Pub Date : 2007-05-23DOI: 10.1504/GBER.2007.013708
N. Berg, S. Maital
This paper argues that political-economic trends referred to under the single heading of globalisation have distinct causes and manifestations in different countries. Institutional variables chosen by governments and their constituents play a dominant role in determining the character of those manifestations, few of which are inevitable. The political Left and Right often base their arguments on the common premise that nations have no choice but to adopt the US model of highly mobile investment capital, market-centred provision of most goods, minimal governmental regulation and minimisation of accounting costs. That countries possess considerable degrees of freedom in establishing rules for international flows of labour, capital and goods is insufficiently appreciated by critics and supporters of trade and labour market liberalisation. Variety in political-economic forms achieves institutional diversification on a global scale, providing a multi-dimensional spectrum of benchmarks that help individual countries measure policy performance and update institutional variables accordingly.
{"title":"Tailoring Globalization to National Needs and Wellbeing: One Size Never Fits All","authors":"N. Berg, S. Maital","doi":"10.1504/GBER.2007.013708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/GBER.2007.013708","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that political-economic trends referred to under the single heading of globalisation have distinct causes and manifestations in different countries. Institutional variables chosen by governments and their constituents play a dominant role in determining the character of those manifestations, few of which are inevitable. The political Left and Right often base their arguments on the common premise that nations have no choice but to adopt the US model of highly mobile investment capital, market-centred provision of most goods, minimal governmental regulation and minimisation of accounting costs. That countries possess considerable degrees of freedom in establishing rules for international flows of labour, capital and goods is insufficiently appreciated by critics and supporters of trade and labour market liberalisation. Variety in political-economic forms achieves institutional diversification on a global scale, providing a multi-dimensional spectrum of benchmarks that help individual countries measure policy performance and update institutional variables accordingly.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123899007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tina Nabatchi, Yuseok Moon, Lisa Blomgren Amsler (formerly Bingham)
This study explores the tactics and strategies of transformative mediators in practice. Specifically, the study examines the premises, principles, and behaviors of mediators in REDRESS, the United States Postal Service (USPS) employment mediation program. The study is also a process evaluation used to determine whether the REDRESS program is being implemented by mediators as designed by the USPS. Survey results indicate that REDRESS mediators understand and correctly use the transformative model. Moreover, triangulation of the results with other studies suggests that the REDRESS program has been implemented as it was designed.
{"title":"Evaluating Transformative Mediation in Practice: The Premises, Principles, and Behaviors of Usps Mediators","authors":"Tina Nabatchi, Yuseok Moon, Lisa Blomgren Amsler (formerly Bingham)","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.916008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.916008","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the tactics and strategies of transformative mediators in practice. Specifically, the study examines the premises, principles, and behaviors of mediators in REDRESS, the United States Postal Service (USPS) employment mediation program. The study is also a process evaluation used to determine whether the REDRESS program is being implemented by mediators as designed by the USPS. Survey results indicate that REDRESS mediators understand and correctly use the transformative model. Moreover, triangulation of the results with other studies suggests that the REDRESS program has been implemented as it was designed.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114935887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how individuals divide themselves into coalitions and choose a public alternative for each coalition. When preferences have consecutive support and coalition feasible sets are positively population- responsive, the proposed consecutive benevolence solution generates allocations belonging to the coalition structure core and that are also Tiebout equilibria. However, when each coalition follows a single-valued collective decision rule, the coalition structure core may be empty. Our results show that if individual preferences are, in a sense, similar and if members can be as well off when a coalition enlarges, then a stable formation of collective decision-making units can be guaranteed. A predetermined decision rule makes coalitions less stable.
{"title":"Formation of Collective Decision-Making Units: Stability and a Solution","authors":"Fan-chin Kung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3081609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3081609","url":null,"abstract":"We study how individuals divide themselves into coalitions and choose a public alternative for each coalition. When preferences have consecutive support and coalition feasible sets are positively population- responsive, the proposed consecutive benevolence solution generates allocations belonging to the coalition structure core and that are also Tiebout equilibria. However, when each coalition follows a single-valued collective decision rule, the coalition structure core may be empty. Our results show that if individual preferences are, in a sense, similar and if members can be as well off when a coalition enlarges, then a stable formation of collective decision-making units can be guaranteed. A predetermined decision rule makes coalitions less stable.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124783044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent redistricting and jury exclusion cases, the Supreme Court has expressed hostility to the idea that government may consider racial or gender group membership in making decisions that determine the composition of representative institutions. Instead, the Court has insisted that government must think of voters and jurors solely as individual actors, who cannot be recognized as having similar interests, experiences, or perspectives as other persons who share their race or sex. Whatever merit there may be in adopting this exclusively individualistic approach in the area of civil rights and privileges, Professors Amar and Brownstein argue that it is an inadequate basis for understanding the Constitution's equality requirements when political rights are at issue. Instead of focusing exclusively on the individual, our constitutional tradition acknowledges a dual dimension to political rights consisting of both an individualistic, dignitary component and a group-based, instrumental component. This tradition developed out of the political and legal struggle to extend the franchise to black men and to women through the 15th and 19th amendments and underlies over 100 years of case law interpreting the nature of political equality for constitutional purposes. Political rights in America have always reflected an uneasy tension between respect for the individual and a concern for the ability of groups to influence government. When the modern Court ignores the group and instrumental dimension of political rights in our history, it avoids, rather than resolves, the hard questions and grounds constitutional doctrine in this area on an unstable foundation.
{"title":"The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights","authors":"V. Amar, Alan E. Brownstein","doi":"10.2307/1229327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1229327","url":null,"abstract":"In recent redistricting and jury exclusion cases, the Supreme Court has expressed hostility to the idea that government may consider racial or gender group membership in making decisions that determine the composition of representative institutions. Instead, the Court has insisted that government must think of voters and jurors solely as individual actors, who cannot be recognized as having similar interests, experiences, or perspectives as other persons who share their race or sex. Whatever merit there may be in adopting this exclusively individualistic approach in the area of civil rights and privileges, Professors Amar and Brownstein argue that it is an inadequate basis for understanding the Constitution's equality requirements when political rights are at issue. Instead of focusing exclusively on the individual, our constitutional tradition acknowledges a dual dimension to political rights consisting of both an individualistic, dignitary component and a group-based, instrumental component. This tradition developed out of the political and legal struggle to extend the franchise to black men and to women through the 15th and 19th amendments and underlies over 100 years of case law interpreting the nature of political equality for constitutional purposes. Political rights in America have always reflected an uneasy tension between respect for the individual and a concern for the ability of groups to influence government. When the modern Court ignores the group and instrumental dimension of political rights in our history, it avoids, rather than resolves, the hard questions and grounds constitutional doctrine in this area on an unstable foundation.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129733569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses the non-satiability assumption, i.e. the more is better assumption, embedded in classic unconstrained utility maximization and discusses the proposition that constrained utility maximization results in greater overall utility and welfare. The paper frames common economic phenomenon from the constrained utility maximization principle. Then it discusses examples from computational optimization problems where constrained utility or optimization results in far superior and higher utility solution in terms of predictive utility than greedy optimization of utility maximization.
{"title":"Towards a Theory of Constrained Economic Utility: Localized Constrained Utility Maximization Paradoxically Results in Greater Welfare and Global Utility Maximization","authors":"Dhruv Sharma, Paras Sharma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1872943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1872943","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the non-satiability assumption, i.e. the more is better assumption, embedded in classic unconstrained utility maximization and discusses the proposition that constrained utility maximization results in greater overall utility and welfare. The paper frames common economic phenomenon from the constrained utility maximization principle. Then it discusses examples from computational optimization problems where constrained utility or optimization results in far superior and higher utility solution in terms of predictive utility than greedy optimization of utility maximization.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"237 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115237869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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