Media portrays a bigger image of every big event. Be it electronic, or print, every day gets a new gossip. And media blows its trumpet the loudest. This cannot be called an outcome of technology or exposure to the world; it indeed, was always a trend. Perhaps the biggest event in the past few centuries for India has been the attainment of independence. This was a time when newspapers came out to revolutionize the movement, and played a major role in arousing India's ever increasing, but population of slaves. It therefore, was a big event when this populace finally became free. However, many other factors, such as partition and birth of two nations ruined the degree of excitement that those black and white prints might have produced on 15 August 1947. It hence, becomes an interesting case of study on how biases were published on that day, and also how they were not.
{"title":"Coverage of Indian Independence","authors":"P. Khan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1103949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1103949","url":null,"abstract":"Media portrays a bigger image of every big event. Be it electronic, or print, every day gets a new gossip. And media blows its trumpet the loudest. This cannot be called an outcome of technology or exposure to the world; it indeed, was always a trend. Perhaps the biggest event in the past few centuries for India has been the attainment of independence. This was a time when newspapers came out to revolutionize the movement, and played a major role in arousing India's ever increasing, but population of slaves. It therefore, was a big event when this populace finally became free. However, many other factors, such as partition and birth of two nations ruined the degree of excitement that those black and white prints might have produced on 15 August 1947. It hence, becomes an interesting case of study on how biases were published on that day, and also how they were not.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132228293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-10-27DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00614.x
M. Endoh
This paper investigates economic and political factors which explain the presence or absence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). A model of three countries with imperfect competition markets is employed for theoretical analysis of political economy. The validity of theoretical results is tested by econometric analysis with a logit model. It is shown that countries with similar incomes are more likely to form PTAs, and that governments with low quality of governance have little incentive to form PTAs.
{"title":"Quality of Governance and the Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements","authors":"M. Endoh","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00614.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00614.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates economic and political factors which explain the presence or absence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). A model of three countries with imperfect competition markets is employed for theoretical analysis of political economy. The validity of theoretical results is tested by econometric analysis with a logit model. It is shown that countries with similar incomes are more likely to form PTAs, and that governments with low quality of governance have little incentive to form PTAs.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130242292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A new survey of over 2000 jurisdictions across all major housing markets in the US documents how regulation of residential building varies across space. New evidence on what a `typical' degree of local regulation entails is provided. In addition, data on how the stringency of land use control varies across markets are analysed. Coastal markets tend to be more highly regulated, with communities in the Northeast region of America being the most highly regulated on average, followed by those in the West region (California especially).
{"title":"A New Measure of the Local Regulatory Environment for Housing Markets: Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index","authors":"Joseph Gyourko, Albert Saiz, Anita A. Summers","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.951463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.951463","url":null,"abstract":"A new survey of over 2000 jurisdictions across all major housing markets in the US documents how regulation of residential building varies across space. New evidence on what a `typical' degree of local regulation entails is provided. In addition, data on how the stringency of land use control varies across markets are analysed. Coastal markets tend to be more highly regulated, with communities in the Northeast region of America being the most highly regulated on average, followed by those in the West region (California especially).","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128828154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-10-08DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00170.x
S. Blomberg, G. Hess, Siddharth Thacker
We develop a model to explore the inter-relationships between conflict and economic activity. We construct a simple two-period model where consumption and investment decisions are made in the presence of governments who consider initiating diversionary conflict to raise their chances of remaining in power. Economies with selfish leaders and lower gains from capital formation may fall prey to engaging in avoidable conflicts thereby lowering investment and hence future growth. Using panel data for over 152 countries from 1950 to 2000, we find evidence for conflict lowering economic growth and, after conditioning on the initial conditions of geography, private, public, and human capital investment, lower growth raising the likelihood of conflict. These results are broadly consistent with our model.
{"title":"On the Conflict-Poverty Nexus","authors":"S. Blomberg, G. Hess, Siddharth Thacker","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00170.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00170.x","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model to explore the inter-relationships between conflict and economic activity. We construct a simple two-period model where consumption and investment decisions are made in the presence of governments who consider initiating diversionary conflict to raise their chances of remaining in power. Economies with selfish leaders and lower gains from capital formation may fall prey to engaging in avoidable conflicts thereby lowering investment and hence future growth. Using panel data for over 152 countries from 1950 to 2000, we find evidence for conflict lowering economic growth and, after conditioning on the initial conditions of geography, private, public, and human capital investment, lower growth raising the likelihood of conflict. These results are broadly consistent with our model.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115584660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-10-01DOI: 10.5089/9781451864885.001
Marco Arnone, Bernard J. Laurens, Jean-François Segalotto
This paper presents an update of the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT) index of central bank (CB) autonomy, based on CB legislation as of end-2003. The index is applied to a set of OECD and developing countries, and emerging market economies. For a smaller set of countries, the paper presents a reconstruction of the GMT index based on Cukierman (1992) and assesses changes in CB autonomy between 1992 and 2003. The results point to a significant increase in CB autonomy, in particular for developing countries. In most cases, this improvement has involved a three-stage process: an initial stage in which the political foundations for CB autonomy are laid; a second stage in which operational autonomy develops; and a final stage in which CBs gain further political autonomy in terms of policy formulation and the appointment of senior management.
{"title":"Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies","authors":"Marco Arnone, Bernard J. Laurens, Jean-François Segalotto","doi":"10.5089/9781451864885.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451864885.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an update of the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT) index of central bank (CB) autonomy, based on CB legislation as of end-2003. The index is applied to a set of OECD and developing countries, and emerging market economies. For a smaller set of countries, the paper presents a reconstruction of the GMT index based on Cukierman (1992) and assesses changes in CB autonomy between 1992 and 2003. The results point to a significant increase in CB autonomy, in particular for developing countries. In most cases, this improvement has involved a three-stage process: an initial stage in which the political foundations for CB autonomy are laid; a second stage in which operational autonomy develops; and a final stage in which CBs gain further political autonomy in terms of policy formulation and the appointment of senior management.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131424955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-08-01DOI: 10.1162/QJEC.2008.123.2.831
J. Gruber, Daniel M. Hungerman
Recently economists have begun to consider the causes and consequences of religious participation. An unanswered question in this literature is the effect upon individuals of changes in the opportunity cost of religious participation. In this paper we identify a policy-driven change in the opportunity cost of religious participation based on state laws that prohibit retail activity on Sunday, known as %u201Cblue laws.%u201D Many states have repealed these laws in recent years, raising the opportunity cost of religious participation. We construct a model which predicts, under fairly general conditions, that allowing retail activity on Sundays will lower attendance levels but may increase or decrease religious donations. We then use a variety of datasets to show that when a state repeals its blue laws religious attendance falls, and that church donations and spending fall as well. These results do not seem to be driven by declines in religiosity prior to the law change, nor do we see comparable declines in membership or giving to nonreligious organizations after a state repeals its laws. We then assess the effects of changes in these laws on drinking and drug use behavior in the NLSY. We find that repealing blue laws leads to an increase in drinking and drug use, and that this increase is found only among the initially religious individuals who were affected by the blue laws. The effect is economically significant; for example, the gap in heavy drinking between religious and non religious individuals falls by about half after the laws are repealed.
{"title":"The Church vs the Mall: What Happens When Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition?","authors":"J. Gruber, Daniel M. Hungerman","doi":"10.1162/QJEC.2008.123.2.831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/QJEC.2008.123.2.831","url":null,"abstract":"Recently economists have begun to consider the causes and consequences of religious participation. An unanswered question in this literature is the effect upon individuals of changes in the opportunity cost of religious participation. In this paper we identify a policy-driven change in the opportunity cost of religious participation based on state laws that prohibit retail activity on Sunday, known as %u201Cblue laws.%u201D Many states have repealed these laws in recent years, raising the opportunity cost of religious participation. We construct a model which predicts, under fairly general conditions, that allowing retail activity on Sundays will lower attendance levels but may increase or decrease religious donations. We then use a variety of datasets to show that when a state repeals its blue laws religious attendance falls, and that church donations and spending fall as well. These results do not seem to be driven by declines in religiosity prior to the law change, nor do we see comparable declines in membership or giving to nonreligious organizations after a state repeals its laws. We then assess the effects of changes in these laws on drinking and drug use behavior in the NLSY. We find that repealing blue laws leads to an increase in drinking and drug use, and that this increase is found only among the initially religious individuals who were affected by the blue laws. The effect is economically significant; for example, the gap in heavy drinking between religious and non religious individuals falls by about half after the laws are repealed.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133490041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the plight of the whistleblower using elements of organizational legitimacy theory. In recognizing the negative correlation between the actions of the organization and the whistleblower, it becomes clear that the continuing legitimacy of the organization necessitates the illegitimacy of the whistleblower. This helps explain the blacklisting of the whistleblower and their vilification which results in the destruction of both their career and their reputation. Only specific protective legislation can provide insurance for their career.
{"title":"The Necessary Illegitimacy of the Whistleblower","authors":"K. Sawyer, Jackie Johnson, M. Holub","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.917316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.917316","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the plight of the whistleblower using elements of organizational legitimacy theory. In recognizing the negative correlation between the actions of the organization and the whistleblower, it becomes clear that the continuing legitimacy of the organization necessitates the illegitimacy of the whistleblower. This helps explain the blacklisting of the whistleblower and their vilification which results in the destruction of both their career and their reputation. Only specific protective legislation can provide insurance for their career.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120983218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the wake of the ECJ decisions in Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art it is now possible to set up an English limited company which conducts its business solely elsewhere (pseudo-foreign company), without subjecting the company to the domestic company law of the Member State in which it intends to do business. This recent development also has an impact on cross-border groups: It provides a route to avoid domestic corporate group law, especially the highly restrictive German Konzernrecht (forum shopping). However, if English law proves to be deficient in that area, the domestic law of the Member State in which the English subsidiary conducts its business may be imposed (Gebhard-test). Therefore, this essay firstly analyses the effectiveness of English creditor protection law in the corporate group context. It will come to the conclusion that the current state of English law is largely unsatisfactory. Especially the English wrongful trading rule (s. 214 IA 1986) has failed to address the corporate group problem adequately. Although the provision is drafted broadly enough, too many conditions need to be fulfilled to regard a parent company as a shadow director. The major shortcoming of all statutory remedies (capital maintenance rules and insolvency claw back provisions) is that they appear to adopt a monotransactional approach. Thus, there is a good chance that the ECJ will accept that some German company law rules are imposed on English "pseudo-foreign" group companies to fill in the perceived gaps. In a second step it is analysed which domestic company law rules can be imposed in particular. It is argued that the German liability for cold liquidation (Existenzvernichtungshaftung) and the German insolvency rules on phantom equity are applicable.
{"title":"Creditor Protection in the Corporate Group","authors":"Eike T. Bicker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.920472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.920472","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the ECJ decisions in Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art it is now possible to set up an English limited company which conducts its business solely elsewhere (pseudo-foreign company), without subjecting the company to the domestic company law of the Member State in which it intends to do business. This recent development also has an impact on cross-border groups: It provides a route to avoid domestic corporate group law, especially the highly restrictive German Konzernrecht (forum shopping). However, if English law proves to be deficient in that area, the domestic law of the Member State in which the English subsidiary conducts its business may be imposed (Gebhard-test). Therefore, this essay firstly analyses the effectiveness of English creditor protection law in the corporate group context. It will come to the conclusion that the current state of English law is largely unsatisfactory. Especially the English wrongful trading rule (s. 214 IA 1986) has failed to address the corporate group problem adequately. Although the provision is drafted broadly enough, too many conditions need to be fulfilled to regard a parent company as a shadow director. The major shortcoming of all statutory remedies (capital maintenance rules and insolvency claw back provisions) is that they appear to adopt a monotransactional approach. Thus, there is a good chance that the ECJ will accept that some German company law rules are imposed on English \"pseudo-foreign\" group companies to fill in the perceived gaps. In a second step it is analysed which domestic company law rules can be imposed in particular. It is argued that the German liability for cold liquidation (Existenzvernichtungshaftung) and the German insolvency rules on phantom equity are applicable.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132971055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper develops and estimates a simple New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with rule-of-thumb consumers and external habits. Our theoretical model has a closed-form solution that allows us to derive its dynamical and stability properties. The model is also evaluated by running numerical simulations based on Monte Carlo Bayesian estimates of the structural parameters. The estimates are repeated for each of the G7 national economies. Providing single country estimates and simulations, we derive some indications on the relative efficacy of monetary policy and of its potential asymmetric effects resulting from the heterogeneity of the estimated model structures.
{"title":"Taylor Rule Under Rule-of-Thumb Consumers and External Habits: An International Comparison","authors":"Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, L. Rossi, M. Tancioni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.918874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.918874","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops and estimates a simple New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with rule-of-thumb consumers and external habits. Our theoretical model has a closed-form solution that allows us to derive its dynamical and stability properties. The model is also evaluated by running numerical simulations based on Monte Carlo Bayesian estimates of the structural parameters. The estimates are repeated for each of the G7 national economies. Providing single country estimates and simulations, we derive some indications on the relative efficacy of monetary policy and of its potential asymmetric effects resulting from the heterogeneity of the estimated model structures.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129990423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the impact of bureaucratic decision costs on agency expertise. The analysis shows that the effect of the cost associated with adopting a new regulation (the enactment cost) on agency expertise depends on what the agency would do if it remains uninformed. If an uninformed agency would regulate, increasing enactment costs increases agency expertise; if an uninformed agency would retain the status quo, increasing enactment costs decreases agency expertise. These results may influence the behavior of an uninformed overseer, such as a court or legislature, that can manipulate the agency's enactment costs. Such an overseer must balance its interest in influencing agency policy preferences against its interest in increasing agency expertise. The paper explores the implications of these results for various topics in institutional design, including judicial and executive review of regulations, structure-and-process theories of congressional oversight, national security, criminal procedure, and constitutional law.
{"title":"Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise","authors":"M. Stephenson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.921439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.921439","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the impact of bureaucratic decision costs on agency expertise. The analysis shows that the effect of the cost associated with adopting a new regulation (the enactment cost) on agency expertise depends on what the agency would do if it remains uninformed. If an uninformed agency would regulate, increasing enactment costs increases agency expertise; if an uninformed agency would retain the status quo, increasing enactment costs decreases agency expertise. These results may influence the behavior of an uninformed overseer, such as a court or legislature, that can manipulate the agency's enactment costs. Such an overseer must balance its interest in influencing agency policy preferences against its interest in increasing agency expertise. The paper explores the implications of these results for various topics in institutional design, including judicial and executive review of regulations, structure-and-process theories of congressional oversight, national security, criminal procedure, and constitutional law.","PeriodicalId":367470,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132759747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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