The article raises the problem of functionality and rational explanation of large arrays of communicative and unclaimed scientific knowledge. To solve the problem and explain this phenomenon, the resources of the system-communicative theory of scientific communication and social-evolutionist approaches are involved. The ability of the system-communicative theory itself to explain this phenomenon is considered as a possibility of its verification. In conclusion, a working hypothesis is proposed linking the existence of a class of unclaimed research and researchers with the function of meta-observation: through their online network reactions on appropriate electronic platforms (downloads, citations, readings, reviews, recommendations, etc.), the distribution of scientific reputations of science leaders and selection of the best scientific knowledge is ensured. This function, according to the author, compensates for the lack of an external audience or public capable of understanding and adequately evaluating scientific achievements in the scientific communication system. It is concluded that the past “collegial and deliberative” assessment of scientific achievements, the appropriate distribution of reputations and support for research projects is incompatible with the dynamic conditions of the “publication market”.
{"title":"Why Does Science Need Losers?","authors":"A. Antonovski","doi":"10.5840/eps202360226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360226","url":null,"abstract":"The article raises the problem of functionality and rational explanation of large arrays of communicative and unclaimed scientific knowledge. To solve the problem and explain this phenomenon, the resources of the system-communicative theory of scientific communication and social-evolutionist approaches are involved. The ability of the system-communicative theory itself to explain this phenomenon is considered as a possibility of its verification. In conclusion, a working hypothesis is proposed linking the existence of a class of unclaimed research and researchers with the function of meta-observation: through their online network reactions on appropriate electronic platforms (downloads, citations, readings, reviews, recommendations, etc.), the distribution of scientific reputations of science leaders and selection of the best scientific knowledge is ensured. This function, according to the author, compensates for the lack of an external audience or public capable of understanding and adequately evaluating scientific achievements in the scientific communication system. It is concluded that the past “collegial and deliberative” assessment of scientific achievements, the appropriate distribution of reputations and support for research projects is incompatible with the dynamic conditions of the “publication market”.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128010066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is argued that O.E. Stoliarova’s analysis of the STS programs leads her to a conclusion that in them the principle of reflexivity (in D. Bloor’s version) is not carried out though this contradicts the orientation of these programs on a self-reflection of the scientific bases. Hence, a problem arises: whether we will apply the principle of empiricism to justification of metascientific reasonings (in particular, to sociological explanations of knowing actions of scientists). This, in turn, leads to a problem of universality of philosophy as a platform for metascientific criticism. The formulation and the solution of such a problem assume the possibility of creation of metaphilosophical systems radicalizing the principle of reflexivity before its application to philosophy. Thereby the philosophy of science appears in the field of immanent paradoxes. An exit from similar paradoxes demands new prospect of philosophical researches.
{"title":"Does the Philosophical Reflection on the Foundations of Scientific Research Follow the Empiricism Principle?","authors":"V. Porus","doi":"10.5840/eps202259456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259456","url":null,"abstract":"It is argued that O.E. Stoliarova’s analysis of the STS programs leads her to a conclusion that in them the principle of reflexivity (in D. Bloor’s version) is not carried out though this contradicts the orientation of these programs on a self-reflection of the scientific bases. Hence, a problem arises: whether we will apply the principle of empiricism to justification of metascientific reasonings (in particular, to sociological explanations of knowing actions of scientists). This, in turn, leads to a problem of universality of philosophy as a platform for metascientific criticism. The formulation and the solution of such a problem assume the possibility of creation of metaphilosophical systems radicalizing the principle of reflexivity before its application to philosophy. Thereby the philosophy of science appears in the field of immanent paradoxes. An exit from similar paradoxes demands new prospect of philosophical researches.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131869756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author analyzes the phenomenon of denialism (denial of scientific consensus out of the normative boundaries of scientific discussion). The intellectual origins (including connection with P. Feyerabend’s post-positivism), sociocultural characteristics and political aspects of this phenomenon are discussed. The author defends the thesis that denialism is associated with scientism – non-reflexive trust in science, which is used for unscrupulous manipulations for the purpose of political influence. As an example, she considers the South African expert case related to HIV denial in the early 2000s. The author believes that denialism needs a comprehensive analysis that takes into account the interdependence of its intellectual and socio-political foundations.
{"title":"Science as an Object of Faith and Distrust: The Phenomenon of Denialism","authors":"L. Tukhvatulina","doi":"10.5840/eps20236011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20236011","url":null,"abstract":"The author analyzes the phenomenon of denialism (denial of scientific consensus out of the normative boundaries of scientific discussion). The intellectual origins (including connection with P. Feyerabend’s post-positivism), sociocultural characteristics and political aspects of this phenomenon are discussed. The author defends the thesis that denialism is associated with scientism – non-reflexive trust in science, which is used for unscrupulous manipulations for the purpose of political influence. As an example, she considers the South African expert case related to HIV denial in the early 2000s. The author believes that denialism needs a comprehensive analysis that takes into account the interdependence of its intellectual and socio-political foundations.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132727726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Modal constitution theory is one of the most influential solutions to the paradoxes of coincidence, and the problem of personal identity. It rests on three fundamental premises: common-sense objects exist; sometimes objects coincide in space; the coincidence of objects in space requires explanation. In this article, the author offers a critique of the modal theory of constitution. First, the definition of the constitution is examined and a new argument is offered that modal theory either does not provide asymmetry of the constitution or leads to an infinite series of constitutive objects, unsatisfactorily extending ontology. Also, the author demonstrates that possible additions to the constitutive definition, which can make the definition sufficient for asymmetric relation, lead to additional theoretical difficulties, leading to the logical impossibility of constitution relation. Second, the author demonstrates that the theory of constitution offers an unsatisfactory theory of identity because it faces three problems: the overpopulation problem, the epistemic problem, and the personal problem. All of these considerations lead the author to conclude that modal constitution theory is not metaphysically satisfactory.
{"title":"Modal Theory of Constitution and the Ontology of Persons","authors":"B. Faul","doi":"10.5840/eps202360110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360110","url":null,"abstract":"Modal constitution theory is one of the most influential solutions to the paradoxes of coincidence, and the problem of personal identity. It rests on three fundamental premises: common-sense objects exist; sometimes objects coincide in space; the coincidence of objects in space requires explanation. In this article, the author offers a critique of the modal theory of constitution. First, the definition of the constitution is examined and a new argument is offered that modal theory either does not provide asymmetry of the constitution or leads to an infinite series of constitutive objects, unsatisfactorily extending ontology. Also, the author demonstrates that possible additions to the constitutive definition, which can make the definition sufficient for asymmetric relation, lead to additional theoretical difficulties, leading to the logical impossibility of constitution relation. Second, the author demonstrates that the theory of constitution offers an unsatisfactory theory of identity because it faces three problems: the overpopulation problem, the epistemic problem, and the personal problem. All of these considerations lead the author to conclude that modal constitution theory is not metaphysically satisfactory.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129681080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article presents the results of a study of the interaction between tDCS-users and scientists on reddit.com. The forum observation and interviewing of the most active members of the Internet community were conducted during 2020–2021 by the methods of digital ethnography. The obtained results are intended to deepen the understanding both the exchange processes between scientists and non-professional, and the space in which such coordination takes place. A suitable tool for such work is the “trading zone” concept, which is defined by the lack of consensus on a scientific fact; the presence of local subcultures separated by disciplinary or practice boundaries; pidginization or creolization of language occurring on the basis of non-monetary exchange forms, without mutual values insight. TDCS is a technology with unproven effectiveness, and therefore scientific discussions are still being held around it. Unlike scientists, users present an alternative approach to the effectiveness of these devices, which analysis allows considering tDCS-technology as a “boundary object”. The central element of interaction at the “trading zone” is the exchange of “anecdotal data”, which determines the features of the emerging pidgin, aimed at describing the individual perception of a user’s experience. The forum interaction, involving the exchange of anecdotal data, leads to the formation of skill to discriminate a variety of tDCS-types, as well as types of scientific expertise. The ability for discrimination becomes the basis of interactional expertise. The user’s right to undertake expertise arise not from the basis of formal membership in scientific institutions, or personal contribution to the development of a scientific discipline, but on the property of “interactional experience”. The article notes that the attempts of users to extend interactional expertise beyond the boundaries of the trading zones, as well as the participation of academic scientists in the activities of the forum, may be associated with risks for scientific research.
{"title":"Intimate Technology and Alien Science","authors":"Kirill A. Petrov","doi":"10.5840/eps202259112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259112","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents the results of a study of the interaction between tDCS-users and scientists on reddit.com. The forum observation and interviewing of the most active members of the Internet community were conducted during 2020–2021 by the methods of digital ethnography. The obtained results are intended to deepen the understanding both the exchange processes between scientists and non-professional, and the space in which such coordination takes place. A suitable tool for such work is the “trading zone” concept, which is defined by the lack of consensus on a scientific fact; the presence of local subcultures separated by disciplinary or practice boundaries; pidginization or creolization of language occurring on the basis of non-monetary exchange forms, without mutual values insight. TDCS is a technology with unproven effectiveness, and therefore scientific discussions are still being held around it. Unlike scientists, users present an alternative approach to the effectiveness of these devices, which analysis allows considering tDCS-technology as a “boundary object”. The central element of interaction at the “trading zone” is the exchange of “anecdotal data”, which determines the features of the emerging pidgin, aimed at describing the individual perception of a user’s experience. The forum interaction, involving the exchange of anecdotal data, leads to the formation of skill to discriminate a variety of tDCS-types, as well as types of scientific expertise. The ability for discrimination becomes the basis of interactional expertise. The user’s right to undertake expertise arise not from the basis of formal membership in scientific institutions, or personal contribution to the development of a scientific discipline, but on the property of “interactional experience”. The article notes that the attempts of users to extend interactional expertise beyond the boundaries of the trading zones, as well as the participation of academic scientists in the activities of the forum, may be associated with risks for scientific research.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131387811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
В статье предложен новый взгляд на формирование экономики как науки, основанный на гипотезе сосуществования в XVII–XVIII вв. целого спектра проектов организации научного экономического знания, отразивших соответствующие научные программы проходившей в ту эпоху научной революции. Анализируются пять таких проектов: проект консервативной трансформации экономического знания Джеймса Стюарта; бэконианские проекты: статистический Уильяма Петти и инженерный Джона Ло; социально-философский проект Д. Юма и теоретический проект Ричарда Кантильона. Каждый проект рассматривается и в контексте его возникновения, и сквозь призму последующей судьбы его основной идеи. Делается вывод, что признание в XIX в. экономики наукой в форме классической политической экономии было победой проекта Кантильона, развитого в трудах Кенэ и Адама Смита. Этот теоретический проект отвечал научным стандартам, утвердившимся во второй половине XVIII в., консолидировал тогдашнее экономическое знание вокруг универсальной онтологической схемы экономики как предмета новой науки и соответствовал идеологическим запросам эпохи. Однако рационалистическая траектория развития экономической науки имела и свою цену. Усложнение теоретического аппарата часто достигалось за счет абстрагирования от черт реальности, которые сложно измерить или смоделировать, а формы экономического знания, представленные в альтернативных проектах, остались на периферии внимания.
{"title":"Плоды Просвещения","authors":"Олег Игоревич Ананьин","doi":"10.5840/eps202360347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360347","url":null,"abstract":"В статье предложен новый взгляд на формирование экономики как науки, основанный на гипотезе сосуществования в XVII–XVIII вв. целого спектра проектов организации научного экономического знания, отразивших соответствующие научные программы проходившей в ту эпоху научной революции. Анализируются пять таких проектов: проект консервативной трансформации экономического знания Джеймса Стюарта; бэконианские проекты: статистический Уильяма Петти и инженерный Джона Ло; социально-философский проект Д. Юма и теоретический проект Ричарда Кантильона. Каждый проект рассматривается и в контексте его возникновения, и сквозь призму последующей судьбы его основной идеи. Делается вывод, что признание в XIX в. экономики наукой в форме классической политической экономии было победой проекта Кантильона, развитого в трудах Кенэ и Адама Смита. Этот теоретический проект отвечал научным стандартам, утвердившимся во второй половине XVIII в., консолидировал тогдашнее экономическое знание вокруг универсальной онтологической схемы экономики как предмета новой науки и соответствовал идеологическим запросам эпохи. Однако рационалистическая траектория развития экономической науки имела и свою цену. Усложнение теоретического аппарата часто достигалось за счет абстрагирования от черт реальности, которые сложно измерить или смоделировать, а формы экономического знания, представленные в альтернативных проектах, остались на периферии внимания.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127620634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper considers three main models of temporal consciousness proposed in grappling with the “paradox of temporal awareness”. They are based on the notion that there is a basic element of perception in the form of some “mental frame” or “apparent present” which, while effective for describing some perceptual features, does not fully reflect our phenomenal experience. It is argued that a two-level model based on the separation of the “specious present” and “current present” is best correlated with higher-order theories of consciousness and should act as a basis for further development of the temporal model of consciousness.
{"title":"Main Models of the Temporal Structure of Consciousness","authors":"A. Zaykova","doi":"10.5840/eps202259344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259344","url":null,"abstract":"The paper considers three main models of temporal consciousness proposed in grappling with the “paradox of temporal awareness”. They are based on the notion that there is a basic element of perception in the form of some “mental frame” or “apparent present” which, while effective for describing some perceptual features, does not fully reflect our phenomenal experience. It is argued that a two-level model based on the separation of the “specious present” and “current present” is best correlated with higher-order theories of consciousness and should act as a basis for further development of the temporal model of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121362979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The main claim of the study is that technocratic public administration based on knowledge as a key element of power, significantly affects the idea of what is objective and what is objectivity. I explore how scientific objectivity as part of a scientific ethos has been evolving on the example of economic knowledge. A key institutional feature of economic knowledge is that it includes in fact two relatively autonomous epistemic cultures: academic one, connected to the production of knowledge in academia and expert-administrative one developing in public and corporate governance systems. The peculiarity of knowledge demanded and functioning in public administration is instrumentality (a possibility to be transformed into technology) and an exeptional focus on quantification. As a result ‘governing by number’ becomes a key social technology and at the same time numbers seem to embody objectivity. I show that economic knowledge in public administration involves an inevitable and deepening ontological gap with ‘objective reality’. The state needs not true but effective knowledge: the task of administrating does not presuppose a realistic representation of the administrated object, but rather seeks to simplify it, to plan it, or even to construct. Thus, unlike scientific knowledge, the objectivity of knowledge in administrative practices has almost nothing to do with the object (in sense of truthfulness, representation). Meanwhile, ongoing need for academic economic knowledge to be used into the state administration and its further development in a fundamentally alien sphere leads to a significant deformation of scientific ethos, which is a crucial regulatory element in the scientific knowledge production. Erosion affects both aspects of objectivity as an ontological principle and as an ‘epistemic virtue’. Against this background, objectivity as an ‘epistemic virtue’ has been transformed into the ‘technique of distancing’ and the principle of technical impersonality, which imply eventually the replacement of the ‘knowledge self’ by a technical system.
{"title":"Economic Knowledge and Power","authors":"O. Koshovets","doi":"10.5840/eps202259113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259113","url":null,"abstract":"The main claim of the study is that technocratic public administration based on knowledge as a key element of power, significantly affects the idea of what is objective and what is objectivity. I explore how scientific objectivity as part of a scientific ethos has been evolving on the example of economic knowledge. A key institutional feature of economic knowledge is that it includes in fact two relatively autonomous epistemic cultures: academic one, connected to the production of knowledge in academia and expert-administrative one developing in public and corporate governance systems. The peculiarity of knowledge demanded and functioning in public administration is instrumentality (a possibility to be transformed into technology) and an exeptional focus on quantification. As a result ‘governing by number’ becomes a key social technology and at the same time numbers seem to embody objectivity. I show that economic knowledge in public administration involves an inevitable and deepening ontological gap with ‘objective reality’. The state needs not true but effective knowledge: the task of administrating does not presuppose a realistic representation of the administrated object, but rather seeks to simplify it, to plan it, or even to construct. Thus, unlike scientific knowledge, the objectivity of knowledge in administrative practices has almost nothing to do with the object (in sense of truthfulness, representation). Meanwhile, ongoing need for academic economic knowledge to be used into the state administration and its further development in a fundamentally alien sphere leads to a significant deformation of scientific ethos, which is a crucial regulatory element in the scientific knowledge production. Erosion affects both aspects of objectivity as an ontological principle and as an ‘epistemic virtue’. Against this background, objectivity as an ‘epistemic virtue’ has been transformed into the ‘technique of distancing’ and the principle of technical impersonality, which imply eventually the replacement of the ‘knowledge self’ by a technical system.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"252 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134345278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the fundamental ontological significance that the category of perception has in philosophy of G.W. Leibniz, and establishes the connection between the category of perception and modern panpsychism. There is a problem of definition of protopsychic properties in modern panpsychism. The problem is expressed not only in the absence of such a definition, but also in the absence of a good strategy for finding possible candidates for the role of protopsychic property. To solve this problem, the author considers the status of the monad as the center of perception in Leibniz’s monadology, as well as the question of the relation of different monads to each other. Based on Leibniz’s ideas, the following modifications for modern panpsychism have been proposed, among others. First, it was proposed that protopsychic properties be viewed as properties that represent all reality in some vague way, preventing the emergence of high-level psychic properties. Second, it was proposed that mental properties be viewed not as a combination of protopsychic properties, but as state of protopsychic properties. This means that to form high-level mental properties, protopsychic properties must not only form some system, but must also be partially blocked. The author also considers the question of whether it is possible to borrow the proposed ideas in modern panpsychism. The problem for this is the ontological differences between modern naturalistic panpsychism and Leibniz’s classical panpsychism. The article proposes three different strategies for dealing with this problem related to three interpretations of Leibniz’s philosophy. First, it is possible to limit ourselves to considering physics as a set of structural phenomena derived from the activity of monads. Second, it is possible to try to show that there is some other, non-causal, type of relationship between the monads. Third, it is possible to consider this system as naturalistic pantheism and assume that God is a mediator and a common non-spatial coordinate system through which the monads agree with each other.
{"title":"Fundamental Perception in Leibniz’s Philosophy and Contemporary Panpsychism","authors":"M. S. Sysoev","doi":"10.5840/eps202259350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259350","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the fundamental ontological significance that the category of perception has in philosophy of G.W. Leibniz, and establishes the connection between the category of perception and modern panpsychism. There is a problem of definition of protopsychic properties in modern panpsychism. The problem is expressed not only in the absence of such a definition, but also in the absence of a good strategy for finding possible candidates for the role of protopsychic property. To solve this problem, the author considers the status of the monad as the center of perception in Leibniz’s monadology, as well as the question of the relation of different monads to each other. Based on Leibniz’s ideas, the following modifications for modern panpsychism have been proposed, among others. First, it was proposed that protopsychic properties be viewed as properties that represent all reality in some vague way, preventing the emergence of high-level psychic properties. Second, it was proposed that mental properties be viewed not as a combination of protopsychic properties, but as state of protopsychic properties. This means that to form high-level mental properties, protopsychic properties must not only form some system, but must also be partially blocked. The author also considers the question of whether it is possible to borrow the proposed ideas in modern panpsychism. The problem for this is the ontological differences between modern naturalistic panpsychism and Leibniz’s classical panpsychism. The article proposes three different strategies for dealing with this problem related to three interpretations of Leibniz’s philosophy. First, it is possible to limit ourselves to considering physics as a set of structural phenomena derived from the activity of monads. Second, it is possible to try to show that there is some other, non-causal, type of relationship between the monads. Third, it is possible to consider this system as naturalistic pantheism and assume that God is a mediator and a common non-spatial coordinate system through which the monads agree with each other.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129831876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author replies and comments on the critical remarks and ideas expressed by her opponents concerning the principle of reflexivity and its philosophical realization. The general idea of the opponents that philosophical reflection, even if addressed to itself, cannot ignore the results of empirical sciences, is highlighted.
{"title":"On the Universality of Philosophical Reflection: Reply to Critics","authors":"Olga E. Stoliarova","doi":"10.5840/eps202259457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259457","url":null,"abstract":"The author replies and comments on the critical remarks and ideas expressed by her opponents concerning the principle of reflexivity and its philosophical realization. The general idea of the opponents that philosophical reflection, even if addressed to itself, cannot ignore the results of empirical sciences, is highlighted.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114296211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：