The paper highlights the origins of Public Choice as a descendant of Public Finance.
本文强调了公共选择作为公共财政学的后代的起源。
{"title":"Public Choice and Public Finance: A Survey","authors":"C. Blankart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2766888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2766888","url":null,"abstract":"The paper highlights the origins of Public Choice as a descendant of Public Finance.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114079053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we investigate viewer responses to changes in the ideological content of television programming using variation induced by cadenas, unannounced takeovers of the public television airwaves by the government in Venezuela. Using high-frequency ratings data, we find that, consistent with the predictions of our choice model, the drop-off in ratings during cadenas is concentrated among viewers of news programming on opposition private channels, as opposed to viewers of news on pro-government public channels. Also consistent with the predictions of our model, the drop-off in ratings for private channels with moderate ideology takes an intermediate value. In addition, the drop-off is stronger for viewers with access to cable channels, which are not required to air cadenas. Consistent with this result, we also show that viewership of an opposition cable channel rises during cadenas. Complementing this analysis, we then estimate the parameters of the theoretical model in a structural analysis. Using these parameter estimates, we consider counterfactual scenarios, allowing for an examination of the dynamic responses of viewers of differing ideology to cadenas and an analysis of the welfare consequences of cadenas.
{"title":"The Limits of Propaganda: Evidence from Chavez&Apos;S Venezuela","authors":"Brian Knight, Ana Tribin","doi":"10.1093/JEEA/JVY012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JEEA/JVY012","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate viewer responses to changes in the ideological content of television programming using variation induced by cadenas, unannounced takeovers of the public television airwaves by the government in Venezuela. Using high-frequency ratings data, we find that, consistent with the predictions of our choice model, the drop-off in ratings during cadenas is concentrated among viewers of news programming on opposition private channels, as opposed to viewers of news on pro-government public channels. Also consistent with the predictions of our model, the drop-off in ratings for private channels with moderate ideology takes an intermediate value. In addition, the drop-off is stronger for viewers with access to cable channels, which are not required to air cadenas. Consistent with this result, we also show that viewership of an opposition cable channel rises during cadenas. Complementing this analysis, we then estimate the parameters of the theoretical model in a structural analysis. Using these parameter estimates, we consider counterfactual scenarios, allowing for an examination of the dynamic responses of viewers of differing ideology to cadenas and an analysis of the welfare consequences of cadenas.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117184600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules. Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would suggest. Our analysis is made both under variable and fixed-size electorates.
{"title":"Revisiting the Connection between the No-Show Paradox and Monotonicity","authors":"Matías Núñez, M. Remzi Sanver","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2734224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2734224","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules. Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would suggest. Our analysis is made both under variable and fixed-size electorates.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128331230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
No individual in the history of public economics has been subject to more contentious discussion than Knut Wicksell – and perhaps no concept subjected to more diverse interpretation than Wicksell’s unanimity rule. The story begins in 1896 with the publication of Wicksell’s public finance treatise, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, and starts to take shape in 1906 with the publication of Pareto’s Manual of Political Economy. The crux of the matter hinges on the relationship between Wicksell’s unanimity rule and Pareto’s optimality. This article examines Knut Wicksell’s one-sided debate with Vilfredo Pareto on issues in welfare economics and considers the trajectory of their economic ideas that led to an eventual convergence in public choice.
{"title":"Wicksell, Pareto and Public Choice","authors":"Marianne Johnson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2704001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2704001","url":null,"abstract":"No individual in the history of public economics has been subject to more contentious discussion than Knut Wicksell – and perhaps no concept subjected to more diverse interpretation than Wicksell’s unanimity rule. The story begins in 1896 with the publication of Wicksell’s public finance treatise, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, and starts to take shape in 1906 with the publication of Pareto’s Manual of Political Economy. The crux of the matter hinges on the relationship between Wicksell’s unanimity rule and Pareto’s optimality. This article examines Knut Wicksell’s one-sided debate with Vilfredo Pareto on issues in welfare economics and considers the trajectory of their economic ideas that led to an eventual convergence in public choice.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"479 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125936739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-11-01DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684250.013.014
J. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz
This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.
{"title":"Democratic Rulemaking","authors":"J. de Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684250.013.014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684250.013.014","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124483830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, we argue that the rules set by a central government to allocate interregional equalization grants may induce richer regions to ask for devolution, even when centralized provision is more efficient. We model a local public good with spillovers in a framework in which devolution is socially inefficient. Nevertheless, we show that the de- centralized solution may be preferred by the richer regions if it implies a reduction in solidarity. We define a threshold for regional income disparity above which claims for more devolution may be driven by a reduction in solidarity. Finally, the relative strength of this effect is computed for a sample of countries.
{"title":"Would Less Solidarity Justify Present Calls for Devolution?","authors":"Rosella Levaggi, F. Menoncin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2669340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2669340","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we argue that the rules set by a central government to allocate interregional equalization grants may induce richer regions to ask for devolution, even when centralized provision is more efficient. We model a local public good with spillovers in a framework in which devolution is socially inefficient. Nevertheless, we show that the de- centralized solution may be preferred by the richer regions if it implies a reduction in solidarity. We define a threshold for regional income disparity above which claims for more devolution may be driven by a reduction in solidarity. Finally, the relative strength of this effect is computed for a sample of countries.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115898104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does the political popularity of a sitting governor affect that incumbent’s tax policy choices? In this paper, I discuss whether, and by what degree, a governor’s popularity affects his or her tax policies between 1970 and 2010. The results show that high levels of popularity may induce governors to act contrary to the interests of independent voters. I find that popular Democratic governors have more incentives to increase corporate taxes, while popular Republican governors are likely to raise sales taxes. Further analysis suggests that popular term-limited governors are more likely to increase total taxes than their counterparts who are eligible for reelection. In addition to explaining the role of popularity in incumbents’ policy choices, these findings improve our understanding of the interaction between voters’ behavior and political attitudes of public officials in representative democracy.
{"title":"Why Do 'Schwarzeneggers' Raise Taxes? The Popularity of Governors and State Tax Policy","authors":"Xiandeng Jiang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2685027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2685027","url":null,"abstract":"How does the political popularity of a sitting governor affect that incumbent’s tax policy choices? In this paper, I discuss whether, and by what degree, a governor’s popularity affects his or her tax policies between 1970 and 2010. The results show that high levels of popularity may induce governors to act contrary to the interests of independent voters. I find that popular Democratic governors have more incentives to increase corporate taxes, while popular Republican governors are likely to raise sales taxes. Further analysis suggests that popular term-limited governors are more likely to increase total taxes than their counterparts who are eligible for reelection. In addition to explaining the role of popularity in incumbents’ policy choices, these findings improve our understanding of the interaction between voters’ behavior and political attitudes of public officials in representative democracy.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116460452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses data from the Gothenburg District Court in Sweden and a research design that exploits the random assignment of politically appointed jurors (termed namndeman) to make three contributions to the literature on jury decision-making: (i) an assessment of whether systematic biases exist in the Swedish namndeman system, (ii) causal evidence on the impact of juror political party on verdicts, and (iii) an empirical examination of the role of peer effects in jury decision-making. The results reveal a number of systematic biases: convictions for young defendants and those with distinctly Arabic sounding names increase substantially when they are randomly assigned jurors from the far-right (nationalist) Swedish Democrat party, while convictions in cases with a female victim increase markedly when they are assigned jurors from the far-left (feminist) Vanster party. The results also indicate the presence of peer effects, with jurors from both the far-left and far-right parties drawing the votes of their more centrist peers towards their positions. Peer effects take the form of both sway effects, where jurors influence the opinions of their closest peers in a way that can impact trial outcomes, and dissent aversion, where jurors switch non-pivotal votes so that the decision is unanimous.
{"title":"Politics in the Courtroom: Political Ideology and Jury Decision Making","authors":"Shamena Anwar, P. Bayer, Randi Hjalmarsson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2600655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2600655","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses data from the Gothenburg District Court in Sweden and a research design that exploits the random assignment of politically appointed jurors (termed namndeman) to make three contributions to the literature on jury decision-making: (i) an assessment of whether systematic biases exist in the Swedish namndeman system, (ii) causal evidence on the impact of juror political party on verdicts, and (iii) an empirical examination of the role of peer effects in jury decision-making. The results reveal a number of systematic biases: convictions for young defendants and those with distinctly Arabic sounding names increase substantially when they are randomly assigned jurors from the far-right (nationalist) Swedish Democrat party, while convictions in cases with a female victim increase markedly when they are assigned jurors from the far-left (feminist) Vanster party. The results also indicate the presence of peer effects, with jurors from both the far-left and far-right parties drawing the votes of their more centrist peers towards their positions. Peer effects take the form of both sway effects, where jurors influence the opinions of their closest peers in a way that can impact trial outcomes, and dissent aversion, where jurors switch non-pivotal votes so that the decision is unanimous.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128876020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a continuous time dynamic game to provide with a benchmark theory of Arab Spring-type events. We consider a resource-dependent economy with two interacting groups, the elite vs. the citizens, and two political regimes, dictatorship vs. a freer regime. Transition to the freer regime can only be achieved if citizens decide to revolt given the concession/repression policy of the elite. Departing from the related literature, the revolution optimal timing is an explicit control variable in the hands of citizens. The elite is the strategic leader: she ultimately chooses her policy knowing the reaction function of citizens. In this framework, we provide with a full equilibrium analysis of the political regime switching game and notably emphasize the role of the direct switching cost of the citizens and of the elite's self-preservation options. In particular, we show how the incorporation of explicit revolution timing may change the conventional wisdom in the related institutional change literature. Finally, we emphasize how the theory may help explaining some key features of the Arab Spring.
{"title":"On the Timing of Political Regime Changes: Theory and Application to the Arab Spring","authors":"R. Boucekkine, Fabien Prieur, K. Puzon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2541630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2541630","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a continuous time dynamic game to provide with a benchmark theory of Arab Spring-type events. We consider a resource-dependent economy with two interacting groups, the elite vs. the citizens, and two political regimes, dictatorship vs. a freer regime. Transition to the freer regime can only be achieved if citizens decide to revolt given the concession/repression policy of the elite. Departing from the related literature, the revolution optimal timing is an explicit control variable in the hands of citizens. The elite is the strategic leader: she ultimately chooses her policy knowing the reaction function of citizens. In this framework, we provide with a full equilibrium analysis of the political regime switching game and notably emphasize the role of the direct switching cost of the citizens and of the elite's self-preservation options. In particular, we show how the incorporation of explicit revolution timing may change the conventional wisdom in the related institutional change literature. Finally, we emphasize how the theory may help explaining some key features of the Arab Spring.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127662575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Congruence between own values and those of one’s reference groups has been found to promote life satisfaction. Actual or anticipated support or sanctions from reference others presumably explains this effect. Does the effect extend to congruence with the values of others who are similar only in socio-demographic characteristics with whom one does not interact? We constructed 36 socio-demographic groups by crossing age, gender, religion, education level, and region of residence in a representative Russian national sample (N=961). We derived value congruence scores by correlating individuals’ values with the mean values of their constructed group. Value congruence and life satisfaction correlated significantly across individuals even in these groups. The less important self-direction values to individuals, the stronger the correlation. A meta-analysis of the correlations in the 36 groups also confirmed the positive association of value congruence with life satisfaction. The characteristics used to construct the groups did not moderate this association.
{"title":"How Robust is the Association of Life Satisfaction with Value Congruence? A Study of Constructed Socio-Demographic Groups in a Russian National Sample","authors":"A. Khaptsova, S. Schwartz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2540000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540000","url":null,"abstract":"Congruence between own values and those of one’s reference groups has been found to promote life satisfaction. Actual or anticipated support or sanctions from reference others presumably explains this effect. Does the effect extend to congruence with the values of others who are similar only in socio-demographic characteristics with whom one does not interact? We constructed 36 socio-demographic groups by crossing age, gender, religion, education level, and region of residence in a representative Russian national sample (N=961). We derived value congruence scores by correlating individuals’ values with the mean values of their constructed group. Value congruence and life satisfaction correlated significantly across individuals even in these groups. The less important self-direction values to individuals, the stronger the correlation. A meta-analysis of the correlations in the 36 groups also confirmed the positive association of value congruence with life satisfaction. The characteristics used to construct the groups did not moderate this association.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129443057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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