In an effort to make its business model more transparent, Medco Health Solutions, the second largest independent pharmacy benefit manager, first disclosed in 3Q2004 that its rebate retention rate was 40.5%.In the nine months since disclosure, Medco has allowed its rebate retention rate to drop to 28.1% and it has seen its rebate share of gross profits decline from 71.7% to 48.0%. Yet, Medco has been able to maintain its overall gross profit margin by moving toward cost-based pricing for its captive mail order operations and claims processing.
为了使其商业模式更加透明，第二大独立药房福利管理公司Medco Health Solutions在2004年第三季度首次披露其回扣保留率为40.5%。自披露以来的9个月里，美可公司的返利留存率降至28.1%，返利占毛利润的比例从71.7%降至48.0%。然而，Medco通过将其固定的邮购业务和索赔处理转向基于成本的定价，一直能够维持其总体毛利率。
{"title":"Medco's Transition to a Transparent Business Model","authors":"L. Abrams","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2849276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2849276","url":null,"abstract":"In an effort to make its business model more transparent, Medco Health Solutions, the second largest independent pharmacy benefit manager, first disclosed in 3Q2004 that its rebate retention rate was 40.5%.In the nine months since disclosure, Medco has allowed its rebate retention rate to drop to 28.1% and it has seen its rebate share of gross profits decline from 71.7% to 48.0%. Yet, Medco has been able to maintain its overall gross profit margin by moving toward cost-based pricing for its captive mail order operations and claims processing.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128597735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-04-01DOI: 10.1108/01443570510585516
E. Bendoly, T. Schoenherr
Purpose – The purpose of this work is to empirically demonstrate the synergistic implications of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems and emerging intra‐organizational technologies.Design/methodology/approach – Using established operational theory as a foundation, the article analyzes the history of ERP use and its impact on gains from business‐to‐business (B2B) purchasing technologies.Findings – The findings reveal that the extent to which firms witness maintenance‐repair‐operating (MRO) savings through such procurement is dependent not only on the presence of an ERP system, but also on the length of time systems have been in use.Research limitations/implications – Although limited to the analysis of B2B “success” cases, the results provide strong implications for the importance of ERP as a key infrastructure for B2B activities.Practical implications – Managers seeking to benefit from B2B economies, should ensure that they possess an adequate IT infrastructure (e.g. ERP) to realize all such potenti...
{"title":"ERP System and Implementation-Process Benefits: Implications for B2B E-Procurement","authors":"E. Bendoly, T. Schoenherr","doi":"10.1108/01443570510585516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/01443570510585516","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose – The purpose of this work is to empirically demonstrate the synergistic implications of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems and emerging intra‐organizational technologies.Design/methodology/approach – Using established operational theory as a foundation, the article analyzes the history of ERP use and its impact on gains from business‐to‐business (B2B) purchasing technologies.Findings – The findings reveal that the extent to which firms witness maintenance‐repair‐operating (MRO) savings through such procurement is dependent not only on the presence of an ERP system, but also on the length of time systems have been in use.Research limitations/implications – Although limited to the analysis of B2B “success” cases, the results provide strong implications for the importance of ERP as a key infrastructure for B2B activities.Practical implications – Managers seeking to benefit from B2B economies, should ensure that they possess an adequate IT infrastructure (e.g. ERP) to realize all such potenti...","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130467418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents an asymptotic analysis of a hierarchical manufacturing system with machines subject to breakdown and repair. The rate of change in machine states is much larger than the rate of fluctuation in demand and the rate of discounting of costs, and this gives rise to a limiting problem in which the stochastic machine availability is replaced by the equilibrium mean availability. The value function for the original problem converges to the value function of the limiting problem. Moreover, the control for the original problem can be constructed from the optimal controls of the limiting problem in a way which guarantees asymptotic optimality of the value function. The limiting problem is computationally more tractable and sometimes has a closed form solution.
{"title":"An Asymptotic Analysis of Hierarchical Control of Manufacturing Systems Under Uncertainty","authors":"J. Lehoczky, S. Sethi, H. Soner, M. Taksar","doi":"10.1287/moor.16.3.596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.16.3.596","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an asymptotic analysis of a hierarchical manufacturing system with machines subject to breakdown and repair. The rate of change in machine states is much larger than the rate of fluctuation in demand and the rate of discounting of costs, and this gives rise to a limiting problem in which the stochastic machine availability is replaced by the equilibrium mean availability. The value function for the original problem converges to the value function of the limiting problem. Moreover, the control for the original problem can be constructed from the optimal controls of the limiting problem in a way which guarantees asymptotic optimality of the value function. The limiting problem is computationally more tractable and sometimes has a closed form solution.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1991-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116298419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine a decentralized supply chain supply chain in which a single assembler buys complementary components from n suppliers and assembles the final product in anticipation of demand. Players take actions in the following sequence. First, (Stage 1) the suppliers form coalitions between themselves. Second, (Stage 2) the coalitions compete for a position in the negotiation sequence. Finally, (Stage 3) the coalitions negotiate with the assembler on allocations of the supply chain's profit. We model the multilateral negotiations between the suppliers and the assembler sequentially, i.e., the assembler negotiates with one coalition at a time. Each of these negotiations is modeled using the Nash bargaining concept. Further, in forming coalitions, we assume that players are farsighted. We then predict, at equilibrium, the structure of the supply chain as a function of the players' relative negotiation powers. In particular, we show that the assembler always prefers the outcome where suppliers do not form coalitions. However, when the assembler is weak (low negotiation power) the suppliers join forces as a grand coalition. But when the assembler is powerful, the suppliers stay independent, which is the preferred outcome to the assembler.
{"title":"A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains (The Assembly Problem)","authors":"M. Nagarajan, Y. Bassok","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1021602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1021602","url":null,"abstract":"We examine a decentralized supply chain supply chain in which a single assembler buys complementary components from n suppliers and assembles the final product in anticipation of demand. Players take actions in the following sequence. First, (Stage 1) the suppliers form coalitions between themselves. Second, (Stage 2) the coalitions compete for a position in the negotiation sequence. Finally, (Stage 3) the coalitions negotiate with the assembler on allocations of the supply chain's profit. We model the multilateral negotiations between the suppliers and the assembler sequentially, i.e., the assembler negotiates with one coalition at a time. Each of these negotiations is modeled using the Nash bargaining concept. Further, in forming coalitions, we assume that players are farsighted. We then predict, at equilibrium, the structure of the supply chain as a function of the players' relative negotiation powers. In particular, we show that the assembler always prefers the outcome where suppliers do not form coalitions. However, when the assembler is weak (low negotiation power) the suppliers join forces as a grand coalition. But when the assembler is powerful, the suppliers stay independent, which is the preferred outcome to the assembler.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131426445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Supply chain management is a critical aspect of conducting any business. In this article, an overview of the advancements in supply chain management is presented. In the initial section, alternative definitions and key issues related to supply chain management are presented followed by a discussion of complexities associated with managing supply chains. Subsequently, major inefficiencies of poor supply chain management are discussed. Finally, a brief summary of research activity to date and a discussion of future challenges related to supply chain management are presented.
{"title":"Supply Chain Management","authors":"Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu, Jayashankar M. Swaminathan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2758860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2758860","url":null,"abstract":"Supply chain management is a critical aspect of conducting any business. In this article, an overview of the advancements in supply chain management is presented. In the initial section, alternative definitions and key issues related to supply chain management are presented followed by a discussion of complexities associated with managing supply chains. Subsequently, major inefficiencies of poor supply chain management are discussed. Finally, a brief summary of research activity to date and a discussion of future challenges related to supply chain management are presented.","PeriodicalId":369181,"journal":{"name":"Operations Strategy eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115490059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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