Pub Date : 2023-10-23DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2263346
C. Dale Walton
"End times: Elites, counter-elites, and the path of political disintegration." Comparative Strategy, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 Additional informationNotes on contributorsC. Dale WaltonC. Dale Walton (DWalton@lindenwood.edu) is a professor of international relations and Hammond Institute senior fellow at Lindenwood University. His is the author of numerous works, including the books The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam (2002); Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century (2007); and Grand Strategy and the Presidency (2012). He also is one of the coauthors of Understanding Modern Warfare, 2nd ed. (2016).
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Pub Date : 2023-10-23DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2263335
Stephen J. Cimbala
AbstractAlbert Wohlstetter’s seminal essay of the early Cold War years, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” calls for revisiting in the current climate of geopolitics and military technology. The possible emergence of China as a near peer competitor with the United States and Russia in strategic nuclear forces changes the dynamics of nuclear deterrence, arms control and strategic stability in Asia and globally. In addition, future deterrence stability will also be challenged by changes in technology, including hypersonic weapons, improved missile defense capabilities, competition in the cyber and space domains, and the uncertain impacts of game changers such as artificial intelligence and nanotechnology. As well, containment of nuclear weapons spread cannot be guaranteed, given the dissatisfaction of some existing and aspiring nuclear weapons states with the present international order. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2, (1959): pp. 211-34, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1472.html2 Stephen J. Cimbala and Adam B. Lowther, “Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy 41, no. 3 (2022): pp. 282-95, April, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2057736. See also: Col. Stephen Reny, USAF, “Nuclear-Armed Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 4 (2020): pp. 47-76.3 Andrew Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, RUSI Occasional Paper, July 2016), www.rusi.org. See also: Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Thermonuclear Cyberwar,” Journal of Cybersecurity (2017), pp. 1-12, doi:10.1093/cybsec/tyw0174 Dr. Steven Lambakis, Space as a Warfighting Domain: Reshaping Defense Space Policy, National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series, no. 499 (2021) www.nipp.org.5 Henry Sokolski, “Pyongyang Goes Nuclear – This Time in Space,” The National Interest, March 7, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/pyongyang-goes-nuclear%E2%80%94-time-space-2062816 For related discussion, see: Krista Langeland and Derek Grossman, Tailoring Deterrence for China in Space (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA943-1.html7 See CPT Matthew R. Bigelow, “LSCO, PNT, and the Space Domain,” Mad Scientist Laboratory, February 16, 2023, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/434-lsco-pnt-and-the-space-domain/8 For additional discussion on this topic, see: Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Drones of Mass Destruction: Drone Swarms and the Future of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-destruction-drone-swarms-and-the-future-of-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-weapons/. See also: Zachary Kallenborn
沃尔斯泰特对冷战早期的开创性文章《恐怖的微妙平衡》呼吁在当前地缘政治和军事技术的气候下重新审视这一问题。中国可能成为与美国和俄罗斯在战略核力量方面势均力敌的竞争对手，改变了亚洲和全球核威慑、军备控制和战略稳定的动态。此外，未来威慑稳定性也将受到技术变化的挑战，包括高超音速武器、改进的导弹防御能力、网络和空间领域的竞争，以及人工智能和纳米技术等游戏规则改变者的不确定影响。同时，由于一些现有和潜在拥核国家对现行国际秩序的不满，遏制核武器扩散也无法得到保证。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1阿尔伯特·沃尔斯泰特:《恐怖的微妙平衡》，《外交事务》第37期，第2期。(1959): pp. 211-34, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1472.html2 Stephen J. Cimbala和Adam B. Lowther，“高超音速武器和核威慑”，《比较战略》第41期。3 (2022): pp. 282-95，四月，2022,https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2057736。参见:Stephen Reny上校，美国空军，“核武装高超音速武器和核威慑”，《战略研究季刊》，第2期。4(2020): 47-76.3安德鲁·福特，网络威胁和核武器:指挥与控制，安全和战略的新问题(伦敦:皇家联合服务研究所国防与安全研究，入寺偶尔的论文，2016年7月)，www.rusi.org。参见:Erik Gartzke和Jon R. Lindsay，“热核网络战”，网络安全杂志(2017)，第1-12页，doi:10.1093/cybsec/tyw0174。499 (2021) www.nipp.org.5亨利·索科尔斯基，《平壤走向核——这次是在太空》，《国家利益》，2023年3月7日，https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/pyongyang-goes-nuclear%E2%80%94-time-space-2062816相关讨论见:克里斯塔·兰克兰和德里克·格罗斯曼，《在太空为中国量身定制威慑》(加州圣莫尼卡:兰德公司，2021)，https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA943-1.html7见CPT Matthew R. Bigelow，“LSCO, PNT和空间领域”，疯狂科学家实验室，2023年2月16日，https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/434-lsco-pnt-and-the-space-domain/8关于这一主题的更多讨论，见:Zachary Kallenborn和Philipp C. Bleek，“大规模杀伤性无人机:无人机群与核、化学和生物武器的未来，《岩石上的战争》，2019年2月14日，https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-destruction-drone-swarms-and-the-future-of-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-weapons/。参见:Zachary Kallenborn，“迎接未来的大规模杀伤性武器，无人机群”，原子科学家公报，2021年4月5日，https://thebulletin.org/2021/04/meet-the-future-weapon-of-mass-destruction-the-drone-swarm9。例如，参见:George Galdorissi博士和Sam Tangredi博士，“世界末日的算法:当我们将人工智能植入我们的军事武器系统时会发生什么，”向国防部战略多层评估(SMA)计划的报告，2021年4月27日，https://nsiteam.com/?s=algorithms+of+armageddon，以及Vincent Boulanin，“调节军事人工智能将是困难的。《原子科学家公报》，2021年3月3日，https://thebulletin.org/2021/03/regulating-military-ai-will-be-difficult-heres-a-way-forward/10 Nancy a . Youssef，“五角大楼发现，中国不断膨胀的核储备使其成为美国日益增长的竞争对手”，《华尔街日报》，2022年11月29日，https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-swelling-nuclear-stockpile-makes-it-a-growing-rival-to-u-s-pentagon-finds-11669741977。另见:William J. Broad和David E. Sanger，“中国第二个新的核导弹基地，以及关于战略的许多问题”，《纽约时报》，2021年7月6日，https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/26/us/politics/china-nuclear-weapons.html11专家分析，见:Brad Roberts等人，中国作为第二个核对手的崛起:对美国核威慑战略的影响，全球安全研究中心召集的一个研究小组的报告(利弗莫尔，CA)。美国能源部劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室，2023年春季)，https://cgsr.llnl.gov/event-calendar/2023/2023-03-23;Keir A. Lieber和Daryl G. Press，《核三极时代的美国战略与态势》，大西洋理事会，斯考克罗夫特战略与安全中心，2023年4月，https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-strategy-and-force-posture-for-an-era-of-nuclear-tripolarity/;Keith B. Payne和David J。 Trachtenberg，新兴威胁环境中的威慑:不同之处及其重要性，《偶然论文》，第2卷，第8号(Fairfax, VA);国家公共政策研究所，2022年8月，特别是第35-50页)，https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/OP-Vol.-2-No.-8.pdf12詹姆斯·阿克顿，“不要对中国的新核能力感到恐慌”，《华盛顿邮报》，2021年6月30日，http://www.www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/30/dont-panic-about-chinas-new-nuclear-capabilities/13作者估计。感谢James J. Tritten博士使用最初由他开发并随后由作者改编的模型。Tritten博士不对其在这里的使用负责Keith B. Payne和David J. Trachtenberg，新兴威胁环境中的威慑:不同之处及其重要性(弗吉尼亚州费尔法克斯:
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Pub Date : 2023-10-20DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2263344
James J. Wirtz
"Innovating victory: Naval technology in three wars." Comparative Strategy, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames J. WirtzJames J. Wirtz (jwirtz@nps.edu) is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He has recently coauthored an update of Colin Gray’s strategic history, War, Peace and International Relations 3rd edition (Routledge, 2024).
“创新胜利:三次战争中的海军技术”james J. Wirtz (jwirtz@nps.edu)是加州蒙特利海军研究生院的一名国家安全事务教授。他最近与人合著了科林·格雷(Colin Gray)的战略历史的更新版，《战争、和平与国际关系》第三版(劳特利奇出版社，2024年)。
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Pub Date : 2023-10-20DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2263334
James Horncastle
AbstractThe limited studies that focus on the weaponization of refugees typically emphasize how liberal democracies and states with restricted carrying capacity are vulnerable to this tactic. The declining number of liberal democracies globally, the Russian-Ukraine War demonstrating states’ true carrying capacities, and the tactic’s increasing prevalence, however, necessitate a closer examination of their causes. Technological and ideological developments, along with developments in warfare as a result of these changes, mean that the weaponization of refugees is likely to increase, not decrease, in the foreseeable future. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 “Plane Carrying Belarusian Opposition Figure Ordered to Divert to Minsk by President Alexander Lukashenko,” The ABC, May 23, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-24/plane-carrying-opposition-figure-diverted-to-belarus/100159524. Accessed November 22, 2022.2 Robin Emmott, Daphne Psaledakis, and James William, “West Hits Belarus with New Sanctions over Ryanair ‘Piracy,’” Reuters, June 21, 2021, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-06-21/west-hits-belarus-with-new-sanctions-over-ryanair-piracy. Accessed November 22, 2022.3 European Council, “Belarus: EU Imposes Sanctions for Repression and Election Falsification,” October 2, 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/10/02/belarus-eu-imposes-sanctions-for-repression-and-election-falsification/. Accessed November 22, 2022.4 FRONTEX, “Migratory Routes: Eastern Borders Route,” 2022, https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-routes/eastern-borders-route/. Accessed November 22, 2022.5 FRONTEX.6 “Belarus Bringing Hundreds in Trucks to Cross into EU: Poland,” Aljazeera, November 19, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/19/poland-reports-more-belarus-border-crossing-attempts. Accessed November 22, 2022.7 Anna Noryskiewicz, “Migrants and Refugees Caught up in Belarus-EU ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Are Freezing to Death in No Man’s Land,” CBS News, October 8, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poland-belarus-eu-border-migrants-refugees-caught-in-middle-and-dying/. Accessed November 23, 2022.8 “Will Belarus Flood Poland with 50,000 Migrants by Christmas?,” RFE/RL Timeline, December 15, 2002, https://www.rferl.org/a/1142817.html. Accessed November 23, 2022.9 Lorenzo Tondo, “In Limbo: The Refugees Left on the Belarusian-Polish Border – a Photo Essay,” The Guardian, February 8, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/08/in-limbo-refugees-left-on-belarusian-polish-border-eu-frontier-photo-essay. Accessed November 23, 2022.10 See: James Horncastle and Jack MacLennan, “Where Eagles Err: Contemporary Geopolitics and the Future of Western Special Operations,” Special Operations Journal 7, no. 1 (2021): 43-54. Arthur Jennequin, “Turkey and the Weaponization of Syrian Refugees” (Brussels, Belgium: Brussels International Centre, 2020). James Horncastle,
{"title":"Weaponization of refugees: Why now?","authors":"James Horncastle","doi":"10.1080/01495933.2023.2263334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2023.2263334","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe limited studies that focus on the weaponization of refugees typically emphasize how liberal democracies and states with restricted carrying capacity are vulnerable to this tactic. The declining number of liberal democracies globally, the Russian-Ukraine War demonstrating states’ true carrying capacities, and the tactic’s increasing prevalence, however, necessitate a closer examination of their causes. Technological and ideological developments, along with developments in warfare as a result of these changes, mean that the weaponization of refugees is likely to increase, not decrease, in the foreseeable future. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 “Plane Carrying Belarusian Opposition Figure Ordered to Divert to Minsk by President Alexander Lukashenko,” The ABC, May 23, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-24/plane-carrying-opposition-figure-diverted-to-belarus/100159524. Accessed November 22, 2022.2 Robin Emmott, Daphne Psaledakis, and James William, “West Hits Belarus with New Sanctions over Ryanair ‘Piracy,’” Reuters, June 21, 2021, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-06-21/west-hits-belarus-with-new-sanctions-over-ryanair-piracy. Accessed November 22, 2022.3 European Council, “Belarus: EU Imposes Sanctions for Repression and Election Falsification,” October 2, 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/10/02/belarus-eu-imposes-sanctions-for-repression-and-election-falsification/. Accessed November 22, 2022.4 FRONTEX, “Migratory Routes: Eastern Borders Route,” 2022, https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-routes/eastern-borders-route/. Accessed November 22, 2022.5 FRONTEX.6 “Belarus Bringing Hundreds in Trucks to Cross into EU: Poland,” Aljazeera, November 19, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/19/poland-reports-more-belarus-border-crossing-attempts. Accessed November 22, 2022.7 Anna Noryskiewicz, “Migrants and Refugees Caught up in Belarus-EU ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Are Freezing to Death in No Man’s Land,” CBS News, October 8, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poland-belarus-eu-border-migrants-refugees-caught-in-middle-and-dying/. Accessed November 23, 2022.8 “Will Belarus Flood Poland with 50,000 Migrants by Christmas?,” RFE/RL Timeline, December 15, 2002, https://www.rferl.org/a/1142817.html. Accessed November 23, 2022.9 Lorenzo Tondo, “In Limbo: The Refugees Left on the Belarusian-Polish Border – a Photo Essay,” The Guardian, February 8, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/08/in-limbo-refugees-left-on-belarusian-polish-border-eu-frontier-photo-essay. Accessed November 23, 2022.10 See: James Horncastle and Jack MacLennan, “Where Eagles Err: Contemporary Geopolitics and the Future of Western Special Operations,” Special Operations Journal 7, no. 1 (2021): 43-54. Arthur Jennequin, “Turkey and the Weaponization of Syrian Refugees” (Brussels, Belgium: Brussels International Centre, 2020). James Horncastle, ","PeriodicalId":35161,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2263337
Anat Stern, Illai Z. Saltzman
AbstractThe national security realm poses great challenges to senior military officers and civilian officials. These leaders oftentimes attend designated Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions as a prerequisite for their futrue appointments. The article examines how these colleges and universities instill in their graduates the intellectual capacity to effectively engage and solve macro-level and acute strategic challenges as well as employ critical thinking skills to ensure intellectual agility and flexibility. The article compares the Israel National Defense College (INDC) and the National Defense University (NDU) to identify the differences and similarities between the two institutions and explain what it says about the Israeli and the American strategic culture and approach to the future of national security. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Barış Seçkin, “Cohesion of NATO Reinforced by Russian President,” Anadolu Agency, March 4, 2022. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/cohesion-of-nato-reinforced-by-russian-president-defense-college-commandant/2524426 (accessed March 6, 2022).2 “Given their gravity, Henry Kissinger Had jointly addressed the two consequential events,” in Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).3 Carl von Clausewitz (ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret), On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 146.4 John B. Hattendorf, “The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective,” in Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, edited by Gregory C. Kennedy, Greg Kennedy, and Keith Neilson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 7.5 John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 50.6 Martin Dempsey, Joint Education: White Paper (July 2012), 4. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_education.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162044-527 (accessed April 18, 2020).7 Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America's Military (London: Routledge, 2013), 2–3.8 We define “senior military officers” as Lt. Col. and above as well as their civilian equivalents.9 Correlli Barnett, “The Education of Military Elites,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 28.10 Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 244.11 Royal College of Defence Studies, https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges-and-schools/royal-college-of-defence-studies/ (accessed August 5, 2021).12 Victoria Syme-Taylor and Duraid Jalili, “Professional Military Education,” in Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies, edited by David J. Galbreath and John R. Deni (London: Routledge, 2018), 98.13 Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating
摘要国家安全领域对高级军官和文职官员提出了巨大的挑战。这些领导人经常参加指定的联合专业军事教育(JPME)机构，作为他们未来任命的先决条件。本文考察了这些高校如何向毕业生灌输有效参与和解决宏观层面和尖锐战略挑战的智力能力，以及如何运用批判性思维技能来确保智力的敏捷性和灵活性。本文对以色列国防学院(INDC)和国防大学(NDU)进行了比较，以确定这两个机构之间的异同，并解释了以色列和美国的战略文化以及对未来国家安全的态度。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Barış sekin，“俄罗斯总统加强北约凝聚力”，阿纳多卢通讯社，2022年3月4日。https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/cohesion-of-nato-reinforced-by-russian-president-defense-college-commandant/2524426(2022年3月6日访问《危机:剖析两大外交政策危机》(纽约:西蒙和舒斯特出版社，2003年)卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨(编译)迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特)，《战争论》(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社，1976年)，146.4约翰·海登多夫，《历史视角下的军事教育难题》，《军事教育:过去、现在和未来》，由格雷戈里·c·肯尼迪、格雷格·肯尼迪和基思·尼尔森编辑(西港，康涅狄格州:普雷格出版社，2002年)，7.5约翰·韦斯利·马斯兰德和劳伦斯·i·拉德韦，《士兵和学者:军事教育和国家政策》(普林斯顿，新泽西州)。马丁·邓普西:《联合教育:白皮书》(2012年7月)，第4页。https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_education.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162044-527(2020年4月18日访问)Joan Johnson-Freese，《美国军事教育》(伦敦:Routledge出版社，2013)，第2-3.8页。我们将“高级军官”定义为中校及以上级别，以及同等级别的文职人员Correlli Barnett，“军事精英的教育”，《当代史杂志》第2期。3(1967年7月):28.10 Karen Guttieri，“民主国家的专业军事教育”，出自Thomas C. Bruneau和Scott D. Tollefson编辑的《谁守护守护者以及如何守护:民主军民关系》(奥斯汀:德克萨斯大学出版社，2006年)，244.11皇家国防研究学院，https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges-and-schools/royal-college-of-defence-studies/(访问日期:2021年8月5日)Victoria Syme-Taylor和Duraid Jalili，“专业军事教育”，《劳特利奇国防研究手册》，由David J. Galbreath和John R. Deni编辑(伦敦:劳特利奇出版社，2018)，98.13 Joan Johnson-Freese，《美国军事教育》(伦敦:劳特利奇出版社，2013)，90.14 Howard J. wiarda，《文化冲突:国家战争学院的军事Brass vs.平民学者》(马里兰州兰厄姆)。参见Wiarda, A Clash of Cultures，第7.16章，引自Brian J. Doyle，《将批判性思维融入指挥与参谋学院课程》(未发表的硕士论文:美国陆军指挥与总参谋部学院，2008)，51-2.17鉴于他们往往缺乏最终学位或在军队以外的大学或学院教学的经验，现在担任文职教官的退休军官的分类并非没有批评。参见Jennifer Mittelstadt，“太多战争，没有足够的大学”，《作战室》，2018年6月20日。https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/too-much-war-not-enough-college/(2023年3月5日访问)弗洛里纳·c·马泰，“北约，对民主控制的需求和军事效能，罗马尼亚”，见托马斯·c·布鲁诺和弗洛里纳·c·马泰主编的《劳特利奇军民关系手册》(伦敦:劳特利奇出版社，2013年)，326.19作者与新西兰指挥与参谋学院的电子邮件通信，2020年4月21日。129-63(希伯来语这一批评出现在1976年学院重新开放之前编写的报告中。见Keren“历史视角下的国防学院”146-7.22“国防学院重新开放”，Maariv, 1977年9月2日(希伯来文)Keren，“历史视角下的国防学院”，156-60.24对Gabriel Ben-Dor教授和Arnon Sofer教授的采访，2021.8月11日。(希伯来语)26采访教授加布里埃尔本多和教授阿农Sofer, 2021年8月11日。 28 .参见Zeev Schiff, Ehud Yaari，以色列的黎巴嫩战争(纽约:Simon and Schuster, 1984)该方案的军事部分的强度只允许学生获得所需学分的一半，但他们被允许在毕业后在任何以色列大学完成学业多伦·鲁宾，《我自己的路》(Hevel Modi 'in: Kinneret, Zmora Bitan, 2018)， 133-7;Moshe Shamir，“从早期开始到今天的战地指挥官巴拉克计划”，以色列国防军指挥和总参谋部学院50周年庆典，Hagai Golan编辑(特拉维夫:国防部，2004年)，第26-8页(希伯来语);Zeev Drory, Dan Shomron-Subtle Leadership (Rishon Le’zion, Yediot Achronot, 2016)， 323-32;作者专访Arnon Sofer教授，2012.1年8月11日《剑与橄榄:以色列国防军的批判史》(纽约:公共事务出版社，1998)，第251页。33 .作者对Gabriel Ben-Dor的采访，2021.8月11日。Amir Rapaport，“有关注的空间”，以色列国防，2013年9月12日(希伯来文)Gershon Hacohen，《以色列国防学院的课程设置:应该研究什么?》国家安全杂志(2011年9月)，14 - 15(希伯来文).34Sofer曾在国家自主研发中心担任多个职位，包括领导游学项目，并担任研究部门负责人数年。参见阿农·索弗:《动荡时代的特权与影响力尝试》(海法:海肯地缘战略博物馆，2017)，第103-4页。(希伯来文)35阿农·索弗，《国家自主贡献计划:我们应该学习什么?》对奥巴马少将的回答。哈科恩，《国家安全杂志》，第2期。Yossi Baidatz，“作为学习过程的战略:37 Yossi Baidatz，《关于国家安全学习的思考》，《以色列国家安全理论——纪念海法大学25年的安全规划》，2013年5月21日。(希伯来文)38《国家自主贡献的目标》，《国家自主贡献手册》，第43 - 43号。47(2015 - 2020)点国家自主研发中心，2023年1月11日开放申请。(希伯来文)可在线获取:https://www
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Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2263333
Andrew Brown
AbstractAs technology advances, machines will increasingly serve as moral arbiters of difficult and convoluted war tasks. Humanity is already in the dawn of the “Autonomous Revolution” and ethical questions and considerations regarding the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in war cannot be delayed. The use of AI-enabled weaponized drones is a microcosm of the issues that arise. The purpose of this paper is to create and sustain a discussion of the ethics of emerging defense technologies by considering them in the context of mainstream ethical frameworks, analyzing the U.S.’s decision-making and moral justifications to date, and discussing what ethics should be instilled in AI-enabled military drones themselves, if indeed the U.S. decides to further pursue them. AcknowledgmentsThe author thanks Kerry M. Kartchner for his insight on developing the policy options for this article.Disclosure statementThe author reports there are no competing interests to declare.Notes1 Genesis 3:22 (NIV).2 Stephen Hummel and F. John Burpo, “Small Groups, Big Weapons: The Nexus of Emerging Technologies and Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1100991.pdf, 12.3 Edmund F. Byrne, “Making Drones to Kill Civilians: Is It Ethical?” Journal of Business Ethics 147, no. 1 (2018): 83, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45022364.4 Byrne, “Making Drones to Kill,” 84.5 Paul McLeary and Alexander Ward, “U.S. Sending Switchblade Drones to Ukraine in $800 Million Package,” Politico, March 16, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/16/us-sends-switchblade-drones-to-ukraine-00017836.6 Nicola Slawson, “First Thing: Al-Qaeda Leader Killed in US Drone Strike, Joe Biden Says,” The Guardian, August 2, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/02/first-thing-al-qaida-leader-killed-in-us-drone-strike-joe-biden-says.7 Sanjana Varghese, “Mass Drone Attacks in Ukraine Foreshadow the ‘Future of Warfare’,” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/20/mass-drones-are-a-worry-for-the-future-of-warfare.8 Kris Osborn, “Navy Accelerates AI-Enabled, Autonomous Drones,” Warrior Maven, April 25, 2022, https://warriormaven.com/sea/military-drones.9 Amir Husain, “AI Is Shaping the Future of War,” PRISM 9, no. 3 (2021): 51, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48640745.10 “Artificial Intelligence (AI),” IBM, June 3, 2020, https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/what-is-artificial-intelligence.11 Stephan De Spiegeleire, Matthijs Maas, and Tim Sweijs, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense: Strategic Implications for Small- and Medium-Sized Force Providers,” Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, January 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12564.8, 53.12 De Spiegeleire, Maas, and Sweijs, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future,” 45.13 James S. Johnson, “Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 1 (2020): 17–18, https://www.jstor.org/stab
Natasha E. Bajema和Diane DiEuliis，“危险与希望:新兴技术与大规模杀伤性武器”，大规模杀伤性武器研究中心，2016年5月12日，https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Portals/97/Documents/Publications/Articles/2016%20Workshop%20Report%20FINAL%205-12-17.pdf?ver=2017-05-12-105811-853, 17-18.32 Zachary Kallenborn，“大规模杀伤性武器集群:无人机集群是大规模杀伤性武器吗?”START联盟，2021年2月19日，YouTube视频，https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yv-qvnd9-bY, 37:24.33 Zachary Kallenborn，“大规模杀伤性蜂群:宣布武装和完全自主无人机蜂群为大规模杀伤性武器的案例”，西点现代战争研究所，2020年5月28日，https://mwi.usma.edu/swarms-mass-destruction-case-declaring-armed-fully-autonomous-drone-swarms-wmd/.34 Kallenborn，“大规模蜂群。35麦克唐纳和豪厄尔，《温柔地杀死我》114-15.36迈克尔·克拉雷，《五角大楼委员会发布人工智能指导方针》，《今日军备控制》49，第15期。10 (2019): 28, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26867487.37修昔底德:《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》译Richard Crawley(奥克兰:浮动出版社，2008)，598.38 MacDonald和Howell，“轻轻地杀死我”，120.39 GlobalData专题研究，“航空航天和国防中的无人机:宏观经济趋势，《陆军技术》，2020年9月28日，2021年12月16日更新，https://www.army-technology.com/comment/drones-aerospace-defence-trends/.40塞缪尔·本德特，《俄罗斯如何将叙利亚用作无人机实验室》，丹尼尔·伍尔福克专访，《国防新闻周刊》，2022年2月28日，00:32,https://www.militarytimes.com/video/2022/02/28/how-russia-used-syria-as-a-uav-laboratory-actionable-intelligence/.41《伦理解释者:义务论，《伦理中心》，2016年2月18日，https://ethics.org.au/ethics-explainer-deontology/.42伦理中心，《伦理解释者:义务论》。43新世界百科全书贡献者，“义务伦理学”，新世界百科全书，2022年7月27日，https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Deontological_ethics.44迈克尔·j·桑德尔，正义:什么是正确的事情?(纽约:Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009)， Kindle, 104.45伦理学中心，《伦理学解释者:义务论》。46 Ali Shakil，“康德的义务伦理学”，七支柱研究所，2013年1月29日，https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/kantian-duty-based-deontological-ethics/.47 Alexander Moseley，“武装部队的正当性”，军事伦理百科全书，2011年4月29日，https://www.militaryethics.org/Justifications-of-the-Armed-Forces/11/.48“伦理解释者:《目的论》，伦理中心，2022年4月4日，https://ethics.org.au/teleology/.49新世界百科全书撰稿人，《目的论伦理》，新世界百科全书，2021年1月20日，https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Teleological_ethics.50阿朗佐·l·汉比，《使用原子弹的决定》，《大英百科全书》，没有日期，https://www.britannica.com/topic/Trumans-decision-to-use-the-bomb-712569/End-game.51 b·肯特·哈里森，《投下原子弹的决定》:个人观察，研究和思考，" SquareTwo 8, no。2(2015年夏季)，https://squaretwo.org/Sq2ArticleHarrisonHiroshima.html.52德里克·艾德，《扔下炸弹:对人类历史上最具破坏性的决定的史学回顾，”汉普顿研究所，2014年6月19日，https://www.hamptonthink.org/read/yp5f8wyasnfn7mncb9r3rztsbw59b7.53马克斯·博特，“‘酷刑报告’与美国价值观”，评论，2014年12月10日，https://www.commentary.org/max-boot/the-torture-report-and-american-values/.54杰弗里·p·丰塔斯，“布什政府的酷刑政策:起源和后果”，《询问杂志/学生脉动》2，第2期。8 (2010)， http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=276.55 Fontas，“布什政府的酷刑”。56 Alberto Gonzales，“关于战俘的日内瓦公约在与基地组织和塔利班冲突中的应用的决定”，备忘录，白宫，总统行政办公室，2002年1月25日，https://nsarchive.wrlc.org/islandora/object/torture%3A2898.57 Eyder Peralta，“酷刑报告”:仔细看看当布什总统知道,”美国国家公共电台,2014年12月16日,https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/12/16/369876047/torture-report-a-closer-look-at-when-and-what-president-bush-knew.58政权·约翰逊,”奥巴马在新书《保卫致命空袭“中东的眼睛,2020年11月16日,https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/obama-defends-deadly-drone-campaign-new-book.59朱莉·Mertus”的危险把汁液广告小独木船和汁液在贝罗,”年会上录(美国国际法学会)100:116 (2006)，http://www.jstor.org/stable/25660073.60 Byrne，“制造无人机杀人”，84.61 Shiri Krebs，“通过无人机的镜子:可视化技术和军事决策，”战争条款，20
{"title":"Ethics, autonomy, and killer drones: Can machines do right?","authors":"Andrew Brown","doi":"10.1080/01495933.2023.2263333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2023.2263333","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractAs technology advances, machines will increasingly serve as moral arbiters of difficult and convoluted war tasks. Humanity is already in the dawn of the “Autonomous Revolution” and ethical questions and considerations regarding the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in war cannot be delayed. The use of AI-enabled weaponized drones is a microcosm of the issues that arise. The purpose of this paper is to create and sustain a discussion of the ethics of emerging defense technologies by considering them in the context of mainstream ethical frameworks, analyzing the U.S.’s decision-making and moral justifications to date, and discussing what ethics should be instilled in AI-enabled military drones themselves, if indeed the U.S. decides to further pursue them. AcknowledgmentsThe author thanks Kerry M. Kartchner for his insight on developing the policy options for this article.Disclosure statementThe author reports there are no competing interests to declare.Notes1 Genesis 3:22 (NIV).2 Stephen Hummel and F. John Burpo, “Small Groups, Big Weapons: The Nexus of Emerging Technologies and Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1100991.pdf, 12.3 Edmund F. Byrne, “Making Drones to Kill Civilians: Is It Ethical?” Journal of Business Ethics 147, no. 1 (2018): 83, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45022364.4 Byrne, “Making Drones to Kill,” 84.5 Paul McLeary and Alexander Ward, “U.S. Sending Switchblade Drones to Ukraine in $800 Million Package,” Politico, March 16, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/16/us-sends-switchblade-drones-to-ukraine-00017836.6 Nicola Slawson, “First Thing: Al-Qaeda Leader Killed in US Drone Strike, Joe Biden Says,” The Guardian, August 2, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/02/first-thing-al-qaida-leader-killed-in-us-drone-strike-joe-biden-says.7 Sanjana Varghese, “Mass Drone Attacks in Ukraine Foreshadow the ‘Future of Warfare’,” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/20/mass-drones-are-a-worry-for-the-future-of-warfare.8 Kris Osborn, “Navy Accelerates AI-Enabled, Autonomous Drones,” Warrior Maven, April 25, 2022, https://warriormaven.com/sea/military-drones.9 Amir Husain, “AI Is Shaping the Future of War,” PRISM 9, no. 3 (2021): 51, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48640745.10 “Artificial Intelligence (AI),” IBM, June 3, 2020, https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/what-is-artificial-intelligence.11 Stephan De Spiegeleire, Matthijs Maas, and Tim Sweijs, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense: Strategic Implications for Small- and Medium-Sized Force Providers,” Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, January 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12564.8, 53.12 De Spiegeleire, Maas, and Sweijs, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future,” 45.13 James S. Johnson, “Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 1 (2020): 17–18, https://www.jstor.org/stab","PeriodicalId":35161,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136079764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2263338
Divy Raghuvanshi
AbstractUnited States space policy has largely reflected the outlook of a major power. The key distinguishing feature of such a state is their willingness to proactively reshape and engage with international regimes and organizations. They do this to protect their strategic goals and national interest. US space policy has historically been shaped by geopolitical tensions and rivalries. Its space policy is an extension of the military doctrines and strategies that it subsequently developed. The article examines different periods since the start of the space race. These periods reflect how US space policy has adapted to meet new challenges. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Theresa Hitchens and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing”, (Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, no. 5 ,2016): iii.2 Hitchens and Johnson-Freese , “Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing”, (Atlantic Council Strategy Paper), iii.3 Zachary Keck, “China Secretly Tested an Anti-Satellite Missile”, The Diplomat, March 19, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-secretly-tested-an-anti-satellite-missile/. (accessed April 12, 2023)4 Zachary Keck, “China Conducted Anti-Satellite Missile Test”, The Diplomat, July 29, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-conducted-anti-satellite-missile-test/. (accessed March 27, 2023)5 Hitchens and Johnson-Freese, “Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing”; ANTONY J. BLINKEN, “Russia Conducts Destructive Anti-Satellite Missile Test”, United States Department of State (blog), November 15, 2021, https://www.state.gov/russia-conducts-destructive-anti-satellite-missile-test/. (accessed July 20, 2023)6 “Department of Defense Establishes U.S. Space Force”, U.S. Department of Defense, December 20, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2045981/department-of-defense-establishes-us-space-force/ (accessed April 18, 2023)7 Eytan Tepper, “The First Space-Cyber War and the Need for New Regimes and Policies”, (Centre for International Governance Innovation, no. CIGI Policy Brief No. 173, 2022), 2 https://www.cigionline.org/publications/the-first-space-cyber-war-and-the-need-for-new-regimes-and-policies/. (accessed July 17, 2023)8 Patrick Howell O’Neill, “Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour before the Ukraine Invasion”, MIT Technology Review, May 10, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/05/10/1051973/russia-hack-viasat-satellite-ukraine-invasion/. (accessed June 26, 2022)9 Tom Simonite, “How Starlink Scrambled to Keep Ukraine Online”, Wired (blog), May 11, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/starlink-ukraine-internet/. (accessed June 26, 2022)10 ‘Statement by Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation Mr. Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) in the First Committee of the 77th Se
62“概况介绍:哈里斯副总统推进太空国家安全规范”，白宫，“概况介绍:哈里斯副总统推进太空国家安全规范”(白宫，2022年4月18日)，https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/。(获取于2023年4月15日)63帕特萨姆，“美国的”卫星群“可以耗尽俄罗斯和中国的反卫星导弹;帮助追踪高超音速武器”，《欧亚时报》，2023年4月8日，https://eurasiantimes.com/us-swarm-of-500-satellites-to-exhaust/。(获取日期:2023年7月1日)64《联合国大会关于破坏性直接上升反卫星导弹试验的决议草案备忘录》(日内瓦:联合国大会，2022年9月21日)，3,https://undocs.org/en/A/AC.294/2022/WP.21.65“军事部门部长备忘录，参谋长联席会议主席，副国防部长，军种首长，作战司令部指挥官，国防部总顾问，国防机构主任”，《太空负责任行为原则》，国防部长，国防部五角大楼华盛顿，Dc 20101 -1000，https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/23/2002809598/-1/-1/0/TENETS-OF-RESPONSIBLE-BEHAVIOR-IN-SPACE.PDF(2023年4月18日访问)66 Daryl G. Kimball，“美国致力于禁止反卫星”，军备控制协会，2022年5月，https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-05/news/us-commits-asat-ban.Additional信息撰稿人说明迪维·拉古万什迪维·拉古万什(divyraghuvanshi@outlook.com)是甘地纳加尔古吉拉特邦中央大学国家安全研究学院的博士研究生。
{"title":"Evolution of United States’ space policy: An approach of proactive engagement","authors":"Divy Raghuvanshi","doi":"10.1080/01495933.2023.2263338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2023.2263338","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractUnited States space policy has largely reflected the outlook of a major power. The key distinguishing feature of such a state is their willingness to proactively reshape and engage with international regimes and organizations. They do this to protect their strategic goals and national interest. US space policy has historically been shaped by geopolitical tensions and rivalries. Its space policy is an extension of the military doctrines and strategies that it subsequently developed. The article examines different periods since the start of the space race. These periods reflect how US space policy has adapted to meet new challenges. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Theresa Hitchens and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing”, (Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, no. 5 ,2016): iii.2 Hitchens and Johnson-Freese , “Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing”, (Atlantic Council Strategy Paper), iii.3 Zachary Keck, “China Secretly Tested an Anti-Satellite Missile”, The Diplomat, March 19, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-secretly-tested-an-anti-satellite-missile/. (accessed April 12, 2023)4 Zachary Keck, “China Conducted Anti-Satellite Missile Test”, The Diplomat, July 29, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-conducted-anti-satellite-missile-test/. (accessed March 27, 2023)5 Hitchens and Johnson-Freese, “Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing”; ANTONY J. BLINKEN, “Russia Conducts Destructive Anti-Satellite Missile Test”, United States Department of State (blog), November 15, 2021, https://www.state.gov/russia-conducts-destructive-anti-satellite-missile-test/. (accessed July 20, 2023)6 “Department of Defense Establishes U.S. Space Force”, U.S. Department of Defense, December 20, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2045981/department-of-defense-establishes-us-space-force/ (accessed April 18, 2023)7 Eytan Tepper, “The First Space-Cyber War and the Need for New Regimes and Policies”, (Centre for International Governance Innovation, no. CIGI Policy Brief No. 173, 2022), 2 https://www.cigionline.org/publications/the-first-space-cyber-war-and-the-need-for-new-regimes-and-policies/. (accessed July 17, 2023)8 Patrick Howell O’Neill, “Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour before the Ukraine Invasion”, MIT Technology Review, May 10, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/05/10/1051973/russia-hack-viasat-satellite-ukraine-invasion/. (accessed June 26, 2022)9 Tom Simonite, “How Starlink Scrambled to Keep Ukraine Online”, Wired (blog), May 11, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/starlink-ukraine-internet/. (accessed June 26, 2022)10 ‘Statement by Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation Mr. Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) in the First Committee of the 77th Se","PeriodicalId":35161,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136079387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-27DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2263341
Nelly Atlan
AbstractThis article analyses the modalities of China’s combinatory unrestricted warfare. After an investigation of the founding principles of Chinese military thought, the second part of the article is dedicated to the importance of technology in modern warfare and more specifically what Chinese military thinkers called “informatization,” which enables a combinatory unrestricted warfare strategy. Through a geopolitical analysis, the last part of this article specifies the modalities of Chinese combinatory unrestricted warfare applied to China’s security concerns: ensuring Chinese economic development and the preservation of China’s territoriality, including Taiwan and its territories in the SCS (South China Sea) and ECS (East China Sea). Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 22.2 Sangkuk Lee, “China’s Three Warfares: Origins, Applications and Organizations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.8700713 James Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., Seeking the Truth from Facts, A retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era (Santa Monica: Rand, Centre for Asia-Pacific Policy, National Research Division, 2001).4 Ibid., 138.5 John F. Sullivan, “How Translators Choose to Render Sun Tzu,” academia.edu, https://usarmy.academia.edu/JohnSullivan (accessed May 4, 2023).6 William H. Mot and Jae Chang Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture, Shih vs. Li (Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 12.7 According to the Li approach “weapons” are only projectiles, or instruments of war used by “armies” themselves conceived as a collection of men in arms. Therefore, according to the Li approach, strategy is the simple use of a mean to achieve a goal, deprived from any intellectual consideration about the significance of men fighting together , or about what can make them fighting together, that said The meaning may vary depending on Tao or Confucianist thinkers. Mot and Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture, Shih vs. Li, 32.8 President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (November 19, 1863), in This Fiery Trial: The Speeches and Writings of Abraham Lincoln, edited by W. E. Gienapp (Oxford University Press, 2002), 184.9 People's war also called protracted people's war, is a Maoist military strategy developed by the Chinese communist revolutionary leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The basic concept behind people's war is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the countryside (stretching their supply lines) where the population will bleed them dry through a mix of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Press: Peking, 1967), 113–94.10 Mot and Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture, Shih vs. Li, 11.11 Hwy-Chang Moon
2018年春天，多米尼加共和国和布基纳法索同中华人民共和国建交;同年8月，萨尔瓦多同台湾断交。巴拿马、<s:1> tom<s:1>和Príncipe、所罗门群岛和基里巴斯也与台北断交，目前与台湾保持正式外交关系的国家只剩下15个。Paul Haenle和Nathaniel Sher，“佩洛西的台湾之行如何为中美紧张关系设定了新的现状”，卡内基国际和平基金会，2022年8月17日，https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/17/how-pelosi-s-taiwan-visit-has-set-new-status-quo-for-u.s-china-tensions-pub-87696(访问于2023年5月5日)Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga和Jeffrey W. Hornung，中国在社交媒体上的虚假信息努力，打击社交媒体上的外国虚假信息系列(兰德公司，2021年)，38.99 Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen和Ryan C. Maness，网络战略:权力和强制的演变特征(牛津大学出版社，2018年)，150.100 Desmond Ball，“中国网络战争能力”，安全挑战7，第7期。2 (2011): 81, https://www.jstor.com/stable/26461991101同上，147.102格沙内克:政治战争:对抗中国“不战而胜”计划的策略，137.103中国对互联网治理的考虑是希望限制台北当局在网络上的声音，以确保他们在网络空间中获得国际支持的前景不会比在当前的政治环境中更多。法比奥·鲁格主编，《面对网络轴心?》《网络空间中的中国、伊朗、朝鲜、俄罗斯》，ISPI(米兰:意大利外交和国际合作部，2018)，68,https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/23931(2023年5月5日访问)哈罗德等人，中国在社交媒体上的虚假信息，21.105同上，22.106同上，24.107这些亲中国的学者招致了贬义的名字“泛红教授”，(……)实际上已经成为“红色”中共的影响力代理人。(。。)一些泛红人公开诋毁台湾的民主，并向学生们颂扬中华人民共和国的极权主义政权，这些学生将成为明天的教师、教授、外交官、法官、律师、立法者、军官和政策制定者。杰弗瑞·弗里德曼:《美国大战略已死吗?》“国际事务，不。Miranda Priebe, Bryan Rooney, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Jeffrey Martini, Stephanie Pezard，实施约束:美国地区安全政策的变化以实施现实主义大战略(兰德公司，2021)，11。根据兰德专家的说法，“在克制的大战略下，美国将对其利益有一个更狭隘的概念，减少其前沿军事存在，重新谈判或终止其许多现有的安全承诺，解决利益冲突并与其他大国更多地合作，并对使用军事力量有更高的门槛。110同上，50.111同上，55-6.112格林，优势线，安倍晋三时代日本的大战略，103.113同上，114迈克尔·奥汉隆，和平时代的战争艺术，美国的大战略和坚决克制(耶鲁大学出版社，2021)，109。另见Manjeet S. Pardesi，“莫迪在管理不对称竞争中的连续性下的印度对华战略”，《国际政治》(2022)，第115页Philippe Le Corre，“这是中国主导南欧的计划”，https://carnegieendowment.org，最后修改于2018年10月30日，https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/30/this-is-china-s-plan-to-dominate-southern-europe-pub-77621(访问于2023年5月1日)。作者简介:nelly atllan (nelly.atlan@protonmail.com)拥有圣安德鲁斯大学(苏格兰-英国)国际关系博士学位，目前从事混合战争、军事冲突和战略方面的研究。
{"title":"The modalities of China’s combinatory unrestrictive warfare strategy","authors":"Nelly Atlan","doi":"10.1080/01495933.2023.2263341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2023.2263341","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThis article analyses the modalities of China’s combinatory unrestricted warfare. After an investigation of the founding principles of Chinese military thought, the second part of the article is dedicated to the importance of technology in modern warfare and more specifically what Chinese military thinkers called “informatization,” which enables a combinatory unrestricted warfare strategy. Through a geopolitical analysis, the last part of this article specifies the modalities of Chinese combinatory unrestricted warfare applied to China’s security concerns: ensuring Chinese economic development and the preservation of China’s territoriality, including Taiwan and its territories in the SCS (South China Sea) and ECS (East China Sea). Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 22.2 Sangkuk Lee, “China’s Three Warfares: Origins, Applications and Organizations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.8700713 James Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., Seeking the Truth from Facts, A retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era (Santa Monica: Rand, Centre for Asia-Pacific Policy, National Research Division, 2001).4 Ibid., 138.5 John F. Sullivan, “How Translators Choose to Render Sun Tzu,” academia.edu, https://usarmy.academia.edu/JohnSullivan (accessed May 4, 2023).6 William H. Mot and Jae Chang Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture, Shih vs. Li (Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 12.7 According to the Li approach “weapons” are only projectiles, or instruments of war used by “armies” themselves conceived as a collection of men in arms. Therefore, according to the Li approach, strategy is the simple use of a mean to achieve a goal, deprived from any intellectual consideration about the significance of men fighting together , or about what can make them fighting together, that said The meaning may vary depending on Tao or Confucianist thinkers. Mot and Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture, Shih vs. Li, 32.8 President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (November 19, 1863), in This Fiery Trial: The Speeches and Writings of Abraham Lincoln, edited by W. E. Gienapp (Oxford University Press, 2002), 184.9 People's war also called protracted people's war, is a Maoist military strategy developed by the Chinese communist revolutionary leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The basic concept behind people's war is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the countryside (stretching their supply lines) where the population will bleed them dry through a mix of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Press: Peking, 1967), 113–94.10 Mot and Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture, Shih vs. Li, 11.11 Hwy-Chang Moon","PeriodicalId":35161,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135536159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2236493
Lukas Milevski
Abstract Strategic concepts are more than simply academic concepts but must also relate to strategic practice, which affects how we should gauge concept quality. Rather than purely academic measures, strategic concepts must also be judged according to their usefulness for practice. Yet the relationship between general theory and specific practice has hardly been explored, a task this article undertakes. Academic theory generates ad hoc concepts, which are used to build specific theories of victory, which are used to generate orders. The measures by which to judge a concept’s quality depends on where in this multi-phase transference process any concept is located.
{"title":"What makes a good strategic concept?","authors":"Lukas Milevski","doi":"10.1080/01495933.2023.2236493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2023.2236493","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Strategic concepts are more than simply academic concepts but must also relate to strategic practice, which affects how we should gauge concept quality. Rather than purely academic measures, strategic concepts must also be judged according to their usefulness for practice. Yet the relationship between general theory and specific practice has hardly been explored, a task this article undertakes. Academic theory generates ad hoc concepts, which are used to build specific theories of victory, which are used to generate orders. The measures by which to judge a concept’s quality depends on where in this multi-phase transference process any concept is located.","PeriodicalId":35161,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44698884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-28DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2023.2236491
Ilai Z. Saltzman
Abstract Contemporary debates surrounding emerging military technologies and international security tend to focus exclusively on the technical traits of such capabilities in an attempt to determine if, once operational, they will increase the likelihood of armed conflict in the future or not. This article argues, however, that the race to acquire the natural resources and information that are critical for developing, manufacturing, and operating emerging military technologies had become a major source of global discord and determinately contributed to the contemporary great power competition among the United States, China, and Russia.
{"title":"Present tense technological competition: Natural resources, information, and American national security","authors":"Ilai Z. Saltzman","doi":"10.1080/01495933.2023.2236491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2023.2236491","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contemporary debates surrounding emerging military technologies and international security tend to focus exclusively on the technical traits of such capabilities in an attempt to determine if, once operational, they will increase the likelihood of armed conflict in the future or not. This article argues, however, that the race to acquire the natural resources and information that are critical for developing, manufacturing, and operating emerging military technologies had become a major source of global discord and determinately contributed to the contemporary great power competition among the United States, China, and Russia.","PeriodicalId":35161,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49225432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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