In this paper, we would like to argue in support of the productiveness of epistemological investigations at the interface of the semantics and pragmatics of natural language and the analysis of perception. We begin with a short overview the history of convergence of these two areas of research. Leibniz is the center of this historical discussion. We identify the general problems that arise when language meets perception and discuss some recent research in the semantics of pictures. We arrive at the following conclusions. First, the reference of a singular term and the perception of its denotation involve the same relation between the conceptual and what is immediately given in perception. The specifics of perception make up a part of a singular term’s pragmatics determining the conditions of a semantic interpretation. Secondly, phenomena with minimal conceptual content arise whenever the update of the conceptual content of linguistic expressions (or the update of their theoretical component) is faster than the update of the sensory material of perception. In the realm of language, these phenomena are related to the appearance of singular terms that become the result of acts of naming singular objects. The semantic and the pragmatic analysis of language identifies the relevant phenomena by revealing the universal formal structures and mechanism within language and its use. The result is an isolation of sensory data from conceptual schemes. Their place is taken by the empirical conditions of perception.
{"title":"Perception, Knowledge, and Natural Language","authors":"P. Kusliy, I. Mikirtumov","doi":"10.5840/eps202259216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259216","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we would like to argue in support of the productiveness of epistemological investigations at the interface of the semantics and pragmatics of natural language and the analysis of perception. We begin with a short overview the history of convergence of these two areas of research. Leibniz is the center of this historical discussion. We identify the general problems that arise when language meets perception and discuss some recent research in the semantics of pictures. We arrive at the following conclusions. First, the reference of a singular term and the perception of its denotation involve the same relation between the conceptual and what is immediately given in perception. The specifics of perception make up a part of a singular term’s pragmatics determining the conditions of a semantic interpretation. Secondly, phenomena with minimal conceptual content arise whenever the update of the conceptual content of linguistic expressions (or the update of their theoretical component) is faster than the update of the sensory material of perception. In the realm of language, these phenomena are related to the appearance of singular terms that become the result of acts of naming singular objects. The semantic and the pragmatic analysis of language identifies the relevant phenomena by revealing the universal formal structures and mechanism within language and its use. The result is an isolation of sensory data from conceptual schemes. Their place is taken by the empirical conditions of perception.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115098979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
В статье обсуждается решение логико-семантических парадоксов, предложенное Б. Расселом и воспроизведенное в современной логической литературе Г. Пристом в качестве принципа единого решения. При этом Г. Прист считает, что разделение парадоксов на две принципиально разные группы (логические и семантические), которое ввел Ф. Рамсей, является неправомерным, и признает правоту именно Б. Рассела, рассматривавшего все парадоксы унифицированно. На основании исследования формальной структуры парадоксов автор статьи утверждает, что принцип единого решения нельзя назвать полностью релевантным проблеме, поскольку он опирается на недостаточно тщательную диагностику причин возникновения парадоксов.
{"title":"О принципе единого решения парадоксов","authors":"Всеволод Адольфович Ладов","doi":"10.5840/eps202360336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360336","url":null,"abstract":"В статье обсуждается решение логико-семантических парадоксов, предложенное Б. Расселом и воспроизведенное в современной логической литературе Г. Пристом в качестве принципа единого решения. При этом Г. Прист считает, что разделение парадоксов на две принципиально разные группы (логические и семантические), которое ввел Ф. Рамсей, является неправомерным, и признает правоту именно Б. Рассела, рассматривавшего все парадоксы унифицированно. На основании исследования формальной структуры парадоксов автор статьи утверждает, что принцип единого решения нельзя назвать полностью релевантным проблеме, поскольку он опирается на недостаточно тщательную диагностику причин возникновения парадоксов.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131273188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article shows that Kuhn's concept of incommensurability emphasizes mainly the objective dimension of communication. To the thesis about the incommensurability of the meanings of scientific concepts in competing paradigms, we oppose the idea of a three-dimensional space of communicative dimensions. We supplement the objective dimension of communication, within which the environmental evolutionary selection of the best knowledge is carried out, with equal social and temporal horizons.
{"title":"Incommensurability and Communication: To the Communicative Turn in the Philosophy of Science","authors":"A. Antonovski","doi":"10.5840/eps202259460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259460","url":null,"abstract":"The article shows that Kuhn's concept of incommensurability emphasizes mainly the objective dimension of communication. To the thesis about the incommensurability of the meanings of scientific concepts in competing paradigms, we oppose the idea of a three-dimensional space of communicative dimensions. We supplement the objective dimension of communication, within which the environmental evolutionary selection of the best knowledge is carried out, with equal social and temporal horizons.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126502452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the early 1960s, American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn contributed to a “crisis of rationality” with his hypothesis that science develops by means of paradigm shifts. He challenged the positivist concept of cumulative and continuous scientific progress. According to Kuhn, the relation between two succeeding scientific traditions ‘separated by a scientific revolution’ is characterized by conceptual incommensurability that constrains the interpretation of science as a cumulative, steadily progressing enterprise. Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy was heavily criticized by German-American biologist Ernst Mayr as unapplicable to the history of biology. Mayr, one of the most outstanding evolutionary biologists of the 20th century and a “co-architect” of the so-called Modern Synthesis (contemporary Darwinism), published extensively on the history and philosophy of biology as he thought that theoretical biology cannot progress without proper philosophy of science. Being convinced of the progressive development of Darwinism, Mayr pointed out that Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolutions does not reflect conceptual changes in evolutionary biology. Here we summarize Mayr’s critiques of Kuhn and, based on our own research, take Mayr’s side in the controversy between two great thinkers.
{"title":"Ernst Mayr’s Critique of Thomas Kuhn","authors":"Georgy S. Levit, U. Hossfeld","doi":"10.5840/eps202259463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259463","url":null,"abstract":"In the early 1960s, American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn contributed to a “crisis of rationality” with his hypothesis that science develops by means of paradigm shifts. He challenged the positivist concept of cumulative and continuous scientific progress. According to Kuhn, the relation between two succeeding scientific traditions ‘separated by a scientific revolution’ is characterized by conceptual incommensurability that constrains the interpretation of science as a cumulative, steadily progressing enterprise. Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy was heavily criticized by German-American biologist Ernst Mayr as unapplicable to the history of biology. Mayr, one of the most outstanding evolutionary biologists of the 20th century and a “co-architect” of the so-called Modern Synthesis (contemporary Darwinism), published extensively on the history and philosophy of biology as he thought that theoretical biology cannot progress without proper philosophy of science. Being convinced of the progressive development of Darwinism, Mayr pointed out that Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolutions does not reflect conceptual changes in evolutionary biology. Here we summarize Mayr’s critiques of Kuhn and, based on our own research, take Mayr’s side in the controversy between two great thinkers.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130406393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In One-Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse followed Husserl in arguing that modern natural science translates concepts and practices from the Lebenswelt, the everyday lifeworld. Marcuse claimed that a socialist revolution would change that life-world and transform natural science. He anticipated a new concept of reason that would incorporate potentialities experienced in the lifeworld. Teleological aspects of everyday experience would be “materialized” by science. Marcuse’s critique of social science employs a similar concept of translation. The notion that changes in the lifeworld would enable the social sciences to incorporate potentialities is more plausible than these speculations about a successor natural science. But Marcuse’s assumption that such changes would occur after a socialist revolution has been overtaken by the actual development of social movements challenging the socially embedded technosciences. The reciprocal interaction between science and society in the struggle for a liveable world is now a present phenomenon, no longer a distant revolutionary prospect.
{"title":"A New Concept of Reason?","authors":"A. Feenberg","doi":"10.5840/eps202259466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259466","url":null,"abstract":"In One-Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse followed Husserl in arguing that modern natural science translates concepts and practices from the Lebenswelt, the everyday lifeworld. Marcuse claimed that a socialist revolution would change that life-world and transform natural science. He anticipated a new concept of reason that would incorporate potentialities experienced in the lifeworld. Teleological aspects of everyday experience would be “materialized” by science. Marcuse’s critique of social science employs a similar concept of translation. The notion that changes in the lifeworld would enable the social sciences to incorporate potentialities is more plausible than these speculations about a successor natural science. But Marcuse’s assumption that such changes would occur after a socialist revolution has been overtaken by the actual development of social movements challenging the socially embedded technosciences. The reciprocal interaction between science and society in the struggle for a liveable world is now a present phenomenon, no longer a distant revolutionary prospect.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130488090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In their article, A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina focus on the concepts of problem, task, and features of a creative personality as a single isolated agent. To a certain extent, such view is “opposed” by the socio-epistemic approach, since today it is extremely difficult to consider a person outside the socio-cultural context. In my paper, I discuss the distinctive features of the concepts of tasks and problems in connection with the fields of science and education. As an example of a kind of creative adaptation practice, to which modern scientists are forced to resort (taking into account difficult socio-economic realities), I consider “tayloring” – a type of activity of “creative” written justification of the importance and usefulness of basic research (J. Calvert). The collective and institutional aspects of modern science, which play a role in the possible limitation of the process of generating new (creative) ideas in science, are discussed (P. Stanford). I agree with A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, that the method of epistemological randomization is most specific for the field of philosophy. Following C. Rovelli, it is emphasized that philosophy can serve as an important “creative resource” for scientific activity.
{"title":"Creativity, Tailoring and Basic Research","authors":"Evgeny A. Zharkov","doi":"10.5840/eps20236017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20236017","url":null,"abstract":"In their article, A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina focus on the concepts of problem, task, and features of a creative personality as a single isolated agent. To a certain extent, such view is “opposed” by the socio-epistemic approach, since today it is extremely difficult to consider a person outside the socio-cultural context. In my paper, I discuss the distinctive features of the concepts of tasks and problems in connection with the fields of science and education. As an example of a kind of creative adaptation practice, to which modern scientists are forced to resort (taking into account difficult socio-economic realities), I consider “tayloring” – a type of activity of “creative” written justification of the importance and usefulness of basic research (J. Calvert). The collective and institutional aspects of modern science, which play a role in the possible limitation of the process of generating new (creative) ideas in science, are discussed (P. Stanford). I agree with A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, that the method of epistemological randomization is most specific for the field of philosophy. Following C. Rovelli, it is emphasized that philosophy can serve as an important “creative resource” for scientific activity.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115023300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article discusses the problems of constructing a scientific picture of the world in a technogenic civilization at the stage of its globalization. The interdependence of science, technology and society generates a number of issues of a socio-humanitarian and, in particular, ideological nature. Interdisciplinary forms of organization of sciences contribute to the development of borderline methodologies. These methodologies integrate the achievements and problems of specific disciplines into a certain overall picture. The ambitions of this worldview include space (near, far), planetary nature with all geo – shells, as well as the biosphere, technosphere, sociosphere, anthroposphere. In the course of communicative interactions, scientists have developed methodological principles for constructing a picture of the world. These principles claim to be universal: integrity, consistency, coherence, structurality, evolution/involution, complexity, self-organization, human dimension. However, epistemic and communicative difficulties accompany the construction of a general scientific picture of the world. There are methodological, experimental, linguistic, cognitive barriers between disciplines. Also, the unevenness of their development is strong. Competition between disciplines and reductionist programs are often caused by social reasons – politicization, ideologization and commercialization of big science. Philosophy seeks to connect the idea of a scientific picture of the world with a change in self-consciousness and a person’s place in the world. The prospect of intellectual synthesis fluctuates between the transdisciplinary form of organization of collective scientific thinking and the ideological imperialism of individual philosophical and scientific programs.
{"title":"A Perspective of the General Scientific Picture of the World: Collisions and Trends","authors":"I. Gerasimova","doi":"10.5840/eps202259335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259335","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses the problems of constructing a scientific picture of the world in a technogenic civilization at the stage of its globalization. The interdependence of science, technology and society generates a number of issues of a socio-humanitarian and, in particular, ideological nature. Interdisciplinary forms of organization of sciences contribute to the development of borderline methodologies. These methodologies integrate the achievements and problems of specific disciplines into a certain overall picture. The ambitions of this worldview include space (near, far), planetary nature with all geo – shells, as well as the biosphere, technosphere, sociosphere, anthroposphere. In the course of communicative interactions, scientists have developed methodological principles for constructing a picture of the world. These principles claim to be universal: integrity, consistency, coherence, structurality, evolution/involution, complexity, self-organization, human dimension. However, epistemic and communicative difficulties accompany the construction of a general scientific picture of the world. There are methodological, experimental, linguistic, cognitive barriers between disciplines. Also, the unevenness of their development is strong. Competition between disciplines and reductionist programs are often caused by social reasons – politicization, ideologization and commercialization of big science. Philosophy seeks to connect the idea of a scientific picture of the world with a change in self-consciousness and a person’s place in the world. The prospect of intellectual synthesis fluctuates between the transdisciplinary form of organization of collective scientific thinking and the ideological imperialism of individual philosophical and scientific programs.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115069705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Inspired by the work of Kuhn, we might want to develop an account of science that explains how it is that while much of science involves the investigation of a world as articulated by a paradigm, the scientist is nevertheless an observer and rational interpreter of a mind-independent world that does not change its character over time. Kuhn himself recognizes that there is a challenge here that he does not know how to meet. I argue that progress can be made on this challenge by carefully examining and criticizing Kuhn’s account of deliberation in science. Inspired by certain views about Gestalt psychology and examples such as the duck/rabbit picture, Kuhn takes deliberation in science to be a consequence of seeing things a certain way, rather than rational deliberation in science making new ways of seeing things possible. I argue that the most serious problems of Kuhn’s view of science stem from this fact, and that we can free ourselves from these problems by not following Kuhn here. In particular, I argue using material from Hanson and Peirce that we should think of the revolutionary scientist as being revolutionary not merely in virtue of seeing things in a new way, but rather for showing – typically through painstaking deliberation – that certain conjectures connected with new ways of seeing the world are reasonable (even prior to anything like inductive confirmation.) This makes coming to see the world differently a deliberative process that is importantly unlike seeing a rabbit/duck picture differently. Such a way of thinking allows us to view the articulation of a new paradigm as a deliberative process that does not take some paradigm or other for granted, but rather as a deliberative process that interrogates existing orthodoxy for its suitability to survive into the next paradigm. The result is a (sketch of a) view of science that maintains much of what is important to Kuhn, but departs from him where his view is least convincing.
{"title":"What is Kuhn’s Problem?","authors":"K. Davey","doi":"10.5840/eps202259461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259461","url":null,"abstract":"Inspired by the work of Kuhn, we might want to develop an account of science that explains how it is that while much of science involves the investigation of a world as articulated by a paradigm, the scientist is nevertheless an observer and rational interpreter of a mind-independent world that does not change its character over time. Kuhn himself recognizes that there is a challenge here that he does not know how to meet. I argue that progress can be made on this challenge by carefully examining and criticizing Kuhn’s account of deliberation in science. Inspired by certain views about Gestalt psychology and examples such as the duck/rabbit picture, Kuhn takes deliberation in science to be a consequence of seeing things a certain way, rather than rational deliberation in science making new ways of seeing things possible. I argue that the most serious problems of Kuhn’s view of science stem from this fact, and that we can free ourselves from these problems by not following Kuhn here. In particular, I argue using material from Hanson and Peirce that we should think of the revolutionary scientist as being revolutionary not merely in virtue of seeing things in a new way, but rather for showing – typically through painstaking deliberation – that certain conjectures connected with new ways of seeing the world are reasonable (even prior to anything like inductive confirmation.) This makes coming to see the world differently a deliberative process that is importantly unlike seeing a rabbit/duck picture differently. Such a way of thinking allows us to view the articulation of a new paradigm as a deliberative process that does not take some paradigm or other for granted, but rather as a deliberative process that interrogates existing orthodoxy for its suitability to survive into the next paradigm. The result is a (sketch of a) view of science that maintains much of what is important to Kuhn, but departs from him where his view is least convincing.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128399827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
В статье обсуждаются предложения Ладова [Ладов, 2023] по единообразному решению классических теоретико-множественных и семантических парадоксов. Показывается, что подход Ладова сталкивается с двумя трудностями. Во-первых, метод устранения отрицания из формулировок парадоксов приводит к новым парадоксам, что демонстрируется на примере теоремы Лёба. Во-вторых, апелляция в аргументации Ладова к «схеме» Рассела», принятой Г. Пристом, не является значимой, ввиду диалетеизма Приста, согласно которому допускаются противоречия. Последнее обстоятельство препятствует единообразному решению парадоксов, предлагаемому Ладовым.
{"title":"Поиски единообразного решения парадоксов: иллюзия простоты","authors":"Виталий Валентинович Целищев","doi":"10.5840/eps202360337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360337","url":null,"abstract":"В статье обсуждаются предложения Ладова [Ладов, 2023] по единообразному решению классических теоретико-множественных и семантических парадоксов. Показывается, что подход Ладова сталкивается с двумя трудностями. Во-первых, метод устранения отрицания из формулировок парадоксов приводит к новым парадоксам, что демонстрируется на примере теоремы Лёба. Во-вторых, апелляция в аргументации Ладова к «схеме» Рассела», принятой Г. Пристом, не является значимой, ввиду диалетеизма Приста, согласно которому допускаются противоречия. Последнее обстоятельство препятствует единообразному решению парадоксов, предлагаемому Ладовым.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"379 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121004178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
В статье обсуждаются аспекты программы философии математики неологицизма, связанные с существованием парадоксов. Отмечается недостаточная тематизированность проблематики парадоксов в программе неологицизма. Несмотря на это, использование в неологицизме методологии введения понятий с помощью принципов абстракции ограничено существованием принципов абстракции, приводящих к противоречию. Основная проблема неологицизма, «проблема плохой компании», связана с обсуждением таких принципов. Автор статьи показывает, что поиск единого критерия для демаркации приемлемых и неприемлимых принципов абстракции не приводит к необходимому результату.
{"title":"О роли существования парадоксов в программе философии математики неологицизма","authors":"Полина Ивановна Олейник","doi":"10.5840/eps202360340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360340","url":null,"abstract":"В статье обсуждаются аспекты программы философии математики неологицизма, связанные с существованием парадоксов. Отмечается недостаточная тематизированность проблематики парадоксов в программе неологицизма. Несмотря на это, использование в неологицизме методологии введения понятий с помощью принципов абстракции ограничено существованием принципов абстракции, приводящих к противоречию. Основная проблема неологицизма, «проблема плохой компании», связана с обсуждением таких принципов. Автор статьи показывает, что поиск единого критерия для демаркации приемлемых и неприемлимых принципов абстракции не приводит к необходимому результату.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116495387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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