Pluralists argue for the distinctness of coinciding objects on the grounds that they have different properties. The grounding problem is the problem of explaining how the supposed difference in properties can arise in the first place. This paper considers this problem as an instance of a more general phenomenon, namely, the problem of dealing with underdetermination in asymmetrical systems admitting of non-trivial automorphisms. It argues in favour of primitivism by developing an account of stochastic grounding that makes room for non-fundamental bruteness and substantially mitigates the costs of primitivism.
{"title":"Coincidence and Supervenience","authors":"R. Bader","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Pluralists argue for the distinctness of coinciding objects on the grounds that they have different properties. The grounding problem is the problem of explaining how the supposed difference in properties can arise in the first place. This paper considers this problem as an instance of a more general phenomenon, namely, the problem of dealing with underdetermination in asymmetrical systems admitting of non-trivial automorphisms. It argues in favour of primitivism by developing an account of stochastic grounding that makes room for non-fundamental bruteness and substantially mitigates the costs of primitivism.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46286813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Metaphysics Θ treats potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια), and many scholars think that Aristotle broaches these topics once he has answered his main questions in Ζ and Η. In Ζ he asked, what is primary being? After arguing in Ζ.1 that substance (οὐσία) is primary being—a being existentially, logically, and epistemologically prior to quantities and qualities and other categorial beings—he devotes the rest of the book to οὐσία itself, investigating what it is, to decide what entities count as primary substances. I differ from the leading interpretative consensus that ΖΗ adequately answer the questions about primary substance, and contend instead that Metaphysics Θ continues the same investigation as ΖΗ and, using δύναμις and ἐνέργεια as tools, arrives at a striking new conception of hylomorphism, different from that in ΖΗ, which enables Aristotle to defend the substantial primacy of living organisms consisting of matter and form.
{"title":"VII—Aristotle’s Hylomorphism Reconceived","authors":"M. Gill","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Metaphysics Θ treats potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια), and many scholars think that Aristotle broaches these topics once he has answered his main questions in Ζ and Η. In Ζ he asked, what is primary being? After arguing in Ζ.1 that substance (οὐσία) is primary being—a being existentially, logically, and epistemologically prior to quantities and qualities and other categorial beings—he devotes the rest of the book to οὐσία itself, investigating what it is, to decide what entities count as primary substances. I differ from the leading interpretative consensus that ΖΗ adequately answer the questions about primary substance, and contend instead that Metaphysics Θ continues the same investigation as ΖΗ and, using δύναμις and ἐνέργεια as tools, arrives at a striking new conception of hylomorphism, different from that in ΖΗ, which enables Aristotle to defend the substantial primacy of living organisms consisting of matter and form.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49013032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between these two strands of thought? This paper makes two claims. First, logic is doubly normative for reasoning because, in addition to constraining the combinations of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may form them. Second, given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, a wide array of logical pluralisms are inconsistent with the normativity of logic as they entail contradictory claims about how agents ought to reason. Thus, if logic is normative for reasoning, these pluralisms are untenable.
{"title":"Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists","authors":"J. Evershed","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between these two strands of thought? This paper makes two claims. First, logic is doubly normative for reasoning because, in addition to constraining the combinations of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may form them. Second, given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, a wide array of logical pluralisms are inconsistent with the normativity of logic as they entail contradictory claims about how agents ought to reason. Thus, if logic is normative for reasoning, these pluralisms are untenable.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47297140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
concepts—and they must learn to manage social emotions that involve comparison, such as winning and losing, envy, and jealousy. Finally—and this is where Kant distinguishes himself from all his predecessors—in order to be able to act morally responsibly, human beings must learn to act as motivated by their practical reason. That is to say, they must be able to act as motivated by moral reasons, by whether or not a certain action is right or wrong, and this is difficult because our animality and ‘self-will’ develop earlier and so easily and strongly motivate us. To put this point in Kantianese, to act morally responsibly is to act consistent with respect for, and insofar as possible supportive of, oneself and others as rational beings, as beings who have the capacity to set ends of their own and consequently must be treated as ends in themselves (not mere means) or as having dignity (a pricelessness). To be able to act as motivated by this ought—to do something just because it is the right thing to do and to refrain from doing something just because it would be wrong—is to have developed the third predisposition, namely to personality (moral responsibility). Developing personality requires us not only to master reasoning, but to heed what our reasoning says about the rightness or wrongness of an action (regardless of what we want to do). It requires us to develop our ‘moral vital force.’ Consequently, it takes us (human beings) a long time to develop our animality, humanity and personality into an integrated whole for which we are able to assume moral responsibility. Moreover, this whole can be divided into two components: one component that constitutes our happiness (rational end-setting grounded on and consistent with our animality and humanity) and one that constitutes our morality (ensuring that our actions are consistent with and supportive of a moral world). The highest good (aim) for us in actual, human lives is therefore to bring these two parts—happiness and morality—into as close a union as possible (TP 8, p. 279, CPrR 5, pp. 110-115) and, hence, also, to bring our ‘natural’ and our ‘moral’ vital forces into harmonious union. In addition to his idea of the predisposition to good, Kant’s theory of human nature contains an account of our propensity to evil. In short, on my preferred interpretation, Kant proposes that evil is something we bring upon ourselves through our capacity for choice (setting ends of our own). Evil is furthermore seen as coming in three degrees—‘frailty,’ ‘impurity’ and ‘depravity’—where moving from one degree to the next, from frailty to impurity or from impurity to depravity, means that we lose our way in life in significantly more complex ways (and, correspondingly, healing becomes more difficult subjectively). More specifically, frailty refers to an instance or an area of our life where we are likely to do wrong, impurity to an emotionally unstable pattern of motivations determining our actions, and depravity to
{"title":"IX—Kant and Arendt on Barbaric and Totalitarian Evil","authors":"Helga Varden","doi":"10.1093/ARISOC/AOAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISOC/AOAB002","url":null,"abstract":"concepts—and they must learn to manage social emotions that involve comparison, such as winning and losing, envy, and jealousy. Finally—and this is where Kant distinguishes himself from all his predecessors—in order to be able to act morally responsibly, human beings must learn to act as motivated by their practical reason. That is to say, they must be able to act as motivated by moral reasons, by whether or not a certain action is right or wrong, and this is difficult because our animality and ‘self-will’ develop earlier and so easily and strongly motivate us. To put this point in Kantianese, to act morally responsibly is to act consistent with respect for, and insofar as possible supportive of, oneself and others as rational beings, as beings who have the capacity to set ends of their own and consequently must be treated as ends in themselves (not mere means) or as having dignity (a pricelessness). To be able to act as motivated by this ought—to do something just because it is the right thing to do and to refrain from doing something just because it would be wrong—is to have developed the third predisposition, namely to personality (moral responsibility). Developing personality requires us not only to master reasoning, but to heed what our reasoning says about the rightness or wrongness of an action (regardless of what we want to do). It requires us to develop our ‘moral vital force.’ Consequently, it takes us (human beings) a long time to develop our animality, humanity and personality into an integrated whole for which we are able to assume moral responsibility. Moreover, this whole can be divided into two components: one component that constitutes our happiness (rational end-setting grounded on and consistent with our animality and humanity) and one that constitutes our morality (ensuring that our actions are consistent with and supportive of a moral world). The highest good (aim) for us in actual, human lives is therefore to bring these two parts—happiness and morality—into as close a union as possible (TP 8, p. 279, CPrR 5, pp. 110-115) and, hence, also, to bring our ‘natural’ and our ‘moral’ vital forces into harmonious union. In addition to his idea of the predisposition to good, Kant’s theory of human nature contains an account of our propensity to evil. In short, on my preferred interpretation, Kant proposes that evil is something we bring upon ourselves through our capacity for choice (setting ends of our own). Evil is furthermore seen as coming in three degrees—‘frailty,’ ‘impurity’ and ‘depravity’—where moving from one degree to the next, from frailty to impurity or from impurity to depravity, means that we lose our way in life in significantly more complex ways (and, correspondingly, healing becomes more difficult subjectively). More specifically, frailty refers to an instance or an area of our life where we are likely to do wrong, impurity to an emotionally unstable pattern of motivations determining our actions, and depravity to ","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42416812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gambling on another person and relying on another person are similar but intuitively distinct phenomena. This paper argues that gambling is distinguished by the stance that it necessarily involves towards the bet-upon conduct. It then contends that, where one has gambled upon the conduct of another, one has no standing to complain against that person for losses that result. This small point may have significant implications for how we think about speculative economic losses.
{"title":"VIII—Gambling on Others and Relying on Others","authors":"N. Cornell","doi":"10.1093/ARISOC/AOAB001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISOC/AOAB001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Gambling on another person and relying on another person are similar but intuitively distinct phenomena. This paper argues that gambling is distinguished by the stance that it necessarily involves towards the bet-upon conduct. It then contends that, where one has gambled upon the conduct of another, one has no standing to complain against that person for losses that result. This small point may have significant implications for how we think about speculative economic losses.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47173419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I show that one of the most fruitful ways of employing paradoxes has been as a philosophical method that forces us to reconsider basic assumptions. After a brief discussion of recent understandings of the notion of paradoxes, I show that Zeno of Elea was the inventor of paradoxes in this sense, against the background of Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ way of argumentation: in contrast to Heraclitus, Zeno’s paradoxes do not ask us to embrace a paradoxical reality; and in contrast to Parmenides, Zeno shows common assumptions to be internally problematic, not just in light of Eleatic positions.
{"title":"VI—Paradoxes as Philosophical Method and Their Zenonian Origins","authors":"B. Sattler","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper I show that one of the most fruitful ways of employing paradoxes has been as a philosophical method that forces us to reconsider basic assumptions. After a brief discussion of recent understandings of the notion of paradoxes, I show that Zeno of Elea was the inventor of paradoxes in this sense, against the background of Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ way of argumentation: in contrast to Heraclitus, Zeno’s paradoxes do not ask us to embrace a paradoxical reality; and in contrast to Parmenides, Zeno shows common assumptions to be internally problematic, not just in light of Eleatic positions.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42813139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What are the prospects for a linguistic approach to ontology? Given that it seems that there are true subject-predicate sentences containing empty names, traditional linguistic approaches to ontology appear to be flawed. I argue that in order to determine what there is, we need to determine which sentences ascribe properties (and relations) to objects, and that there does not appear to be any formal criterion for this. This view is then committed to giving an account of what predicates do in sentences when they do not ascribe properties. I sketch an approach to the varieties of predication.
{"title":"V—The Linguistic Approach to Ontology","authors":"Lee Walters","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What are the prospects for a linguistic approach to ontology? Given that it seems that there are true subject-predicate sentences containing empty names, traditional linguistic approaches to ontology appear to be flawed. I argue that in order to determine what there is, we need to determine which sentences ascribe properties (and relations) to objects, and that there does not appear to be any formal criterion for this. This view is then committed to giving an account of what predicates do in sentences when they do not ascribe properties. I sketch an approach to the varieties of predication.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41366814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60671872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60671912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoaa018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60671804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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