The article provides a reply to critical remarks made during the discussion about creativity and scientific knowledge. The authors propose to consider their concept of creativity not as antagonistic or incommensurable with the alternative, but rather co-existing through the complementarity principle. Responding to a comment about the socio-cultural conditionality of a particular cognitive situation, the authors question whether globalization seriously influence this matter in science. They support the statement about the importance of the interaction between science and art, science and philosophy as an opportunity to consider scientific problems from the outside, in an unusual way. Regarding the comment about serendipity, the authors note that in certain cases we need exactly epistemological randomization, since we cannot consciously induce serendipity. In conclusion, thanks are expressed to all participants in the discussion.
{"title":"Complementarity or Incommensurability? Reply to Critics","authors":"A. M. Dorozhkin, S. Shibarshina","doi":"10.5840/eps20236018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20236018","url":null,"abstract":"The article provides a reply to critical remarks made during the discussion about creativity and scientific knowledge. The authors propose to consider their concept of creativity not as antagonistic or incommensurable with the alternative, but rather co-existing through the complementarity principle. Responding to a comment about the socio-cultural conditionality of a particular cognitive situation, the authors question whether globalization seriously influence this matter in science. They support the statement about the importance of the interaction between science and art, science and philosophy as an opportunity to consider scientific problems from the outside, in an unusual way. Regarding the comment about serendipity, the authors note that in certain cases we need exactly epistemological randomization, since we cannot consciously induce serendipity. In conclusion, thanks are expressed to all participants in the discussion.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131909492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Novels like Fight Club or American Psycho are said to be instances of unreliable narration: the first person narrator presents an evidently distorted picture of the fictional world. The film adaptations of these novels are likewise said to involve unreliable narration. I resist this extension of the term ‘unreliable narration’ to film. My argument for this rests on the observation that unreliable narration requires a personal narrator while film typically involves an impersonal narrator (corresponding to the camera viewpoint). The kind of ambiguous story-telling that we find in literary fiction with unreliable narrators, where for certain descriptions it is unclear whether what we’re told is an accurate account of what’s happening in the story world or not, can instead be achieved by conventionalized filmmaking techniques for reporting the contents of mental states, like the point of view shot, but especially the more ambiguous blended perspective shot.
{"title":"Unreliability and Point of View in Filmic Narration","authors":"E. Maier","doi":"10.5840/eps202259217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259217","url":null,"abstract":"Novels like Fight Club or American Psycho are said to be instances of unreliable narration: the first person narrator presents an evidently distorted picture of the fictional world. The film adaptations of these novels are likewise said to involve unreliable narration. I resist this extension of the term ‘unreliable narration’ to film. My argument for this rests on the observation that unreliable narration requires a personal narrator while film typically involves an impersonal narrator (corresponding to the camera viewpoint). The kind of ambiguous story-telling that we find in literary fiction with unreliable narrators, where for certain descriptions it is unclear whether what we’re told is an accurate account of what’s happening in the story world or not, can instead be achieved by conventionalized filmmaking techniques for reporting the contents of mental states, like the point of view shot, but especially the more ambiguous blended perspective shot.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133708270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Within the framework of a new interdisciplinary scientific scientific field – epistemological urbanism – the authors develop the idea of the human right to their city and show the epistemological nature of this right, which is explained by the fact that it is conditioned by the processes of cognition and scientific communication. Three main provisions are substantiated. Firstly, the city is an intelligent system. “The right to your city” is a specific right to scientific and intellectual production and consumption. Such a right is not realized in every locality designated as a city, but only where there are conditions for intellectual dynamics – where art, education and science are developing. Secondly, the intellectual system of the city has autonomy. Each city has its own intellectual resource. Realizing the right to their city, citizens are involved in the activity of the city's scientific and intellectual autonomy. In other words, a city where there are opportunities to realize the “right to the city” generates an autonomous scientific school or a set of scientific schools. Thirdly, cities (we are talking only about those cities where the right to their own city is realizable) how research centers form a scientific network. Not a scientific consortium with common ideas and goals, but a network based on the principles of proliferation. The authors insist on the decentralization of science not for the purpose of its enclavization, but for the purpose of developing the potential, multi-vector and intellectual self-realization of urban communities themselves. It is shown that the development of science as a whole (at the global or state levels) can be ensured by the heterogeneity of science itself (in this case, due to the development of urban universities): integration and differentiation give rise to an integration scientific and communicative process.
{"title":"“The Right to Your City”: A Project of the Epistemological Urban Studies","authors":"I. Savchenko, Y. Kozlova","doi":"10.5840/eps202259349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259349","url":null,"abstract":"Within the framework of a new interdisciplinary scientific scientific field – epistemological urbanism – the authors develop the idea of the human right to their city and show the epistemological nature of this right, which is explained by the fact that it is conditioned by the processes of cognition and scientific communication. Three main provisions are substantiated. Firstly, the city is an intelligent system. “The right to your city” is a specific right to scientific and intellectual production and consumption. Such a right is not realized in every locality designated as a city, but only where there are conditions for intellectual dynamics – where art, education and science are developing. Secondly, the intellectual system of the city has autonomy. Each city has its own intellectual resource. Realizing the right to their city, citizens are involved in the activity of the city's scientific and intellectual autonomy. In other words, a city where there are opportunities to realize the “right to the city” generates an autonomous scientific school or a set of scientific schools. Thirdly, cities (we are talking only about those cities where the right to their own city is realizable) how research centers form a scientific network. Not a scientific consortium with common ideas and goals, but a network based on the principles of proliferation. The authors insist on the decentralization of science not for the purpose of its enclavization, but for the purpose of developing the potential, multi-vector and intellectual self-realization of urban communities themselves. It is shown that the development of science as a whole (at the global or state levels) can be ensured by the heterogeneity of science itself (in this case, due to the development of urban universities): integration and differentiation give rise to an integration scientific and communicative process.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132754208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This reply draws attention to the importance of taking into account the results of the study of the phenomenon of reflexivity in scientific knowledge, which have been obtained in the domestic philosophical and methodological tradition. We believe that taking this kind of results into account could enrich the analysis of the strong programme in the STS. We touch the origins of reflexive tendencies, the reflexive and non-reflexive in scientific knowledge, personal and transpersonal forms, the types and levels of reflexion in science, as well as denote the mechanisms that allows taking an external position in relation to the subject about which reflexive procedures are carried out (if we mean the interval approach implementation).
{"title":"On the Analysis of the Reflexion in Science, in the Russian Philosophy, and the STS Strong Program","authors":"V. Bazhanov","doi":"10.5840/eps202259454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259454","url":null,"abstract":"This reply draws attention to the importance of taking into account the results of the study of the phenomenon of reflexivity in scientific knowledge, which have been obtained in the domestic philosophical and methodological tradition. We believe that taking this kind of results into account could enrich the analysis of the strong programme in the STS. We touch the origins of reflexive tendencies, the reflexive and non-reflexive in scientific knowledge, personal and transpersonal forms, the types and levels of reflexion in science, as well as denote the mechanisms that allows taking an external position in relation to the subject about which reflexive procedures are carried out (if we mean the interval approach implementation).","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133143552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article is devoted to the analysis of arguments from empirical science against free will. Its main purpose is to reveal their deep anti-naturalism. This anti-naturalism lies in the use of a concept of free will that cannot be the subject of naturalistic consideration, as well as in the various explanatory and ontological paradoxes that arguments from empirical science lead in case when someone is trying to generalize the explanatory principles underlying them. At the beginning of the article, the author gives a general notion of the free will problem, a working definition of naturalism and the place of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will. To achieve the main goal of the article, the author suggests a classification of arguments from empirical science, which includes five types: from prediction, from manipulation, from the brain, from illusion, from the substitution of concepts. In accordance with this classification, the structure of the article is defined, where each of the presented types is sequentially considered. The logic of considering each type of argument is approximately the same: explication of the essence of the argument of a particular type, its analysis, identification of basic principles and their generalization, demonstration of the negative consequences that it leads to, and answers to possible objections. In the course of the consideration, the author formulates an ontologically neutral concept of free will as a set of abilities associated with the agent’s control over his actions. At the end of the article, the main points is summed up, the idea of naturalistic compatibilism is proposed, the role of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will is clarified, as is the problem of free will itself, the question of the sources of “chimerization” of naturalism is briefly highlighted, and the problem of completeness of the proposed reasoning is touched upon.
{"title":"Chimera of Naturalism and Free Will","authors":"Anton Kuznetsov","doi":"10.5840/eps202360117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360117","url":null,"abstract":"This article is devoted to the analysis of arguments from empirical science against free will. Its main purpose is to reveal their deep anti-naturalism. This anti-naturalism lies in the use of a concept of free will that cannot be the subject of naturalistic consideration, as well as in the various explanatory and ontological paradoxes that arguments from empirical science lead in case when someone is trying to generalize the explanatory principles underlying them. At the beginning of the article, the author gives a general notion of the free will problem, a working definition of naturalism and the place of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will. To achieve the main goal of the article, the author suggests a classification of arguments from empirical science, which includes five types: from prediction, from manipulation, from the brain, from illusion, from the substitution of concepts. In accordance with this classification, the structure of the article is defined, where each of the presented types is sequentially considered. The logic of considering each type of argument is approximately the same: explication of the essence of the argument of a particular type, its analysis, identification of basic principles and their generalization, demonstration of the negative consequences that it leads to, and answers to possible objections. In the course of the consideration, the author formulates an ontologically neutral concept of free will as a set of abilities associated with the agent’s control over his actions. At the end of the article, the main points is summed up, the idea of naturalistic compatibilism is proposed, the role of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will is clarified, as is the problem of free will itself, the question of the sources of “chimerization” of naturalism is briefly highlighted, and the problem of completeness of the proposed reasoning is touched upon.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"185 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124701763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
В своей статье Всеволод Ладов ставит важный вопрос – могут ли парадоксы иметь единое решение? В качестве ответа я предлагаю обратить внимание на подход, в котором утверждается, что мы должны рассматривать предикат истины как простой аналог нечеткого предиката. Защитники данного подхода (В. МакГи, Дж. Таппенден, Х. Филд, Г. Прист и Д. Хайд) открыто настаивают на том, что между соритами и парадоксами самореференции существует структурная связь и они должны иметь единое решение.
{"title":"Что значит быть лысым и лжецом? Новая опция унифицированного подхода к парадоксам","authors":"А. В. Нехаев","doi":"10.5840/eps202360339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360339","url":null,"abstract":"В своей статье Всеволод Ладов ставит важный вопрос – могут ли парадоксы иметь единое решение? В качестве ответа я предлагаю обратить внимание на подход, в котором утверждается, что мы должны рассматривать предикат истины как простой аналог нечеткого предиката. Защитники данного подхода (В. МакГи, Дж. Таппенден, Х. Филд, Г. Прист и Д. Хайд) открыто настаивают на том, что между соритами и парадоксами самореференции существует структурная связь и они должны иметь единое решение.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124825067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Space is a cross-cutting philosophical theme: an unattainable dream coming from the depths of centuries, and at the same time a source of religious faith and high science. Therefore, space is not limited to specific space projects and the conquest of celestial space. In contrast to this, space is a starting point for a global problematization of politics, economics and culture. It demonstrates its archetypal significance for the history of all human culture. At the same time, space as a project and a subject matter of imagination needs today a new humanistic definition, in which the role of philosophy cannot be underestimated. It is necessary to find and theoretically justify a balance between the task of economic efficiency of space research and the results of space exploration, on the one hand, and their use for creative human development, designing a safe and fair society and forming a scientific picture of the world.
{"title":"Cosmos: A Big Challenge and a Global Project","authors":"I. Kasavin","doi":"10.5840/eps20225911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20225911","url":null,"abstract":"Space is a cross-cutting philosophical theme: an unattainable dream coming from the depths of centuries, and at the same time a source of religious faith and high science. Therefore, space is not limited to specific space projects and the conquest of celestial space. In contrast to this, space is a starting point for a global problematization of politics, economics and culture. It demonstrates its archetypal significance for the history of all human culture. At the same time, space as a project and a subject matter of imagination needs today a new humanistic definition, in which the role of philosophy cannot be underestimated. It is necessary to find and theoretically justify a balance between the task of economic efficiency of space research and the results of space exploration, on the one hand, and their use for creative human development, designing a safe and fair society and forming a scientific picture of the world.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125921784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Modern analytical metaphysics contains many theories and approaches regarding the problem of personal identity. This diversity inevitably leads to the emergence of various classifications, the authors of which are trying to develop a compact way of typologizing existing views. Most of the classifications involve a significant simplification of the theories and approaches under consideration, and some of them are not taken into account at all. As such global classifications, one can single out an approach based on the identity criterion used in the theory (psychological, biological, narrative views). However, numerous local classifications allow one to point out potential differences in theories, even if formally they use a common criterion of identity. Other possible classifications are the division into endurantism and perdurantism, as well as simple (non-reductionist) and complex (reductionist) theories of identity. Special attention is paid to M. Shechtman‘s approach, which offers a local classification of narrative theories. Its main classification is the presentation of the views of researchers in the form of a possible spectrum. The place of a particular philosopher on this spectrum characterizes his views in relation to other supporters of the narrative approach. The purpose of this article is, based on the classification of narrative theories proposed by Shechtman, to propose a classification option for all theories and approaches to the problem of personal identity, which would be sensitive to conceptual details and differences that are important to them.
{"title":"Types of Identity and Coordinates of Person","authors":"R. L. Kochnev","doi":"10.5840/eps202360228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360228","url":null,"abstract":"Modern analytical metaphysics contains many theories and approaches regarding the problem of personal identity. This diversity inevitably leads to the emergence of various classifications, the authors of which are trying to develop a compact way of typologizing existing views. Most of the classifications involve a significant simplification of the theories and approaches under consideration, and some of them are not taken into account at all. As such global classifications, one can single out an approach based on the identity criterion used in the theory (psychological, biological, narrative views). However, numerous local classifications allow one to point out potential differences in theories, even if formally they use a common criterion of identity. Other possible classifications are the division into endurantism and perdurantism, as well as simple (non-reductionist) and complex (reductionist) theories of identity. Special attention is paid to M. Shechtman‘s approach, which offers a local classification of narrative theories. Its main classification is the presentation of the views of researchers in the form of a possible spectrum. The place of a particular philosopher on this spectrum characterizes his views in relation to other supporters of the narrative approach. The purpose of this article is, based on the classification of narrative theories proposed by Shechtman, to propose a classification option for all theories and approaches to the problem of personal identity, which would be sensitive to conceptual details and differences that are important to them.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127147097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The central problem of the article is the paradox in the history of Newton’s mechanics: prominent researchers of the genesis of the Principia did not believe Newton’s words about the origin of the idea of universal gravity. They did not believe that he could have come up with this idea as early as 1666, considering circular orbits, and believed that Newton invented the story of the falling apple. The article proposes a “subjunctive” scenario leading to the law of universal gravity and feasible at the level of Galileo’s knowledge and skills in 1611. The basis for such a scenario is the description of a thought experiment in Newton’s manuscript “The System of the World”, preceding the creation of Principia. The proposed reconstruction helps to consider and clarify the concept of “modern physics”, the birth of which was the main event of the Scientific Revolution of the XVI–XVII centuries. The traditional understanding reduces the essence of modern physics to a reliance on experience and on the language of mathematics. Such a definition, however, is not sufficient. The geometry of Euclid and the physics of Archimedes were mathematically perfect, and their axioms were based on objective experience. Despite the importance of the tools of mathematics and experiment, the key innovation of modern physics has become the belief in the hidden fundamental laws of the Universe and in the right of the researcher to invent invisible, “illogical”, “absurd” concepts and postulates, experimentally verifiable only together with the theory based on them. This postulate of fundamental cognitive optimism combines bold ingenuity with a humble need for empirical verification.
{"title":"Could Galileo Discover the Law of Universal Gravitation in 1611, Was There Newton’s Apple and What Is “Modern Physics”?.","authors":"Gennady E. Gorelik","doi":"10.5840/eps202360115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360115","url":null,"abstract":"The central problem of the article is the paradox in the history of Newton’s mechanics: prominent researchers of the genesis of the Principia did not believe Newton’s words about the origin of the idea of universal gravity. They did not believe that he could have come up with this idea as early as 1666, considering circular orbits, and believed that Newton invented the story of the falling apple. The article proposes a “subjunctive” scenario leading to the law of universal gravity and feasible at the level of Galileo’s knowledge and skills in 1611. The basis for such a scenario is the description of a thought experiment in Newton’s manuscript “The System of the World”, preceding the creation of Principia. The proposed reconstruction helps to consider and clarify the concept of “modern physics”, the birth of which was the main event of the Scientific Revolution of the XVI–XVII centuries. The traditional understanding reduces the essence of modern physics to a reliance on experience and on the language of mathematics. Such a definition, however, is not sufficient. The geometry of Euclid and the physics of Archimedes were mathematically perfect, and their axioms were based on objective experience. Despite the importance of the tools of mathematics and experiment, the key innovation of modern physics has become the belief in the hidden fundamental laws of the Universe and in the right of the researcher to invent invisible, “illogical”, “absurd” concepts and postulates, experimentally verifiable only together with the theory based on them. This postulate of fundamental cognitive optimism combines bold ingenuity with a humble need for empirical verification.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129251075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The response to the article by O.E. Stolyarova the author shows why the proposed justification for the place of philosophy in the structure of science and technology studies does not work well in relation to the tasks of interdisciplinary communication. It is argued that it is more effective to refer to historical examples and analyze them than to use a purely theoretical explanation of why these examples arise. It is pointed out that, despite the results of postpositivist research of science, the scientific community continues to rely on corporate “common sense”, in which science is seen as positive knowledge and on this basis is opposed to philosophy as a speculative discipline. The necessity of avoiding these ideas in the context of science policy tasks, primarily among scientific managers from among the scientists themselves, is substantiated.
{"title":"Philosophy and Science and Technology Studies: The Problem of Relationships","authors":"S. Pirozhkova","doi":"10.5840/eps202259455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259455","url":null,"abstract":"The response to the article by O.E. Stolyarova the author shows why the proposed justification for the place of philosophy in the structure of science and technology studies does not work well in relation to the tasks of interdisciplinary communication. It is argued that it is more effective to refer to historical examples and analyze them than to use a purely theoretical explanation of why these examples arise. It is pointed out that, despite the results of postpositivist research of science, the scientific community continues to rely on corporate “common sense”, in which science is seen as positive knowledge and on this basis is opposed to philosophy as a speculative discipline. The necessity of avoiding these ideas in the context of science policy tasks, primarily among scientific managers from among the scientists themselves, is substantiated.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127688917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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