Pub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1080/0731129x.2023.2275967
Isaac Taylor
AbstractCriminal justice systems have traditionally relied heavily on human decision-making, but new technologies are increasingly supplementing the human role in this sector. This paper considers what general limits need to be placed on the use of algorithms in sentencing decisions. It argues that, even once we can build algorithms that equal human decision-making capacities, strict constraints need to be placed on how they are designed and developed. The act of condemnation is a valuable element of criminal sentencing, and using algorithms in sentencing – even in an advisory role – threatens to undermine this value. The paper argues that a principle of “meaningful public control” should be met in all sentencing decisions if they are to retain their condemnatory status. This principle requires that agents who have standing to act on behalf of the wider political community retain moral responsibility for all sentencing decisions. While this principle does not rule out the use of algorithms, it does require limits on how they are constructed.Keywords: artificial intelligence (AI)criminal justiceFeinbergJoelpunishmentsentencing algorithms [I am very grateful to audiences at the Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Law at Uppsala University; the Political Theory Seminar at Stockholm University; and the workshop on “Ethics of AI in the Public Sector” at KTH Royal Institute of Technology for discussions on previous drafts of this paper; as well as to the anonymous reviewers from Criminal Justice Ethics for very helpful comments.][Disclosure Statement: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s)].Notes1 Danziger, Levav and Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions.”2 Pamela McCroduck suggests that many members of disadvantaged groups may want to take their chances with an impartial computer over a (potentially biased) human judge. See McCorduck, Machines Who Think, 375.3 Yong, “A Popular Algorithm is No Better at Predicting Crimes Than Random People.”4 Angwin, Larson, Mattu, and Kirchner, “Machine Bias.” The question of whether algorithms can avoid objectionable forms of discrimination has been addressed in Davis and Douglas, “Learning to Discriminate: The Perfect Proxy Problem in Artificially Intelligent Criminal Sentencing.”5 Dressel and Farid, “The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism.”6 One worry here is that there is no possible algorithm that can simultaneously meet various intuitively plausible criteria of fairness. See, for example, Chouldechova, “Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact.” I set this issue aside for the purposes of this paper, and assume that a fair algorithm is at least possible to construct. This might be because some of the purported criteria of fairness which cannot be met simultaneously are not, in fact, genuine moral requirements. Cf. Hedden, “On Statistical Criteria of Algorithmic Fairness;” Eva, “Algorithmic Fairness and Base Rate Tracking.”7 For the purposes of this paper, “
摘要刑事司法系统传统上严重依赖于人的决策，但新技术越来越多地补充了人在这一领域的作用。本文考虑了在量刑决策中使用算法需要设置的一般限制。它认为，即使我们能够构建出与人类决策能力相当的算法，也需要对它们的设计和开发方式施加严格的限制。谴责行为是刑事判决的一个有价值的因素，在判决中使用算法- -即使是作为咨询的角色- -有可能破坏这一价值。这篇论文认为，如果要保持量刑的地位，就应该在所有量刑决定中遵守“有意义的公共控制”原则。这一原则要求有资格代表更广泛的政治团体行事的代理人对所有量刑决定负有道德责任。虽然这一原则并不排除算法的使用，但它确实要求对它们的构造方式进行限制。关键词:人工智能(AI)刑事司法feinberg joelpunishment量刑算法我非常感谢在乌普萨拉大学法律哲学高级研讨会上的观众;斯德哥尔摩大学政治理论研讨会;以及在KTH皇家理工学院举办的“公共部门人工智能伦理”研讨会，讨论本文件的先前草稿;以及来自《刑事司法伦理》的匿名评论者，他们的评论非常有帮助。[披露声明:作者未报告潜在的利益冲突]。注1 Danziger, Levav和Avnaim-Pesso，“司法判决中的外来因素”。帕梅拉·麦克罗达克认为，许多弱势群体的成员可能更愿意选择一个公正的计算机，而不是一个(可能有偏见的)人类法官。参见McCorduck，会思考的机器，375.3 Yong，“一个流行的算法在预测犯罪方面并不比随机的人好。”4 Angwin, Larson, Mattu, and Kirchner， <机器偏见>算法是否能避免不良的问题形式的歧视已经在戴维斯和道格拉斯,解决“学习区别:完美的代理问题在人工智能的刑事判决。5 Dressel and Farid，《预测累犯的准确性、公平性和局限性》。这里的一个担忧是，没有可能的算法可以同时满足各种直觉上合理的公平标准。例如，请参阅Chouldechova的“具有不同影响的公平预测”。为了本文的目的，我把这个问题放在一边，并假设至少有可能构建一个公平的算法。这可能是因为一些不能同时满足的所谓公平标准实际上并不是真正的道德要求。参见Hedden，“论算法公平的统计标准”;Eva，“算法公平与基准率跟踪”。“7为本文的目的，“量刑决定”将不仅包括在定罪后立即对罪犯作出的严重程度和量刑类型的初步决定，而且还包括在执行刑罚时作出的类似决定(例如在假释听证会上)人们注意到，关于风险评估分数如何更普遍地用于刑事司法系统的研究存在空白。参见英格兰和威尔士法律协会，“刑事司法系统中的算法”。52.9 Skitka, Mosier和Burdick，《自动化会影响决策吗?》我所说的“客观”是指这些因素不包括个人的评价或心理反应。与主观因素的对比将在适当的时候进行功利主义者边沁认为，减少犯罪是刑事惩罚的唯一合法目的。参见边沁，《道德与立法原则导论》，170-203.12摩尔，《怪罪》，13瑞伯格，《风险与报应》。并非所有的报复主义者都反对基于风险的量刑。参见胡萨克，“为什么法律哲学家(包括报应主义)应该更少抵制基于风险的判决。”14 Cf. Chiao，“预测比例”，341-3.15基于先前司法判决的建议的算法可能为这些因素提供有用的代理。类似的算法在同上被设想过。Jesper Ryberg注意到报应主义者试图证明使用现有案例作为输入的机器学习算法是合理的一个困境。这些算法要么依赖于一个太小而无法给出可接受结果的样本，要么依赖于一个太大而难以构建的样本。看到Ryberg量刑差异和人工智能。16 Abney，“自主机器人与正义战争理论的未来”，347;Wallach and valor，道德机器。17达夫:《惩罚、交流与社区》，第175-202页;《刑法主体的社会化》;《沙漠、民主与量刑改革》。 18报复因素可能被认为具有这种形式。19一直到20世纪70年代，美国刑事司法系统之所以给予法官如此广泛的自由裁量权，是出于工具性的原因。参见Berman，“重新平衡句子的适宜性、公平性和终了性”，157-8.20这可能是基于这样一种观点，即在某种程度上，应得是比较的，在某种意义上，某人应得的(例如，报应主义的适当判决)可能取决于其他人得到了什么。关于这个观点，请参见米勒的《比较与非比较沙漠》。21另一个著名的例子，见Wringe:《惩罚的表达理论》。22 Feinberg:《惩罚的表达功能》，400.23同上，397-8.24同上，404-8。我们可以补充说，谴责可能受到工具主义者(因为谴责的可能性可以作为一种有用的抑制因素)和报复主义者(因为谴责产生的耻辱可能构成严厉对待的一部分，报复主义者认为这是有内在价值的)的欢迎关于表现主义者应该支持对仇恨犯罪判处更严厉刑罚的观点，请见威尔曼:《为仇恨犯罪判处更严厉刑罚辩护》，68.30诺齐克:《哲学解释》，370.31 Cf.谢尔比:《黑暗的贫民窟》，240-241，其中认为是定罪(而不是量刑)阶段涉及表达因素Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 176-9.33关于谴责是有价值的，但不足以证明惩罚本身是正当的观点，见Narayan，“适当的反应和预防性利益”;Hirsh，谴责和制裁，6-19.34应该指出，某些可能被标记为“交际”而不是表达的惩罚理论也可能解释为什么算法的某些使用存在问题。这些理论表明，惩罚应该是一种互惠行为，需要被惩罚者一定程度的理性参与(例如，参见Duff, punishment, Communication, and Community;汉普顿，《惩罚的道德教育理论》)。因为某些算法可能无法向那些被判刑的人解释，理性参与可能是不可能的。虽然这个想法值得进一步注意，但我无法在本文中提供它Fischer和Ravizza，责任和控制，12-4.36，这些不同形式的责任的有用概述，见Jeppsson，“问责制，可回答性和归因性。”37沃森，《责任的两面》，229.38夏基，《自主武器系统、杀手机器人和人类尊严》，《麻雀》，《机器人和尊重》，《麻雀》，《杀手机器人》，67;泰勒，“谁该对杀人机器人负责”，232-3.39这个概念已经成为制定正在进行的关于法律监管的国际谈判的指导原则。见联合国日内瓦办事处，“致命自主武器系统领域新兴技术政府专家组2019年会议报告”，25.40例如，见麻雀，“杀手机器人”。41 Santoni de Sia和van den Hoven，“对自主系统的有意义的人类控制”。42泰勒，《谁该为杀手机器人负责?》234.43可解释性是人工智能伦理的一个被广泛认可的要求，原因与这里概述的不同。参见Floridi和Cowls，“人工智能在社会中的五项原则的统一框架”，7。可解释性的重要性在弗里登伯格的《解释的权利》一书中得到了更广泛的讨论。关于我们希望从算法中获得的可解释性，请参见Chiao，“量刑时的透明度”;Ryberg，“量刑与算法透明度”;Ryberg和Petersen，“量刑与算法准确性与透明度之间的冲突”。44 Roff和Moyes，“有意义的人类控制，人工智能和自主武器。”(45 Cf. Wellman，权利没收与惩罚，49.46)关于惩罚(而不是
{"title":"Justice by Algorithm: The Limits of AI in Criminal Sentencing","authors":"Isaac Taylor","doi":"10.1080/0731129x.2023.2275967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.2023.2275967","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractCriminal justice systems have traditionally relied heavily on human decision-making, but new technologies are increasingly supplementing the human role in this sector. This paper considers what general limits need to be placed on the use of algorithms in sentencing decisions. It argues that, even once we can build algorithms that equal human decision-making capacities, strict constraints need to be placed on how they are designed and developed. The act of condemnation is a valuable element of criminal sentencing, and using algorithms in sentencing – even in an advisory role – threatens to undermine this value. The paper argues that a principle of “meaningful public control” should be met in all sentencing decisions if they are to retain their condemnatory status. This principle requires that agents who have standing to act on behalf of the wider political community retain moral responsibility for all sentencing decisions. While this principle does not rule out the use of algorithms, it does require limits on how they are constructed.Keywords: artificial intelligence (AI)criminal justiceFeinbergJoelpunishmentsentencing algorithms [I am very grateful to audiences at the Higher Seminar in Philosophy of Law at Uppsala University; the Political Theory Seminar at Stockholm University; and the workshop on “Ethics of AI in the Public Sector” at KTH Royal Institute of Technology for discussions on previous drafts of this paper; as well as to the anonymous reviewers from Criminal Justice Ethics for very helpful comments.][Disclosure Statement: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s)].Notes1 Danziger, Levav and Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions.”2 Pamela McCroduck suggests that many members of disadvantaged groups may want to take their chances with an impartial computer over a (potentially biased) human judge. See McCorduck, Machines Who Think, 375.3 Yong, “A Popular Algorithm is No Better at Predicting Crimes Than Random People.”4 Angwin, Larson, Mattu, and Kirchner, “Machine Bias.” The question of whether algorithms can avoid objectionable forms of discrimination has been addressed in Davis and Douglas, “Learning to Discriminate: The Perfect Proxy Problem in Artificially Intelligent Criminal Sentencing.”5 Dressel and Farid, “The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism.”6 One worry here is that there is no possible algorithm that can simultaneously meet various intuitively plausible criteria of fairness. See, for example, Chouldechova, “Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact.” I set this issue aside for the purposes of this paper, and assume that a fair algorithm is at least possible to construct. This might be because some of the purported criteria of fairness which cannot be met simultaneously are not, in fact, genuine moral requirements. Cf. Hedden, “On Statistical Criteria of Algorithmic Fairness;” Eva, “Algorithmic Fairness and Base Rate Tracking.”7 For the purposes of this paper, “","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":"13 15","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135818630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.1080/0731129x.2023.2275966
Gustavo A. Beade
{"title":"Disenfranchisement as Distancing from Offenders?","authors":"Gustavo A. Beade","doi":"10.1080/0731129x.2023.2275966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.2023.2275966","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135871479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2023.2230756
Kai Draper
As a party to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the United States is under an obligation to criminalize all state torture. The aim of this article is to show that the United States has failed to fulfill that obligation and should correct that failure by broadening the respective definitions of “torture” in two federal criminal statutes, the War Crimes Act and the Torture Act. The broader definition that is proposed is formulated with an eye to minimizing ambiguity and vagueness, avoiding both overcriminalization and undercriminalization, and facilitating accurate determinations of guilt or innocence.
{"title":"A Proposal to Criminalize State Torture in the United States","authors":"Kai Draper","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2023.2230756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2023.2230756","url":null,"abstract":"As a party to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the United States is under an obligation to criminalize all state torture. The aim of this article is to show that the United States has failed to fulfill that obligation and should correct that failure by broadening the respective definitions of “torture” in two federal criminal statutes, the War Crimes Act and the Torture Act. The broader definition that is proposed is formulated with an eye to minimizing ambiguity and vagueness, avoiding both overcriminalization and undercriminalization, and facilitating accurate determinations of guilt or innocence.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":"42 1","pages":"133 - 157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41411122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2023.2233331
S. Holmen
One way to seek to reduce the risk of potential offenders engaging in certain types of crime in a public or semi-public area is to make it much more difficult, or even impossible, for them to gain access to the area in question and subject them to a sanction if they do enter the area. This paper considers whether preventive exclusion of this kind should be considered a pro tanto morally impermissible means of crime prevention because it violates the agency of those excluded. Several variants of this agency objection to preventive exclusion are identified and critically assessed. It is argued that none persuasively show preventive exclusion to be pro tanto morally wrong.
{"title":"The Agency Objection to Preventive Exclusion from Public Spaces","authors":"S. Holmen","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2023.2233331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2023.2233331","url":null,"abstract":"One way to seek to reduce the risk of potential offenders engaging in certain types of crime in a public or semi-public area is to make it much more difficult, or even impossible, for them to gain access to the area in question and subject them to a sanction if they do enter the area. This paper considers whether preventive exclusion of this kind should be considered a pro tanto morally impermissible means of crime prevention because it violates the agency of those excluded. Several variants of this agency objection to preventive exclusion are identified and critically assessed. It is argued that none persuasively show preventive exclusion to be pro tanto morally wrong.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":"42 1","pages":"178 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45109341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2023.2225995
Re’em Segev
According to an appealing and common view, the moral status of an action – whether it is wrong, for example – is sometimes important in itself in terms of the moral status of other actions – especially those that respond to the original action. This view is especially influential with respect to the criminal law. It is accepted not only by legal moralists but also by adherents of the harm principle, for example. In this paper, I argue against this view. The main arguments emphasize the distinctions between the moral status of actions, consequences, and agents. I argue that what matters, in terms of other actions, is not the moral status of the original action but rather other factors that may be confused with it, such as the moral status of its consequences – whether they are good or bad – and the moral status of the agent – whether she is praiseworthy or blameworthy. The intuitive appeal of the common view is, I argue, at least partly due to a conflation of these factors. Most importantly, once we recall the distinctions between these factors, we can see more clearly that this view lacks a compelling rationale. Or, at least, that it is based on assumptions that, first, are much more controversial than their conclusion, and, second, do not support every aspect of this view – and thus do not offer a unified foundation for this view.
{"title":"Actions, Agents, and Consequences","authors":"Re’em Segev","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2023.2225995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2023.2225995","url":null,"abstract":"According to an appealing and common view, the moral status of an action – whether it is wrong, for example – is sometimes important in itself in terms of the moral status of other actions – especially those that respond to the original action. This view is especially influential with respect to the criminal law. It is accepted not only by legal moralists but also by adherents of the harm principle, for example. In this paper, I argue against this view. The main arguments emphasize the distinctions between the moral status of actions, consequences, and agents. I argue that what matters, in terms of other actions, is not the moral status of the original action but rather other factors that may be confused with it, such as the moral status of its consequences – whether they are good or bad – and the moral status of the agent – whether she is praiseworthy or blameworthy. The intuitive appeal of the common view is, I argue, at least partly due to a conflation of these factors. Most importantly, once we recall the distinctions between these factors, we can see more clearly that this view lacks a compelling rationale. Or, at least, that it is based on assumptions that, first, are much more controversial than their conclusion, and, second, do not support every aspect of this view – and thus do not offer a unified foundation for this view.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":"42 1","pages":"99 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45263371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2023.2241765
H. Källmén, Magnus Israelsson, P. Wennberg, A. H. Berman
The present study investigates the association between mental health problems and criminal behavior among adolescents in Sweden. Community crime prevention in a Swedish context is also discussed. Every two years, pupils from schools in Stockholm answer the Stockholm School Survey with questions and statements about their social situation, alcohol and drug use, attitudes, school climate, school grades and criminal behavior. Data collected from pupils who answered the survey in 2014, 2018 and 2020 form the basis of this study. A significant association between mental health problems and criminal behavior was shown, even after controlling for factors suggested in international literature. Mental health problems were shown to be a strong explanation for criminal behavior among adolescents.
{"title":"Criminal Behavior and Mental Health Problems among Adolescents: A Cross-sectional Study and Description of Prevention Policy in Sweden","authors":"H. Källmén, Magnus Israelsson, P. Wennberg, A. H. Berman","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2023.2241765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2023.2241765","url":null,"abstract":"The present study investigates the association between mental health problems and criminal behavior among adolescents in Sweden. Community crime prevention in a Swedish context is also discussed. Every two years, pupils from schools in Stockholm answer the Stockholm School Survey with questions and statements about their social situation, alcohol and drug use, attitudes, school climate, school grades and criminal behavior. Data collected from pupils who answered the survey in 2014, 2018 and 2020 form the basis of this study. A significant association between mental health problems and criminal behavior was shown, even after controlling for factors suggested in international literature. Mental health problems were shown to be a strong explanation for criminal behavior among adolescents.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":"42 1","pages":"158 - 177"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49446160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2023.2170658
Vincent Chiao
Katherine Beckett’s new book, Ending Mass Incarceration (EMI), is ambitious and wide-ranging. Beckett tackles one of the most urgent human rights problems of the last fifty years, namely the massive growth of incarceration in the United States, with devastating consequences for millions of people who cycle through jails and prisons, disadvantaged communities, and for the cause of racial justice. The first half of EMI is diagnostic, focusing on Beckett’s analysis of the causes of mass incarceration, whereas the second half is programmatic, defending a series of proposals for winding it down. Broadly speaking, Beckett’s diagnosis centers on increases in the rates at which felony arrests are converted into custodial sentences in rural and suburban counties, and on across-the-board increases in time served over the last generation. Programmatically, Beckett proposes three main reforms: reducing what she deems “excessive” sentencing, in particular by imposing a twentyyear cap on custodial sentences and broadening parole eligibility; expanding restorative justice programs, including for people convicted of violent crimes; and replacing criminal enforcement for low-level drug offenses with harm reduction programs, perhaps taking a lead from the LEAD 2.0 program in Seattle. There is much to admire about EMI. Beckett is a careful researcher, draws on awide range of quantitative and qualitative research, and has the unusual ability to speak to both specialist and lay audiences. The last, in particular, is a difficult task to Vincent Chiao, University of Richmond, School of Law & Jepson School of Leadership. Email: vchiao@richmond.edu Criminal Justice Ethics, 2023 Vol. 42, No. 1, 86–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2023.2170658
{"title":"What Does It Mean to End Mass Incarceration, and How Would We Know If We Did?","authors":"Vincent Chiao","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2023.2170658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2023.2170658","url":null,"abstract":"Katherine Beckett’s new book, Ending Mass Incarceration (EMI), is ambitious and wide-ranging. Beckett tackles one of the most urgent human rights problems of the last fifty years, namely the massive growth of incarceration in the United States, with devastating consequences for millions of people who cycle through jails and prisons, disadvantaged communities, and for the cause of racial justice. The first half of EMI is diagnostic, focusing on Beckett’s analysis of the causes of mass incarceration, whereas the second half is programmatic, defending a series of proposals for winding it down. Broadly speaking, Beckett’s diagnosis centers on increases in the rates at which felony arrests are converted into custodial sentences in rural and suburban counties, and on across-the-board increases in time served over the last generation. Programmatically, Beckett proposes three main reforms: reducing what she deems “excessive” sentencing, in particular by imposing a twentyyear cap on custodial sentences and broadening parole eligibility; expanding restorative justice programs, including for people convicted of violent crimes; and replacing criminal enforcement for low-level drug offenses with harm reduction programs, perhaps taking a lead from the LEAD 2.0 program in Seattle. There is much to admire about EMI. Beckett is a careful researcher, draws on awide range of quantitative and qualitative research, and has the unusual ability to speak to both specialist and lay audiences. The last, in particular, is a difficult task to Vincent Chiao, University of Richmond, School of Law & Jepson School of Leadership. Email: vchiao@richmond.edu Criminal Justice Ethics, 2023 Vol. 42, No. 1, 86–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2023.2170658","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":"42 1","pages":"86 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49162392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2023.2181524
Chad W. Flanders
In his paper “Public Reason and the Justification of Punishment,” Zachary Hoskins develops and defends an idea of “public reason” that might be applicable to debates over punishment in the Western world. This short reply takes issue with some of Hoskins’ conclusions (while agreeing with many of his premises), and suggests that contra Hoskins, many versions of retribution are not compatible with the ideal of public reason as Rawls articulated it. Instead, debates over criminal justice and punishment should properly revolve around the goods of public safety and harm reduction—rather than around any of the supposed metaphysical goods achieved by retributive punishment.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2023.2174722
Hadassa Noorda
Scholars have addressed restrictions on individual liberty, or deprivations thereof, that do not entail prison or jail—including area restrictions, revoking driver’s licenses, and GPS bracelets. In all legal domains, the effects of these measures on the lives of targeted individuals can be significant, primarily with respect to their capability to guide their own behavior. Some are applied categorically rather than individually, do not involve a fair trial or hearing, or are applied preventively or after the targeted individual has completed a prison sentence. My aim in this article is to extend our view from prison as the quintessential method of depriving individuals of their liberty to control of individuals without locking them up. I address degrees of individual liberty and inquire into legal protections for individuals who are partially free but deprived of liberty in some areas of life.
{"title":"Exprisonment: Deprivation of Liberty on the Street and at Home","authors":"Hadassa Noorda","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2023.2174722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2023.2174722","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have addressed restrictions on individual liberty, or deprivations thereof, that do not entail prison or jail—including area restrictions, revoking driver’s licenses, and GPS bracelets. In all legal domains, the effects of these measures on the lives of targeted individuals can be significant, primarily with respect to their capability to guide their own behavior. Some are applied categorically rather than individually, do not involve a fair trial or hearing, or are applied preventively or after the targeted individual has completed a prison sentence. My aim in this article is to extend our view from prison as the quintessential method of depriving individuals of their liberty to control of individuals without locking them up. I address degrees of individual liberty and inquire into legal protections for individuals who are partially free but deprived of liberty in some areas of life.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":"42 1","pages":"1 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48685651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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