Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-1-118-126
A. Myasnikov
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-34-47
K. G. Frolov
In this paper I analyse some theoretical problems with identification of actions as concrete events which possess certain features. I show that the result of such identification can be a significant factor in attributing moral responsibility to an agent. In the first two sections I explore the problem of tracing the boundaries of actions in space and time and the theoretical option that actions can have spatial and temporal parts. In the third section I explore three approaches to what are the features of actions that allow distinguishing them from all other types of events and from each other. Such features can be defined as: the presence of an agent; the presence of a control over agent’s body movements, taking into account their accessible alternatives and their possible consequences; the presence of an agent’s intentional state that precedes or accompanies the performance of certain body movements. In the light of these possible factors for identifying actions, in the third part of the article I show the features of internalist and externalist approaches to the concept of action. I draw a conclusion that possession of justification which is required for identifying actions by these approaches turns out to be so problematic in practice, that it makes reasonable to assign moral responsibility on the basis of a naive approach that identifies actions with movements of the agent’s body.
{"title":"Identification of Actions as a Factor in Attributing Moral Responsibility","authors":"K. G. Frolov","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-34-47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-34-47","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I analyse some theoretical problems with identification of actions as concrete events which possess certain features. I show that the result of such identification can be a significant factor in attributing moral responsibility to an agent. In the first two sections I explore the problem of tracing the boundaries of actions in space and time and the theoretical option that actions can have spatial and temporal parts. In the third section I explore three approaches to what are the features of actions that allow distinguishing them from all other types of events and from each other. Such features can be defined as: the presence of an agent; the presence of a control over agent’s body movements, taking into account their accessible alternatives and their possible consequences; the presence of an agent’s intentional state that precedes or accompanies the performance of certain body movements. In the light of these possible factors for identifying actions, in the third part of the article I show the features of internalist and externalist approaches to the concept of action. I draw a conclusion that possession of justification which is required for identifying actions by these approaches turns out to be so problematic in practice, that it makes reasonable to assign moral responsibility on the basis of a naive approach that identifies actions with movements of the agent’s body.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124761984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-77-89
R. Platonov
The article sets a goal to show the function of moral virtue in the practical knowledge of Aristotle. For this purpose: we describe the main meanings of the concept of “arete” in ancient Greek culture (excellence, compliance with the goal); reconstruct the main steps of Aristotle's research of the act; analyze Aristotle's conceptualization of virtue as a qualitative characteristic of activity. We show the finding of a break between the decision process (rational procedures of search and analysis) and the based on desire and personal preferences choice is the main result of the analysis of the act and the creation of the concept of conscious choice. Therefore, the very knowledge about human activity is divided into two subject areas – rational and non-rational. This also correlates with the description of the structure of the soul as a form of realization of human nature – the thinking and passionate / volitional parts are distinguished in it. In habit, Aristotle sees the possibility of controlling personal preferences and, through this, the act of choice. He sees in habituation the constant work of a person on himself, training in making a choice in accordance with rationally defined goals. On this basis, he introduces the concept of “temper” to describe the non-rational component of activity. As a result, he divides the virtues into rational (dianoetic) and moral (ethical). Moral virtues are a cultivated parameter of individual development. It is concluded, the conceptualization of moral virtues makes it possible to include education in practical knowledge as a way of working with passions and desires, makes the non-rational part of the act visible.
{"title":"The Function of Ethical Virtues in Aristotle’s Ethics","authors":"R. Platonov","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-77-89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-77-89","url":null,"abstract":"The article sets a goal to show the function of moral virtue in the practical knowledge of Aristotle. For this purpose: we describe the main meanings of the concept of “arete” in ancient Greek culture (excellence, compliance with the goal); reconstruct the main steps of Aristotle's research of the act; analyze Aristotle's conceptualization of virtue as a qualitative characteristic of activity. We show the finding of a break between the decision process (rational procedures of search and analysis) and the based on desire and personal preferences choice is the main result of the analysis of the act and the creation of the concept of conscious choice. Therefore, the very knowledge about human activity is divided into two subject areas – rational and non-rational. This also correlates with the description of the structure of the soul as a form of realization of human nature – the thinking and passionate / volitional parts are distinguished in it. In habit, Aristotle sees the possibility of controlling personal preferences and, through this, the act of choice. He sees in habituation the constant work of a person on himself, training in making a choice in accordance with rationally defined goals. On this basis, he introduces the concept of “temper” to describe the non-rational component of activity. As a result, he divides the virtues into rational (dianoetic) and moral (ethical). Moral virtues are a cultivated parameter of individual development. It is concluded, the conceptualization of moral virtues makes it possible to include education in practical knowledge as a way of working with passions and desires, makes the non-rational part of the act visible.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124017327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-143-155
Vladimir I. Bakshtanovsky, M. Bogdanova
The article examines the project-oriented potential of the conceptual direction “Innovative paradigm of applied ethics”, which was formed in Russia in the second half of the XX and early XXI centuries. The basis of this direction is formed by theoretical ethical knowledge, project-oriented knowledge for the purposeful transformation of “small systems”, phronesis (that is the ability to understand and interpret the situation at hand and decide about appropriate actions). The main issue under discussion is the relevance of the project-oriented potential of applied ethics in the knowledge of modern situations of moral choice. The experience of applying the project-oriented potential of the innovative paradigm of applied ethics in the context of the transformation of a Russian university is analyzed. Experience, which is presented on the pages of the journal “Semestrial Papers Applied Ethics”. The dynamics of the features of the application of ethical and applied knowledge to the study of changing situations is fixed: theoretical comprehension of new situations of moral choice; recognition of choice alternatives; project-oriented impact on the value-normative system; humanitarian examination of the conflict interaction of value systems. It is concluded that the mission of the innovative paradigm of applied ethics from the point of view of its project-oriented potential is feasible when applied to situations of uncertainty in moral choice, when there is a request from the acting subject for humanitarian expertise, consulting and project activities. In the absence of a situation of moral choice, with a decrease in the possibility of self-determination of the acting subject, and a reduction in the sphere of his responsibility, the mission of the innovative paradigm of applied ethics is hardly feasible. At the same time, the nature of ethical issues in a changing society indicates a potential demand for project-oriented potential of applied ethics in the near future.
{"title":"The Innovative Paradigm of Applied Ethics: A Mission (Not)Feasible?","authors":"Vladimir I. Bakshtanovsky, M. Bogdanova","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-143-155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-143-155","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the project-oriented potential of the conceptual direction “Innovative paradigm of applied ethics”, which was formed in Russia in the second half of the XX and early XXI centuries. The basis of this direction is formed by theoretical ethical knowledge, project-oriented knowledge for the purposeful transformation of “small systems”, phronesis (that is the ability to understand and interpret the situation at hand and decide about appropriate actions). The main issue under discussion is the relevance of the project-oriented potential of applied ethics in the knowledge of modern situations of moral choice. The experience of applying the project-oriented potential of the innovative paradigm of applied ethics in the context of the transformation of a Russian university is analyzed. Experience, which is presented on the pages of the journal “Semestrial Papers Applied Ethics”. The dynamics of the features of the application of ethical and applied knowledge to the study of changing situations is fixed: theoretical comprehension of new situations of moral choice; recognition of choice alternatives; project-oriented impact on the value-normative system; humanitarian examination of the conflict interaction of value systems. It is concluded that the mission of the innovative paradigm of applied ethics from the point of view of its project-oriented potential is feasible when applied to situations of uncertainty in moral choice, when there is a request from the acting subject for humanitarian expertise, consulting and project activities. In the absence of a situation of moral choice, with a decrease in the possibility of self-determination of the acting subject, and a reduction in the sphere of his responsibility, the mission of the innovative paradigm of applied ethics is hardly feasible. At the same time, the nature of ethical issues in a changing society indicates a potential demand for project-oriented potential of applied ethics in the near future.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131042898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-37-50
J. Babić
The Golden Rule – “do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” or in its negative formulation “do not do unto others what you would not have done unto you” – is one of the most ancient formulations of moral criteria. We encounter it in some form in the canonical texts of practically all religions that aspire to any kind of universality. At the first glance, the categorical imperative states and demands the same as the Golden Rule. This presents the question of whether the categorical imperative is a variation of the Golden Rule, or whether, inversely, the Golden Rule is a different way of stating the demand that morality be one and the same the world over? In other words, can these two “rules” be reduced to each other? If this is indeed the case, it would represent an exceptional example of correlation between practice and theory, sophisticatedly elaborated in Kant’s moral philosophy. Alas, if the argument that follows in this text is correct, it will show that the categorical imperative is not a variation of the Golden Rule, nor is the Golden Rule a popular form of the demand placed by the categorical imperative. Furthermore, it will show that the Golden Rule does not present a deontological standpoint at all, and that it fails to guard against arbitrariness; it does not have the capacity to be a criterion of the particular kind of evaluation we call moral or issue the cardinal demand of universal objectivity and impartiality. None of which can be denied the categorical imperative, due to its precious property Kant labels as “formalism”.
{"title":"The Golden Rule and the Categorical Imperative","authors":"J. Babić","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-37-50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-37-50","url":null,"abstract":"The Golden Rule – “do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” or in its negative formulation “do not do unto others what you would not have done unto you” – is one of the most ancient formulations of moral criteria. We encounter it in some form in the canonical texts of practically all religions that aspire to any kind of universality. At the first glance, the categorical imperative states and demands the same as the Golden Rule. This presents the question of whether the categorical imperative is a variation of the Golden Rule, or whether, inversely, the Golden Rule is a different way of stating the demand that morality be one and the same the world over? In other words, can these two “rules” be reduced to each other? If this is indeed the case, it would represent an exceptional example of correlation between practice and theory, sophisticatedly elaborated in Kant’s moral philosophy. Alas, if the argument that follows in this text is correct, it will show that the categorical imperative is not a variation of the Golden Rule, nor is the Golden Rule a popular form of the demand placed by the categorical imperative. Furthermore, it will show that the Golden Rule does not present a deontological standpoint at all, and that it fails to guard against arbitrariness; it does not have the capacity to be a criterion of the particular kind of evaluation we call moral or issue the cardinal demand of universal objectivity and impartiality. None of which can be denied the categorical imperative, due to its precious property Kant labels as “formalism”.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129642447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-158-164
M. Gabrovska
{"title":"XVII Scientific Conference on Ethics with International Participation: “Ethics: Freedom and Duty”","authors":"M. Gabrovska","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-158-164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-158-164","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123594105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-129-142
A. Pavlov
Analytical Marxism – formerly also known as the “September group” – is a branch of Anglo-Saxon social theory, political and normative philosophy. There are several publications on the set in the Russian humanities and social sciences, but all articles are limited to the sociological aspect of the work of analytical Marxists. In this article we propose to consider another aspect of this direction – normative aspect. To show this aspect of analytical Marxists, the author suggests considering the movement in historical dynamics. It originates from the publication of “Karl Marx’s Theory of History” (1978) by Canadian-English philosopher J.A. Cohen. Cohen tried to rid Marxism of Hegelianism and make it the subject of a real science, which set the framework the current’s activity. At the first stage of the work, analytical Marxists (J.A. Cohen, Jon Elster, John Roemer, Erik Olin Wright, Robert Brenner, Adam Przeworski and others) worked within the framework of sociology and historical sociology, combining the problems raised by Marx with various scientific methods – game theory, rational choice theory, historical sociology, etc. By the early 1990’s, some of the participants of the movement left the group (Elster, Przeworski), while others refocused on new topics, namely, normative political philosophy. Arguing with the ideas and arguments of John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and others, analytical Marxists answered the problems of normative theory in their own way – an attempt to combine freedom and equality (Cohen), egalitarianism (Roemer), real utopias (Wright), and basic income (Philippe Van Parijs).
分析马克思主义——以前也被称为“九月集团”——是盎格鲁-撒克逊社会理论、政治和规范哲学的一个分支。在俄罗斯人文和社会科学方面有一些出版物，但所有的文章都局限于分析马克思主义者工作的社会学方面。在本文中，我们建议考虑这一方向的另一个方面-规范方面。为了体现分析马克思主义者的这一方面，作者建议从历史动态的角度来考虑这一运动。它起源于加拿大-英国哲学家J.A.科恩出版的《卡尔·马克思的历史理论》(1978年)。科恩试图摆脱马克思主义的黑格尔主义，使马克思主义成为一门真正的科学，这为当代的活动奠定了框架。在工作的第一阶段，分析马克思主义者(J.A. Cohen, Jon Elster, John Roemer, Erik Olin Wright, Robert Brenner, Adam Przeworski等人)在社会学和历史社会学的框架内工作，将马克思提出的问题与各种科学方法-博弈论，理性选择理论，历史社会学等相结合。到20世纪90年代初，该运动的一些参与者离开了该团体(Elster, Przeworski)，而其他人则重新关注新的主题，即规范政治哲学。分析马克思主义者与约翰·罗尔斯、罗伯特·诺齐克等人的思想和论点争论，以他们自己的方式回答了规范理论的问题——试图将自由与平等(科恩)、平均主义(罗默)、真正的乌托邦(赖特)和基本收入(菲利普·范·帕里斯)结合起来。
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-62-73
Sergei Rusakov
The article is devoted to the analysis of philosophical constructions of Marcus Aurelius, one of the representatives of late Stoicism. The interest in the works of the last “good emperor” is connected with the historical study of Michel Foucault, aimed at studying the ethical teachings of Marcus Aurelius and his declared practices of self-care. The work carried out by the French thinker, on the one hand, is deeply interesting from the point of view of inte- grating Stoic practices into the general concept of subjectification, i.e., the self-construction of human subjectivity. On the other hand, Foucault’s analysis is not systematic, and his idea of Marcus Aurelius is presented in a fragmented and generalized way. The aim of this article is to provide a systematic overview of the practices of subjectification (self-care) found in his correspondence with Fronton and in his diary, entitled Alone with Myself. Among the practices presented are the following: the technique of writing oneself, the inspection of consciousness, spiritual cognition, the exercise of memory, and the exercise of the last day. The article shows what variations of these exercises are found in other philosophers of antiquity, and how far these techniques of self-care transformed with the development of Stoicism. The analysis points out exactly how each practice should influence the forma- tion of subjectivity, and how the subject should be formed in the view of the philosophers of late Stoicism.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-35-47
R. Apressyan, A. Besedin, V. Vasilyev, A. Kostikova, Anton Kuznetsov, Sergey M. Levin, A. Mishura, R. Platonov, A. Prokofyev, Aleksandr V. Razin
Proceedings of a Discussion on «Prolegomena to Moral Responsibility» (RAS Institute of Philosophy, March 2021).
《道德责任导论》讨论论文集(RAS哲学研究所，2021年3月)。
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-100-111
R. Gulyaev
The article examines how film ‘Come and See’ by Elem Klimov corresponds to ethical problems of classical theory of war. Soviet reviewers tended to interpret it as an opposition between humanity and inhumanity of Soviet and Nazi sides respectively. We assume that Klimov’s film depicts not only World War II, but the very essence of war as such, according to Clausewitz – violence as a way of compelling an enemy to do our will. Partisan war can be viewed as a method of wearing out enemy forces without decisive battle, but it provokes terror upon civilian population and becomes more violent and bloody than conventional war. Clausewitz views it as a last resort for government at war. Klimov’s film approaches Clausewitz’s theory not only in evaluation of partisan warfare, but also in the main ethical idea: both belong to the tradition of realism, which views military violence through expediency. In military situation, violence is not immoral per se, but is considered to be moral or immoral according to its expediency, i.e. the balance of results it achieves and of number of victims and collateral damage. Both Klimov and Clausewitz oppose not war itself, but militarism, i.e. attempts to glorify and romanticize it.
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