Drawing on the history of statebuilding in Western Europe, fiscal sociology has proposed the existence of a mutually reinforcing effect between the emergence of representative government and effective taxation. This paper looks at the case of Benin, a low-income West African country that underwent a fairly successful democratization process in the early 1990s. It finds, in contrast to previous studies that have emphasized dependency on aid rents, that Benin appears to have reinforced its extractive capacities since democratization. However, the effect of democratization has been largely indirect, while other factors, such as the influence of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the size of the country’s informal sector, have played a more direct role in encouraging or inhibiting tax extraction. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that effective taxation depends on a quasiconsensual relationship between government and taxpayers finds some confirmation in the Beninese case.
{"title":"A Democratic Rentier State? Taxation, Aid Dependency, and Political Representation in Benin","authors":"G. Piccolino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2554285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2554285","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on the history of statebuilding in Western Europe, fiscal sociology has proposed the existence of a mutually reinforcing effect between the emergence of representative government and effective taxation. This paper looks at the case of Benin, a low-income West African country that underwent a fairly successful democratization process in the early 1990s. It finds, in contrast to previous studies that have emphasized dependency on aid rents, that Benin appears to have reinforced its extractive capacities since democratization. However, the effect of democratization has been largely indirect, while other factors, such as the influence of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the size of the country’s informal sector, have played a more direct role in encouraging or inhibiting tax extraction. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that effective taxation depends on a quasiconsensual relationship between government and taxpayers finds some confirmation in the Beninese case.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127449692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
German Abstract: Die deliberative Demokratie setzt die Marktwirtschaft als ein System des wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerbs voraus. Dies kann anhand des Popperschen Konzepts einer Offenen Gesellschaft mit Piecemeal Engineering nachgewiesen werden. Denn die Kohärenz einer Offenen Gesellschaft setzt bei endogen beeinflussten Präferenzen voraus, dass diese Präferenzen adaptiv sind. Ohne Marktwirtschaft würden adaptive Präferenzen jedoch zu gesellschaftlicher Erstarrung führen. – Andererseits setzt die Legitimierung der Marktwirtschaft auch die deliberative Demokratie voraus. Denn die interpersonellen Einflüsse auf Präferenzen und Werte bedürfen zu ihrer Legitimierung des Wettbwerbs dieser Einflüsse, den es nur im Rahmen einer demokratisch strukturierten Öffentlichkeit gibt. Die Kohärenz eines solchen Systems wird gestützt durch die Tatsache, dass man interpersonelle Präferenzeinflüsse oft in Analogie zu adaptiven Präferenzen sehen kann. Das gilt insbesondere für das universelle Phänomen der Nachahmung. English Abstract: The central concept of Karl Popper's idea of an Open Society is the one of "piecemeal engineering". Using the model of homo oeconomicus economics has provided a coherent justification of piecemeal engineering by means of cost-benefit analysis in a partial equilibrium setting (Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky criterion). But preferences are not fixed. Can we then still find a coherent justification of Karl Popper´s piecemeal engineering? The answer is yes, if preferences are "adaptive". But adaptivity of preferences implies a strong adherence to the status quo. For the generation of progress (for example, by legislation, by expanding infrastructure or by introducing a new product) society has to decentralize decision making, i.e. it has to rely on a market system and on freedom of speech and of research. On the other hand, preferences of citizens only can be the legitimate normative guidelines of private market oriented and of collective decisions if inter-personal impacts on preferences are part of a system of competing interpersonal "influences" of on preferences. But this requirement for legitimacy leads to "deliberative democracy" as a precondition of the market system. Perhaps the most important mode of inter-personal influence on preferences is imitation of others; for example imitation of parents by their children. It can be shown that the coherence requirement of piecemeal engineering under conditions of inter-personal influences on preferences is fulfilled, if these inter-personal influences exhibit the mode of imitation. There is an interesting formal symmetry between Eucken's ideal of perfect competition and Habermas' ideal of deliberative democracy. Both concepts are ideals, because they require the absence of inter-personal power relations. In Eucken's case it is the absence of pricing power of any supplier. Habermas considers the legitimate form of social decision making one in which consensus is achieved by means of the
{"title":"Die normative Ko-Evolution von Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie (Normative Co-Evolution of the Market System and of Democracy)","authors":"C. von Weizsäcker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2500066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500066","url":null,"abstract":"<b>German Abstract:</b> Die deliberative Demokratie setzt die Marktwirtschaft als ein System des wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerbs voraus. Dies kann anhand des Popperschen Konzepts einer Offenen Gesellschaft mit Piecemeal Engineering nachgewiesen werden. Denn die Kohärenz einer Offenen Gesellschaft setzt bei endogen beeinflussten Präferenzen voraus, dass diese Präferenzen adaptiv sind. Ohne Marktwirtschaft würden adaptive Präferenzen jedoch zu gesellschaftlicher Erstarrung führen. – Andererseits setzt die Legitimierung der Marktwirtschaft auch die deliberative Demokratie voraus. Denn die interpersonellen Einflüsse auf Präferenzen und Werte bedürfen zu ihrer Legitimierung des Wettbwerbs dieser Einflüsse, den es nur im Rahmen einer demokratisch strukturierten Öffentlichkeit gibt. Die Kohärenz eines solchen Systems wird gestützt durch die Tatsache, dass man interpersonelle Präferenzeinflüsse oft in Analogie zu adaptiven Präferenzen sehen kann. Das gilt insbesondere für das universelle Phänomen der Nachahmung. <b>English Abstract:</b> The central concept of Karl Popper's idea of an Open Society is the one of \"piecemeal engineering\". Using the model of homo oeconomicus economics has provided a coherent justification of piecemeal engineering by means of cost-benefit analysis in a partial equilibrium setting (Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky criterion). But preferences are not fixed. Can we then still find a coherent justification of Karl Popper´s piecemeal engineering? The answer is yes, if preferences are \"adaptive\". But adaptivity of preferences implies a strong adherence to the status quo. For the generation of progress (for example, by legislation, by expanding infrastructure or by introducing a new product) society has to decentralize decision making, i.e. it has to rely on a market system and on freedom of speech and of research. On the other hand, preferences of citizens only can be the legitimate normative guidelines of private market oriented and of collective decisions if inter-personal impacts on preferences are part of a system of competing interpersonal \"influences\" of on preferences. But this requirement for legitimacy leads to \"deliberative democracy\" as a precondition of the market system. Perhaps the most important mode of inter-personal influence on preferences is imitation of others; for example imitation of parents by their children. It can be shown that the coherence requirement of piecemeal engineering under conditions of inter-personal influences on preferences is fulfilled, if these inter-personal influences exhibit the mode of imitation. There is an interesting formal symmetry between Eucken's ideal of perfect competition and Habermas' ideal of deliberative democracy. Both concepts are ideals, because they require the absence of inter-personal power relations. In Eucken's case it is the absence of pricing power of any supplier. Habermas considers the legitimate form of social decision making one in which consensus is achieved by means of the ","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124417702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we analyse the effects of objective and subjective knowledge about monetary policy, as well as the information search patterns, of German citizens on trust in the ECB. We rely on a unique representative public opinion survey of German households conducted in 2011. We find that subjective and factual knowledge, as well as the desire to be informed, about the ECB foster citizens' trust. Specific knowledge about the ECB is more influential than general monetary policy knowledge. Objective knowledge is more important than subjective knowledge. However, an increasing intensity of media usage, especially newspaper reading, has a significantly negative influence on trust. We conclude that the only viable way for the ECB to generate more trust in itself is to spread monetary policy knowledge.
{"title":"The German Public and Its Trust in the ECB: The Role of Knowledge and Information Search","authors":"B. Hayo, Edith Neuenkirch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2389652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2389652","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyse the effects of objective and subjective knowledge about monetary policy, as well as the information search patterns, of German citizens on trust in the ECB. We rely on a unique representative public opinion survey of German households conducted in 2011. We find that subjective and factual knowledge, as well as the desire to be informed, about the ECB foster citizens' trust. Specific knowledge about the ECB is more influential than general monetary policy knowledge. Objective knowledge is more important than subjective knowledge. However, an increasing intensity of media usage, especially newspaper reading, has a significantly negative influence on trust. We conclude that the only viable way for the ECB to generate more trust in itself is to spread monetary policy knowledge.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124850089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-10-01DOI: 10.5089/9781475570946.001.A001
Timothy C. Irwin
The extent of fiscal transparency in Western Europe has varied over the centuries. Although ancient Greek, Roman, and medieval governments were sometimes open about their finances, the absolute monarchies of the 1600s and 1700s shrouded them in mystery. Factors that have encouraged transparency include (i) the sharing of political power and rulers’ need to persuade creditors to lend and taxpayers’ representatives to approve new taxes; (ii) the spread of technological innovations that reduce the costs of storing and transmitting information; and (iii) the acceptance of political theories that emphasize accountable government and public discussion of government policy.
{"title":"Shining a Light on the Mysteries of State: The Origins of Fiscal Transparency in Western Europe","authors":"Timothy C. Irwin","doi":"10.5089/9781475570946.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475570946.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"The extent of fiscal transparency in Western Europe has varied over the centuries. Although ancient Greek, Roman, and medieval governments were sometimes open about their finances, the absolute monarchies of the 1600s and 1700s shrouded them in mystery. Factors that have encouraged transparency include (i) the sharing of political power and rulers’ need to persuade creditors to lend and taxpayers’ representatives to approve new taxes; (ii) the spread of technological innovations that reduce the costs of storing and transmitting information; and (iii) the acceptance of political theories that emphasize accountable government and public discussion of government policy.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125527097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The notion of optimism or pessimism is defined in the psychology literature in terms of forecasting where the term is used more generally than in statistics. Here we use the theory of loss aversion combined with Bayesian forecasting to propose rather precise definitions of optimism and pessimism. Put simply, optimists are those who condition their Bayesian state probabilities on optimistic forecasts whilst pessimists condition their Bayesian state probabilities on pessimistic forecasts. This simple structure leads to closed-form results in asset allocation problems which can be seen as a solution of more general dichotomous problems. Our results with loss aversion utility show that a slightly optimistic (or pessimistic) preference would have a huge impact on the optimal asset allocation.
{"title":"The Impact of Optimistic and Pessimistic Preferences on Decision Making","authors":"Soosung Hwang, S. Satchell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2306023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2306023","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of optimism or pessimism is defined in the psychology literature in terms of forecasting where the term is used more generally than in statistics. Here we use the theory of loss aversion combined with Bayesian forecasting to propose rather precise definitions of optimism and pessimism. Put simply, optimists are those who condition their Bayesian state probabilities on optimistic forecasts whilst pessimists condition their Bayesian state probabilities on pessimistic forecasts. This simple structure leads to closed-form results in asset allocation problems which can be seen as a solution of more general dichotomous problems. Our results with loss aversion utility show that a slightly optimistic (or pessimistic) preference would have a huge impact on the optimal asset allocation.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114716602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article seeks to explain inequality outcomes in authoritarian regimes as a function of the different combinations of loyalty-building and repressive measures (carrots and sticks) that authoritarian rulers use to maintain power. Like democratically-elected rulers, authoritarian rulers supply public and private goods in response to competitive pressures, and they can also employ repression to raise the costs of political dissent. The optimal combination of carrots and sticks varies across authoritarian regimes according to the nature of the political institutions by which authoritarian rule is organized. The results are economic policy outcomes that, over time, affect the level of economic inequality. Using a cross-national dataset covering over 80 authoritarian regimes observed during the 1965-2005 time period, this article develops and tests hypotheses that link inequality outcomes to authoritarian regime types.
{"title":"Loyalty and Acquiescence: Authoritarian Regimes and Inequality Outcomes","authors":"Jonathan K. Hanson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1642485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1642485","url":null,"abstract":"This article seeks to explain inequality outcomes in authoritarian regimes as a function of the different combinations of loyalty-building and repressive measures (carrots and sticks) that authoritarian rulers use to maintain power. Like democratically-elected rulers, authoritarian rulers supply public and private goods in response to competitive pressures, and they can also employ repression to raise the costs of political dissent. The optimal combination of carrots and sticks varies across authoritarian regimes according to the nature of the political institutions by which authoritarian rule is organized. The results are economic policy outcomes that, over time, affect the level of economic inequality. Using a cross-national dataset covering over 80 authoritarian regimes observed during the 1965-2005 time period, this article develops and tests hypotheses that link inequality outcomes to authoritarian regime types.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123437194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: This paper analyses the economist Antonio de Viti de Marco’s collaboration with the daily press, in relation to his scientific work and in the context of early twentieth century Italy. It brings out De Viti’s proposals for free trade and fiscal policies intended to support the development of the southern regions of Italy, as well as his critical attitude towards the public sector and its decision making processes. It also highlights his political activities and commitment, an important aspect of his achievement, yet all but unknown outside Italy.
{"title":"The Daily Battles of Antonio De Viti De Marco","authors":"M. Mosca","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2289799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2289799","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: This paper analyses the economist Antonio de Viti de Marco’s collaboration with the daily press, in relation to his scientific work and in the context of early twentieth century Italy. It brings out De Viti’s proposals for free trade and fiscal policies intended to support the development of the southern regions of Italy, as well as his critical attitude towards the public sector and its decision making processes. It also highlights his political activities and commitment, an important aspect of his achievement, yet all but unknown outside Italy.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123393155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eastern Cape Province of South Africa struggles with high poverty, poor public infrastructure, and dysfunctional administrative systems. One result is that the Eastern Cape has the worst health outcomes in the country. This case study illustrates how a South African civil society organization has used its budgetary analysis to advocate for improvements in health service delivery. This case study is part of the Learning Program of the International Budget Partnership’s Partnership Initiative. The PI Learning Program seeks to assess and document the impact of civil society engagement in public budgeting.
{"title":"When Opportunity Beckons: The Impact of the Public Service Accountability Monitor's Work on Improving Health Budgets in South Africa","authors":"Alta Folscher, J. Kruger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2326587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326587","url":null,"abstract":"The Eastern Cape Province of South Africa struggles with high poverty, poor public infrastructure, and dysfunctional administrative systems. One result is that the Eastern Cape has the worst health outcomes in the country. This case study illustrates how a South African civil society organization has used its budgetary analysis to advocate for improvements in health service delivery. This case study is part of the Learning Program of the International Budget Partnership’s Partnership Initiative. The PI Learning Program seeks to assess and document the impact of civil society engagement in public budgeting.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125153886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Now that so much of collective action takes place online, web-generated data can further understanding of the mechanics of Internet-based mobilisation. This trace data offers social science researchers the potential for new forms of analysis, using real-time transactional data based on entire populations, rather than sample-based surveys of what people think they did or might do. This paper uses a 'big data' approach to track the growth of over 8,000 petitions to the UK Government on the No. 10 Downing Street website for two years, analysing the rate of growth per day and testing the hypothesis that the distribution of daily change will be leptokurtic (rather than normal) as previous research on agenda setting would suggest. This hypothesis is confirmed, suggesting that Internet-based mobilisation is characterized by tipping points (or punctuated equilibria) and explaining some of the volatility in online collective action. We find also that most successful petitions grow quickly and that the number of signatures a petition receives on its first day is a significant factor in explaining the overall number of signatures a petition receives during its lifetime. These findings have implications for the strategies of those initiating petitions and the design of web sites with the aim of maximising citizen engagement with policy issues.
{"title":"Petition growth and success rates on the UK No. 10 Downing Street website","authors":"Scott A. Hale, H. Margetts, T. Yasseri","doi":"10.1145/2464464.2464518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2464464.2464518","url":null,"abstract":"Now that so much of collective action takes place online, web-generated data can further understanding of the mechanics of Internet-based mobilisation. This trace data offers social science researchers the potential for new forms of analysis, using real-time transactional data based on entire populations, rather than sample-based surveys of what people think they did or might do. This paper uses a 'big data' approach to track the growth of over 8,000 petitions to the UK Government on the No. 10 Downing Street website for two years, analysing the rate of growth per day and testing the hypothesis that the distribution of daily change will be leptokurtic (rather than normal) as previous research on agenda setting would suggest. This hypothesis is confirmed, suggesting that Internet-based mobilisation is characterized by tipping points (or punctuated equilibria) and explaining some of the volatility in online collective action. We find also that most successful petitions grow quickly and that the number of signatures a petition receives on its first day is a significant factor in explaining the overall number of signatures a petition receives during its lifetime. These findings have implications for the strategies of those initiating petitions and the design of web sites with the aim of maximising citizen engagement with policy issues.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133643638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the social value of public information in environments without common knowledge of the data-generating process. We show that the stronger the coordination motive behind agents’ behaviour is, the more they use private or public signals in the way that they suspect others are doing it. Consequently, the negative impact of public communication noted by Morris and Shin (2002) can be amplified if agents suspect that others take the public signal too literally and/or are too inattentive to their private signals. Social welfare, if measured as in Morris and Shin (2002), always increases in the precision of the public signal when each agent evaluates its precision correctly, but believes that others did not understand the public signal at all, which suggests that there is a scope to “obliterate” public communication in a specific way, by making it, e.g., sophisticated and technical. By contrast, measuring welfare as in Woodford (2005) reverses, in general, desirability for such obliteration and non-commonality of signals’ understanding.
{"title":"Wondering How Others Interpret it: Social Value of Public Information","authors":"A. Gizatulina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2269641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2269641","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the social value of public information in environments without common knowledge of the data-generating process. We show that the stronger the coordination motive behind agents’ behaviour is, the more they use private or public signals in the way that they suspect others are doing it. Consequently, the negative impact of public communication noted by Morris and Shin (2002) can be amplified if agents suspect that others take the public signal too literally and/or are too inattentive to their private signals. Social welfare, if measured as in Morris and Shin (2002), always increases in the precision of the public signal when each agent evaluates its precision correctly, but believes that others did not understand the public signal at all, which suggests that there is a scope to “obliterate” public communication in a specific way, by making it, e.g., sophisticated and technical. By contrast, measuring welfare as in Woodford (2005) reverses, in general, desirability for such obliteration and non-commonality of signals’ understanding.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124408512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：