Bush administration applied a narrow standard as it sought to assist South Korea’s pyroprocessing efforts. By positing a reciprocal relationship between technology and politics, this article challenges both the position that technical solutions can solve entrenched political conflicts, and also the simplified narrative that great-power politics trumps shared technical and legal standards. Interpretive conflicts over technical standards are shaped by politics, and yet technical contestation also limits and bounds political manipulation.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43545706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-25DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2117885
Magdalena E. Stawkowski
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, an expansive arsenal of nuclear weapons was scattered across thousands of sites in newly independent states. The collapse meant that the new nations of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan inherited a total of more than 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads controlled by Russia. Amid the social, political, and economic crises that marked the early 1990s for much of the former Soviet Union, the prospect of new states possessing nuclear weapons unsettled many Western leaders. With anxieties high, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other European powers pursued nonproliferation agreements leading to complete disarmament of the three new nations. After a few years of diplomatic wrangling, the leaders of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed to move, dismantle, and destroy their inherited arsenal. As a cornerstone of this commitment, they became signatories of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in exchange for security and sovereignty assurances from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom as outlined in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. As non-nuclear-weapon-state parties to the NPT, they are prohibited from ever acquiring or manufacturing atomic weapons. But with Russia’s unprecedented invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and Vladimir Putin’s ominous nuclear threats to any country bold enough to get in Russia’s way, the issue of whether the Soviet Union’s successor states have made the right choice has been called into question in the popular media. Indeed, the most dangerous effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is that it exposes the shortcomings of the NPT—in particular, that there seem to be no real security guarantees for states that do not possess nuclear weapons when those states face existential threats from their neighbors. US foreign-policy “realists,” such as John Mearsheimer, have long argued that nuclear weapons are the best deterrent against foreign aggression. The case of Kazakhstan, however, shows something different for technological, political, and historical reasons. Holding onto the inherited cache would have meant potentially dire consequences for the newly minted nation-state as it sought to make a stable and recognized place for itself in the world. For one thing, like Belarus and Ukraine, Kazakhstan lacked the proper infrastructure, military force, and finances to maintain or even activate the inherited nuclear arsenal. In addition, Moscow had full operational command and control of its nuclear arsenal in Kazakhstan, as well as elsewhere, including the
{"title":"Kazakhstan’s legacy of nuclear testing and its post-Soviet nuclear future","authors":"Magdalena E. Stawkowski","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2117885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2117885","url":null,"abstract":"When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, an expansive arsenal of nuclear weapons was scattered across thousands of sites in newly independent states. The collapse meant that the new nations of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan inherited a total of more than 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads controlled by Russia. Amid the social, political, and economic crises that marked the early 1990s for much of the former Soviet Union, the prospect of new states possessing nuclear weapons unsettled many Western leaders. With anxieties high, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other European powers pursued nonproliferation agreements leading to complete disarmament of the three new nations. After a few years of diplomatic wrangling, the leaders of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed to move, dismantle, and destroy their inherited arsenal. As a cornerstone of this commitment, they became signatories of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in exchange for security and sovereignty assurances from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom as outlined in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. As non-nuclear-weapon-state parties to the NPT, they are prohibited from ever acquiring or manufacturing atomic weapons. But with Russia’s unprecedented invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and Vladimir Putin’s ominous nuclear threats to any country bold enough to get in Russia’s way, the issue of whether the Soviet Union’s successor states have made the right choice has been called into question in the popular media. Indeed, the most dangerous effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is that it exposes the shortcomings of the NPT—in particular, that there seem to be no real security guarantees for states that do not possess nuclear weapons when those states face existential threats from their neighbors. US foreign-policy “realists,” such as John Mearsheimer, have long argued that nuclear weapons are the best deterrent against foreign aggression. The case of Kazakhstan, however, shows something different for technological, political, and historical reasons. Holding onto the inherited cache would have meant potentially dire consequences for the newly minted nation-state as it sought to make a stable and recognized place for itself in the world. For one thing, like Belarus and Ukraine, Kazakhstan lacked the proper infrastructure, military force, and finances to maintain or even activate the inherited nuclear arsenal. In addition, Moscow had full operational command and control of its nuclear arsenal in Kazakhstan, as well as elsewhere, including the","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45346300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-20DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2114153
Or Rabinowitz
{"title":"US alliance dynamics and nuclear proliferation in the Cold War","authors":"Or Rabinowitz","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2114153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2114153","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49371873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-19DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2110703
G. Perkovich
{"title":"Michael Krepon: a life building peace","authors":"G. Perkovich","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2110703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2110703","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46129377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-29DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2022.2075643
M. Carranza
The conventional wisdom is that there is a new great-power competition among the United States, Russia, and China, as they have shown a renewed interest in modernizing their nuclear arsenals while reaffirming the centrality of nuclear weapons in their internationalsecurity policy and nuclear strategy. There is an impending multipolar nuclear arms race while important nuclear-arms-control treaties negotiated during the Cold War, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, have disappeared. The combination of the return to great-power rivalry, the deterioration of the international-security environment since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and aggressive nuclear doctrines creates the danger of nuclear use in regional conflict scenarios. Under these circumstances, can arms control be revived? These two books give an affirmative answer. Despite their important differences, they complement each other and make a significant contribution to the literature on nuclear arms control in the era of nuclear multipolarity. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is the latest book from Michael Krepon, a leading specialist on South Asian security who is the cofounder of the Stimson Center inWashington, DC. The book provides a thorough and intensive historical analysis that starts with a prehistory of nuclear arms control: the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the failed Baruch Plan, how atomic scientists became political actors, and how the enormous anxiety provoked by the first use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was “institutionalized” through deterrence theory. The prehistory chapter ends with the first Soviet nuclear test, in 1949; the US decision to develop the hydrogen bomb; “NSC-68,” a document produced by the US National Security Council that provided “a comprehensive... assessment of the nature of the Soviet threat and what to do about it” (p. 41); and the launch in 1957 of Sputnik, a Russian satellite that could carry a nuclear bomb. The book is divided into seven sections covering the rise of nuclear arms control in the 1950s and 1960s, the pivotal summit meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva in
{"title":"Can nuclear arms control be revived in the era of nuclear multipolarity?","authors":"M. Carranza","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2022.2075643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2022.2075643","url":null,"abstract":"The conventional wisdom is that there is a new great-power competition among the United States, Russia, and China, as they have shown a renewed interest in modernizing their nuclear arsenals while reaffirming the centrality of nuclear weapons in their internationalsecurity policy and nuclear strategy. There is an impending multipolar nuclear arms race while important nuclear-arms-control treaties negotiated during the Cold War, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, have disappeared. The combination of the return to great-power rivalry, the deterioration of the international-security environment since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and aggressive nuclear doctrines creates the danger of nuclear use in regional conflict scenarios. Under these circumstances, can arms control be revived? These two books give an affirmative answer. Despite their important differences, they complement each other and make a significant contribution to the literature on nuclear arms control in the era of nuclear multipolarity. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is the latest book from Michael Krepon, a leading specialist on South Asian security who is the cofounder of the Stimson Center inWashington, DC. The book provides a thorough and intensive historical analysis that starts with a prehistory of nuclear arms control: the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the failed Baruch Plan, how atomic scientists became political actors, and how the enormous anxiety provoked by the first use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was “institutionalized” through deterrence theory. The prehistory chapter ends with the first Soviet nuclear test, in 1949; the US decision to develop the hydrogen bomb; “NSC-68,” a document produced by the US National Security Council that provided “a comprehensive... assessment of the nature of the Soviet threat and what to do about it” (p. 41); and the launch in 1957 of Sputnik, a Russian satellite that could carry a nuclear bomb. The book is divided into seven sections covering the rise of nuclear arms control in the 1950s and 1960s, the pivotal summit meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva in","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42202153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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