Pub Date : 2018-10-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-155-162
Tatiana G. Leshkevitch
В статье рассмотрена смысловая нагрузка игрового познания, связанная с имитацией и моделированием событий, ролей и паттернов поведения. Основная цель – обосновать универсальность феномена игрового освоения действительности. Автор опирается на принцип конструктивизма и компаративистского анализа с использованием основных идей Г. Гадамера, Й. Хейзинга, Э. Финка, Г. Гессе, Д. Эльконина. Рефлексивно-философский анализ позволяет сформулировать следующие выводы. Во-первых, обосновать смысложизненное значение игрового начала; во-вторых, выявить смысловую амбивалентность игрового освоения действительности; в-третьих, обозначить этические маркеры игровой активности. В-четвертых, рассмотреть функции игровой деятельности, имеющие онтологический характер: компенсаторную, эскапистскую, адаптационную, самореализационную функцию. В статье анализируется феномен игровой зависимости.
{"title":"The meaning and Specificity of Game-based Cognition in Human Life","authors":"Tatiana G. Leshkevitch","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-155-162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-155-162","url":null,"abstract":"В статье рассмотрена смысловая нагрузка игрового познания, связанная с имитацией и моделированием событий, ролей и паттернов поведения. Основная цель – обосновать универсальность феномена игрового освоения действительности. Автор опирается на принцип конструктивизма и компаративистского анализа с использованием основных идей Г. Гадамера, Й. Хейзинга, Э. Финка, Г. Гессе, Д. Эльконина. Рефлексивно-философский анализ позволяет сформулировать следующие выводы. Во-первых, обосновать смысложизненное значение игрового начала; во-вторых, выявить смысловую амбивалентность игрового освоения действительности; в-третьих, обозначить этические маркеры игровой активности. В-четвертых, рассмотреть функции игровой деятельности, имеющие онтологический характер: компенсаторную, эскапистскую, адаптационную, самореализационную функцию. В статье анализируется феномен игровой зависимости.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116088192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-116-128
R. Apressyan
{"title":"Lukas van Leyden, J. Huizinga, And the Space of Play","authors":"R. Apressyan","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-116-128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-116-128","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127026511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-56-71
M. Korzo
{"title":"Orthodox Moral Theology of the 17th Century and its Peculiarities: “Mir s Bogom čeloveku” (Kiev 1669)","authors":"M. Korzo","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-56-71","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-56-71","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134329542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-5-21
Ioannis A. Tassopoulos
Starting from Hobbes’s silver rule of impartiality “quod tibi fiery non vis, alteri ne feceris” the paper discusses the constitutional tensions between claims of justice, which ground their impartiality on the equality between men, regarding their dependence on basic needs; and claims for justice, which are also made in the name of impartiality, but are grounded on liberty and responsibility, resulting out of the common capability of men to pursue their interest as rational planners. Their difference, in terms of impartiality, is that the former present redistribution, for purposes of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all, as a matter of procedural impartiality, while the latter take distribution to be a matter of personal responsibility, falling primarily within the ambit of proportional equality and distributive justice. The paper discusses the corresponding constitutional forms and sociopolitical implications, depending on the prevailing conception of impartiality. Each notion of impartiality has its proper power structure, for the realization of the respective constitutional ends: the focus of the former is on legislation providing for social rights; the focus of the latter is on individual rights and judicial review. But the interplay between claims of justice and claims for justice cannot be settled once and forever. Constitutional democracy, to overcome their friction and tension without undermining political liberalism, has to disprove Hobbes’s pessimism on rhetoric and public deliberation; for this to happen, however, it is necessary to recognize that impartiality is more than a matter of prudence; rather it is a virtue associated with civility.
{"title":"Hobbesian Impartiality in Constitutional Law: Claims of Justice and Claims for Justice","authors":"Ioannis A. Tassopoulos","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-5-21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2018-18-2-5-21","url":null,"abstract":"Starting from Hobbes’s silver rule of impartiality “quod tibi fiery non vis, alteri ne feceris” the paper discusses the constitutional tensions between claims of justice, which ground their impartiality on the equality between men, regarding their dependence on basic needs; and claims for justice, which are also made in the name of impartiality, but are grounded on liberty and responsibility, resulting out of the common capability of men to pursue their interest as rational planners. Their difference, in terms of impartiality, is that the former present redistribution, for purposes of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all, as a matter of procedural impartiality, while the latter take distribution to be a matter of personal responsibility, falling primarily within the ambit of proportional equality and distributive justice. The paper discusses the corresponding constitutional forms and sociopolitical implications, depending on the prevailing conception of impartiality. Each notion of impartiality has its proper power structure, for the realization of the respective constitutional ends: the focus of the former is on legislation providing for social rights; the focus of the latter is on individual rights and judicial review. But the interplay between claims of justice and claims for justice cannot be settled once and forever. Constitutional democracy, to overcome their friction and tension without undermining political liberalism, has to disprove Hobbes’s pessimism on rhetoric and public deliberation; for this to happen, however, it is necessary to recognize that impartiality is more than a matter of prudence; rather it is a virtue associated with civility.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126377055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-116-127
M. Korzo
Fraternal correction (“correctio/correptio fraterna”), or love-motivated edification of the sinner, aimed at his repentance and correction based on the gospel fragment Matt. 18:15–17, was a part of everyday practices in early Christian and monastic communities; later it received theological interpretation and justification in the writings of Augustine, Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, Jean Gerson, of early Modern scholastics. The theological and canonical thought of different epochs turned to this topic often in connection with specific socio-political circumstances or events of church life. Despite the diversity of points of view, fraternal correction was understood as a positive prescription, for the fulfillment of which certain conditions are necessary: their absence makes it possible to refrain from edifying the sinner; in some situations, it is even morally unacceptable to resort to this procedure. In the literature for the laity, a positive prescription for fraternal correction has appeared since the 13th century; over the next centuries, this prescription becomes more and more categorical, in the early Modern times, it turns into an unconditional duty: failure to fulfill this duty was regarded as a sin and was subject to confession. The procedure described in Matt. 18:15–17 also becomes one of the forms of horizontal moral reform in early modern societies, is used by different Protestant denominations to justify the practice of censorship of morals and the activities of church courts (consistories), is also used to give legitimacy to certain situations of denunciation in both Catholic and Protestant communities.
{"title":"The Practice of ‘Fraternal Correction’: Theological Grounds and Confessional-Cultural Specificity","authors":"M. Korzo","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-116-127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-116-127","url":null,"abstract":"Fraternal correction (“correctio/correptio fraterna”), or love-motivated edification of the sinner, aimed at his repentance and correction based on the gospel fragment Matt. 18:15–17, was a part of everyday practices in early Christian and monastic communities; later it received theological interpretation and justification in the writings of Augustine, Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, Jean Gerson, of early Modern scholastics. The theological and canonical thought of different epochs turned to this topic often in connection with specific socio-political circumstances or events of church life. Despite the diversity of points of view, fraternal correction was understood as a positive prescription, for the fulfillment of which certain conditions are necessary: their absence makes it possible to refrain from edifying the sinner; in some situations, it is even morally unacceptable to resort to this procedure. In the literature for the laity, a positive prescription for fraternal correction has appeared since the 13th century; over the next centuries, this prescription becomes more and more categorical, in the early Modern times, it turns into an unconditional duty: failure to fulfill this duty was regarded as a sin and was subject to confession. The procedure described in Matt. 18:15–17 also becomes one of the forms of horizontal moral reform in early modern societies, is used by different Protestant denominations to justify the practice of censorship of morals and the activities of church courts (consistories), is also used to give legitimacy to certain situations of denunciation in both Catholic and Protestant communities.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114969229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-141-146
Anastasia V. Povecherova
Due to the enormous importance of Kantian ethics for the development of the entire Western European philosophy, it is worth asking about the origins of its formation. A possible answer to this question can be the entire German tradition preceding Kant in relation to theoretical and practical philosophical constructions, called the era of the German Enlightenment. Christian Augustus Crusius, one of the brightest philosophers of this time, has long been considered by researchers as a probable source of many later characteristic features of Kant’s moral philosophy. However, there are still very few works devoted to the work of this thinker. In addition, almost all of them are aimed at his polemic with Christian Wolf regarding the law of sufficient reason. Crusius himself is also considered in conjunction with other thinkers of the era of the German Enlightenment. There are practically no detailed studies of moral teaching at all. This state of affairs indicates the undeserved oblivion of Crusius, which is expressed, among other things, in the absence of translations of Crusius into Russian. The article, prefixed to the translation of an important chapter from the treatise on ethics, examines the main features of Crusius’ practical philosophy, highlights common aspects of Crusian and Kantian ethics based on the analysis of the texts of both philosophers and the similarity of some basic terms, and makes assumptions about the influence. The reasoning is based on the concept of virtue, which both Crusius and Kant accept as central. In addition, the stages in the formation of the ethics of Crusius himself are briefly revealed, the differences from Crusius that allowed Kant to develop his own moral teaching are indicated.
{"title":"Christian August Crusius and His Ethics","authors":"Anastasia V. Povecherova","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-141-146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-141-146","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the enormous importance of Kantian ethics for the development of the entire Western European philosophy, it is worth asking about the origins of its formation. A possible answer to this question can be the entire German tradition preceding Kant in relation to theoretical and practical philosophical constructions, called the era of the German Enlightenment. Christian Augustus Crusius, one of the brightest philosophers of this time, has long been considered by researchers as a probable source of many later characteristic features of Kant’s moral philosophy. However, there are still very few works devoted to the work of this thinker. In addition, almost all of them are aimed at his polemic with Christian Wolf regarding the law of sufficient reason. Crusius himself is also considered in conjunction with other thinkers of the era of the German Enlightenment. There are practically no detailed studies of moral teaching at all. This state of affairs indicates the undeserved oblivion of Crusius, which is expressed, among other things, in the absence of translations of Crusius into Russian. The article, prefixed to the translation of an important chapter from the treatise on ethics, examines the main features of Crusius’ practical philosophy, highlights common aspects of Crusian and Kantian ethics based on the analysis of the texts of both philosophers and the similarity of some basic terms, and makes assumptions about the influence. The reasoning is based on the concept of virtue, which both Crusius and Kant accept as central. In addition, the stages in the formation of the ethics of Crusius himself are briefly revealed, the differences from Crusius that allowed Kant to develop his own moral teaching are indicated.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127440483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-112-123
P. Čičovački, N. S. Lima
The goal of this paper is to reflect on our common post-Covid-19 future. To do so, we first examine our present pandemic situation in terms of the pairs of the correlated concepts: peace and war, and the normal and the abnormal. We then proceed to analyze the dual aspect of the concept of normal: its descriptive as well as its normative side. In doing so, we consider the ethical views of Immanuel Kant, Nicolai Hartmann, Fritz Jahr, and Paul Ricoeur; their views help but do not lead to the solution we find satisfactory. Upon further examination, we come to the realization that our problems with understanding our present and with anticipating our future seem to be ultimately related to our struggle to establish a ground on which both the descriptive and normative aspects of the concept of “normal” can be satisfactorily founded. Our suggestion is that this problem may be solved by understanding what is normal in terms of health, understood as balance and as finding a proper measure in everything we do. Our common post-Covid-19 future should be centered on our renewed commitment to the promotion of physical and mental, as well as individual, social, and environmental health. We thus set a stage for further development of an ethics of health.
{"title":"Our Common Post-Covid-19 Pandemic Future: A Return to “Normal” or a Creation of the New “Normal”?","authors":"P. Čičovački, N. S. Lima","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-112-123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-112-123","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of this paper is to reflect on our common post-Covid-19 future. To do so, we first examine our present pandemic situation in terms of the pairs of the correlated concepts: peace and war, and the normal and the abnormal. We then proceed to analyze the dual aspect of the concept of normal: its descriptive as well as its normative side. In doing so, we consider the ethical views of Immanuel Kant, Nicolai Hartmann, Fritz Jahr, and Paul Ricoeur; their views help but do not lead to the solution we find satisfactory. Upon further examination, we come to the realization that our problems with understanding our present and with anticipating our future seem to be ultimately related to our struggle to establish a ground on which both the descriptive and normative aspects of the concept of “normal” can be satisfactorily founded. Our suggestion is that this problem may be solved by understanding what is normal in terms of health, understood as balance and as finding a proper measure in everything we do. Our common post-Covid-19 future should be centered on our renewed commitment to the promotion of physical and mental, as well as individual, social, and environmental health. We thus set a stage for further development of an ethics of health.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"68 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117016447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-1-141-156
N. Rozov
{"title":"Anthroprostasia (Protection of a Human Being) is an Ethical Core of Humanism","authors":"N. Rozov","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-1-141-156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-1-141-156","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124119623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-1-20-35
Elena Namli
What is a reasonable understanding of the relationship between human rights protection, on the one hand, and respect for people’s sovereignty, on the other? In order to address this question this article utilizes the distinction between political cosmopolitanism on the one side, and moral cosmopolitanism on the other. Political cosmopolitanism implies that some form of global citizenship is needed for universal protection of human rights. Critics of this position stress the importance of self-governance and state sovereignty. In this article, it is claimed that rejection of political cosmopolitanism can be combined with embracement of moral cosmopolitanism, i.e. embracement a global moral community where respect for human dignity and therefore recognition of human rights of each individual is not limited by national citizenship and borders. In this article, I defend a non-violent form of moral cosmopolitanism. Such a cosmopolitanism demands a modification of universalism of human rights. I distinguish between descriptive and epistemological universalism on the one hand and pure normative universalism on the other. Descriptive and epistemological universalism, I demonstrate, are aggressive forms of universalism that tend to legitimize domination. Critical universalism, which is a form of pure normative universalism, is justified in that it inspires political liberation within different traditions without legitimizing cultural monopolism and violence of the Global North.
{"title":"Cosmopolitanism, sovereignty and human rights – In defense of critical universalism","authors":"Elena Namli","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-1-20-35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-1-20-35","url":null,"abstract":"What is a reasonable understanding of the relationship between human rights protection, on the one hand, and respect for people’s sovereignty, on the other? In order to address this question this article utilizes the distinction between political cosmopolitanism on the one side, and moral cosmopolitanism on the other. Political cosmopolitanism implies that some form of global citizenship is needed for universal protection of human rights. Critics of this position stress the importance of self-governance and state sovereignty. In this article, it is claimed that rejection of political cosmopolitanism can be combined with embracement of moral cosmopolitanism, i.e. embracement a global moral community where respect for human dignity and therefore recognition of human rights of each individual is not limited by national citizenship and borders. In this article, I defend a non-violent form of moral cosmopolitanism. Such a cosmopolitanism demands a modification of universalism of human rights. I distinguish between descriptive and epistemological universalism on the one hand and pure normative universalism on the other. Descriptive and epistemological universalism, I demonstrate, are aggressive forms of universalism that tend to legitimize domination. Critical universalism, which is a form of pure normative universalism, is justified in that it inspires political liberation within different traditions without legitimizing cultural monopolism and violence of the Global North.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121937850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-51-67
L. Zhukovskaya
The article analyzes the interaction of national economic, legal and social macrosystems as a complex metasystem, justifies and solves the problem of their balance (equilibrium) based on the Berger equilibrium concept, which is a mathematical reflection of the Golden Rule of Morality. The influence of morality, understood in the sense of Kant’s imperative or the Golden Rule of Morality, close to it, on the process of strategic decision-making in the national complex metasystem is considered. A Nash equilibrium model of the three considered macrosystems is described as a reflection of the currently applied neoliberal economic doctrine. Using systems theory and game theory an alternative to it moral-philosophical economic doctrine (based on the Golden Rule of Morality) is substantiated. Relevant is the description of the model of system equilibrium of the complex metasystem on the basis of the Golden Rule of Morality to determine effective strategic decisions under conditions of uncertainty in the social sphere, which reflects the ideas of building a social state. The research is multidisciplinary as it uses synthesis of scientific approaches of systems analysis, philosophical ethics, economics, law, sociology, game theories, management and systems.
{"title":"The Mechanisms of the Golden Rule of Morality and the Economic Policy of Today’s Russia","authors":"L. Zhukovskaya","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-51-67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-51-67","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the interaction of national economic, legal and social macrosystems as a complex metasystem, justifies and solves the problem of their balance (equilibrium) based on the Berger equilibrium concept, which is a mathematical reflection of the Golden Rule of Morality. The influence of morality, understood in the sense of Kant’s imperative or the Golden Rule of Morality, close to it, on the process of strategic decision-making in the national complex metasystem is considered. A Nash equilibrium model of the three considered macrosystems is described as a reflection of the currently applied neoliberal economic doctrine. Using systems theory and game theory an alternative to it moral-philosophical economic doctrine (based on the Golden Rule of Morality) is substantiated. Relevant is the description of the model of system equilibrium of the complex metasystem on the basis of the Golden Rule of Morality to determine effective strategic decisions under conditions of uncertainty in the social sphere, which reflects the ideas of building a social state. The research is multidisciplinary as it uses synthesis of scientific approaches of systems analysis, philosophical ethics, economics, law, sociology, game theories, management and systems.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133971652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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