Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1003
Joseph Ulatowski
On the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to fact. Criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth have argued that such a strict interpretation of the correspondence relation will not be able to account for the truth of statements about fiction or mathematics. This challenge has resulted in the introduction of more permissive correspondence relations, such as Austin’s correspondence as correlation or Tarski’s correspondence as reference satisfaction. Recently, some mediated correspondence theorists of truth have proposed that the correspondence relation holds not only between thought and world but also between thought and language. In this paper, I argue that correspondence truth, direct or mediated, is not a monistic theory of truth, the view that there is one and only way for a proposition to be true. To argue for this position, I will have to show that each of the correspondence theories accept direct and indirect ways of understanding the correspondence relation as well as address potential objections to the view that correspondence theory is not singular and monolithic.
{"title":"Is Correspondence Truth One or Many?","authors":"Joseph Ulatowski","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1003","url":null,"abstract":"On the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to fact. Criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth have argued that such a strict interpretation of the correspondence relation will not be able to account for the truth of statements about fiction or mathematics. This challenge has resulted in the introduction of more permissive correspondence relations, such as Austin’s correspondence as correlation or Tarski’s correspondence as reference satisfaction. Recently, some mediated correspondence theorists of truth have proposed that the correspondence relation holds not only between thought and world but also between thought and language. In this paper, I argue that correspondence truth, direct or mediated, is not a monistic theory of truth, the view that there is one and only way for a proposition to be true. To argue for this position, I will have to show that each of the correspondence theories accept direct and indirect ways of understanding the correspondence relation as well as address potential objections to the view that correspondence theory is not singular and monolithic.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"3 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135928036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0917
Andrea Strollo
In contemporary philosophy, it is tempting to apply the metaphysics of properties to the specific case of truth, in the hope of making progress on the investigation of the latter. In this paper, I argue that a different approach, mostly independent from the metaphysics of properties and based on the naturalness, in Lewis’ sense, of semantic nations, is often a better alternative, both in general and in some specific cases. In particular, adopting the new perspective, I present a new problem of combining logical validity and strong truth pluralism, and offer a way to sharply distinguish deflationism and primitivism about truth. The main original upshot of the paper is offering a perspective on philosophy of truth that sheds new light on the general problem of truth and on some particular issues.
{"title":"Truth and the Metaphysics of Semantic and Logical Notions","authors":"Andrea Strollo","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0917","url":null,"abstract":"In contemporary philosophy, it is tempting to apply the metaphysics of properties to the specific case of truth, in the hope of making progress on the investigation of the latter. In this paper, I argue that a different approach, mostly independent from the metaphysics of properties and based on the naturalness, in Lewis’ sense, of semantic nations, is often a better alternative, both in general and in some specific cases. In particular, adopting the new perspective, I present a new problem of combining logical validity and strong truth pluralism, and offer a way to sharply distinguish deflationism and primitivism about truth. The main original upshot of the paper is offering a perspective on philosophy of truth that sheds new light on the general problem of truth and on some particular issues.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"17 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135928321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1067
Arvid Båve
Deflationism about truth is often said to be incompatible with truth-theoretic semantics. However, both of these labels are ambiguous, making the truth of the incompatibility claim dependent on interpretation. I provide one pair of natural interpretations, on which both views relate essentially to grounding and on which they are indeed incompatible. This result has some intrinsic interest as well as paving the way for further needed clarifications in the debate about the relationship between the views.
{"title":"Truth-Deflationism and Truth-Theoretic Semantics: One Way to Make Them Clash","authors":"Arvid Båve","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1067","url":null,"abstract":"Deflationism about truth is often said to be incompatible with truth-theoretic semantics. However, both of these labels are ambiguous, making the truth of the incompatibility claim dependent on interpretation. I provide one pair of natural interpretations, on which both views relate essentially to grounding and on which they are indeed incompatible. This result has some intrinsic interest as well as paving the way for further needed clarifications in the debate about the relationship between the views.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"108 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135928763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0937
Marco Simionato
The primitivist theory of truth, i.e., the view that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, has been cleverly revamped by Jamin Asay, who has combined a primitivist approach to the concept of truth with a deflationary approach to the (metaphysical) property of being true. This paper aims to adjust Asay’s primitivist theory to consistently include the primitiveness of the (pre-theoretical) correspondence relation, grasped by our correspondence intuition, alongside the primitiveness of truth. In the process, I apply a thesis by Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, according to which the correspondence of beliefs to facts (broadly construed) can occur with no commitment to a correspondence theory of truth. Then I argue why Asay’s theory might not be able to account for the primitiveness of the pre-theoretical correspondence relation. Finally, I use a suggestion by André Kukla concerning the possible entailment between an ineffable insight and its effable consequences, to build a revised primitivist theory of truth.
{"title":"A “Modest” Primitivist Theory of Truth: The Ineffability of Truth, Effability of the Correspondence Relation","authors":"Marco Simionato","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0937","url":null,"abstract":"The primitivist theory of truth, i.e., the view that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, has been cleverly revamped by Jamin Asay, who has combined a primitivist approach to the concept of truth with a deflationary approach to the (metaphysical) property of being true. This paper aims to adjust Asay’s primitivist theory to consistently include the primitiveness of the (pre-theoretical) correspondence relation, grasped by our correspondence intuition, alongside the primitiveness of truth. In the process, I apply a thesis by Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, according to which the correspondence of beliefs to facts (broadly construed) can occur with no commitment to a correspondence theory of truth. Then I argue why Asay’s theory might not be able to account for the primitiveness of the pre-theoretical correspondence relation. Finally, I use a suggestion by André Kukla concerning the possible entailment between an ineffable insight and its effable consequences, to build a revised primitivist theory of truth.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"142 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135927897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0873
Mitch Thiessen
The question of truth is bound to the question of the relation between identity and difference. Historically, the bond between truth and the primacy of identity was forged through the conviction that to speak of truth is to speak of being, or what is (the case). Since Parmenides, being becomes intelligible solely in relation to identity, or the One, with difference either being excluded from “what is” altogether, or as in Plato and Aristotle, finding its subordinate “place” within being. After Hegel, whose thought accomplishes this “placing” in an absolute way, philosophy has sought to reverse this priority, while still insisting, necessarily, on thinking and speaking about what is the case, and therefore of truth. This essay raises the question of the coherence of this reversal. Characterizing the past century as the one in which philosophy’s aim was the overcoming of the perennial priority of identity, it attempts to show not only that post-Hegelian thought was at multiple levels divided on this aim, but that what Gillian Rose called the “metaphysics of pure difference” went uniquely awry—both in terms of its consequences and in its failure to maintain a genuinely critical relation to so-called “philosophies of representation.”
{"title":"The Crowning of Anarchy, Remarks on the Age of Pure Difference","authors":"Mitch Thiessen","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0873","url":null,"abstract":"The question of truth is bound to the question of the relation between identity and difference. Historically, the bond between truth and the primacy of identity was forged through the conviction that to speak of truth is to speak of being, or what is (the case). Since Parmenides, being becomes intelligible solely in relation to identity, or the One, with difference either being excluded from “what is” altogether, or as in Plato and Aristotle, finding its subordinate “place” within being. After Hegel, whose thought accomplishes this “placing” in an absolute way, philosophy has sought to reverse this priority, while still insisting, necessarily, on thinking and speaking about what is the case, and therefore of truth. This essay raises the question of the coherence of this reversal. Characterizing the past century as the one in which philosophy’s aim was the overcoming of the perennial priority of identity, it attempts to show not only that post-Hegelian thought was at multiple levels divided on this aim, but that what Gillian Rose called the “metaphysics of pure difference” went uniquely awry—both in terms of its consequences and in its failure to maintain a genuinely critical relation to so-called “philosophies of representation.”","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135927886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1097
Antonio Di Chiro
The aim of this paper is to propose a theory of pluralistic realism, i.e. a theory that presents an idea of reality that embraces multiplicity both at an ontological and epistemological level. The basic ideal of this theory is that reality is inexhaustibly multifaceted and that, therefore, the ways in which human beings can account for it are diverse and multiple. This idea of reality also implies an idea of plural truth, i.e. as an openness and acceptance of diversity and difference which can act as an antidote to the resurgence of fundamentalisms and totalitarian visions of reality based on the refusal of diversity, on the lack of ethical recognition-political-social difference and on the tendency to believe that one’s own reality and therefore one’s culture, one’s nation, one’s country are objectively superior to other realities, nations, countries, cultures. In proposing the reasons for this theory we will try to integrate Mario De Caro’s philosophical proposal of a «liberalized naturalism» or «pluralistic realism» with the phenomenological perspective of Vincenzo Costa based on the idea that reality is determined on the basis of the experience of the human subject.
{"title":"La «verità come indefinito differirsi del reale». Le ragioni del realismo pluralistico","authors":"Antonio Di Chiro","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1097","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to propose a theory of pluralistic realism, i.e. a theory that presents an idea of reality that embraces multiplicity both at an ontological and epistemological level. The basic ideal of this theory is that reality is inexhaustibly multifaceted and that, therefore, the ways in which human beings can account for it are diverse and multiple. This idea of reality also implies an idea of plural truth, i.e. as an openness and acceptance of diversity and difference which can act as an antidote to the resurgence of fundamentalisms and totalitarian visions of reality based on the refusal of diversity, on the lack of ethical recognition-political-social difference and on the tendency to believe that one’s own reality and therefore one’s culture, one’s nation, one’s country are objectively superior to other realities, nations, countries, cultures. In proposing the reasons for this theory we will try to integrate Mario De Caro’s philosophical proposal of a «liberalized naturalism» or «pluralistic realism» with the phenomenological perspective of Vincenzo Costa based on the idea that reality is determined on the basis of the experience of the human subject.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"177 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135928881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1073
Marc Champagne
Descartes held that it is impossible to make true statements about what we perceive, but I go over alleged cases of illusory experience to show why such a skeptical conclusion (and recourse to God) is overblown. The overreaction, I contend, stems from an insufficient awareness of the habitual expectations brought to any given experience. These expectations manifest themselves in motor terms, as perception constantly prompts and updates an embodied posture of readiness for what might come next. Such habitual anticipations work best when they efface themselves, so it is easy to blame perception when our expectations get frustrated. I illustrate this misdirected blame with the example of a stick partially in water: it is only because we expect the stick to be straight that its appearance as bent is deemed problematic. I thus conclude that, if we factor in the habitual interpretations operative in perception and switch to a processual view that allows practical engagement, we can deflate the worries that led Descartes to rule out perceptual truths. Distancing myself from the naïve “sign” of folk semiotics, my critique draws inspiration from the triadic semiotic model developed in some late medieval schools of Portugal.
{"title":"Illusory Signs as Frustrated Expectations: Undoing Descartes’ Overblown Response","authors":"Marc Champagne","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1073","url":null,"abstract":"Descartes held that it is impossible to make true statements about what we perceive, but I go over alleged cases of illusory experience to show why such a skeptical conclusion (and recourse to God) is overblown. The overreaction, I contend, stems from an insufficient awareness of the habitual expectations brought to any given experience. These expectations manifest themselves in motor terms, as perception constantly prompts and updates an embodied posture of readiness for what might come next. Such habitual anticipations work best when they efface themselves, so it is easy to blame perception when our expectations get frustrated. I illustrate this misdirected blame with the example of a stick partially in water: it is only because we expect the stick to be straight that its appearance as bent is deemed problematic. I thus conclude that, if we factor in the habitual interpretations operative in perception and switch to a processual view that allows practical engagement, we can deflate the worries that led Descartes to rule out perceptual truths. Distancing myself from the naïve “sign” of folk semiotics, my critique draws inspiration from the triadic semiotic model developed in some late medieval schools of Portugal.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"22 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135928034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0965
Ricardo Tavares da Silva
This essay has two parts: 1) a negative or destructive one, which consists of showing that there is no anomaly, even apparent, in the concept of ‘truth’ (and ‘falsehood’), so that the available theories of truth are not justified, either to solve or react to this alleged problem; 2) a positive or constructive one, which consists of proposing a characterization of truth (and falsehood) based solely on the “objective aspect” of this concept. Here, I will associate the concept of ‘truth’ with the concept of ‘existence’, taking them as two different species of a common genus. Along the way, I will critically analyze the theories of truth “available on the market” and argue that truth only has an “objective aspect”.
{"title":"Verdade e Existência: Duas Espécies do Mesmo Género","authors":"Ricardo Tavares da Silva","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0965","url":null,"abstract":"This essay has two parts: 1) a negative or destructive one, which consists of showing that there is no anomaly, even apparent, in the concept of ‘truth’ (and ‘falsehood’), so that the available theories of truth are not justified, either to solve or react to this alleged problem; 2) a positive or constructive one, which consists of proposing a characterization of truth (and falsehood) based solely on the “objective aspect” of this concept. Here, I will associate the concept of ‘truth’ with the concept of ‘existence’, taking them as two different species of a common genus. Along the way, I will critically analyze the theories of truth “available on the market” and argue that truth only has an “objective aspect”.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"61 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135928310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1163
Barry Allen
The idea that truth is eternal is an old one in philosophy, and I do not propose to survey its history here. Yet a sketch of the historical context is useful for my main purpose, which is to discuss the theme of truth and temporality in Martin Heidegger and Richard Rorty. Although both philosophers repudiate eternal truth, their reasons for doing so are different, and this difference reveals a probably irreconcilable opposition between Heidegger and the Pragmatist.
{"title":"Time for Truth: Tarski Between Heidegger and Rorty","authors":"Barry Allen","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_1163","url":null,"abstract":"The idea that truth is eternal is an old one in philosophy, and I do not propose to survey its history here. Yet a sketch of the historical context is useful for my main purpose, which is to discuss the theme of truth and temporality in Martin Heidegger and Richard Rorty. Although both philosophers repudiate eternal truth, their reasons for doing so are different, and this difference reveals a probably irreconcilable opposition between Heidegger and the Pragmatist.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"32 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135927875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0851
Junyeol Kim
This paper aims to construct a picture of knowledge out of Frege’s comments on truth, judgment, assertion, and knowledge. Frege takes truth to be an object, and the act of judgment to be the act of non-judgmental identification of truth qua an object with the reference of a sentence. For him, the propositional knowledge that p is the non-propositional knowledge of the identity between truth and |p|. Propositional knowledge thusly understood is produced by our knowledge of truth qua an object, which is constituted by our abilities to identify truth as such. The Fregean picture of knowledge provides a tight connection between knowledge-how, objectual knowledge, and propositional knowledge.
{"title":"Frege’s Conception of Truth as an Object and the Fregean Picture of Knowledge","authors":"Junyeol Kim","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_3_0851","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to construct a picture of knowledge out of Frege’s comments on truth, judgment, assertion, and knowledge. Frege takes truth to be an object, and the act of judgment to be the act of non-judgmental identification of truth qua an object with the reference of a sentence. For him, the propositional knowledge that p is the non-propositional knowledge of the identity between truth and |p|. Propositional knowledge thusly understood is produced by our knowledge of truth qua an object, which is constituted by our abilities to identify truth as such. The Fregean picture of knowledge provides a tight connection between knowledge-how, objectual knowledge, and propositional knowledge.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"26 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135928888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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