We conduct an empirical analysis of a hand-collected sample of 2,376 turnovers of soccer managers in the four major English leagues in the seasons from 1949/50 to 2007/08. While the relation between the probability of a manager being fired and long-term performance remained remarkably stable, both the absolute frequency and the sensitivity of firing decisions on the outcome of recent matches steadily and significantly increased during the six decades covered by our sample. This is likely to reflect the increased level of competition in and economic importance of the English soccer leagues.
{"title":"Forced Manager Turnovers in English Soccer Leagues: A Long-Term Perspective","authors":"Stefano d’Addona, Axel H. Kind","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1966543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1966543","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct an empirical analysis of a hand-collected sample of 2,376 turnovers of soccer managers in the four major English leagues in the seasons from 1949/50 to 2007/08. While the relation between the probability of a manager being fired and long-term performance remained remarkably stable, both the absolute frequency and the sensitivity of firing decisions on the outcome of recent matches steadily and significantly increased during the six decades covered by our sample. This is likely to reflect the increased level of competition in and economic importance of the English soccer leagues.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"1 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130262550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-11-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-005X.2011.00270.x
Guðbjörg Linda Rafnsdóttir, M. Gudmundsdóttir
This paper examines the self‐measured psychosocial work environment among employees working in six Icelandic companies, having similar jobs. Some are surveilled by electronic performance monitoring (EPM) technology and some are not. We find that employees working under EPM technology reported a worse psychosocial work environment than their colleagues.
{"title":"EPM Technology and the Psychosocial Work Environment","authors":"Guðbjörg Linda Rafnsdóttir, M. Gudmundsdóttir","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-005X.2011.00270.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-005X.2011.00270.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the self‐measured psychosocial work environment among employees working in six Icelandic companies, having similar jobs. Some are surveilled by electronic performance monitoring (EPM) technology and some are not. We find that employees working under EPM technology reported a worse psychosocial work environment than their colleagues.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121651680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We econometrically evaluate the performance effects of a six month e-learning programme in a large retail chain with monthly data on sales revenue, for four years using panel regressions. Participants in early cohorts show positive performance effects during training periods that depreciate afterwards. We conclude that offering training on a voluntary basis leads participants with the highest expected idiosyncratic gains and the highest talent to self-select into early participation. As performance effects already unfold during training, our findings put forward the importance of continuous training with close coaching unlike single training incidences.
{"title":"When the Early Bird Catches the Worm: The Impact of Training in Retail","authors":"Christiane Hinerasky, R. Fahr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1948033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1948033","url":null,"abstract":"We econometrically evaluate the performance effects of a six month e-learning programme in a large retail chain with monthly data on sales revenue, for four years using panel regressions. Participants in early cohorts show positive performance effects during training periods that depreciate afterwards. We conclude that offering training on a voluntary basis leads participants with the highest expected idiosyncratic gains and the highest talent to self-select into early participation. As performance effects already unfold during training, our findings put forward the importance of continuous training with close coaching unlike single training incidences.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128253515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The design of incentive schemes that improve quality of care is a central issue for the healthcare sector. Nowadays we observe many pay-for-performance programs, where payment is contingent on meeting indicators of provider effort, but also other alternative strategies have been introduced, for example programs rewarding physicians for participation in diseases management plans. Although it has been recognised that incentive-based remuneration schemes can have an impact on GP behaviour, there is still weak empirical evidence on the extent to which such programs influence health outcomes. We investigate the impact of financial incentives in Regional and Local Health Authority contracts for primary care in the Italian Region Emilia Romagna for the years 2003-05. We focus on avoidable hospitalisations (Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions) for patients affected by type 2 diabetes mellitus, for which the assumption of responsibility and the adoption of clinical guidelines are specifically rewarded. We estimate a panel count data model using a Negative Binomial distribution to test the hypothesis that, other things equal, patients under the responsibility of GPs receiving a higher share of their income through these programs are less likely to experience avoidable hospitalisations. Our findings support the hypothesis that financial transfers may contribute to improve quality of care, even when they are not based on the ex-post verification of performances.
{"title":"The Role of GP’s Compensation Schemes in Diabetes Care: Evidence from Panel Data","authors":"C. Ugolini, Matteo Lippi Bruni, Elisa Lezzi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1873331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1873331","url":null,"abstract":"The design of incentive schemes that improve quality of care is a central issue for the healthcare sector. Nowadays we observe many pay-for-performance programs, where payment is contingent on meeting indicators of provider effort, but also other alternative strategies have been introduced, for example programs rewarding physicians for participation in diseases management plans. Although it has been recognised that incentive-based remuneration schemes can have an impact on GP behaviour, there is still weak empirical evidence on the extent to which such programs influence health outcomes. We investigate the impact of financial incentives in Regional and Local Health Authority contracts for primary care in the Italian Region Emilia Romagna for the years 2003-05. We focus on avoidable hospitalisations (Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions) for patients affected by type 2 diabetes mellitus, for which the assumption of responsibility and the adoption of clinical guidelines are specifically rewarded. We estimate a panel count data model using a Negative Binomial distribution to test the hypothesis that, other things equal, patients under the responsibility of GPs receiving a higher share of their income through these programs are less likely to experience avoidable hospitalisations. Our findings support the hypothesis that financial transfers may contribute to improve quality of care, even when they are not based on the ex-post verification of performances.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125175797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marco Casari, Jingjing Zhang, Christine L. Jackson
It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellectual tasks. We report that in a company takeover experiment, groups placed better bids than individuals and substantially reduced the winner’s curse. This improvement was mostly due to peer pressure over the minority opinion and to learning. Learning took place from interacting and negotiating consensus with others, not simply from observing their bids. When there was disagreement, what prevailed was not the best proposal but the one of the majority. Groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark although they outperformed individuals deciding in isolation.
{"title":"When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? A Company Takeover Experiment","authors":"Marco Casari, Jingjing Zhang, Christine L. Jackson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1873267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1873267","url":null,"abstract":"It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellectual tasks. We report that in a company takeover experiment, groups placed better bids than individuals and substantially reduced the winner’s curse. This improvement was mostly due to peer pressure over the minority opinion and to learning. Learning took place from interacting and negotiating consensus with others, not simply from observing their bids. When there was disagreement, what prevailed was not the best proposal but the one of the majority. Groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark although they outperformed individuals deciding in isolation.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"55 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127419103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Globalization of production has created an environment for labor-management relations that involves international actors and spans countries, going beyond the boundaries of the traditional workspace. The dramatic changes brought about by globalization led to the emergence of new cross-border forms of industrial relations. This paper analyses the case of the International Labour Organization’s Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) project as a transnational instrument to create the institutional space for industrial relations in Cambodia. Based on the principle of social dialogue among the social partners (the national Government and workers’ and employers’ organizations) as well as with global buyers, BFC’s multistakeholder approach reaches beyond the workplace and may be a key instrument of industrial relations because it bridges the gap between the sphere of production and that of consumption. The empirical results reveal some of the particular strengths of the program.
{"title":"Better Factories Cambodia: An Instrument for Improving Industrial Relations in a Transnational Context","authors":"Arianna Rossi, Raymond Robertson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1888404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1888404","url":null,"abstract":"Globalization of production has created an environment for labor-management relations that involves international actors and spans countries, going beyond the boundaries of the traditional workspace. The dramatic changes brought about by globalization led to the emergence of new cross-border forms of industrial relations. This paper analyses the case of the International Labour Organization’s Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) project as a transnational instrument to create the institutional space for industrial relations in Cambodia. Based on the principle of social dialogue among the social partners (the national Government and workers’ and employers’ organizations) as well as with global buyers, BFC’s multistakeholder approach reaches beyond the workplace and may be a key instrument of industrial relations because it bridges the gap between the sphere of production and that of consumption. The empirical results reveal some of the particular strengths of the program.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126556180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper documents gender disparities in labor earnings for sixty-four countries around the world. Disparities are partially attributed to gender differences in observable socio-demographic and job characteristics. These characteristics are used to match males and females such that gender earnings disparities are computed only among individuals with the same characteristics, as in Nopo (2008). After comparing males and females with the same characteristics we found that the earnings gap falls within a range between 8% and 48% of average females' earnings, being more pronounced in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The unexplained earnings gaps are more pronounced among part-time workers and those with low education.
{"title":"Gender Earnings Gaps in the World","authors":"Hugo Nopo, Nancy Daza, Johanna Ramos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1855188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1855188","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents gender disparities in labor earnings for sixty-four countries around the world. Disparities are partially attributed to gender differences in observable socio-demographic and job characteristics. These characteristics are used to match males and females such that gender earnings disparities are computed only among individuals with the same characteristics, as in Nopo (2008). After comparing males and females with the same characteristics we found that the earnings gap falls within a range between 8% and 48% of average females' earnings, being more pronounced in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The unexplained earnings gaps are more pronounced among part-time workers and those with low education.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127729551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Holzmann, Y. Pouget, Milan Vodopivec, Michael Weber
The paper examines severance pay programs around the world by providing the first ever overview of existing programs, examining their historic development, assessing their economic rationale and describing current reform attempts. While a significant part of the paper is devoted to a comprehensive 183 cross country review of existing severance arrangements and their characteristics, the paper goes beyond a mere description. It develops and empirically tests three hypotheses about the economic rationale of the program, namely severance pay being: (i) a primitive income protection program, (ii) an efficiency enhancing human resource instrument, and (iii) a job protection instrument. The paper also reviews the recent reforms of Austria, Chile, Italy, and Korea.
{"title":"Severance Pay Programs Around the World: History, Rationale, Status, and Reforms","authors":"R. Holzmann, Y. Pouget, Milan Vodopivec, Michael Weber","doi":"10.1596/27339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/27339","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines severance pay programs around the world by providing the first ever overview of existing programs, examining their historic development, assessing their economic rationale and describing current reform attempts. While a significant part of the paper is devoted to a comprehensive 183 cross country review of existing severance arrangements and their characteristics, the paper goes beyond a mere description. It develops and empirically tests three hypotheses about the economic rationale of the program, namely severance pay being: (i) a primitive income protection program, (ii) an efficiency enhancing human resource instrument, and (iii) a job protection instrument. The paper also reviews the recent reforms of Austria, Chile, Italy, and Korea.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128941105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Employing a unique dataset with varying grant sizes and exercise prices, we test the competing optimal option incentive models of Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) (HM) and Baker and Hall (2004) (BH) which differ with respect to the impact of CEO productivity on incentive determination and also the treatment of risk aversion and firm risk. Direct testing of the BH model proves more satisfactory than direct testing of the HM model, but given this outcome, it is surprising that the HM model explains a higher proportion of grant abnormal returns than does the BH model. We attribute this outcome to PPS and not the exercise price. Since exercise prices have been shown unrelated to agency problems, we conclude that caution needs to be exercised when prescribing exercise prices to create the optimal incentive, especially for highly risk-averse CEOs and those who are also poorly diversified.
{"title":"A Test of the Incremental Power of CEO Productivity in Optimum Incentive Modelling","authors":"J. Canil, B. Rosser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1785882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785882","url":null,"abstract":"Employing a unique dataset with varying grant sizes and exercise prices, we test the competing optimal option incentive models of Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) (HM) and Baker and Hall (2004) (BH) which differ with respect to the impact of CEO productivity on incentive determination and also the treatment of risk aversion and firm risk. Direct testing of the BH model proves more satisfactory than direct testing of the HM model, but given this outcome, it is surprising that the HM model explains a higher proportion of grant abnormal returns than does the BH model. We attribute this outcome to PPS and not the exercise price. Since exercise prices have been shown unrelated to agency problems, we conclude that caution needs to be exercised when prescribing exercise prices to create the optimal incentive, especially for highly risk-averse CEOs and those who are also poorly diversified.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129011223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The acquisition of physical assets is remarkably distinct from the acquisition of human capital assets. Holding physical asset size fixed, acquisitions involving more employees of the target firms are associated with lower announcement period returns. This effect is particularly stronger in (1) within-industry mergers, (2) cross-state mergers, and (3) mergers involving employees with a higher human capital market value. Each of these conditions suggests that MA that is, controlling for this variable, the relative size of merger is unrelated to announcement period returns. Our finding validates one of the most cited reasons of M&A failures: the employee factor. (Comments welcomed)
{"title":"Employee Factor and M & As","authors":"Surasak Ngammekchai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1785429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785429","url":null,"abstract":"The acquisition of physical assets is remarkably distinct from the acquisition of human capital assets. Holding physical asset size fixed, acquisitions involving more employees of the target firms are associated with lower announcement period returns. This effect is particularly stronger in (1) within-industry mergers, (2) cross-state mergers, and (3) mergers involving employees with a higher human capital market value. Each of these conditions suggests that MA that is, controlling for this variable, the relative size of merger is unrelated to announcement period returns. Our finding validates one of the most cited reasons of M&A failures: the employee factor. (Comments welcomed)","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132129187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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