This article presents the sociological typology of crimes developed by Durkheim for his course in criminal sociology of 1892–1893, of which a complete set of notes by his nephew and student Mauss was found among descendants in 2018. It can be broken down into four types of crimes: ataxic (theft, vagrancy), altruistic (homicide), alcoholic (blows and wounds, insults), anomic (fraudulent bankruptcy, swindling). This original typology in many ways announced the typology of suicides that would appear in 1897, and shows Durkheim’s sociological theory at that time, while he was defending his thesis in 1893, at the end of that academic year. It sheds new light on the notions of regulation and integration and suggests the articulation between collective representations and social life, while Durkheim has not yet had his “revelation” (1894–1895). Cet article présente la typologie sociologique des crimes élaborée par Durkheim pour son cours de sociologie criminelle de 1892–1893 dont un jeu de notes complet de son neveu et étudiant Mauss a été retrouvé chez des descendants en 2018. Elle se décompose en quatre types ou espèces de crimes : ataxiques (vols, vagabondage), altruistes (homicides), alcooliques (injures et coups et blessures) et anomiques. Cette typologie inédite préfigure, sur de nombreux aspects, la typologie des suicides qui paraîtra en 1897, et donne à voir la théorie sociologique de Durkheim à cet instant, alors qu’il soutient sa thèse à la fin de cette même année universitaire. Elle éclaire d’un nouveau jour les notions de régulation et d’intégration, alors à l’état de gestation, et donne à penser sur l’articulation entre les représentations collectives et la vie sociale, alors que Durkheim n’a pas encore eu sa « révélation » pour mener à bien son programme de sociologie religieuse (1894–1895).
{"title":"La typologie des crimes de Durkheim dans ses Leçons de sociologie criminelle (1892–1893)","authors":"M.-A. Béra","doi":"10.3167/ds.2021.250109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2021.250109","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents the sociological typology of crimes developed\u0000by Durkheim for his course in criminal sociology of 1892–1893, of\u0000which a complete set of notes by his nephew and student Mauss was\u0000found among descendants in 2018. It can be broken down into four types\u0000of crimes: ataxic (theft, vagrancy), altruistic (homicide), alcoholic (blows\u0000and wounds, insults), anomic (fraudulent bankruptcy, swindling). This\u0000original\u0000typology in many ways announced the typology of suicides that\u0000would appear in 1897, and shows Durkheim’s sociological theory at that\u0000time, while he was defending his thesis in 1893, at the end of that academic\u0000year. It sheds new light on the notions of regulation and integration and\u0000suggests the articulation between collective representations and social life,\u0000while Durkheim has not yet had his “revelation” (1894–1895).\u0000Cet article présente la typologie sociologique des crimes élaborée par Durkheim pour son cours de sociologie criminelle de 1892–1893 dont un jeu de notes complet de son neveu et étudiant Mauss a été retrouvé chez des descendants en 2018. Elle se décompose en quatre types ou espèces de crimes : ataxiques (vols, vagabondage), altruistes (homicides), alcooliques (injures et coups et blessures) et anomiques. Cette typologie inédite préfigure, sur de nombreux aspects, la typologie des suicides qui paraîtra en 1897, et donne à voir la théorie sociologique de Durkheim à cet instant, alors qu’il soutient sa thèse à la fin de cette même année universitaire. Elle éclaire d’un nouveau jour les notions de régulation et d’intégration, alors à l’état de gestation, et donne à penser sur l’articulation entre les représentations collectives et la vie sociale, alors que Durkheim n’a pas encore eu sa « révélation » pour mener à bien son programme de sociologie religieuse (1894–1895).","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41928925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 1950, the cultural anthropologist Alfred Métraux, a student of Marcel Mauss, was appointed to head a new Race Bureau at UNESCO in Paris whose mission was to combat racism with the tools of social science. Métraux had worked in the Americas since the 1930s, and his appointment allowed French social scientists to join the global struggle to remove prejudice ‘from the minds of men’. To what extent did French scholars help shape Métraux’s efforts, given that at the time American sociologists and social psychologists dominated the study of race relations? Booklets commissioned by UNESCO and authored by French and American scientists in the early 1950s suggest that linguistic and conceptual barriers made cross-national discussions of race difficult, but not impossible. Thanks in part to Métraux’s campaign, the social scientific study of race relations in post-war France began earlier than is typically remembered.
{"title":"‘Nothing Is Less Universal than the Idea of Race’","authors":"Alice L. Conklin","doi":"10.3167/ds.2021.250105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2021.250105","url":null,"abstract":"In 1950, the cultural anthropologist Alfred Métraux, a student of Marcel Mauss, was appointed to head a new Race Bureau at UNESCO in Paris whose mission was to combat racism with the tools of social science. Métraux had worked in the Americas since the 1930s, and his appointment allowed French social scientists to join the global struggle to remove prejudice ‘from the minds of men’. To what extent did French scholars help shape Métraux’s efforts, given that at the time American sociologists and social psychologists dominated the study of race relations? Booklets commissioned by UNESCO and authored by French and American scientists in the early 1950s suggest that linguistic and conceptual barriers made cross-national discussions of race difficult, but not impossible. Thanks in part to Métraux’s campaign, the social scientific study of race relations in post-war France began earlier than is typically remembered.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46388702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The phenomenon of sacrifice was a major problem in nineteenth-century social thought about religion for a variety of reasons. These surfaced in a spectacular way in a German trial in which the most prominent Jewish philosopher of the century, the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen, was asked to be an expert witness. The text he produced on the nature of Judaism was widely circulated and influential. It presents what can be taken as the neo-Kantian approach to understanding ritual. But it also reveals the ways in which neo-Kantianism avoided becoming relativistic social science. In this case, it came to the edge and stopped. Cohen’s account is compared to the similar, but ‘empirical’, account of the same material in Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, which completed the transition.
{"title":"From Neo-Kantianism to Durkheimian Sociology","authors":"","doi":"10.3167/ds.2021.250106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2021.250106","url":null,"abstract":"The phenomenon of sacrifice was a major problem in nineteenth-century social thought about religion for a variety of reasons. These surfaced in a spectacular way in a German trial in which the most prominent Jewish philosopher of the century, the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen, was asked to be an expert witness. The text he produced on the nature of Judaism was widely circulated and influential. It presents what can be taken as the neo-Kantian approach to understanding ritual. But it also reveals the ways in which neo-Kantianism avoided becoming relativistic social science. In this case, it came to the edge and stopped. Cohen’s account is compared to the similar, but ‘empirical’, account of the same material in Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, which completed the transition.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44605477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past 20 years, numerous scholars have called upon social scientists to consider the colonial contexts within which sociology, anthropology and ethnology were institutionalised in Europe and beyond. We explain how historical sociologists and historians of international law, sociology and anthropology can develop a global intellectual history of what we call the ‘sciences of the international’ by paying attention to the political ideas of the Durkheimian school of sociology. We situate the political ideas of the central figures explored in this special issue—Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Bronisław Malinowski and Alfred Métraux—in their broader context, analysing their convergence and differences. We also reinterpret the calls made by historians of ideas to ‘provincialise Europe’ or move to a ‘global history’, by studying how epistemologies and political imaginaries continued by sociologists and ethnologists after the colonial era related to imperialist ways of thinking.
{"title":"Decolonising Durkheimian Conceptions of the International","authors":"","doi":"10.3167/ds.2021.250101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2021.250101","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past 20 years, numerous scholars have called upon social scientists to consider the colonial contexts within which sociology, anthropology and ethnology were institutionalised in Europe and beyond. We explain how historical sociologists and historians of international law, sociology and anthropology can develop a global intellectual history of what we call the ‘sciences of the international’ by paying attention to the political ideas of the Durkheimian school of sociology. We situate the political ideas of the central figures explored in this special issue—Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Bronisław Malinowski and Alfred Métraux—in their broader context, analysing their convergence and differences. We also reinterpret the calls made by historians of ideas to ‘provincialise Europe’ or move to a ‘global history’, by studying how epistemologies and political imaginaries continued by sociologists and ethnologists after the colonial era related to imperialist ways of thinking.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43431878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In order to question the modernist common sense of mainstream sociology, epitomised today by the charge of methodological nationalism, this article offers an overall reading of Marcel Mauss’s The Nation. Conceived during the Great War and written mainly in 1920, Mauss’s work radically re-examined both the nation and nationalism from a regenerated sociological viewpoint centered on the relations between societies. Distinguishing between partial relations of exchange and total relations of encounter, Mauss came to discover the gift as a total social fact, seeing it as the traditional unconscious spring of the federative dynamics that had to be reactivated in Europe to associate its nations in a great ‘Inter-nation’ and avoid the risk of a new total war. The Nation, by reviving the original ambition of Émile Durkheim’s sociology to be a way rethinking and reshaping the concepts and institutions of modernity, helps us explore the contradictions and pathologies involved in the concept and history of the nation, in a situation currently marked by the return of nationalism and the quest for a social Europe.
{"title":"The Gift of The Nation","authors":"Francesco Callegaro","doi":"10.3167/ds.2021.250103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2021.250103","url":null,"abstract":"In order to question the modernist common sense of mainstream sociology, epitomised today by the charge of methodological nationalism, this article offers an overall reading of Marcel Mauss’s The Nation. Conceived during the Great War and written mainly in 1920, Mauss’s work radically re-examined both the nation and nationalism from a regenerated sociological viewpoint centered on the relations between societies. Distinguishing between partial relations of exchange and total relations of encounter, Mauss came to discover the gift as a total social fact, seeing it as the traditional unconscious spring of the federative dynamics that had to be reactivated in Europe to associate its nations in a great ‘Inter-nation’ and avoid the risk of a new total war. The Nation, by reviving the original ambition of Émile Durkheim’s sociology to be a way rethinking and reshaping the concepts and institutions of modernity, helps us explore the contradictions and pathologies involved in the concept and history of the nation, in a situation currently marked by the return of nationalism and the quest for a social Europe.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48692315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bronisław Malinowski sought throughout his career to make a scientific contribution to understanding and reforming the international order by making analogies with ‘primitive’ societies. His ethnographic material was important to Marcel Mauss’s internationalist project in The Gift, and can still provide lessons in internationalism. This article examines Malinowski’s ethnographic figuration of ‘the evolution of primitive international law’, and documents a set of intellectual exchanges between him and Mauss. This illuminates an unexpected avenue of Durkheimian influence on British social anthropology and situates Malinowski in contemporary imperial and internationalist debates. Despite Malinowski’s early criticism of Émile Durkheim’s account of ‘collective ideas’, his later writing shows the (unacknowledged) influence of Mauss’s understandings of obligation and intersocial exchange. Unearthing the terms of this exchange between Malinowski and Mauss helps to recover the central normative lesson of the former’s final book and his ethnographic work as a whole – namely, that sovereignty should be dethroned as an organising principle of international order in favour of intersocial exchange and the obligations it produces.
{"title":"Malinowski and Mauss Exchanging Knowledge in Interwar Europe","authors":"Leo Coleman","doi":"10.3167/ds.2021.250104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2021.250104","url":null,"abstract":"Bronisław Malinowski sought throughout his career to make a scientific contribution to understanding and reforming the international order by making analogies with ‘primitive’ societies. His ethnographic material was important to Marcel Mauss’s internationalist project in The Gift, and can still provide lessons in internationalism. This article examines Malinowski’s ethnographic figuration of ‘the evolution of primitive international law’, and documents a set of intellectual exchanges between him and Mauss. This illuminates an unexpected avenue of Durkheimian influence on British social anthropology and situates Malinowski in contemporary imperial and internationalist debates. Despite Malinowski’s early criticism of Émile Durkheim’s account of ‘collective ideas’, his later writing shows the (unacknowledged) influence of Mauss’s understandings of obligation and intersocial exchange. Unearthing the terms of this exchange between Malinowski and Mauss helps to recover the central normative lesson of the former’s final book and his ethnographic work as a whole – namely, that sovereignty should be dethroned as an organising principle of international order in favour of intersocial exchange and the obligations it produces.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43870194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
*Full article is in FrenchEnglish abstract: This article discusses the relationships between sociology and psychology through the dialogue between Georges Dumas and Marcel Mauss about the expression of emotions during the 1920s. Firstly, the aim is to show the affinities of their engagements concerning the disputes between human sciences and philosophy. Secondly, from an analysis of their trajectories, the aim is to show that the positions taken in the debates are associated with the positions psychologists and sociologists took inside the academic field from 1900 to 1930. Finally, the article aims to show that the dialogue between Mauss and Dumas reveals a process of sociologization of psychology rather than a psychologization of sociology, which has produced criticism from psychologists aiming to regain their lost position and from sociologists from the new generation aiming to overcome Durkheimian sociology.French abstract: Il s’agit de discuter les rapports entre la sociologie et la psychologie à travers le dialogue entre Georges Dumas et Marcel Mauss au long des années 1920 sur l’expression des émotions et des sentiments. Le but est d’abord de montrer les affinités entre leurs engagements concernant les combats des sciences de l’homme contre la philosophie. Ensuite, à partir d’une analyse de leurs trajectoires, d’argumenter que leurs prises de position dans ce débat sont associées aux positions que les psychologues et les sociologues ont occupées dans le champ académique entre les années 1900 et 1930. Finalement, il s’agira de montrer que le dialogue entre Mauss et Dumas révèle la sociologisation de la psychologie plutôt que la psychologisation de la sociologie, et que les critiques faites à ce dialogue par les psychologues visent à regagner de l’espace perdu, alors que celles des sociologues de la nouvelle génération visent plutôt à dépasser la sociologie durkheimienne qui inspire ce dialogue.
{"title":"Georges Dumas et Marcel Mauss","authors":"Marcia Consolim","doi":"10.3167/ds.2020.24011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2020.24011","url":null,"abstract":"*Full article is in FrenchEnglish abstract:\u0000This article discusses the relationships between sociology and psychology through the dialogue between Georges Dumas and Marcel Mauss about the expression of emotions during the 1920s. Firstly, the aim is to show the affinities of their engagements concerning the disputes between human sciences and philosophy. Secondly, from an analysis of their trajectories, the aim is to show that the positions taken in the debates are associated with the positions psychologists and sociologists took inside the academic field from 1900 to 1930. Finally, the article aims to show that the dialogue between Mauss and Dumas reveals a process of sociologization of psychology rather than a psychologization of sociology, which has produced criticism from psychologists aiming to regain their lost position and from sociologists from the new generation aiming to overcome Durkheimian sociology.French abstract: \u0000Il s’agit de discuter les rapports entre la sociologie et la psychologie à travers le dialogue entre Georges Dumas et Marcel Mauss au long des années 1920 sur l’expression des émotions et des sentiments. Le but est d’abord de montrer les affinités entre leurs engagements concernant les combats des sciences de l’homme contre la philosophie. Ensuite, à partir d’une analyse de leurs trajectoires, d’argumenter que leurs prises de position dans ce débat sont associées aux positions que les psychologues et les sociologues ont occupées dans le champ académique entre les années 1900 et 1930. Finalement, il s’agira de montrer que le dialogue entre Mauss et Dumas révèle la sociologisation de la psychologie plutôt que la psychologisation de la sociologie, et que les critiques faites à ce dialogue par les psychologues visent à regagner de l’espace perdu, alors que celles des sociologues de la nouvelle génération visent plutôt à dépasser la sociologie durkheimienne qui inspire ce dialogue.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":"24 1","pages":"144-174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44869944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
*Full article is in FrenchFrench abstract: La Doctrine de Durkheim, texte écrit par Halbwachs en 1918, nous éclaire sur la filiation intellectuelle qui les relie l’un à l’autre. En effet, il met en évidence un intérêt qui va s’avérer durable dans l’oeuvre d’Halbwachs : la sociologie de la connaissance, dans la droite ligne de ce que Durkheim présente dans la conclusion des Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Or si Halbwachs insiste sur la portée de l’oeuvre de Durkheim en matière de sociologie religieuse dans le domaine de la connaissance, c’est aussi le seul point sur lequel il se permet dans le texte d’adjoindre un développement personnel, preuve supplémentaire qu’il lui accorde de l’importance. Il est d’accord avec Durkheim pour affirmer que la connaissance consiste en un ensemble de classifications dont l’origine est sociale, et qu’ainsi la pensée conceptuelle répond au même besoin que la pensée capable déjà de classer, des primitifs, si bien qu’entre leur pensée logique et la nôtre, la différence n’est que de degrés et pas de nature. Il s’accorde aussi à dire, à la suite de Durkheim et Mauss, que l’évolution fait passer de classifications totémiques à des classifications spatiales, et à la pensée conceptuelle contemporaine, mais selon lui sans qu’on en sache beaucoup plus sur le passage du 2e au 3e stade de cette évolution. Aussi Halbwachs esquisse-t-il, en guise de complément, un élément de réponse pour combler ce vide, et, ce faisant, révèle une sensibilité qui annonce ses travaux futurs. Aux catégories de la pensée (espace, temps, causalité etc.) déjà étudiées par Durkheim, il ajoute celles de changement et d’individu, dont il va faire usage dans ses travaux ultérieurs pour expliquer ce mouvement de civilisation qu’est le passage des sociétés rurales aux sociétés urbaines.
{"title":"Les deux catégories cachées de La Doctrine de Durkheim","authors":"Jean-Christophe Marcel","doi":"10.3167/ds.2020.240109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2020.240109","url":null,"abstract":"*Full article is in FrenchFrench abstract: \u0000La Doctrine de Durkheim, texte écrit par Halbwachs en 1918, nous éclaire sur la filiation intellectuelle qui les relie l’un à l’autre. En effet, il met en évidence un intérêt qui va s’avérer durable dans l’oeuvre d’Halbwachs : la sociologie de la connaissance, dans la droite ligne de ce que Durkheim présente dans la conclusion des Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Or si Halbwachs insiste sur la portée de l’oeuvre de Durkheim en matière de sociologie religieuse dans le domaine de la connaissance, c’est aussi le seul point sur lequel il se permet dans le texte d’adjoindre un développement personnel, preuve supplémentaire qu’il lui accorde de l’importance. Il est d’accord avec Durkheim pour affirmer que la connaissance consiste en un ensemble de classifications dont l’origine est sociale, et qu’ainsi la pensée conceptuelle répond au même besoin que la pensée capable déjà de classer, des primitifs, si bien qu’entre leur pensée logique et la nôtre, la différence n’est que de degrés et pas de nature. Il s’accorde aussi à dire, à la suite de Durkheim et Mauss, que l’évolution fait passer de classifications totémiques à des classifications spatiales, et à la pensée conceptuelle contemporaine, mais selon lui sans qu’on en sache beaucoup plus sur le passage du 2e au 3e stade de cette évolution. Aussi Halbwachs esquisse-t-il, en guise de complément, un élément de réponse pour combler ce vide, et, ce faisant, révèle une sensibilité qui annonce ses travaux futurs. Aux catégories de la pensée (espace, temps, causalité etc.) déjà étudiées par Durkheim, il ajoute celles de changement et d’individu, dont il va faire usage dans ses travaux ultérieurs pour expliquer ce mouvement de civilisation qu’est le passage des sociétés rurales aux sociétés urbaines.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43644364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
*Full article is in FrenchLa publication de la leçon inédite du cours de physiques des moeurs et du droit de 1899 sur les sanctions pénales permet de mieux comprendre la typologie des sanctions et responsabilités que Durkheim planifiait de déployer dans le cadre de cette dernière partie de l’éthique objective consacrée à la théorie spéciale des sanctions. Nous nous attardons plus particulièrement, dans cet article, sur la réfutation de la définition de la peine par la douleur et sur les arguments que Durkheim amène pour corriger la définition de la peine qui figure dans la DTS. Nous présentons également l’ébauche d’une typologie des sanctions négatives qui figure dans cette leçon et qui montre que la définition sociologique des sanctions pénales passe par leur comparaison avec d’autres sanctions négatives, tant répressives (publiques et privées) que restitutives (civiles). Enfin, nous soulignons l’intérêt qu’il y a à explorer certains éléments du texte, notamment les sanctions positives et l’éthique subjective qui, bien qu’ils y soient peu développés, permettraient sans doute de parfaire notre compréhension de la sociologie de la morale de Durkheim.
{"title":"Leçon 1 du cours","authors":"Françoise Noël","doi":"10.3167/ds.2020.240105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2020.240105","url":null,"abstract":"*Full article is in FrenchLa publication de la leçon inédite du cours de physiques des moeurs et du droit de 1899 sur les sanctions pénales permet de mieux comprendre la typologie des sanctions et responsabilités que Durkheim planifiait de déployer dans le cadre de cette dernière partie de l’éthique objective consacrée à la théorie spéciale des sanctions. Nous nous attardons plus particulièrement, dans cet article, sur la réfutation de la définition de la peine par la douleur et sur les arguments que Durkheim amène pour corriger la définition de la peine qui figure dans la DTS. Nous présentons également l’ébauche d’une typologie des sanctions négatives qui figure dans cette leçon et qui montre que la définition sociologique des sanctions pénales passe par leur comparaison avec d’autres sanctions négatives, tant répressives (publiques et privées) que restitutives (civiles). Enfin, nous soulignons l’intérêt qu’il y a à explorer certains éléments du texte, notamment les sanctions positives et l’éthique subjective qui, bien qu’ils y soient peu développés, permettraient sans doute de parfaire notre compréhension de la sociologie de la morale de Durkheim.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":"24 1","pages":"57-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42054500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
English abstract: It is well known that Durkheim was a major source of influence in most of Boudon’s writings. But his vision of Durkheim has evolved a lot over the years. In the 1960s until the 1990s, he presented Durkheim as a positivist, fairly close to Auguste Comte, and he considered The Rules of the Sociological Method as a mediating work which announced all of the Durkheim’s thought. In his most recent works, Boudon brings an original perspective that Durkheim was an important theorist of rationality.French abstract: Boudon a développé une admiration durable pour Durkheim dont il ne s’est jamais départi. Durkheim n’a jamais cessé en effet d’être pour lui un inspirateur, mais la lecture qu’il en fait a néanmoins évolué au fil du temps. Des années 1960 aux années 1990 il le présente comme un auteur positiviste dont il admire la réflexion sur la scientificité de la sociologie. Après 1990 il le présente comme un précurseur malgré lui de l’individualisme méthodologique, et traduit sa sociologie dans le langage de la théorie de l’action.
{"title":"Boudon's Interpretation of Durkheim Sociology","authors":"R. Leroux","doi":"10.3167/ds.2020.24012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/ds.2020.24012","url":null,"abstract":"English abstract: It is well known that Durkheim was a major source of influence in most of Boudon’s writings. But his vision of Durkheim has evolved a lot over the years. In the 1960s until the 1990s, he presented Durkheim as a positivist, fairly close to Auguste Comte, and he considered The Rules of the Sociological Method as a mediating work which announced all of the Durkheim’s thought. In his most recent works, Boudon brings an original perspective that Durkheim was an important theorist of rationality.French abstract: Boudon a développé une admiration durable pour Durkheim dont il ne s’est jamais départi. Durkheim n’a jamais cessé en effet d’être pour lui un inspirateur, mais la lecture qu’il en fait a néanmoins évolué au fil du temps. Des années 1960 aux années 1990 il le présente comme un auteur positiviste dont il admire la réflexion sur la scientificité de la sociologie. Après 1990 il le présente comme un précurseur malgré lui de l’individualisme méthodologique, et traduit sa sociologie dans le langage de la théorie de l’action.","PeriodicalId":35254,"journal":{"name":"Durkheimian Studies/Etudes durkheimiennes","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41842811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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