Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0159
Guy-François Delaporte
With this second dialogue, Salviati wants to remove Simplicio’s difficulties on the actual distinction of essence and being as well as on the notion of the act of being (actus essendi). Feeling that he had skipped stages in their first dialogue, he suggests going back to the determination of the exact subject of metaphysics according to Thomas Aquinas. He will progress in two steps: the transition from «first perceived being» to «common being» or «being as being» by a judgment of separation, and then the definition of the subject of metaphysics as «being negatively or neutrally immaterial». With this conclusion, Salviati intends to lead Simplicio to understand the autonomy of the principles of metaphysics towards philosophy of nature. Simplicio remains curious but dubious. Is not the negatively immaterial being a simple dialectical notion that Salviati would take for a metaphysical one? Is the independence of metaphysics from physics therefore also ensured? And consequently, is there actually a difference between the first perceived being and the common being, subject of metaphysics? What is, actually, the subject of metaphysics?
{"title":"Jugement de séparation et sujet de la métaphysique","authors":"Guy-François Delaporte","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0159","url":null,"abstract":"With this second dialogue, Salviati wants to remove Simplicio’s difficulties on the actual distinction of essence and being as well as on the notion of the act of being (actus essendi). Feeling that he had skipped stages in their first dialogue, he suggests going back to the determination of the exact subject of metaphysics according to Thomas Aquinas. He will progress in two steps: the transition from «first perceived being» to «common being» or «being as being» by a judgment of separation, and then the definition of the subject of metaphysics as «being negatively or neutrally immaterial». With this conclusion, Salviati intends to lead Simplicio to understand the autonomy of the principles of metaphysics towards philosophy of nature. Simplicio remains curious but dubious. Is not the negatively immaterial being a simple dialectical notion that Salviati would take for a metaphysical one? Is the independence of metaphysics from physics therefore also ensured? And consequently, is there actually a difference between the first perceived being and the common being, subject of metaphysics? What is, actually, the subject of metaphysics?","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135314777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0633
Ryan Miller
Aquinas’s characterization of Sacra Doctrina has received sustained engagement addressing its relation to contemporary conceptions of theology and Aristotelian conceptions of science. More recently, attention has been paid to Aquinas’s neo-Platonist influences, and the way they lead him to subvert purely Aristotelian categories. I therefore combine these themes by introducing the first study of whether sacra doctrina counts as a technê in Plato’s sense. After examining how Platonic technê relate to their ergon. epistasthai, gignôskein, and epistêmê and examining sacra doctrina’s relationship to each of these Platonic categories, I suggest that Sacra Doctrina is an unqualified Platonic technê.
{"title":"Aquinas’ Science of Sacra Doctrina as a Platonic Technê","authors":"Ryan Miller","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0633","url":null,"abstract":"Aquinas’s characterization of Sacra Doctrina has received sustained engagement addressing its relation to contemporary conceptions of theology and Aristotelian conceptions of science. More recently, attention has been paid to Aquinas’s neo-Platonist influences, and the way they lead him to subvert purely Aristotelian categories. I therefore combine these themes by introducing the first study of whether sacra doctrina counts as a technê in Plato’s sense. After examining how Platonic technê relate to their ergon. epistasthai, gignôskein, and epistêmê and examining sacra doctrina’s relationship to each of these Platonic categories, I suggest that Sacra Doctrina is an unqualified Platonic technê.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135314861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0659
Brian Kemple
More than ever do people seem entrenched in their intellectual positions despite a dearth of concerted and honest reflection upon them. This obstinacy presents a moral and rhetorical challenge—attempting persuasion through naked rational argumentation alone will prove fruitless. But we should not discount the role of the intellect in the fixation of even the least-reflectively formed beliefs. From the perspective of cognition, this fixation is proximately the result of interpretation. In the language of Thomism, this interpretive adherence to falsity consists in a perverse process of discursive reasoning. To exposit the constitution of adherence to false interpretation, here we will draw on the traditions of Thomism, phenomenology, and semiotics. With the insights of these traditions, we will proceed: first, examining the process of interpretation itself; second, considering two different modes of interpretation; and third, situating interpretation in the context of the twofold movement of resolution. Through analyzing interpretation and resolution, we will demonstrate that obstinate intellectual insistence consists in two intellectual errors: adoption of the vague as sufficient for understanding; and reflexive confusions. In both cases, the error persists through the failure to pursue the twofold movement of resolution.
{"title":"The Resolution of Interpretations. Thomism, Semiotics, and Phenomenology in Dialogue","authors":"Brian Kemple","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0659","url":null,"abstract":"More than ever do people seem entrenched in their intellectual positions despite a dearth of concerted and honest reflection upon them. This obstinacy presents a moral and rhetorical challenge—attempting persuasion through naked rational argumentation alone will prove fruitless. But we should not discount the role of the intellect in the fixation of even the least-reflectively formed beliefs. From the perspective of cognition, this fixation is proximately the result of interpretation. In the language of Thomism, this interpretive adherence to falsity consists in a perverse process of discursive reasoning. To exposit the constitution of adherence to false interpretation, here we will draw on the traditions of Thomism, phenomenology, and semiotics. With the insights of these traditions, we will proceed: first, examining the process of interpretation itself; second, considering two different modes of interpretation; and third, situating interpretation in the context of the twofold movement of resolution. Through analyzing interpretation and resolution, we will demonstrate that obstinate intellectual insistence consists in two intellectual errors: adoption of the vague as sufficient for understanding; and reflexive confusions. In both cases, the error persists through the failure to pursue the twofold movement of resolution.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135314868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0375
Michał Głowala
In the paper I discuss Geach’s rejection of volitions (inner acts of the will) both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in systematic action theory – a rejection followed by some analytical commentators of Aquinas (like Davies and Kenny). I claim that Geach’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in terms of tendencies (treating the will as a special kind of tendency) enables – pace Geach – a sound defense of volitionism both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in the action theory. In other words, I offer arguments in favour of volitions (inner acts of the will) starting from some insights to be found in Geach, and I response to some standard objections against volitionism. Moreover, I try to sketch a framework (based on an ontology of tendencies suggested by Geach) suitable to discuss some other volitionist claims. I proceed in four steps: first I introduce the definition of a volition or inner act of the will that may be ascribed to various camps in the volitionism debate; then I discuss three main arguments of Geach against volitionism – the argument from trying, the argument from voluntary omissions, and the argument from natural theology. I pay special attention to the issue of the timing of volitions.
{"title":"Aquinas, Geach, and the Inner Acts of the Will","authors":"Michał Głowala","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0375","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper I discuss Geach’s rejection of volitions (inner acts of the will) both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in systematic action theory – a rejection followed by some analytical commentators of Aquinas (like Davies and Kenny). I claim that Geach’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in terms of tendencies (treating the will as a special kind of tendency) enables – pace Geach – a sound defense of volitionism both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in the action theory. In other words, I offer arguments in favour of volitions (inner acts of the will) starting from some insights to be found in Geach, and I response to some standard objections against volitionism. Moreover, I try to sketch a framework (based on an ontology of tendencies suggested by Geach) suitable to discuss some other volitionist claims. I proceed in four steps: first I introduce the definition of a volition or inner act of the will that may be ascribed to various camps in the volitionism debate; then I discuss three main arguments of Geach against volitionism – the argument from trying, the argument from voluntary omissions, and the argument from natural theology. I pay special attention to the issue of the timing of volitions.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135315362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0027
Michel Fédou
{"title":"La pensée de Joseph Ratzinger: Benoît XVI (1927-2022)","authors":"Michel Fédou","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135314771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0205
Gonçalo do Vale Sá da Costa
The 20th Century was a rich period for Thomism. Many commentaries to the First Way were written. One of the many points of disagreement between Thomists was the actual meaning of “motion.” In this paper, I try to argue that one should take for “motion” the broad meaning of “motus” (as equivalent to “mutatio”). I do so by reviewing the position of various prominent Thomists of the last century, many of which have disagreed with this position. I make the case that Aristotle is not the best interpreter of the First Way, and similarly that other works by Aquinas should only be used when the Summa Theologiae itself is not clear enough—which is not the case.
{"title":"The Meaning of “Motus” in Aquinas’ First Way","authors":"Gonçalo do Vale Sá da Costa","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0205","url":null,"abstract":"The 20th Century was a rich period for Thomism. Many commentaries to the First Way were written. One of the many points of disagreement between Thomists was the actual meaning of “motion.” In this paper, I try to argue that one should take for “motion” the broad meaning of “motus” (as equivalent to “mutatio”). I do so by reviewing the position of various prominent Thomists of the last century, many of which have disagreed with this position. I make the case that Aristotle is not the best interpreter of the First Way, and similarly that other works by Aquinas should only be used when the Summa Theologiae itself is not clear enough—which is not the case.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135314776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0045
Miche Fédou, Ricardo Barroso Batista
{"title":"The Intellectual Legacy of Joseph Ratzinger: Benedict XVI (1927-2022)","authors":"Miche Fédou, Ricardo Barroso Batista","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135314780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0443
Jared Brandt
I discuss Aquinas’s view of habit—the genus to which virtue belongs. The first article in both of Aquinas’s sustained treatments of the virtues in general (STh I.II.55-67 and QDV 1) asks whether virtues are habits. Thus, Aquinas’s pedagogical strategy is to elucidate the virtues in terms of their nature as habits. Following this strategy, I explore Aquinas’s discussion of habits in Questions 49-54 of the prima secundae by tracing three important topics: the essence of habits, the cause of habits, and the increase of habits. By the end of this paper, the reader will have a strong grasp of the nature and types of habits and the different ways in which they can increase.
{"title":"Participation through Actualization. Aquinas on Habit Formation","authors":"Jared Brandt","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0443","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss Aquinas’s view of habit—the genus to which virtue belongs. The first article in both of Aquinas’s sustained treatments of the virtues in general (STh I.II.55-67 and QDV 1) asks whether virtues are habits. Thus, Aquinas’s pedagogical strategy is to elucidate the virtues in terms of their nature as habits. Following this strategy, I explore Aquinas’s discussion of habits in Questions 49-54 of the prima secundae by tracing three important topics: the essence of habits, the cause of habits, and the increase of habits. By the end of this paper, the reader will have a strong grasp of the nature and types of habits and the different ways in which they can increase.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135315238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0315
Stephen Chanderbhan
Narratives relate salient connected events across some time and many particular details of the agents involved in those events. Whether fictional or true, historical or current, personal or cultural, they seem to pervade human experience and, according to theorists across different philosophical traditions, can be of some help to elucidate concerns in the moral life. Thomas Aquinas himself acknowledges the existence of such things, or at least their near analogues, in various places in his corpus. But he does not offer a sustained explanation of how narratives are understood in terms of his psychology. In this paper, I claim that such an account lies in his thought on the functioning of two interior senses in particular – the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) and the memorative power (vis memorativa) – which have been the subject of more sustained study only more recently. With this account of how humans generate and process such narratives, Thomistic scholars will be positioned to explain how narratives may function in human experience, especially the moral life, on Thomistic terms.
{"title":"Understanding Narratives according to the Psychology of Thomas Aquinas","authors":"Stephen Chanderbhan","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0315","url":null,"abstract":"Narratives relate salient connected events across some time and many particular details of the agents involved in those events. Whether fictional or true, historical or current, personal or cultural, they seem to pervade human experience and, according to theorists across different philosophical traditions, can be of some help to elucidate concerns in the moral life. Thomas Aquinas himself acknowledges the existence of such things, or at least their near analogues, in various places in his corpus. But he does not offer a sustained explanation of how narratives are understood in terms of his psychology. In this paper, I claim that such an account lies in his thought on the functioning of two interior senses in particular – the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) and the memorative power (vis memorativa) – which have been the subject of more sustained study only more recently. With this account of how humans generate and process such narratives, Thomistic scholars will be positioned to explain how narratives may function in human experience, especially the moral life, on Thomistic terms.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135315354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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