Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-48-61
R. Platonov
The article sets a goal to show Aristotle’s ethics (as a practical science) has its foundations in the fundamental conceptions of his philosophy, because they describe the process of knowledge, being in general and human as a specific existence. For this purpose the author analyses the concept of “episteme” in Aristotle’s philosophy, define the structure of knowledge through the main questions about existence (“what?” and “how?”), and we also show the specifics of the combination of these questions in ethics. We identify the limitations of human cognitive ability and the structure of the object of knowledge, which Aristotle described through the concepts “potency”, “energy” and “entelechy”. As an object of knowledge, a human is revealed through the process of transition from potentially existing to actually existing, while he does not have an actual completion. We make a detailed description of the object of knowledge through the conception of four causes, where the material cause fixes the potentially existing in knowledge, and three other reasons (efficient, formal, final) fix various aspects of its actualization. The description of the object of knowledge through four causes is universal for Aristotle's epistemology and it allows us to describe everything that exists as a global process of expedient change. We show that Aristotle considers the development of an individual as included in the process of human development. Its internal structure is represented by the concept of the soul, where the interaction of parts of the soul determines the quality of human activity. As a result, these notions are the epistemic foundations of ethics as a science, since they determine the subject of its study (human) and reveal his nature as a permanent activity that is included in the generic development and has a purpose in itself.
{"title":"Epistemic Foundations of Aristotle’s Ethics","authors":"R. Platonov","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-48-61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-48-61","url":null,"abstract":"The article sets a goal to show Aristotle’s ethics (as a practical science) has its foundations in the fundamental conceptions of his philosophy, because they describe the process of knowledge, being in general and human as a specific existence. For this purpose the author analyses the concept of “episteme” in Aristotle’s philosophy, define the structure of knowledge through the main questions about existence (“what?” and “how?”), and we also show the specifics of the combination of these questions in ethics. We identify the limitations of human cognitive ability and the structure of the object of knowledge, which Aristotle described through the concepts “potency”, “energy” and “entelechy”. As an object of knowledge, a human is revealed through the process of transition from potentially existing to actually existing, while he does not have an actual completion. We make a detailed description of the object of knowledge through the conception of four causes, where the material cause fixes the potentially existing in knowledge, and three other reasons (efficient, formal, final) fix various aspects of its actualization. The description of the object of knowledge through four causes is universal for Aristotle's epistemology and it allows us to describe everything that exists as a global process of expedient change. We show that Aristotle considers the development of an individual as included in the process of human development. Its internal structure is represented by the concept of the soul, where the interaction of parts of the soul determines the quality of human activity. As a result, these notions are the epistemic foundations of ethics as a science, since they determine the subject of its study (human) and reveal his nature as a permanent activity that is included in the generic development and has a purpose in itself.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133071416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-21-33
E. Koval
Paradoxically, the choice of a variant of behavior, as well as the norm that should be followed in a particular case, is the more difficult, the more variations of normative prescriptions a person has. This article is devoted to the peculiarities of the moral aspects of choosing by a religious person in problematic life situations (moral choice of an Orthodox Christian belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church is used as an example). In particular, the situation associated with such an ambiguous phenomenon as divorce is considered. A religious person in such a situation is presented with norms that contain a different amount of requirements. Canons prohibit divorce (there is only one exception – the betrayal of one of the spouses). Norms formulated by modern church authorities prohibit divorce, but allow it in the presence of one of eleven reasons. A complex dilemma arises when choosing between the canons and the new norms. If such a choice is made by a competent cleric (bishop, clergyman), the principles of oikonomia (indulgence) or akribeia (literal adherence to the canon) are used. If a layman makes a choice in a particular life situation, in order to formulate a moral assessment or self-assessment adequate to the case, one of two formulations of a well-known moral principle can be useful: a normative formulation “ought implies can”, that expands responsibility, or a formulation “without ‘can’ there is no ‘ought’”. The latter wording serves as the basis for limiting liability for the choice.
{"title":"Correlation Between “Ought” and “Can”: Moral Aspects of the Choice of Religious Person","authors":"E. Koval","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-21-33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-21-33","url":null,"abstract":"Paradoxically, the choice of a variant of behavior, as well as the norm that should be followed in a particular case, is the more difficult, the more variations of normative prescriptions a person has. This article is devoted to the peculiarities of the moral aspects of choosing by a religious person in problematic life situations (moral choice of an Orthodox Christian belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church is used as an example). In particular, the situation associated with such an ambiguous phenomenon as divorce is considered. A religious person in such a situation is presented with norms that contain a different amount of requirements. Canons prohibit divorce (there is only one exception – the betrayal of one of the spouses). Norms formulated by modern church authorities prohibit divorce, but allow it in the presence of one of eleven reasons. A complex dilemma arises when choosing between the canons and the new norms. If such a choice is made by a competent cleric (bishop, clergyman), the principles of oikonomia (indulgence) or akribeia (literal adherence to the canon) are used. If a layman makes a choice in a particular life situation, in order to formulate a moral assessment or self-assessment adequate to the case, one of two formulations of a well-known moral principle can be useful: a normative formulation “ought implies can”, that expands responsibility, or a formulation “without ‘can’ there is no ‘ought’”. The latter wording serves as the basis for limiting liability for the choice.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125387609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-26-34
Dmitry A. Ananyev
In my paper, I critically discuss the third part of an article by E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, A. Mertsalov and A. Iunusov “Prolegomena to Moral Responsibility”. In the third part of the Prolegomena, the authors present an analysis of the structure of the concept of moral responsibility. An important feature of the structure is the distinction between the fittingness of moral assessment and the fittingness of moral consequences. My objection is that there are no sufficiently weighty reasons that could justify making this distinction in the structure provided by the authors. It seems more reasonable to identify the fact of an agent’s being morally responsible with fittingness of certain moral consequences. The authors also claim that cases in which a factor that belongs to an agent but lacks moral relevance is mistakenly described as having moral relevance is a distinct kind of case in which an agent is held responsible in an incorrect way. I show that the difference of this kind of mistake in holding people responsible from mistakes, which result from holding an agent responsible for a factor which does not belong to this agent in the way that is relevant for moral assessment, is unclear.
在我的论文中，我批判性地讨论了E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, A. Mertsalov和A. Iunusov的文章“道德责任导论”的第三部分。在《绪论》的第三部分，作者分析了道德责任概念的结构。该结构的一个重要特征是区分道德评价的适宜性和道德后果的适宜性。我的反对意见是，没有足够有力的理由可以证明在作者提供的结构中做出这种区分。将行为人负有道德责任的事实与某些道德后果的适宜性联系起来似乎更合理。作者还声称，在某些情况下，属于行为人但缺乏道德相关性的因素被错误地描述为具有道德相关性，这是一种独特的情况，在这种情况下，行为人以不正确的方式承担责任。我展示了让人们对错误负责的这种错误的区别，这种错误是由让一个行为人对不属于这个行为人的因素负责而导致的这与道德评估是相关的，这是不清楚的。
{"title":"Home / Archives / Vol. 21 No. 2 (2021) / MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility: Comments on a Paper by E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, A. Mertsalov and A. Iunusov","authors":"Dmitry A. Ananyev","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-26-34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-26-34","url":null,"abstract":"In my paper, I critically discuss the third part of an article by E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, A. Mertsalov and A. Iunusov “Prolegomena to Moral Responsibility”. In the third part of the Prolegomena, the authors present an analysis of the structure of the concept of moral responsibility. An important feature of the structure is the distinction between the fittingness of moral assessment and the fittingness of moral consequences. My objection is that there are no sufficiently weighty reasons that could justify making this distinction in the structure provided by the authors. It seems more reasonable to identify the fact of an agent’s being morally responsible with fittingness of certain moral consequences. The authors also claim that cases in which a factor that belongs to an agent but lacks moral relevance is mistakenly described as having moral relevance is a distinct kind of case in which an agent is held responsible in an incorrect way. I show that the difference of this kind of mistake in holding people responsible from mistakes, which result from holding an agent responsible for a factor which does not belong to this agent in the way that is relevant for moral assessment, is unclear.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123239539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-90-103
M. Kizima
The article analyzes the book on the equality of women “Woman in the Nineteenth Century” (1845) written by Margaret Fuller (1810–1850), an outstanding American romantic, to elaborate the ideas she had expressed in the essay “The Great Lawsuit: Man versus Men. Woman versus Women” (1843). The author compares these two works and shows their common conceptual ground, as well as the development of Fuller’s views that grew in scope and radicalism. The book is analyzed in its cultural and historical context as a religious and philosophical work that gave a unique expression to the ideas of American Transcendentalism: Fuller was the first to apply its fundamental principle of self-reliance to women and created in the cultural discourse the image of “woman thinking”, complementing thus the image of “man thinking” elaborated in the works of Emerson and other transcendentalists. The author shows that Fuller’s ethical conception drew on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Christianity, mystical teachings (Swedenborg), utopian socialism (Fourier), Goethe, European romanticism and points out that transcendental moral universalism was Fuller’s basic premise. The article demonstrates that in her book Fuller combined ethical theory with a criticism of the social reality, norms and morals in the USA as unjust (particularly concerning women’s rights, slavery, rights of the underprivileged) and stressed the significance of justice as a moral value. A special attention is drawn to the peculiarities of the book as a publicistic work, in which Fuller develops her ethical ideas through forms of literary expression: sermon, artistic imagination (characters, dialogues), works by other writers in a discussion on the place of women in the history of cultures.
{"title":"Margaret Fuller’s Woman in the Nineteenth Century: A Reading","authors":"M. Kizima","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-90-103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-90-103","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the book on the equality of women “Woman in the Nineteenth Century” (1845) written by Margaret Fuller (1810–1850), an outstanding American romantic, to elaborate the ideas she had expressed in the essay “The Great Lawsuit: Man versus Men. Woman versus Women” (1843). The author compares these two works and shows their common conceptual ground, as well as the development of Fuller’s views that grew in scope and radicalism. The book is analyzed in its cultural and historical context as a religious and philosophical work that gave a unique expression to the ideas of American Transcendentalism: Fuller was the first to apply its fundamental principle of self-reliance to women and created in the cultural discourse the image of “woman thinking”, complementing thus the image of “man thinking” elaborated in the works of Emerson and other transcendentalists. The author shows that Fuller’s ethical conception drew on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Christianity, mystical teachings (Swedenborg), utopian socialism (Fourier), Goethe, European romanticism and points out that transcendental moral universalism was Fuller’s basic premise. The article demonstrates that in her book Fuller combined ethical theory with a criticism of the social reality, norms and morals in the USA as unjust (particularly concerning women’s rights, slavery, rights of the underprivileged) and stressed the significance of justice as a moral value. A special attention is drawn to the peculiarities of the book as a publicistic work, in which Fuller develops her ethical ideas through forms of literary expression: sermon, artistic imagination (characters, dialogues), works by other writers in a discussion on the place of women in the history of cultures.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"73 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114098194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-48-61
O. Zubets
Morality, being understood as a form of value-normative regulation, as a set of norms, commandments, ideas, was actively involved in the mechanics of Auschwitz. One of the key concepts of Nazi morality is “humane” killing: the Nazis’ understanding of it as “humane” is connected with an idea of fighting evil, with the fact that its performer morally justifies and motivates it (with the good of others, including the victim), with a method of its realisation, which should be merciful towards both the killer and his victim. In Nazi morality, the “virtuous” person takes the decision to kill on the basis of moral ideology; killing as an actual action, as a given one, turns out to be outside of morality. They reproduce the mistake of Adam, who took the words of god’s truth for a commandment, a law, which is described by Spinoza. Criticizing the single-level position of moral commandments, the author comes to the conclusion that Auschwitz is opposed not by the commandment, not by the moral prohibition “Thou shalt not kill”, but by non-killing as an act. Philosophy, having emphasized the fundamental nature of human mortality, is forced by Auschwitz to place the concept of killing at the center and postulate the givenness of non-killing as a primary act – outside of verbal expression, consideration, distinction: as the beginning that makes the language, the thinking and the individual as an acting human possible. This means a turn of moral philosophy: from the substantive development of moral ideology and the specification of morality through the nuance of motives, norms and values – back to the givenness of an act, which excludes the differentiation of killing on moral grounds. The act of non-killing is not mediated by morality, it is not defined by the fact that killing is evil, but the very fact that it is evil follows from the primacy of the act of not committing killing, from the decision not to kill given in the act of non-killing. Moral philosophy itself is conceived by the author as the thinking of the one who does not kill.
{"title":"Non-Killing as the Primary Act","authors":"O. Zubets","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-48-61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-48-61","url":null,"abstract":"Morality, being understood as a form of value-normative regulation, as a set of norms, commandments, ideas, was actively involved in the mechanics of Auschwitz. One of the key concepts of Nazi morality is “humane” killing: the Nazis’ understanding of it as “humane” is connected with an idea of fighting evil, with the fact that its performer morally justifies and motivates it (with the good of others, including the victim), with a method of its realisation, which should be merciful towards both the killer and his victim. In Nazi morality, the “virtuous” person takes the decision to kill on the basis of moral ideology; killing as an actual action, as a given one, turns out to be outside of morality. They reproduce the mistake of Adam, who took the words of god’s truth for a commandment, a law, which is described by Spinoza. Criticizing the single-level position of moral commandments, the author comes to the conclusion that Auschwitz is opposed not by the commandment, not by the moral prohibition “Thou shalt not kill”, but by non-killing as an act. Philosophy, having emphasized the fundamental nature of human mortality, is forced by Auschwitz to place the concept of killing at the center and postulate the givenness of non-killing as a primary act – outside of verbal expression, consideration, distinction: as the beginning that makes the language, the thinking and the individual as an acting human possible. This means a turn of moral philosophy: from the substantive development of moral ideology and the specification of morality through the nuance of motives, norms and values – back to the givenness of an act, which excludes the differentiation of killing on moral grounds. The act of non-killing is not mediated by morality, it is not defined by the fact that killing is evil, but the very fact that it is evil follows from the primacy of the act of not committing killing, from the decision not to kill given in the act of non-killing. Moral philosophy itself is conceived by the author as the thinking of the one who does not kill.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128141173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-100-115
R. Apressyan
The principle of reciprocity is fundamental to the Old Testament moral world and is traced in all its main manifestations. In the Old Testament books, they are comprehensively presented in descriptions of both, the relationship between God and the humans, and human relations. The article considers the principle of reciprocity on the basis of its main forms – Lex Talionis, gratitude and the Golden Rule, in its two types – retrospective reciprocity of retaliatory actions (positive or negative) and prospective reciprocity of initiative actions that implement an agent’s benevolence towards others. The study has been grounded on a normative-ethical analysis of imperative and narrative texts of the Old Testament books. Some narrative plots (Gen. 21: 22–24, 27; 26: 26–31; Nav. 2: 1–24) are especially significant for the study of the Golden Rule, which is present in the Old Testament mostly rudimentary: the analysis of the corresponding narratives allows us to reconstruct the process of crystallization of thinking in the spirit of the Golden Rule at a proto-normative stage. The Lex Talionis and the Golden Rule normative dynamics shows that the principle of reciprocity, which initially emerged in the practice of trade exchanges and became a means to ensure the coherence of social relations, was gradually realized as a universal principle of social life and as such turned out to be fundamental for morality.
{"title":"The Principle of Reciprocity in the Old Testament Ethics","authors":"R. Apressyan","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-100-115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-100-115","url":null,"abstract":"The principle of reciprocity is fundamental to the Old Testament moral world and is traced in all its main manifestations. In the Old Testament books, they are comprehensively presented in descriptions of both, the relationship between God and the humans, and human relations. The article considers the principle of reciprocity on the basis of its main forms – Lex Talionis, gratitude and the Golden Rule, in its two types – retrospective reciprocity of retaliatory actions (positive or negative) and prospective reciprocity of initiative actions that implement an agent’s benevolence towards others. The study has been grounded on a normative-ethical analysis of imperative and narrative texts of the Old Testament books. Some narrative plots (Gen. 21: 22–24, 27; 26: 26–31; Nav. 2: 1–24) are especially significant for the study of the Golden Rule, which is present in the Old Testament mostly rudimentary: the analysis of the corresponding narratives allows us to reconstruct the process of crystallization of thinking in the spirit of the Golden Rule at a proto-normative stage. The Lex Talionis and the Golden Rule normative dynamics shows that the principle of reciprocity, which initially emerged in the practice of trade exchanges and became a means to ensure the coherence of social relations, was gradually realized as a universal principle of social life and as such turned out to be fundamental for morality.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114400894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-68-80
A. Seregin
This paper examines two alternative ways to interpret the early Stoic concept of “intermediate appropriate” action (μέσον καθῆκον). According to the first interpretation, which the author calls “dichotomous”, appropriate actions can be “intermediate” or morally neutral only when viewed in abstracto, i.e. without reference to the virtuous or vicious disposition of those who commit them, whereas in practice they always become either morally right or morally wrong depending on this disposition. According to the second interpretation, which the author calls “trichotomous”, “intermediate appropriate” actions constitute a separate class of morally neutral actions along with morally right and morally wrong ones. The author believes that the dichotomous interpretation is preferable. On the whole, it fits much better with the early Stoic view that all moral agents are divided into virtuous sages who only perform morally right actions (κατορθώματα) and vicious fools who only commit morally wrong transgressions (ἁμαρτήματα). Nevertheless, some Stoic fragments contain statements that might seem to support the trichotomous reading. The author offers a detailed analysis of these fragments, demonstrating that they do not in fact contradict the dichotomous interpretation – either because on closer examination these texts prove to be quite compatible with it and even to some extent confirm it or because they do not provide evidence for authentically Stoic teaching at all.
{"title":"Some Remarks on How to Interpret the Concept of “Intermediate Appropriate” Action in Early Stoic Ethics","authors":"A. Seregin","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-68-80","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-68-80","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines two alternative ways to interpret the early Stoic concept of “intermediate appropriate” action (μέσον καθῆκον). According to the first interpretation, which the author calls “dichotomous”, appropriate actions can be “intermediate” or morally neutral only when viewed in abstracto, i.e. without reference to the virtuous or vicious disposition of those who commit them, whereas in practice they always become either morally right or morally wrong depending on this disposition. According to the second interpretation, which the author calls “trichotomous”, “intermediate appropriate” actions constitute a separate class of morally neutral actions along with morally right and morally wrong ones. The author believes that the dichotomous interpretation is preferable. On the whole, it fits much better with the early Stoic view that all moral agents are divided into virtuous sages who only perform morally right actions (κατορθώματα) and vicious fools who only commit morally wrong transgressions (ἁμαρτήματα). Nevertheless, some Stoic fragments contain statements that might seem to support the trichotomous reading. The author offers a detailed analysis of these fragments, demonstrating that they do not in fact contradict the dichotomous interpretation – either because on closer examination these texts prove to be quite compatible with it and even to some extent confirm it or because they do not provide evidence for authentically Stoic teaching at all.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"479 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123033886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-86-99
O. Artemyeva
The article analyzes the peculiarities of conceptualization of the Golden Rule in Sidgwick’s ethics. The significance of his approach to the study of the Golden Rule is determined, in particular, by the fact that he introduced the Golden Rule into the context of moral theory and, focusing on the analysis of the Golden Rule as a statement, started the tradition of thinking about the rule in analytical ethics. In his consideration of the Golden Rule, Sidgwick assumed that it represents a fundamental moral intuition recognized by all humans. However, the evangelical formulation of the rule, in his view, is vague, open to ambiguous and false interpretations and, because of the significance of the rule, needs to be clarified and reformulated. In an effort to rationalize and clarify the normative content of the Golden Rule, Sidgwick links it to the principle of justice, in which he emphasizes the idea of universalizability. Universalizability according to the model of the Golden Rule is realized through the correlation of one's own judgments and actions with other people’s judgments and actions. The idea of universalizability in his interpretation sets the criterion for right action in general and right action in relation to others, in particular. Sidgwick's association of the Golden Rule with the principle of justice was essential because justice was most often correlated with the Talion. The correlation of justice with the Golden Rule provides a different image of justice: it manifests itself in the reciprocal willingness of persons to act proactively, to balance their interests with the interests of others and to allow no exceptions for themselves. This creates a space of humanity, providing conditions for positive interactions between people.
{"title":"The Golden Rule and the Principle of Justice in Henry Sidgwick’s Ethics","authors":"O. Artemyeva","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-86-99","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-86-99","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the peculiarities of conceptualization of the Golden Rule in Sidgwick’s ethics. The significance of his approach to the study of the Golden Rule is determined, in particular, by the fact that he introduced the Golden Rule into the context of moral theory and, focusing on the analysis of the Golden Rule as a statement, started the tradition of thinking about the rule in analytical ethics. In his consideration of the Golden Rule, Sidgwick assumed that it represents a fundamental moral intuition recognized by all humans. However, the evangelical formulation of the rule, in his view, is vague, open to ambiguous and false interpretations and, because of the significance of the rule, needs to be clarified and reformulated. In an effort to rationalize and clarify the normative content of the Golden Rule, Sidgwick links it to the principle of justice, in which he emphasizes the idea of universalizability. Universalizability according to the model of the Golden Rule is realized through the correlation of one's own judgments and actions with other people’s judgments and actions. The idea of universalizability in his interpretation sets the criterion for right action in general and right action in relation to others, in particular. Sidgwick's association of the Golden Rule with the principle of justice was essential because justice was most often correlated with the Talion. The correlation of justice with the Golden Rule provides a different image of justice: it manifests itself in the reciprocal willingness of persons to act proactively, to balance their interests with the interests of others and to allow no exceptions for themselves. This creates a space of humanity, providing conditions for positive interactions between people.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129878110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-2-38-50
L. Maximov
{"title":"The Concepts of “What is” and “What ought to be” in Ethical Contexts","authors":"L. Maximov","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-2-38-50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-2-38-50","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127798024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-74-85
Natalia Yu. Chepeleva
The article analyzes the contribution made by Schopenhauer to the development of the movement for the protection of animals. The author reconstructs some details of Schopenhauer’s interaction with the founder of the first German societies for the protection of animals Ignaz Perner. The article discusses the criticism of the Cartesian worldview and Christian morality proposed by Schopenhauer, with which Schopenhauer associates the lawlessness of animals that was relevant for his era. The article critically reconstructs some of Schopenhauer’s judgments regarding the reflection of the status of animals in language, in the Bible, and in legislation. The author compares the status of animals in Schopenhauer’s philosophy and in classical German philosophy on the example of Kant and Hegel. The article discusses the criticism of Kant presented by Schopenhauer for “idolatry of reason”, on the basis of which Kant, following Descartes and Christian morality, continues to be in error regarding the existence of an ontological gap between man and animals. The article gives a detailed reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of animals, including the idea of the animal kingdom as one of the stages of objectification of will, the interpretation of the aesthetic image of animals and the creative drives of the animals themselves, and the justification for the need for compassionate behavior towards animals. The article criticizes the widespread perception of Schopenhauer as a vegetarian, and provides Schopenhauer’s own arguments about the necessity of eating meat. The article discusses Schopenhauer’s doctrine of animals in the context of modern animal and vegan studies. The article concludes that Schopenhauer was the first European philosopher to offer a popular theoretical justification for the need for an ethical attitude towards animals, which formed the basis of the animal welfare movement in Germany.
{"title":"Schopenhauer’s Contribution to the Animal Welfare Movement","authors":"Natalia Yu. Chepeleva","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-74-85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-74-85","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the contribution made by Schopenhauer to the development of the movement for the protection of animals. The author reconstructs some details of Schopenhauer’s interaction with the founder of the first German societies for the protection of animals Ignaz Perner. The article discusses the criticism of the Cartesian worldview and Christian morality proposed by Schopenhauer, with which Schopenhauer associates the lawlessness of animals that was relevant for his era. The article critically reconstructs some of Schopenhauer’s judgments regarding the reflection of the status of animals in language, in the Bible, and in legislation. The author compares the status of animals in Schopenhauer’s philosophy and in classical German philosophy on the example of Kant and Hegel. The article discusses the criticism of Kant presented by Schopenhauer for “idolatry of reason”, on the basis of which Kant, following Descartes and Christian morality, continues to be in error regarding the existence of an ontological gap between man and animals. The article gives a detailed reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of animals, including the idea of the animal kingdom as one of the stages of objectification of will, the interpretation of the aesthetic image of animals and the creative drives of the animals themselves, and the justification for the need for compassionate behavior towards animals. The article criticizes the widespread perception of Schopenhauer as a vegetarian, and provides Schopenhauer’s own arguments about the necessity of eating meat. The article discusses Schopenhauer’s doctrine of animals in the context of modern animal and vegan studies. The article concludes that Schopenhauer was the first European philosopher to offer a popular theoretical justification for the need for an ethical attitude towards animals, which formed the basis of the animal welfare movement in Germany.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"99 1-4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125988462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：