Can Crowds serve as useful allies in policy design? How do non-expert Crowds perform relative to experts in the assessment of policy measures? Does the geographic location of non-expert Crowds, wit ...
{"title":"A Computational Model of Crowds for Collective Intelligence","authors":"John Prpic, Piper J. Jackson, Thai-Phu Nguyen","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/y33dm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/y33dm","url":null,"abstract":"Can Crowds serve as useful allies in policy design? How do non-expert Crowds perform relative to experts in the assessment of policy measures? Does the geographic location of non-expert Crowds, wit ...","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129355671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The research tries to understand the ongoing process in products offered by online streaming company Netflix. Using extensive secondary research and text mining as a primary approach to collect information to the current portfolio of Netflix, multiple corporate strategies are designed. SWOT analysis is used as an extensive tool to take step by step approach in understanding the opportunities that exists in the general environment. At the same time SWOT also helps to understand the strengths that Netflix can exploit through value chain analysis and how the internal core competencies produce a fit in Netflix’s operational activities. Overall the study is strongly qualitative in nature and explores multiple avenues that an entertainment vendor company can implement to penetrate and gain greater market share.
{"title":"From Streaming Vendor to Production House: Netflix SWOT Analysis","authors":"Prathamesh Muzumdar, Prathamesh Muzumdar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2377151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2377151","url":null,"abstract":"The research tries to understand the ongoing process in products offered by online streaming company Netflix. Using extensive secondary research and text mining as a primary approach to collect information to the current portfolio of Netflix, multiple corporate strategies are designed. SWOT analysis is used as an extensive tool to take step by step approach in understanding the opportunities that exists in the general environment. At the same time SWOT also helps to understand the strengths that Netflix can exploit through value chain analysis and how the internal core competencies produce a fit in Netflix’s operational activities. Overall the study is strongly qualitative in nature and explores multiple avenues that an entertainment vendor company can implement to penetrate and gain greater market share.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115268688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper situates lean startup within the debate on whether opportunities are discovered or created. Drawing on complexity theory, lean startup is described as a technique that enables an entrepreneur to search for peaks on a fitness landscape. While much of the lean startup literature characterizes this as a discovery process, we demonstrate that a dancing fitness landscape also resembles opportunity creation. We then explore the implications of this finding for theory and practice.
{"title":"Lean Startup: Opportunity Discovery or Opportunity Creation?","authors":"Paul W. Boland, Brett Riggio, Steven E. Phelan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2534139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2534139","url":null,"abstract":"This paper situates lean startup within the debate on whether opportunities are discovered or created. Drawing on complexity theory, lean startup is described as a technique that enables an entrepreneur to search for peaks on a fitness landscape. While much of the lean startup literature characterizes this as a discovery process, we demonstrate that a dancing fitness landscape also resembles opportunity creation. We then explore the implications of this finding for theory and practice.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"179 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132590697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The agency model used by Apple and other platform providers such as Google allows upstream firms (content providers like book publishers and developers of apps) to choose the retail prices of their products (RPM) subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. We show that (i) this leads to higher prices if the competitive pressure is higher downstream than upstream; (ii) upstream firms earn positive surplus even when platform providers have all the bargaining power; and (iii) with asymmetric business formats (where only some platform providers use the agency model), a retail most-favored-nation clause leads to retail prices that resemble the outcome under industry-wide RPM.
{"title":"Turning the Page on Business Formats for Digital Platforms: Does Apple's Agency Model Soften Competition?","authors":"Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind, G. Shaffer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2317715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317715","url":null,"abstract":"The agency model used by Apple and other platform providers such as Google allows upstream firms (content providers like book publishers and developers of apps) to choose the retail prices of their products (RPM) subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. We show that (i) this leads to higher prices if the competitive pressure is higher downstream than upstream; (ii) upstream firms earn positive surplus even when platform providers have all the bargaining power; and (iii) with asymmetric business formats (where only some platform providers use the agency model), a retail most-favored-nation clause leads to retail prices that resemble the outcome under industry-wide RPM.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126071532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The advantage of multiple sourcing to protect against supplier failures arising from undependable products due to latent defects is examined using a model with non-linear external failure costs. Prior research has focused only on supplier failures arising from unreliable supply, such as late/insufficient/no delivery. I derive a closed-form characterization of the optimal production quota allocation for the LUX (Latent defect-Undependable product-eXternal failure) setting. The allocation determines the optimal supply base, with intuitive properties that hold under a mild requirement. The requirement includes the special case of equal procurement costs charged by suppliers but also allows unequal costs without any particular order. The key result of the paper is a necessary and sufficient condition determining whether single or multiple sourcing is optimal. Another condition is obtained to determine the exact size of the optimal supply base, provided the mild requirement holds. With minor modifications, the results also hold when a buyer-initiated procurement contract can be used to elicit private information on the suppliers’ unit variable production costs.
{"title":"Failure Risk and Quality Cost Management in Single versus Multiple Sourcing Decision","authors":"Andrew Yim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1630570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1630570","url":null,"abstract":"The advantage of multiple sourcing to protect against supplier failures arising from undependable products due to latent defects is examined using a model with non-linear external failure costs. Prior research has focused only on supplier failures arising from unreliable supply, such as late/insufficient/no delivery. I derive a closed-form characterization of the optimal production quota allocation for the LUX (Latent defect-Undependable product-eXternal failure) setting. The allocation determines the optimal supply base, with intuitive properties that hold under a mild requirement. The requirement includes the special case of equal procurement costs charged by suppliers but also allows unequal costs without any particular order. The key result of the paper is a necessary and sufficient condition determining whether single or multiple sourcing is optimal. Another condition is obtained to determine the exact size of the optimal supply base, provided the mild requirement holds. With minor modifications, the results also hold when a buyer-initiated procurement contract can be used to elicit private information on the suppliers’ unit variable production costs.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126282758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Starting a race in first place, pole position, is the goal of every race driver. This is even more pronounced in Formula One (F1) racing as the road courses they race are more difficult to pass on, providing an additional advantage to starting on the pole. However, their unique standing starts also create a bottleneck at the first turn, which often leads to contact between cars. Because F1 cars are not designed to make contact, this contact can greatly impact a driver’s position on the track. We find that there are certain positions on the starting grid that are more likely to make contact with other drivers than other positions. Specifically the starting position with the highest odds to make contact at the first turn is position 10. This creates the incentive for drivers to avoid this position, which means if they are unable to qualify higher than this position, the incentive exists for drivers to intentionally adjust their behavior to avoid these high-risk (of making contact) positions.
{"title":"Incentives on the Starting Grid in Formula One Racing","authors":"Larry McCarthy, K. Rotthoff","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2232260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2232260","url":null,"abstract":"Starting a race in first place, pole position, is the goal of every race driver. This is even more pronounced in Formula One (F1) racing as the road courses they race are more difficult to pass on, providing an additional advantage to starting on the pole. However, their unique standing starts also create a bottleneck at the first turn, which often leads to contact between cars. Because F1 cars are not designed to make contact, this contact can greatly impact a driver’s position on the track. We find that there are certain positions on the starting grid that are more likely to make contact with other drivers than other positions. Specifically the starting position with the highest odds to make contact at the first turn is position 10. This creates the incentive for drivers to avoid this position, which means if they are unable to qualify higher than this position, the incentive exists for drivers to intentionally adjust their behavior to avoid these high-risk (of making contact) positions.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125519576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The literature on supply chain management (SCM) has consistently promoted the “bright side” of collaborative buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs). Based on the social capital argument, SCM scholars have investigated how a buyer can gain access to and leverage resources through its collaborative BSRs. Our study extends this research stream by considering the “dark side” of social capital in BSRs. It evaluates how social capital in its cognitive, relational, and structural forms contributes to or impedes value creation within BSRs. Both primary survey measures and secondary objective measures have been used in data analysis. The results show the presence of both the bright side, confirming the existing literature, and the dark side, extending the literature. There is an inverted curvilinear relationship between social capital and performance: Either too little or too much social capital can hurt performance. This study confirms that building social capital in a collaborative BSR positively affects buyer performance, but that if taken to an extreme it can reduce the buyer’s ability to be objective and make effective decisions as well as increase the supplier’s opportunistic behavior. Our study also examines how a buyer can delay the emergence of the dark side. It opens up new research avenues in the collaborative BSR context and suggests directions for future research and practice.
{"title":"The Dark Side of Collaborative Buyer-Supplier Relationships: A Social Capital Perspective","authors":"Verónica H. Villena, E. Revilla, Thomas Y. Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2220486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2220486","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on supply chain management (SCM) has consistently promoted the “bright side” of collaborative buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs). Based on the social capital argument, SCM scholars have investigated how a buyer can gain access to and leverage resources through its collaborative BSRs. Our study extends this research stream by considering the “dark side” of social capital in BSRs. It evaluates how social capital in its cognitive, relational, and structural forms contributes to or impedes value creation within BSRs. Both primary survey measures and secondary objective measures have been used in data analysis. The results show the presence of both the bright side, confirming the existing literature, and the dark side, extending the literature. There is an inverted curvilinear relationship between social capital and performance: Either too little or too much social capital can hurt performance. This study confirms that building social capital in a collaborative BSR positively affects buyer performance, but that if taken to an extreme it can reduce the buyer’s ability to be objective and make effective decisions as well as increase the supplier’s opportunistic behavior. Our study also examines how a buyer can delay the emergence of the dark side. It opens up new research avenues in the collaborative BSR context and suggests directions for future research and practice.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124354070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider a two-stage principal-agent screening environment in a decentralized supply chain with retailers, distributors, and a supplier. The retailers possess private information regarding their local market profitabilities. The distributors can partially observe the retailers' profitabilities and are heterogeneous with regard to the precision of that information. The supplier determines the level of production, but knows neither the local market profitabilities nor the precision of the distributors' information. In the first stage, the supplier allocates finished products to distributors. In the second stage, given the allocated quantity by the supplier, the distributors contract with local retailers with a capacity constraint.We find that due to the distributors' superior information, the quantity distortion on the retailers' side is mitigated, and the upstream information asymmetry (between the supplier and the distributors) subsequently affects the quantity allocation among the downstream retailers. The supplier may not benefit from contracting with the distributors. In addition, no distributor is excluded based on the heterogeneity of the information precision, even though some distributors do not have better information than the supplier. In the numerical examples, we further analyze how the local market heterogeneity and inventory costs affect the capacity allocation, the retailers' payoffs, and the supply chain profits. We document some counter-intuitive quantity allocation rules that arise from the distributors' information advantage.
{"title":"Hierarchical Screening for Capacity Allocation in Supply Chains: The Role of Distributors","authors":"Ying‐ju Chen, Mingcherng Deng, Ke-Wei Huang","doi":"10.1111/POMS.12063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/POMS.12063","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a two-stage principal-agent screening environment in a decentralized supply chain with retailers, distributors, and a supplier. The retailers possess private information regarding their local market profitabilities. The distributors can partially observe the retailers' profitabilities and are heterogeneous with regard to the precision of that information. The supplier determines the level of production, but knows neither the local market profitabilities nor the precision of the distributors' information. In the first stage, the supplier allocates finished products to distributors. In the second stage, given the allocated quantity by the supplier, the distributors contract with local retailers with a capacity constraint.We find that due to the distributors' superior information, the quantity distortion on the retailers' side is mitigated, and the upstream information asymmetry (between the supplier and the distributors) subsequently affects the quantity allocation among the downstream retailers. The supplier may not benefit from contracting with the distributors. In addition, no distributor is excluded based on the heterogeneity of the information precision, even though some distributors do not have better information than the supplier. In the numerical examples, we further analyze how the local market heterogeneity and inventory costs affect the capacity allocation, the retailers' payoffs, and the supply chain profits. We document some counter-intuitive quantity allocation rules that arise from the distributors' information advantage.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114502453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Data suggest a change in banks’ performance attributable to a greater involvement in non-traditional activities. Indeed, market-oriented banking increases banks’ accounting returns at the cost of a higher volatility in financial results. The motivation of this paper is to study how bank product mix impacts diversification and performance. Thanks to our data and methodology we are able to shed new light on the apparently contradictory results found in the literature regarding the benefits to diversify in market-based banking. Some keys conditional volatilities reveal these benefits may in fact vary both over the business cycles and through time. Using a new framework based on a multivariate GARCH procedure and a modified Hausman test, our main findings suggest that most components of non-interest income actually provide non-negligible diversification benefits with respect to traditional banks’ business lines. In normal times, diversification even works for the components most related to market-oriented banking, i.e., trading income and capital markets fees. Not so surprisingly however, during crisis episodes these diversification benefits seem to vanish for most of the components, except for insurance and securitization, which act as buffers. Consistent with the literature, we also find that, despite the evolution of the banking business model, fees related to banks’ traditional activities – deposit, credit card and loan fees – remain the most stable and profitable sources of income.
{"title":"The Change in Banks' Product Mix, Diversification and Performance: An Application of Multivariate GARCH to Canadian Data","authors":"Christian Calmès, Raymond Théoret","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2380711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2380711","url":null,"abstract":"Data suggest a change in banks’ performance attributable to a greater involvement in non-traditional activities. Indeed, market-oriented banking increases banks’ accounting returns at the cost of a higher volatility in financial results. The motivation of this paper is to study how bank product mix impacts diversification and performance. Thanks to our data and methodology we are able to shed new light on the apparently contradictory results found in the literature regarding the benefits to diversify in market-based banking. Some keys conditional volatilities reveal these benefits may in fact vary both over the business cycles and through time. Using a new framework based on a multivariate GARCH procedure and a modified Hausman test, our main findings suggest that most components of non-interest income actually provide non-negligible diversification benefits with respect to traditional banks’ business lines. In normal times, diversification even works for the components most related to market-oriented banking, i.e., trading income and capital markets fees. Not so surprisingly however, during crisis episodes these diversification benefits seem to vanish for most of the components, except for insurance and securitization, which act as buffers. Consistent with the literature, we also find that, despite the evolution of the banking business model, fees related to banks’ traditional activities – deposit, credit card and loan fees – remain the most stable and profitable sources of income.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"155 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124337293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The linkage existing between commerce and agricultural management is a worthy relationship which is perceived by the researcher as mutually bound. Management activities in agricultural entities have expanded in the present day world of enhanced commerce with e-commerce leading the trend. This paper examines the undoubted close relationship between agricultural management at one end and commerce at another end – believing that agriculture could not have developed to the present extent without commercial opportunities beyond country borders. It reviews the arguments about the origin of agricultural management as both a subject from business management and applied economics. Review of past works led to the conclusion that there are basically four major challenges threatening the success of agricultural entities especially in Africa; which appear in the area of marketing, information technology, financing and risk management, and farm practices. To remedy the underlying challenges, the paper sees the organization of farmers into active unions and units as the best practice.
{"title":"Commerce and Modern Challenges in Agricultural Management","authors":"A. Usman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2184639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184639","url":null,"abstract":"The linkage existing between commerce and agricultural management is a worthy relationship which is perceived by the researcher as mutually bound. Management activities in agricultural entities have expanded in the present day world of enhanced commerce with e-commerce leading the trend. This paper examines the undoubted close relationship between agricultural management at one end and commerce at another end – believing that agriculture could not have developed to the present extent without commercial opportunities beyond country borders. It reviews the arguments about the origin of agricultural management as both a subject from business management and applied economics. Review of past works led to the conclusion that there are basically four major challenges threatening the success of agricultural entities especially in Africa; which appear in the area of marketing, information technology, financing and risk management, and farm practices. To remedy the underlying challenges, the paper sees the organization of farmers into active unions and units as the best practice.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121927517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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