With the globalization of production, the goods-moving sector of the economy has increasing significance.Over half of all imported goods consumed in the U.S. arrive by container ship and are largely moved from the port terminal to the next point in the supply chain by truck. This “port drayage” system employs drivers that work under a particular set of conditions. We look more closely at this sector of the logistics labor force. We replicate and extend studies done on port drayage workers at other U.S. ports based on a survey distributed to port truckers in Jacksonville, Florida. Our quantitative and qualitative results confirm prior studies regarding the most significant work-related challenges facing drivers. These include levels and methods of compensation, delays and bottlenecks, unsafe chassis, and treatment by terminal workers. Finally, we make policy recommendations for improving both the quality of the work and the efficiency of the logistics supply chain.
{"title":"Hauling Containers: Port Drayage Drivers in the Logistics Supply Chain","authors":"David Jaffee, A. Rowley","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1617348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1617348","url":null,"abstract":"With the globalization of production, the goods-moving sector of the economy has increasing significance.Over half of all imported goods consumed in the U.S. arrive by container ship and are largely moved from the port terminal to the next point in the supply chain by truck. This “port drayage” system employs drivers that work under a particular set of conditions. We look more closely at this sector of the logistics labor force. We replicate and extend studies done on port drayage workers at other U.S. ports based on a survey distributed to port truckers in Jacksonville, Florida. Our quantitative and qualitative results confirm prior studies regarding the most significant work-related challenges facing drivers. These include levels and methods of compensation, delays and bottlenecks, unsafe chassis, and treatment by terminal workers. Finally, we make policy recommendations for improving both the quality of the work and the efficiency of the logistics supply chain.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125253377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a case study of Askari Bank using Balanced Scorecard (BSC) as a strategic management system to identify quality and performance issues. The case study utilizes the Hypotheses to explore 1: Profound foundation in term of strategic policies exists or not, 2: Formalized approach is to be acquired by the Management for ensuring better relationships, Internal Communication relationships, Performance Management, Development of Procedures/Policies or not, 3: Working relationships also need to be formalized or not, and 4: Finding the need of human assets through formal trainings.
{"title":"Using Balanced Scorecard (BSC) to Improve Quality and Performance of Askari Bank: A Case Study in Pakistan","authors":"Atif Hussain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1415384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1415384","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a case study of Askari Bank using Balanced Scorecard (BSC) as a strategic management system to identify quality and performance issues. The case study utilizes the Hypotheses to explore 1: Profound foundation in term of strategic policies exists or not, 2: Formalized approach is to be acquired by the Management for ensuring better relationships, Internal Communication relationships, Performance Management, Development of Procedures/Policies or not, 3: Working relationships also need to be formalized or not, and 4: Finding the need of human assets through formal trainings.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129691066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-05-20DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00552.x
Pedro Ortín-Ángel, Lluís Santamaria Sánchez
The heads of R&D departments are those most responsible for the adaptation of firms' human resource management (HRM) practices to the idiosyncrasies of their departments. From their description, this paper analyzes the HRM practices in R&D departments and the adaptation achieved in four different firms. The data suggest that the main adaptations are produced primarily in recruiting and organizing the work of R&D personnel. In contrast to suggestions in the specialized literature, less adaptation is found in other HRM practices analyzed (managerial support and degree of delegation, compensation and career plans). Psychological theories of procedural justice and social comparison can improve our understanding of such results. The organizational structure affects the reference group for such comparisons and, consequently, the R&D managers' capacity to adapt such practices. Based on these arguments, the delegation of HRM practices to R&D departments will enhance the degree of adaptation of such policies.
{"title":"R&D Managers' Adaptation of Firms' HRM Practices","authors":"Pedro Ortín-Ángel, Lluís Santamaria Sánchez","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00552.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00552.x","url":null,"abstract":"The heads of R&D departments are those most responsible for the adaptation of firms' human resource management (HRM) practices to the idiosyncrasies of their departments. From their description, this paper analyzes the HRM practices in R&D departments and the adaptation achieved in four different firms. The data suggest that the main adaptations are produced primarily in recruiting and organizing the work of R&D personnel. In contrast to suggestions in the specialized literature, less adaptation is found in other HRM practices analyzed (managerial support and degree of delegation, compensation and career plans). Psychological theories of procedural justice and social comparison can improve our understanding of such results. The organizational structure affects the reference group for such comparisons and, consequently, the R&D managers' capacity to adapt such practices. Based on these arguments, the delegation of HRM practices to R&D departments will enhance the degree of adaptation of such policies.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116871214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CEO compensation increased steadily these last years, the increase is mainly related to the fraction of compensation derived from stock-options. Moreover, earnings management increased and coincided with the major accounting scandals. We document that there was a significant decline in the ratio of incentive compensation to salary after the passage of SOX. We also show that earnings management decreased after the passage of SOX and we conclude that the opportunistic behaviour of managers, primarily related to incentive compensation, was significantly associated with earnings management in the period preceding SOX.
{"title":"Impact of Sox on CEO Compensation and Earnings Management","authors":"Imen Fakhfakh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1400683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1400683","url":null,"abstract":"CEO compensation increased steadily these last years, the increase is mainly related to the fraction of compensation derived from stock-options. Moreover, earnings management increased and coincided with the major accounting scandals. We document that there was a significant decline in the ratio of incentive compensation to salary after the passage of SOX. We also show that earnings management decreased after the passage of SOX and we conclude that the opportunistic behaviour of managers, primarily related to incentive compensation, was significantly associated with earnings management in the period preceding SOX.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124541584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we review Pay Without Performance by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. The book develops and summarizes the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the U.S., and offers a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing, and systemic reform is needed. This review summarizes the book in some detail and offers some counter-arguments. The book's thesis is that executive compensation practices are bad for shareholders (not "optimal") because they are the product of "managerial power." Managerial power arises because boards of directors at public companies are not independent of executives. Weak compensation committees thus do little to protect the firm in its pay negotiations with the CEO, leading to levels of executive pay that are both inappropriately high and have inappropriately low levels of incentives. The authors offer a four part analysis of CEO pay. First, they describe and critique optimal contracting theory, which posits that executive compensation arrangements are designed to benefit shareholders. Second, they explain managerial power theory, in part through an in-depth analysis of current executive compensation practices. They assert the managerial power theory provides a superior explanation of current practices to the optimal contracting perspective. They also draw the strong implication that if managerial power exists, it means that something is wrong with the contracting process. Third, they claim that CEO compensation does not vary sufficiently with firm performance. They conclude with policy recommendations for changing compensation plans and improving corporate governance, for example by requiring that directors be more independent. We agree that it is useful to consider the effect of managerial power on compensation, but we disagree with their interpretation of the consequences of this power. It is true that contract structures reflect CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get more pay, but this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that CEO pay is not optimized for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs reform. We show that in many settings where managerial power exists, observed contracts anticipate and try to minimize the costs of this power, and therefore may in fact be written optimally. As a result, the optimal contracting and managerial power perspectives are complementary, and not competing, explanations. We next examine Bebchuk and Fried's claim that U.S. compensation is inefficient "pay without performance." Their analysis focuses on whether CEO annual pay varies with firm performance. While the book conducts an extensive analysis of the incentives provided by annual grants of stock options and equity it largely ignores the main source of CEO incentives: Large holdings of stock and options. These large equity holdings provide powerful performance incentives and ensure th
{"title":"Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?","authors":"J. Core, W. Guay, Randall S. Thomas","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.648648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.648648","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we review Pay Without Performance by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. The book develops and summarizes the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the U.S., and offers a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing, and systemic reform is needed. This review summarizes the book in some detail and offers some counter-arguments. The book's thesis is that executive compensation practices are bad for shareholders (not \"optimal\") because they are the product of \"managerial power.\" Managerial power arises because boards of directors at public companies are not independent of executives. Weak compensation committees thus do little to protect the firm in its pay negotiations with the CEO, leading to levels of executive pay that are both inappropriately high and have inappropriately low levels of incentives. The authors offer a four part analysis of CEO pay. First, they describe and critique optimal contracting theory, which posits that executive compensation arrangements are designed to benefit shareholders. Second, they explain managerial power theory, in part through an in-depth analysis of current executive compensation practices. They assert the managerial power theory provides a superior explanation of current practices to the optimal contracting perspective. They also draw the strong implication that if managerial power exists, it means that something is wrong with the contracting process. Third, they claim that CEO compensation does not vary sufficiently with firm performance. They conclude with policy recommendations for changing compensation plans and improving corporate governance, for example by requiring that directors be more independent. We agree that it is useful to consider the effect of managerial power on compensation, but we disagree with their interpretation of the consequences of this power. It is true that contract structures reflect CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get more pay, but this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that CEO pay is not optimized for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs reform. We show that in many settings where managerial power exists, observed contracts anticipate and try to minimize the costs of this power, and therefore may in fact be written optimally. As a result, the optimal contracting and managerial power perspectives are complementary, and not competing, explanations. We next examine Bebchuk and Fried's claim that U.S. compensation is inefficient \"pay without performance.\" Their analysis focuses on whether CEO annual pay varies with firm performance. While the book conducts an extensive analysis of the incentives provided by annual grants of stock options and equity it largely ignores the main source of CEO incentives: Large holdings of stock and options. These large equity holdings provide powerful performance incentives and ensure th","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132237014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite a growing literature, the relationship between the structure of executive compensation and firm performance is not fully understood. Furthermore, little work has been done on the link between Economic Value Added (EVA) as a measure of firm performance and the form of executive compensation. An examination of the compensation structure and economic value added of 209 companies in 1995 - 1998 provides evidence supporting incentive compensation. Economic Value Added is found to be positively and significantly related to incentive based compensation. Cash based remuneration, was found to be unrelated to EVA performance.
{"title":"An Examination of Economic Value Added and Executive Compensation","authors":"John P. Evans, R. Evans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.313974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.313974","url":null,"abstract":"Despite a growing literature, the relationship between the structure of executive compensation and firm performance is not fully understood. Furthermore, little work has been done on the link between Economic Value Added (EVA) as a measure of firm performance and the form of executive compensation. An examination of the compensation structure and economic value added of 209 companies in 1995 - 1998 provides evidence supporting incentive compensation. Economic Value Added is found to be positively and significantly related to incentive based compensation. Cash based remuneration, was found to be unrelated to EVA performance.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130483987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefanie E. Naumann, N. Bennett, R. Bies, Christopher L. Martin
Research on layoff victims reports that interactional justice judgments influence important work‐related attitudes, such as organizational commitment. In this paper, we build on this emerging literature through an examination of the role that both interactional justice and organizational support have in explaining the organizational commitment of 147 layoff victims at a major manufacturing plant. The results of structural equation analyses supported our hypothesis that organizational support mediates the relationship between interactional justice and organizational commitment.
{"title":"Laid Off, But Still Loyal: The Influence of Perceived Justice and Organizational Support","authors":"Stefanie E. Naumann, N. Bennett, R. Bies, Christopher L. Martin","doi":"10.1108/EB022815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/EB022815","url":null,"abstract":"Research on layoff victims reports that interactional justice judgments influence important work‐related attitudes, such as organizational commitment. In this paper, we build on this emerging literature through an examination of the role that both interactional justice and organizational support have in explaining the organizational commitment of 147 layoff victims at a major manufacturing plant. The results of structural equation analyses supported our hypothesis that organizational support mediates the relationship between interactional justice and organizational commitment.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128052257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An overview of various theories is undertaken to gain some insight into manager – co-worker interaction in the workplace. Social theories are used as well as economic explanations to understand the nature of the interaction between managers and other staff. From this the underpinnings of morality and honesty are discussed as important foundations to what happens in this social phenomenon.
{"title":"Theoretical Underpinnings of Manager – Co-Worker Interaction","authors":"Terry A. Sheridan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2017371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2017371","url":null,"abstract":"An overview of various theories is undertaken to gain some insight into manager – co-worker interaction in the workplace. Social theories are used as well as economic explanations to understand the nature of the interaction between managers and other staff. From this the underpinnings of morality and honesty are discussed as important foundations to what happens in this social phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126573815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.11122/ijmeb.2013.9.20.305
Mehmet Günlük, G. Özer, Murat Özcan
Bu calismanin amaci, muhasebecilerin is memnuniyetlerine iliskin algilamalarinin, orgutsel baglilik ve isten ayrilma egilimleri uzerindeki etkisini incelemektir. Bu amacla Turkiye’nin cesitli cografi bolgelerindeki muhasebe burolarinda (serbest muhasebeci ile serbest muhasebeci ve mali musavirlik burolari) bagimli olarak calisan 1085 muhasebe meslek uyesinin (mesleki stajyer, SM ve SMMM) katilimindan olusan orneklem esas alinmistir. Is memnuniyeti, orgutsel baglilik ile isten ayrilma egilimi degiskenleri arasindaki iliskiler, Meyer ve Allen (1984) tarafindan gelistirilen orgutsel baglilik modeli ele alinarak incelenmistir. Yapilan analiz sonuclari is memnuniyetinin orgute duygusal ve normatif baglilik uzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamli ve pozitif yonde, orgute devam bagliligi uzerinde ise istatistiksel olarak anlamli ve negatif bir etkiye sahip oldugunu gostermektedir. The aim of this study is to search the effects of accountant’s perceptions about job satisfaction over turnover intention and organizational commitment. For this purpose, a sample consisting of 1085 accountancy profession member (Trainers, CA and CPA) who work dependent to accounting firms (CA and CPA firms) from various regions in Turkey is based. Job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover intention relations have been examined by using Meyer and Allen’s three-component model of organizational commitment. To be able to test the relationships among job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover intention, the findings which have been obtained by analyzing the data from the questionnaire that was carried out with random selection,job satisfaction has a statistically meaningful and positive effect on affective and normative commitment to the organization, and meaningful and negative effect on continuous commitment to organization.
{"title":"İş Memnuniyetinin Muhasebecilerin Örgütsel Bağlılık ve İşten Ayrılma Eğilimleri Üzerindeki Etkisi (The Effect of Job Satisfaction on Accountants’ Organizational Commitment and Turnover Intentions)","authors":"Mehmet Günlük, G. Özer, Murat Özcan","doi":"10.11122/ijmeb.2013.9.20.305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11122/ijmeb.2013.9.20.305","url":null,"abstract":"Bu calismanin amaci, muhasebecilerin is memnuniyetlerine iliskin algilamalarinin, orgutsel baglilik ve isten ayrilma egilimleri uzerindeki etkisini incelemektir. Bu amacla Turkiye’nin cesitli cografi bolgelerindeki muhasebe burolarinda (serbest muhasebeci ile serbest muhasebeci ve mali musavirlik burolari) bagimli olarak calisan 1085 muhasebe meslek uyesinin (mesleki stajyer, SM ve SMMM) katilimindan olusan orneklem esas alinmistir. Is memnuniyeti, orgutsel baglilik ile isten ayrilma egilimi degiskenleri arasindaki iliskiler, Meyer ve Allen (1984) tarafindan gelistirilen orgutsel baglilik modeli ele alinarak incelenmistir. Yapilan analiz sonuclari is memnuniyetinin orgute duygusal ve normatif baglilik uzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamli ve pozitif yonde, orgute devam bagliligi uzerinde ise istatistiksel olarak anlamli ve negatif bir etkiye sahip oldugunu gostermektedir. The aim of this study is to search the effects of accountant’s perceptions about job satisfaction over turnover intention and organizational commitment. For this purpose, a sample consisting of 1085 accountancy profession member (Trainers, CA and CPA) who work dependent to accounting firms (CA and CPA firms) from various regions in Turkey is based. Job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover intention relations have been examined by using Meyer and Allen’s three-component model of organizational commitment. To be able to test the relationships among job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover intention, the findings which have been obtained by analyzing the data from the questionnaire that was carried out with random selection,job satisfaction has a statistically meaningful and positive effect on affective and normative commitment to the organization, and meaningful and negative effect on continuous commitment to organization.","PeriodicalId":355618,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Personnel Management (Topic)","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121900094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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