Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-5-17
E. Loginov, M. V. Gavrilov, Andrew V. Mertsalov, Artem T. Iunusov
This text presents the result of the work of our research group carried out in 2019–2020. The research has focused on the debate on moral responsibility in analytical philosophy in the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The full results of the study are presented in the collective work “Prolegomena to moral responsibility” (see: Loginov E.V., Gavrilov M.V., Mertsalov A.V., Iunusov A.T. “Prolegomeny k moral’noi otvetstvennosti” [Prolegomena to Moral Responsibility], Finikovyi kompot [Date Palm Compote], 2020, No. 15, pp. 3–100. (In Russian)). Although Prolegomena was conceived primarily as a survey work, it also presents its authors’ own ideas, mostly of a metatheoretical ones. In this paper these ideas are summarised briefly in the following order: a) the problem statement in general terms, b) a discussion of ethics and metaphysics of moral responsibility, and c) a consideration of an important question having to do with the nature of the relation of “appropriateness” of moral reactions.
本文介绍了我们课题组在2019-2020年开展的工作成果。该研究集中于20世纪下半叶和21世纪初分析哲学中关于道德责任的辩论。该研究的全部结果发表在集体著作“道德责任导论”中(见:Loginov e.v.， Gavrilov m.v.， Mertsalov a.v.， Iunusov A.T.“Prolegomeny k moral 'noi otvetstvennosti”[道德责任导论]，Finikovyi kompot[枣椰树]，2020，第15期，第3-100页)。(俄罗斯))。虽然《导论》最初是作为一部概括性著作来构思的，但它也提出了作者自己的观点，主要是一种元理论的观点。在本文中，这些观点按以下顺序简要总结:a)问题的一般表述，b)道德责任的伦理学和形而上学的讨论，以及c)考虑与道德反应的“适当性”关系的本质有关的一个重要问题。
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-89-99
A. Schweitzer
Translation by edition: Schweitzer A. Predigten 1898–1948. Werke aus dem Nachlaß / Hrsg. von R. Brüllmann, E. Gräser. München, 2001. S. 1233–1239.
尤同弗利的社会名言资料。冯·高尔曼，e·格拉斯慕尼黑,2001 .s 1233-1239 .
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-2-98-111
Alexey I. Trotsak
Кант в ряде своих работ касается вопроса о статусе сообщества разумных существ, которое он именует «царством целей». Однако эта идеальная конструкция («царство целей») может иметь практическое значение как регулятор морального поведения. В сфере нравственности особое значение приобретает отношение цели и средства между субъектами, которое зависит от воспитания и образования, что в практической деятельности выражается через понятие «квалификация». Какими уровнями квалификаций могут (должны) обладать эти субъекты, чтобы поступать морально? Для ответа на указанный вопрос автор берет за основу существующую систему квалификаций Европейского Союза и в качестве гипотезы проводит сравнение основных принципов построения политики в образовании и трудовой сфере Европейского союза, выраженной в «Европейской рамке квалификаций», с элементами системы этики И. Канта. Мысленный эксперимент сравнения действующего механизма («Европейская рамка квалификаций») с понятием «царство целей» Канта позволяет выявить, насколько предъявляемые к субъекту требования могут быть соотнесены с абсолютной этикой Канта, в которой субъект является высшей ценностью и целью. В результате в статье делается вывод о том, что для поддержания систематических и непротиворечивых моральных взаимоотношений между субъектами, требуется обладать определенным уровнем квалификации, а необходимым условием ее приобретения является образование.
{"title":"On the Applicability of the “European Qualification Framework” to I. Kant’s ‘Kingdom of Ends’: Mental Experiment","authors":"Alexey I. Trotsak","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-2-98-111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-2-98-111","url":null,"abstract":"Кант в ряде своих работ касается вопроса о статусе сообщества разумных существ, которое он именует «царством целей». Однако эта идеальная конструкция («царство целей») может иметь практическое значение как регулятор морального поведения. В сфере нравственности особое значение приобретает отношение цели и средства между субъектами, которое зависит от воспитания и образования, что в практической деятельности выражается через понятие «квалификация». Какими уровнями квалификаций могут (должны) обладать эти субъекты, чтобы поступать морально? Для ответа на указанный вопрос автор берет за основу существующую систему квалификаций Европейского Союза и в качестве гипотезы проводит сравнение основных принципов построения политики в образовании и трудовой сфере Европейского союза, выраженной в «Европейской рамке квалификаций», с элементами системы этики И. Канта. Мысленный эксперимент сравнения действующего механизма («Европейская рамка квалификаций») с понятием «царство целей» Канта позволяет выявить, насколько предъявляемые к субъекту требования могут быть соотнесены с абсолютной этикой Канта, в которой субъект является высшей ценностью и целью. В результате в статье делается вывод о том, что для поддержания систематических и непротиворечивых моральных взаимоотношений между субъектами, требуется обладать определенным уровнем квалификации, а необходимым условием ее приобретения является образование.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127352047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-62-76
A. Gaginsky
The is/ought separation, initiated by D. Hume, but only gained popularity in the first half of the twentieth century, occupies a very important place in ethical discourse for it calls into question the possibility of justifying moral norms. At the same time, the Humean distinction rests on a number of ontological assumptions that need to be clarified in order to understand the limits of the principle. In particular, if Hume’s “guillotine” and its subsequent adaptation in metaethics presupposes an ontology of atomic facts, then the is/ought separation will prove problematic in revising the ontological model. The article shows that the common version of Hume’s “guillotine” is a pseudo-problem because it only works within a reductionist methodology, when a moral judgment is decontextualized and decomposed into atomic components from which nothing is logically derived. A more correct approach to the problem leads to the conclusion that the being and the ought are to be distinguished, but cannot be separated. In this form, Hume’s “guillotine” ceases to be destructive for the ethical systems.
{"title":"“Hume’s Guillotine” as a Pseudo Problem","authors":"A. Gaginsky","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-62-76","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-62-76","url":null,"abstract":"The is/ought separation, initiated by D. Hume, but only gained popularity in the first half of the twentieth century, occupies a very important place in ethical discourse for it calls into question the possibility of justifying moral norms. At the same time, the Humean distinction rests on a number of ontological assumptions that need to be clarified in order to understand the limits of the principle. In particular, if Hume’s “guillotine” and its subsequent adaptation in metaethics presupposes an ontology of atomic facts, then the is/ought separation will prove problematic in revising the ontological model. The article shows that the common version of Hume’s “guillotine” is a pseudo-problem because it only works within a reductionist methodology, when a moral judgment is decontextualized and decomposed into atomic components from which nothing is logically derived. A more correct approach to the problem leads to the conclusion that the being and the ought are to be distinguished, but cannot be separated. In this form, Hume’s “guillotine” ceases to be destructive for the ethical systems.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"2011 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127369339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-5-18
A. Prokofyev
The paper reconstructs O.G. Drobnitskii’s view on moral sanctions and fits it into the history of studying this phenomenon in ethics, sociology and anthropology. The description of moral sanction proposed by O.G. Drobnitskii generally coincides with the tradition of its understanding that links it with public condemnation of a transgressor. In his first analysis of the problem, in The Short Dictionary of Ethics, he defines moral sanction as a spiritual impact on a transgressor that does not affect her real position and material interest. Here moral sanction consists in censure. In his monograph The Concept of Morality: Historical-Critical Essay, he further develops this idea and proposes the conception of the be-polar character of moral sanction: the first pole is external (the public condemnation itself), and the second pole is internal (the acceptance of the condemnation by a transgressor and her feelings of shame, repentance, and remorse). This is what makes morality different from custom which rests upon the sheer ‘emotional-volitional pressure’. So the ‘ideal character’ of moral sanction reveals itself not only in the absence of physical coercion but in the proper ‘subjective attitude [of a transgressor] to herself’. The second tradition of understanding of moral sanctions includes among them the very self-condemnation of a transgressor and her negative emotions of self-appraisal. Drobnitskii got closer to this tradition in a few fragments of his dissertational thesis.
{"title":"Moral Sanctions in the Ethics of O.G. Drobnitskii","authors":"A. Prokofyev","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-5-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-5-18","url":null,"abstract":"The paper reconstructs O.G. Drobnitskii’s view on moral sanctions and fits it into the history of studying this phenomenon in ethics, sociology and anthropology. The description of moral sanction proposed by O.G. Drobnitskii generally coincides with the tradition of its understanding that links it with public condemnation of a transgressor. In his first analysis of the problem, in The Short Dictionary of Ethics, he defines moral sanction as a spiritual impact on a transgressor that does not affect her real position and material interest. Here moral sanction consists in censure. In his monograph The Concept of Morality: Historical-Critical Essay, he further develops this idea and proposes the conception of the be-polar character of moral sanction: the first pole is external (the public condemnation itself), and the second pole is internal (the acceptance of the condemnation by a transgressor and her feelings of shame, repentance, and remorse). This is what makes morality different from custom which rests upon the sheer ‘emotional-volitional pressure’. So the ‘ideal character’ of moral sanction reveals itself not only in the absence of physical coercion but in the proper ‘subjective attitude [of a transgressor] to herself’. The second tradition of understanding of moral sanctions includes among them the very self-condemnation of a transgressor and her negative emotions of self-appraisal. Drobnitskii got closer to this tradition in a few fragments of his dissertational thesis.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122222173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-19-36
M. L. Gel’fond
Some historians of Russian philosophical thought, relying on the fact that it focuses on moral issues, argue that the problem of justification of morality is as significant, as independent and as thoroughly developed in the Russian philosophical tradition as in Western ethics. Meanwhile, an analysis of the main trends and most famous doctrines of Russian religious ethics of the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that justification of morality is present in them only implicitly, not as a solution of a separate theoretical problem. In this regard, the relevance of the analysis of Russian ethical-philosophical thought is to identify and reveal the reasons for this situation, as well as to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the option of defending the moral good, which does not separate the problem of justification of morality from the philosophical search for the foundations of life. The purpose of the article also includes checking the hypothesis that the synthetic discursive strategy used by the leading representatives of the Russian philosophical tradition, relying simultaneously on rational and irrational (super-rational) grounds, provides a more complete moral development of a person than attempts to initiate his transformation on a purely religious basis or to use only rational arguments to prove to the moral skeptic the necessity of transformation into a moral person. Of greatest research interest in this context is Leo Tolstoy’s concept of “reasonable faith”.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-156-171
A. A. Skvortsov
The article deals with the history of the emergence and subsequent development of the Department of Ethics at Lomonosov Moscow State University. The Department was founded in December 1969 and is currently one of three independent departments of ethics in Russia. Many well-known philosophers-ethicists of the country worked in it. The Department has developed its own academic school and traditions in ethical education; its graduates include many successful scientists, educators and practitioners working in different socially relevant areas. Thanks to their efforts, the Department plays a prominent role in the Russian philosophical community and in public life. The author shows how the Department has changed in the early 1990s and at the turn of the millennium, and how it has responded to the various challenges posed by the long reform of education and science. Particular attention is paid to the scholarly perceptions of morality and ethics, and the research interests and theoretical views of the department’s staff. It looks at the department’s educational programme, teaching and methodological work, approaches to teaching and student life, which has always been very interesting. In recent years, the department has revised its approaches to teaching in many ways, making it more polemical and filled with the most controversial topics. Today, the Department is actively involved in various research and educational projects, advises civil society organisations and professional communities on ethical regulation practices, and is active in the media.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-147-163
Christian August Crusius
{"title":"Guide to Rational Living (Part I)","authors":"Christian August Crusius","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-147-163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-147-163","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132516187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-124-134
O. Savvina
The article analyses the moral justification of human germline editing and the tendency to its legalization. The study is based on documents of international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), national bioethics committees and others that regulate the usage of technologies for human germline editing or issue related recommendations. The paper analyzes the impact of the introduction of new technologies on human germline editing recommendations. It is concluded that that the development of biotechnologies contributes to liberal attitude towards human germline editing, slowly canceling the technologies’ usage ban firstly for therapeutic purposes, and then for the human enhancement purposes. The article suggests that the development of biotechnologies makes it difficult to apply the old bioethics principles; and exacerbates the discussion about the boundaries of the new biotechnologies’ application. Despite the shock and condemnation of the first experiments that violate ban (as in the cases with CRISPR/Cas9 in 2015 and 2018 in China), the scientific community, international organizations and governments return to the issue concerning gene editing technologies limitation. The inability to be guided by the old bioethics principles forces to look for new ethical grounds for gene editing. Now old principles and values are applied with utilitarian approach in ethics, that cancel ban and raises the issue of human germline editing limitation. The article also describes the limits of permissible interventions in the issue of human germline editing at the end of 2021.
{"title":"Genetic Modification of Human Embryos: Limits","authors":"O. Savvina","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-124-134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-124-134","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyses the moral justification of human germline editing and the tendency to its legalization. The study is based on documents of international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), national bioethics committees and others that regulate the usage of technologies for human germline editing or issue related recommendations. The paper analyzes the impact of the introduction of new technologies on human germline editing recommendations. It is concluded that that the development of biotechnologies contributes to liberal attitude towards human germline editing, slowly canceling the technologies’ usage ban firstly for therapeutic purposes, and then for the human enhancement purposes. The article suggests that the development of biotechnologies makes it difficult to apply the old bioethics principles; and exacerbates the discussion about the boundaries of the new biotechnologies’ application. Despite the shock and condemnation of the first experiments that violate ban (as in the cases with CRISPR/Cas9 in 2015 and 2018 in China), the scientific community, international organizations and governments return to the issue concerning gene editing technologies limitation. The inability to be guided by the old bioethics principles forces to look for new ethical grounds for gene editing. Now old principles and values are applied with utilitarian approach in ethics, that cancel ban and raises the issue of human germline editing limitation. The article also describes the limits of permissible interventions in the issue of human germline editing at the end of 2021.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128088639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-5-20
O. Zubets
The article represents an attempt to think of a possible concept list of moral philosophy, arising from the decision to build it on the basis of the concept of an act and to determine which ideas and ways of thought should be abandoned in this case. We are talking about the specifically philosophical nature of this concept, which is the basis of the first philosophy: its content is revealed through a “bunch” of conceptual identities: act – being – actor (subject, beginning) – decision – non-differentiation – timelessness – self-sufficiency – asymmetry – centrality – oneness – responsibility. This “list” is both completed and open. Revealing the specifics of the moral philosophy of the act, it also determines the ideas that should be abandoned, taking the challenge of Auschwitz with all seriousness, as a challenge to moral thinking. So, it names the rejection of various kinds of differentiations due to the unity, oneness and completeness of the act (including the substantial differentiation of the act, and the actor, and the decision), and in general from the idea of plurality (act, subject); rejection of the juxtaposition of morality to value-regulatory forms: law, science, art, etc.; the refusal from localization (limitation) of responsibility, from the concepts of behavior and personality; from understanding an act as a result of choice and rational discourse, knowledge; and in general from the secondary nature of the act in relation to moral ideas, norms, commandments as a result of the recognition of the priority of the act as a given one and morality as based on the initial act of non-killing.
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