Pub Date : 2018-07-04DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5514
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Nis Grünberg
In February and March 2018 the 3rd Plenum of the 19th CPC Congress and the first meeting of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) were held. During these meetings, important and far-reaching structural reforms were adopted, including constitutional amendments, restructurings of the government and the relationship between Party and state. Structural reforms are common at the outset of a new fi ve-year NPC term, and it is important to understand these reforms as part of an ongoing process. The recent reforms, however, were remarkable in the way they rearranged Party–state relations and bolstered not only the Party but, importantly, Xi Jinping's authority as core leader. This article provides a detailed overview of the major changes in constitution, government structure (ministries and state departments), personnel and Party authority.
{"title":"Structural Reforms and CPC Power after the Third CPC Plenum, and the 1st Session of the 13th NPC","authors":"Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Nis Grünberg","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5514","url":null,"abstract":"In February and March 2018 the 3rd Plenum of the 19th CPC Congress and the first meeting of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) were held. During these meetings, important and far-reaching structural reforms were adopted, including constitutional amendments, restructurings of the government and the relationship between Party and state. Structural reforms are common at the outset of a new fi ve-year NPC term, and it is important to understand these reforms as part of an ongoing process. The recent reforms, however, were remarkable in the way they rearranged Party–state relations and bolstered not only the Party but, importantly, Xi Jinping's authority as core leader. This article provides a detailed overview of the major changes in constitution, government structure (ministries and state departments), personnel and Party authority.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44415992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-04DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5511
Guangdong Xu
China's fi nancial system conforms to the stereotype described by the theory of financial repression. The banking sector is dominated by state ownership, interest rates are controlled by the government and credit allocation is heavily influenced by political factors rather than by commercial motives. The severity of repression in China's financial sector increased to an unprecedented level after 2008, when the Chinese government poured enormous financial resources into the economy as a response to the financial crisis. Financial repression has seriously damaged the sustainability of China's economy by decreasing economic effi ciency. However, financial repression may be maintained in the future despite its harmful effects because for the Chinese Communist Party control over fi nancial resources is a powerful weapon that can be used when necessary to address certain economic, political or social problems that may endanger its rule. Given the importance of fi nancial resources to the rule of the Party, it is diffi cult to imagine that it will eventually adopt a liberalization strategy and relinquish its control over the financial system.
{"title":"China's Financial Repression: Symptoms, Consequences and Causes","authors":"Guangdong Xu","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5511","url":null,"abstract":"China's fi nancial system conforms to the stereotype described by the theory of financial repression. The banking sector is dominated by state ownership, interest rates are controlled by the government and credit allocation is heavily influenced by political factors rather than by commercial motives. The severity of repression in China's financial sector increased to an unprecedented level after 2008, when the Chinese government poured enormous financial resources into the economy as a response to the financial crisis. Financial repression has seriously damaged the sustainability of China's economy by decreasing economic effi ciency. However, financial repression may be maintained in the future despite its harmful effects because for the Chinese Communist Party control over fi nancial resources is a powerful weapon that can be used when necessary to address certain economic, political or social problems that may endanger its rule. Given the importance of fi nancial resources to the rule of the Party, it is diffi cult to imagine that it will eventually adopt a liberalization strategy and relinquish its control over the financial system.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45945538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-04DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5513
Cornelis Lay
This article discusses the phenomenon of volunteer organizations supporting Joko Widodo – better known as Jokowi – in Surakarta and the surrounding area during Indonesia's 2014 presidential election. This research is important because, although volunteerism has been commonly replicated since Barack Obama's victories in the 2008 and 2012 American presidential elections, profi les of volunteers (their identities, motivations and self-defi nitions of their activities) and their activities (how they organize carry out and fund them) are still largely unknown. The article aims to address this lack of research within both the context of political transformation in Indonesia as well as the broader context of volunteerism, and to show how it contributes to democratization in Indonesia. This article reveals that volunteerism as a movement crosses class, age, ideological and gender boundaries, while its organizational form at the local level seems to be based on class, gender and/or age. Through their organizational models, activities, approaches and motives, volunteers have restored activism and volunteerism to Indonesian political processes. Nonetheless, this article cannot be certain of the movement's contribution to the development of Indonesian democracy.
{"title":"Hometown Volunteers: A Case Study of Volunteer Organizations in Surakarta Supporting Joko Widodo's Presidential Campaign","authors":"Cornelis Lay","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V36I1.5513","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the phenomenon of volunteer organizations supporting Joko Widodo – better known as Jokowi – in Surakarta and the surrounding area during Indonesia's 2014 presidential election. This research is important because, although volunteerism has been commonly replicated since Barack Obama's victories in the 2008 and 2012 American presidential elections, profi les of volunteers (their identities, motivations and self-defi nitions of their activities) and their activities (how they organize carry out and fund them) are still largely unknown. The article aims to address this lack of research within both the context of political transformation in Indonesia as well as the broader context of volunteerism, and to show how it contributes to democratization in Indonesia. This article reveals that volunteerism as a movement crosses class, age, ideological and gender boundaries, while its organizational form at the local level seems to be based on class, gender and/or age. Through their organizational models, activities, approaches and motives, volunteers have restored activism and volunteerism to Indonesian political processes. Nonetheless, this article cannot be certain of the movement's contribution to the development of Indonesian democracy.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43564540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-18DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5446
Sarah Chan
The China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is set to become a formidable development programme and its implications will be far reaching for East Asia, including ASEAN and China. It will provide further momentum for intra-Asian investment and trade flows and the implementation of such a strategy will also help to accelerate China's mergers and acquisitions activities in infrastructure, logistics and tourism. The BRI is expected to raise the Renminbi's international use in trade settlement and financing. A considerable amount of financing is estimated to come from Chinese institutions, particularly policy banks such as China Development Bank and a range of government-linked institutions. This article discusses China's funding support and investment to improve regional connectivity and analyses the repercussions of China's financial commitments under the Belt and Road Initiative for East Asia as well as its own economy.
{"title":"The Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for China and East Asian Economies","authors":"Sarah Chan","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5446","url":null,"abstract":"The China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is set to become a formidable development programme and its implications will be far reaching for East Asia, including ASEAN and China. It will provide further momentum for intra-Asian investment and trade flows and the implementation of such a strategy will also help to accelerate China's mergers and acquisitions activities in infrastructure, logistics and tourism. The BRI is expected to raise the Renminbi's international use in trade settlement and financing. A considerable amount of financing is estimated to come from Chinese institutions, particularly policy banks such as China Development Bank and a range of government-linked institutions. This article discusses China's funding support and investment to improve regional connectivity and analyses the repercussions of China's financial commitments under the Belt and Road Initiative for East Asia as well as its own economy.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43235914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-18DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5444
Jesrina Ann Xavier, E. T. Gomez
This article investigates changes in the conduct of ethnic enterprises following the emergence of a new generation of owners with varying class resources and as market conditions transform. The case study method is used to examine the impact of changing class resources and market conditions on ethnicallybased enterprises, exploring the effects of generational transitions among small Indian owned companies in the food industry in Malaysia. The results provide an insight into key changes in the evolution of Indian owned enterprises. They indicate that changes in class resources and market conditions have enabled Indian owned food-based companies to alter their products to fit a larger market, while responding to the demands of a rapidly modernizing society.
{"title":"Ethnic Enterprises, Class Resources and Market Conditions: Indian owned SMEs in Malaysia","authors":"Jesrina Ann Xavier, E. T. Gomez","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5444","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates changes in the conduct of ethnic enterprises following the emergence of a new generation of owners with varying class resources and as market conditions transform. The case study method is used to examine the impact of changing class resources and market conditions on ethnicallybased enterprises, exploring the effects of generational transitions among small Indian owned companies in the food industry in Malaysia. The results provide an insight into key changes in the evolution of Indian owned enterprises. They indicate that changes in class resources and market conditions have enabled Indian owned food-based companies to alter their products to fit a larger market, while responding to the demands of a rapidly modernizing society.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45662257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-18DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5445
Gang Chen
In the study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, the cryptic anticorruption institutions active in non-democratic governance are often understudied. This is largely due to the opaque intra-regime disciplinary inspection process associated with extralegal detentions, as well as the sub-rosa nature of corruption activities. Through research on the institutional implications of Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign, a vital effort for his power consolidation, this article aims to explain the 'authoritarian resilience' of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Based on analysis of the evolution of the CPC's anti-corruption effort in the reform era, focused on the comparison of Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao's respective anti-corruption drives and of institutional flaws in the CPC bureaucracy that stoke high-stakes corruption, the article discusses different institutional imperatives that the top leadership needs to address in a range of political contexts. It also assesses the extent to which the new methods adopted by Xi's graft-busters have been effective in addressing these challenges.
{"title":"Reinforcing Leninist Means of Corruption Control in China: Centralization, Regulatory Changes and Party-State Integration","authors":"Gang Chen","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5445","url":null,"abstract":"In the study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, the cryptic anticorruption institutions active in non-democratic governance are often understudied. This is largely due to the opaque intra-regime disciplinary inspection process associated with extralegal detentions, as well as the sub-rosa nature of corruption activities. Through research on the institutional implications of Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign, a vital effort for his power consolidation, this article aims to explain the 'authoritarian resilience' of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Based on analysis of the evolution of the CPC's anti-corruption effort in the reform era, focused on the comparison of Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao's respective anti-corruption drives and of institutional flaws in the CPC bureaucracy that stoke high-stakes corruption, the article discusses different institutional imperatives that the top leadership needs to address in a range of political contexts. It also assesses the extent to which the new methods adopted by Xi's graft-busters have been effective in addressing these challenges.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46336212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-18DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5447
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, N. Christensen
The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing October 18-24 2017. Leading up to the congress there was intense speculation concerning the new line-up of the most important leadership bodies of the CPC: the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Would the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) continue to consist of seven members, or would it be expanded to nine members, as was the case during Jiang Zemin's era, or would it instead be reduced to five members, as was the case during the late 1980s? Would unwritten rules such as '68 down, 67 up' be observed? Or would veteran leaders such as Wang Qishan (69) continue to serve on the committee? Would Xi Jinping pack the Politburo and the PSC with his own close allies, or would he try to achieve a factional balance observing the interests of former leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao? There was also much speculation concerning Xi Jinping's status. Would the 'Chairman of Everything' have his name and thought written into the CPC Constitution alongside that of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and ahead of his two immediate predecessors? Xi Jinping's report to the Party congress was also awaited with much interest. Such a report is usually a long document setting out the Party's priorities and policy objectives for the next five-year period. Would Xi Jinping's report signal new policy initiatives, and would it outline strategic guidelines reaching beyond 2022? This article examines these questions and assesses the future impact of the Party congress on Chinese politics.
{"title":"The 19th Party Congress: Personnel Changes and Policy Guidelines","authors":"Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, N. Christensen","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V35I2.5447","url":null,"abstract":"The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing October 18-24 2017. Leading up to the congress there was intense speculation concerning the new line-up of the most important leadership bodies of the CPC: the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Would the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) continue to consist of seven members, or would it be expanded to nine members, as was the case during Jiang Zemin's era, or would it instead be reduced to five members, as was the case during the late 1980s? Would unwritten rules such as '68 down, 67 up' be observed? Or would veteran leaders such as Wang Qishan (69) continue to serve on the committee? Would Xi Jinping pack the Politburo and the PSC with his own close allies, or would he try to achieve a factional balance observing the interests of former leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao? There was also much speculation concerning Xi Jinping's status. Would the 'Chairman of Everything' have his name and thought written into the CPC Constitution alongside that of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and ahead of his two immediate predecessors? Xi Jinping's report to the Party congress was also awaited with much interest. Such a report is usually a long document setting out the Party's priorities and policy objectives for the next five-year period. Would Xi Jinping's report signal new policy initiatives, and would it outline strategic guidelines reaching beyond 2022? This article examines these questions and assesses the future impact of the Party congress on Chinese politics.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43817816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-29DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V35I1.5402
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard
{"title":"Minxin Pei, China's Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay","authors":"Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V35I1.5402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V35I1.5402","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41881098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-29DOI: 10.22439/CJAS.V35I1.5399
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, P. Hubbard
Drawing on a database tracking the career of 1,250 top Chinese executives from 1,084 publicly-listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this article analyzes differences in career incentives for subsidiaries controlled by the central government compared to those controlled by local governments. It also considers the differences for executives in listed companies close to the parent group compared to those that are heads in distant subsidiaries. We find that in both SOEs and their publicly listed subsidiaries, administrative experience or political connections appear to increase the likelihood of promotion. However, in the case of central SOE subsidiaries, leaders are more likely to be promoted based on financial performance. For both central and local 'direct' SOE groups age is a significant negative factor for promotion, whereas tenure is a significant positive factor.
{"title":"China's SOE Executives: Drivers of or Obstacles to Reform?","authors":"Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, P. Hubbard","doi":"10.22439/CJAS.V35I1.5399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/CJAS.V35I1.5399","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on a database tracking the career of 1,250 top Chinese executives from 1,084 publicly-listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this article analyzes differences in career incentives for subsidiaries controlled by the central government compared to those controlled by local governments. It also considers the differences for executives in listed companies close to the parent group compared to those that are heads in distant subsidiaries. We find that in both SOEs and their publicly listed subsidiaries, administrative experience or political connections appear to increase the likelihood of promotion. However, in the case of central SOE subsidiaries, leaders are more likely to be promoted based on financial performance. For both central and local 'direct' SOE groups age is a significant negative factor for promotion, whereas tenure is a significant positive factor.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42183053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-29DOI: 10.22439/cjas.v35i1.5398
Roland Howanietz
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, the Chinese government radically adjusted the regulatory framework of the domestic Rare Earth Elements (REEs) sector. This article investigates the reasons for regulatory adjustments and the impact on China's market power. The analysis of long-term REEs price and production trends illustrates four reasons for regulatory adjustments: the China discount, the need for industrial upgrading, growing domestic REEs demand and severe environmental pollution. The analysis of the effects of regulations shows that the restrictive trade regime has increased China's market power and ability to affect prices, which led to a redistribution of global welfare in favour of China. However, this market power is only temporary due to foreign countermeasures such as WTO-based allegations.
{"title":"Changes to the Regulatory Framework of the Chinese Rare Earth Industry after the Global Financial Crisis","authors":"Roland Howanietz","doi":"10.22439/cjas.v35i1.5398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v35i1.5398","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, the Chinese government radically adjusted the regulatory framework of the domestic Rare Earth Elements (REEs) sector. This article investigates the reasons for regulatory adjustments and the impact on China's market power. The analysis of long-term REEs price and production trends illustrates four reasons for regulatory adjustments: the China discount, the need for industrial upgrading, growing domestic REEs demand and severe environmental pollution. The analysis of the effects of regulations shows that the restrictive trade regime has increased China's market power and ability to affect prices, which led to a redistribution of global welfare in favour of China. However, this market power is only temporary due to foreign countermeasures such as WTO-based allegations.","PeriodicalId":35904,"journal":{"name":"Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49542690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}