Biosafety and Health最新文献

The outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron variant in China have revealed a high rate of asymptomatic cases, making isolation and quarantine measures exceedingly difficult. Public health surveillance and intervention measures will require rapid and accurate testing preferably on-site using point-of-care tests (POCTs) technology for SARS-CoV-2 variants. However, delayed and/or inaccurate surveillance data is a major obstacle blocking the large-scale implementation of POCTs in curbing spread of infectious pathogens and reducing mortality during an outbreak. To determine levels of community transmission and timely strategies accordingly, highly sensitive and specific POCT embedded with the internet of things (IoT) technology could enable on-site screening and real-time data collection. A new Rapid Amplification with Sensitivity And Portability point-of-care test (RASAP-POCT) system based on thermal convection PCR is the first IoT-based isothermal nucleic acid amplification POCT, which can provide test results within 20–30 min using saliva and/or nasopharyngeal swab samples without nucleic acid extraction. With the IoT-imbedded feature, the RASAP-POCT system can be integrated easily and smoothly with China’s existing mobile-phone-based contact tracing system, which has previously proved to be highly effective in maintaining the dynamic zero-COVID policy. Current regulatory guidelines and rules should be modified to accelerate the adoption of new technologies under an emergency use authorization (EUA).

With the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), it is essential to share pathogens and their data information safely, transparently, and timely. At the same time, it is also worth exploring how to share the benefits of using the provided pathogenic microorganisms fairly and equitably. There are some mechanisms for the management and sharing of pathogenic microbial resources in the world, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United States, the Europe, and China. This paper studies these mechanisms and puts forward “PICC” principles, including public welfare principle, interests principle, classified principle, and category principle, to strengthen cooperation, improve efficiency, and maintain biosafety.

Technological advances in the first two decades of the 21^st century have profoundly impacted medical research in many ways, with large population cohorts, biological sample collections and datasets through biobanks becoming valued global resources to guide biomedical research, drug development, and medical practice. However, in order for biobanks to maximize their impact and scientific reach of their resources, they would need to act within a complex network of infrastructures and activities. Therefore, different ways have emerged in which biobanks, including those for infectious diseases, can emerge as (part of) infrastructures, integrate within existing ones, or become an independent, yet an interoperable component of the existing infrastructural landscape. However, there has been a limited understanding and study of such mechanisms to date. This perspective aims to address this knowledge gap and illustrates these three high-level ways in which such infrastructures could integrate their activities and identifies the necessary key pre-conditions for doing so, while drawing from specific examples.

Monkeypox is a zoonotic disease caused by the monkeypox virus (MPXV), which is a potential biological warfare agent of bioterrorism and poses the greatest threat to the world’s public biosafety and health after variola virus (VARV). While the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has not ended yet, monkeypox is spreading menacingly. The first case of monkeypox in a nonendemic country was confirmed on May 6^th, 2022, while the first imported case from Asia was found on June 21^st. There were more than 16 thousand reported cases as of July 23^rd, the day the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the global monkeypox outbreak a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) at the same level as smallpox and COVID-19; while there were more than 53 thousand cases as of September 1^st. Therefore, we will propose relevant biosafety prevention and control strategies after analyzing the etiology of the 2022 multi-country monkeypox outbreak from the biological feature, transmissibility, epidemic, and variability of MPXV.

Since its first confirmation in London on 12 May 2022, many monkeypox cases have been reported worldwide. Noticeably, the epidemiology, pathology, and clinical features of the current emergence have been compared to those of smallpox, a severe contagious disease historically epidemic worldwide for nearly 3,000 years. However, some characteristics of the present outbreak differed from those of previous monkeypox outbreaks. Herein, we ask if this emergence of monkeypox could cause another global pandemic similar to smallpox or influenza or if it is only the re-emergence of a new strain. To address these questions, we reviewed its virology, transmission, clinical characteristics, experimental diagnosis, and prevention and intervention, giving our commentary along the way.

The Omicron variants spread rapidly worldwide after being initially detected in South Africa in November 2021. It showed increased transmissibility and immune evasion with far more amino acid mutations in the spike (S) protein than the previously circulating variants of concern (VOCs). Notably, on 15 July 2022, we monitored the first VOC / Omicron subvariant BA.2.75 in China from an imported case. Moreover, nowadays, this subvariant still is predominant in India. It has nine additional mutations in the S protein compared to BA.2, three of which (W152R, G446S, and R493Q reversion) might contribute to higher transmissibility and immune escape. This subvariant could cause wider spread and pose a threat to the global situation. Our timely reporting and continuous genomic analysis are essential to fully elucidate the characteristics of the subvariant BA.2.75 in the future.

Medical laboratory workers handle clinical specimens, which are a threat of exposure to infectious agents. Notably, medical laboratory science students report for internships with only theoretical knowledge of biosafety and biorisk management practices, predisposing them to a higher risk of laboratory hazards. In this study, we assessed the influence of entry-level students' adherence to practices and attitudes towards biosafety and biorisk management during the Internship. An online survey tool was used to explore the practices and attitudes towards laboratory biosafety and risk management. Of the 96 students, 60 (62.5%) anonymous responses were received, and of these, 60.3% were direct entrants, and 32.8% were diploma entrants. Most (91.7%) of the students attended hospital internships, with 60.2% in Biosafety Level (BSL)-2 laboratories and 70.2% rotating in all the core areas of laboratory medicine. The 8.3% who did not attend any internship were under the direct entry category. Exposure to biohazards was not significantly associated with laboratory safety level and student entry category (P> 0.05). Recommended laboratory biosafety practices were not significantly associated with the safety level of the laboratory and student entry category (P> 0.05). Poor attitudes towards certain laboratory biosafety practices were not significantly associated with the biosafety level of the training laboratory (P> 0.05), whereas training (P = 0.021) and clean-up procedures (P = 0.048) were associated with laboratory safety levels, respectively. The direct entrants had no access to BSL-3 laboratories, and this category of students had a negative attitude towards internship attendance. Therefore, there is a need to create a multi-channel full range laboratory biosafety and biorisk management teaching reforms based on practical application, real case studies, and laboratory simulation to be incorporated into the curriculum to benefit the direct entrant.

How to address the impact of genome editing on human rights is a global challenge. The World Health Organization (WHO) recently developed a governance framework for human genome editing to provide global recommendations for establishing appropriate governance mechanisms for human genome editing. This article suggests that a human rights-respecting approach should be explicitly recognized in the framework and other relevant endeavors. Such recognition has significant implications not only on clarifying the duty of States but also on the responsibility of non-State actors, particularly biotech enterprises, to orient this technology towards respect for human rights. To implement this approach, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) provide helpful guidance for States, biotech enterprises, and other stakeholders to raise awareness and enhance responsible practices in the field.

An ongoing multi-country outbreak of monkeypox was reported in May 2022 with several deaths, affecting 107 countries of all six World Health Organization (WHO) regions. The WHO has declared the current monkeypox outbreak to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. It is, thus, necessary to rapidly and accurately detect and distinguish different monkeypox virus (MPXV) clades. We designed primers and probes based on the alignment of 138 complete genomes of poxviruses. In Panel 1, we mixed one pair of primers and three probes to detect and differentiate the MPXV Western Africa (IIa, IIb clade) and Congo Basin (I clade) and other orthopoxviruses. In Panel 2, we mixed one pair of primers and two probes to detect the 2022 MPXV (B.1 lineage and its descendant lineages). In addition, we tested the specificity and sensitivity of the assay using real-time PCR. In Panel 1, the assay reproducibly identified various concentrations of two plasmids of the monkeypox virus, whereas other orthopoxviruses did not cross-react. In Panel 2, the probe annealed well to MPXV B.1 and showed the expected linearity. These two multiple real-time assays are inclusive and highly specific for identifying different clades of MPXV.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has caused many deaths and contributed to a tremendous public health concern worldwide since 2020. Angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) binds to the SARS-CoV-2 virus as a receptor. The challenge of different nonhuman primate (NHP) species by SARS-CoV-2 virus demonstrated different effects on virus replication and disease pathology. This study characterizes differences between host ACE2 sequences of three NHP species: Macaca mulatta, Macaca fascicularis, and Chlorocebus sabaeus. In addition, the binding affinity between the ACE2 ectodomain and the SARS-CoV-2 S receptor-binding domain (RBD) was analyzed. Variation of ACE2 sequence among NHP species and the binding affinity may account for different susceptibility and responses to SARS-CoV-2 infection.