This paper focuses on health-care assistants as individuals and a sectional group in terms of how they experience the NHS modernisation and skill mix agenda. Empirical material focuses on aspiration, frustration and job satisfaction. Findings report highly sectional work groups which promote populist coping strategies.
{"title":"Health‐Care Assistants, Aspiration, Frustration and Job Satisfaction in the Workplace","authors":"I. Clark","doi":"10.1111/irj.12053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12053","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on health-care assistants as individuals and a sectional group in terms of how they experience the NHS modernisation and skill mix agenda. Empirical material focuses on aspiration, frustration and job satisfaction. Findings report highly sectional work groups which promote populist coping strategies.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127191899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: В статье рассматриваются 4 редко применяемых не традиционных метода оценки персонала – графология, физиогномика, невербальная психодиагностика, случайность. В статье каждый метод рассматривается как фильтр, через который будут проходить соискатели на должность.English Abstract: The article discusses 4 not used traditional personnel evaluation methods: physiognomy, graphology, non-verbal psychological diagnostics and randomness. Each technique is discussed in the article as a filter through which applicants will be held for the post.
{"title":"Нетрадиционные Методы Оценки Персонала (Unconventional Methods of Personnel Evaluation)","authors":"Michail Letyagin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2460729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2460729","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: В статье рассматриваются 4 редко применяемых не традиционных метода оценки персонала – графология, физиогномика, невербальная психодиагностика, случайность. В статье каждый метод рассматривается как фильтр, через который будут проходить соискатели на должность.English Abstract: The article discusses 4 not used traditional personnel evaluation methods: physiognomy, graphology, non-verbal psychological diagnostics and randomness. Each technique is discussed in the article as a filter through which applicants will be held for the post.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"179 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132099519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper studies the short-run and long-run effects of the introduction of a team-oriented Pay-for-Performance, P4P, payment scheme when agents may differ in their degree of intrinsic motivation toward the job. Suppose that new potential employees were able to assess the expected pay-offs of current workers. Then they may modify their approach to work in order to follow the employee type that earned the highest expected pay-off. We show that the definition of the scheme needs to take into consideration the effects produced on the evolution of the motivation of new generations. In particular the desirability and success of a P4P scheme strongly depend on the way incentives are allocated to the members of a team, on the power of the quality-related financial incentive and on the economic and social context in which the scheme is introduced. The analysis is in part motivated by the introduction in UK in 2004 of a P4P scheme for family practitioners in the UK (Quality and Outcomes Framework, QOF) and of a new system of assessing the quality of academic research completed in 2014 (Research Excellence Framework, REF).
{"title":"Evolutionary Efficacy of a Pay for Performance Scheme with Motivated Agents","authors":"F. Lamantia, Mario Pezzino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2426822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2426822","url":null,"abstract":"The paper studies the short-run and long-run effects of the introduction of a team-oriented Pay-for-Performance, P4P, payment scheme when agents may differ in their degree of intrinsic motivation toward the job. Suppose that new potential employees were able to assess the expected pay-offs of current workers. Then they may modify their approach to work in order to follow the employee type that earned the highest expected pay-off. We show that the definition of the scheme needs to take into consideration the effects produced on the evolution of the motivation of new generations. In particular the desirability and success of a P4P scheme strongly depend on the way incentives are allocated to the members of a team, on the power of the quality-related financial incentive and on the economic and social context in which the scheme is introduced. The analysis is in part motivated by the introduction in UK in 2004 of a P4P scheme for family practitioners in the UK (Quality and Outcomes Framework, QOF) and of a new system of assessing the quality of academic research completed in 2014 (Research Excellence Framework, REF).","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"516 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123087894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this paper is to investigate and discuss historical active manager performance relative to the performance of an appropriate market benchmark. Although this subject has been written about extensively, much of the analysis has traditionally been plagued with data quality issues. Specifically, survivorship bias, selection bias, and classification noise within manager performance data are present in any analysis that does not account for them, potentially leading to misleading outcomes. Our analysis takes steps to correct these data quality issues where possible. Using this more representative and appropriate data, this paper uses a number of metrics to analyze the relative performance of active managers over an extensive time period. Our analysis evaluates whether managers have added value historically, if there is a difference across asset classes, and if past relative performance has been indicative of future relative performance (i.e., persistence).
{"title":"Active Manager Performance: Alpha and Persistence","authors":"F. Benham, E. Walsh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2411783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2411783","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to investigate and discuss historical active manager performance relative to the performance of an appropriate market benchmark. Although this subject has been written about extensively, much of the analysis has traditionally been plagued with data quality issues. Specifically, survivorship bias, selection bias, and classification noise within manager performance data are present in any analysis that does not account for them, potentially leading to misleading outcomes. Our analysis takes steps to correct these data quality issues where possible. Using this more representative and appropriate data, this paper uses a number of metrics to analyze the relative performance of active managers over an extensive time period. Our analysis evaluates whether managers have added value historically, if there is a difference across asset classes, and if past relative performance has been indicative of future relative performance (i.e., persistence).","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114938867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accounting literature recognizes that relatively autonomous self-control by subordinates can potentially create organizational value in highly uncertain situations, such as those involving creativity, entrepreneurship, learning, and innovation. The accounting literature, however, has a 50 year history of conflicting assumptions, disagreement, or "debate" about the relevance, reliability, and roles associated with the design of performance measures and performance measurement systems for influencing subordinate self-control. This paper begins to address this debate using the following research strategy. First, interdisciplinary theories are used to develop theory labeled implicit accounting architecture for how performance measures and performance measurement systems function in a highly uncertain emergent learning situation in which subordinates are relied on to self-control. Second, the paper uses the implicit accounting architecture and three rival social psychology theories to develop competing hypotheses about whether and how performance measurement system causal framing influences subordinates’ intrinsic payoffs. Finally, a behavioral economic method and a field experiment are used to test the competing hypotheses in a subordinate self-control situation designed to simulate bottom-up emergent learning. The results provide strong support for one competing social psychology theory that posits a reliable or performance-contingent relationship between performance measurement system causal framing and subordinates' intrinsic payoffs. The implications for practice and theory are discussed.
{"title":"Performance Measurement Systems and Subordinate Self-Control of Emergent Learning","authors":"Casey M. Rowe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312906","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting literature recognizes that relatively autonomous self-control by subordinates can potentially create organizational value in highly uncertain situations, such as those involving creativity, entrepreneurship, learning, and innovation. The accounting literature, however, has a 50 year history of conflicting assumptions, disagreement, or \"debate\" about the relevance, reliability, and roles associated with the design of performance measures and performance measurement systems for influencing subordinate self-control. This paper begins to address this debate using the following research strategy. First, interdisciplinary theories are used to develop theory labeled implicit accounting architecture for how performance measures and performance measurement systems function in a highly uncertain emergent learning situation in which subordinates are relied on to self-control. Second, the paper uses the implicit accounting architecture and three rival social psychology theories to develop competing hypotheses about whether and how performance measurement system causal framing influences subordinates’ intrinsic payoffs. Finally, a behavioral economic method and a field experiment are used to test the competing hypotheses in a subordinate self-control situation designed to simulate bottom-up emergent learning. The results provide strong support for one competing social psychology theory that posits a reliable or performance-contingent relationship between performance measurement system causal framing and subordinates' intrinsic payoffs. The implications for practice and theory are discussed.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131986620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Internal Anomaly Detection in the area of employee procurment cards continues to be an issue within many firms, even large multinational corporations. In this case, the authors observed the manual procedures that were being employed by a firm and are creating detailed scripts imitating and enhancing these processes. This firm oversees over 50,000 employee procuremnt card transactions per month. There are over 55 attributes for each transaction. The data set begins in 2011 and is continually updated at the end of each month. Meanwhile, the firm continues to employ its own current manual fraud detection procedures, as a control setting for this study. Based on initial preliminary results, these scripts are expected to improve the success rate of anomaly detection for this firm, plus greatly ease and accelerate its fraud detection process.This research is important as it contributes to the literature of anomaly detection in continuous auditing and monitoring. By replicating the human processes and judgement procedures on many levels, these scripts can improve the audit detection rate at many firms in the area of employee procurement cards.
{"title":"Expert Knowledge Elicitations in a Procurement Card Environment","authors":"A. Alawadhi, Deniz Appelbaum","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2350588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2350588","url":null,"abstract":"Internal Anomaly Detection in the area of employee procurment cards continues to be an issue within many firms, even large multinational corporations. In this case, the authors observed the manual procedures that were being employed by a firm and are creating detailed scripts imitating and enhancing these processes. This firm oversees over 50,000 employee procuremnt card transactions per month. There are over 55 attributes for each transaction. The data set begins in 2011 and is continually updated at the end of each month. Meanwhile, the firm continues to employ its own current manual fraud detection procedures, as a control setting for this study. Based on initial preliminary results, these scripts are expected to improve the success rate of anomaly detection for this firm, plus greatly ease and accelerate its fraud detection process.This research is important as it contributes to the literature of anomaly detection in continuous auditing and monitoring. By replicating the human processes and judgement procedures on many levels, these scripts can improve the audit detection rate at many firms in the area of employee procurement cards.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122733008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In order to evaluate their capacity and effectiveness, SAIs employ various devices, including reports on their activities and development, evaluations vis-a-vis the ISSAI framework, and national or internationally developed performance indicators. This article refers to the New SAI Performance Measurement Framework, a new assessment model.
{"title":"Adapting Business Practices to the SAI's Environment: Towards a New Performance Measurement Framework","authors":"Georgia N. Kontogeorga","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2427389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2427389","url":null,"abstract":"In order to evaluate their capacity and effectiveness, SAIs employ various devices, including reports on their activities and development, evaluations vis-a-vis the ISSAI framework, and national or internationally developed performance indicators. This article refers to the New SAI Performance Measurement Framework, a new assessment model.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130928377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With reference to the performance management research agenda, this article focuses on the politics of production in food manufacturing and distribution companies in the supermarket supply chain. Burawoy's concept of ‘factory regimes’ is utilised to explore the broader context of labour process change in inter‐linked organisations in the retail supply chain. The article examines the extent to which new despotic or coercive regime characteristics are emerging that weakens the power of both suppliers and labour. In revealing changes in the nature and dynamics of performance regimes within these organisations, the article exposes the connections and linkages between workplaces as distinct moments in the integrated circuit of capital.
{"title":"‘You Monitor Performance at Every Hour’: Labour and the Management of Performance in the Supermarket Supply Chain","authors":"K. Newsome, P. Thompson, J. Commander","doi":"10.1111/ntwe.12000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ntwe.12000","url":null,"abstract":"With reference to the performance management research agenda, this article focuses on the politics of production in food manufacturing and distribution companies in the supermarket supply chain. Burawoy's concept of ‘factory regimes’ is utilised to explore the broader context of labour process change in inter‐linked organisations in the retail supply chain. The article examines the extent to which new despotic or coercive regime characteristics are emerging that weakens the power of both suppliers and labour. In revealing changes in the nature and dynamics of performance regimes within these organisations, the article exposes the connections and linkages between workplaces as distinct moments in the integrated circuit of capital.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"53 370 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126165471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author uses Peter Drucker's framework as a social ecologist to identify changes that have already happened in our understanding of human nature and the impact that they are likely to have on the practice and theory of management. He suggests that the emerging concepts of ecological rationality and embodied cognition will lead a return to Aristotle's concept of phronesis or practical wisdom. This will allow a new discussion of the concept and role of power in organizations. Ethics, judgement and prudence will once again become central to the field.
{"title":"Practical Wisdom: Reinventing Work and Reinventing Organizations by Rediscovering Ourselves","authors":"David K. Hurst","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2186057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2186057","url":null,"abstract":"The author uses Peter Drucker's framework as a social ecologist to identify changes that have already happened in our understanding of human nature and the impact that they are likely to have on the practice and theory of management. He suggests that the emerging concepts of ecological rationality and embodied cognition will lead a return to Aristotle's concept of phronesis or practical wisdom. This will allow a new discussion of the concept and role of power in organizations. Ethics, judgement and prudence will once again become central to the field.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"167 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122041513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Companies can increase executive compensation by allowing dividends to be paid on unvested restricted stocks grants, also known as stealth compensation. Examining all S&P 500 firms over the period 2003–2007, we find that more than half of the dividend paying firms allow this practice. We look at whether this form of compensation reduces agency costs or decreases value for shareholders. We find that CEOs' stealth compensation amounts to an average of $180,000 in additional income, which increases the CEOs' cash compensation and total compensation by 9% and 2% respectively. Firms engaging in stealth compensation have higher dividend payout ratios than those not allowing stealth compensation. For all firms using stealth compensation, there is a reduction in average ROA and Tobin's Q over the long run. However, stealth compensation companies with potential agency issues see a meaningful improvement in their long run performance. For weakly governed companies, stealth compensation may act as a bonding mechanism which may serve to reduce agency costs and therefore increase shareholder value.
{"title":"Stealth Compensation: Do CEOs Increase Their Pay by Influencing Dividend Policy?","authors":"Kristina Minnick, Leonard Rosenthal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1656154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1656154","url":null,"abstract":"Companies can increase executive compensation by allowing dividends to be paid on unvested restricted stocks grants, also known as stealth compensation. Examining all S&P 500 firms over the period 2003–2007, we find that more than half of the dividend paying firms allow this practice. We look at whether this form of compensation reduces agency costs or decreases value for shareholders. We find that CEOs' stealth compensation amounts to an average of $180,000 in additional income, which increases the CEOs' cash compensation and total compensation by 9% and 2% respectively. Firms engaging in stealth compensation have higher dividend payout ratios than those not allowing stealth compensation. For all firms using stealth compensation, there is a reduction in average ROA and Tobin's Q over the long run. However, stealth compensation companies with potential agency issues see a meaningful improvement in their long run performance. For weakly governed companies, stealth compensation may act as a bonding mechanism which may serve to reduce agency costs and therefore increase shareholder value.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"277 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132870739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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