Pub Date : 2023-04-05DOI: 10.1017/s2045381722000284
G. Heathcote, Lucia Kula
Through an account of white feminisms and white privilege, this article examines the tensions between local and international knowledge frames. The article considers the possibility of a feminist approach to global constitutionalism and argues for a twofold critique: first, a feminist interrogation of the dominance of a specifically male history of Western and Anglo-European knowledge frames; and second, a self-critique within feminist approaches to global legal regimes that acknowledges the complicity of mainstream feminist tools in the racist histories of knowledge production. To this end, the article examines the space of gender expertise to explore how this can be both an aperture for plural feminist encounters and a refinement of diverse feminist approaches into a form digestible by the contours of international institutions. To explore alternative, decolonized encounters, the article centres Lusophone African feminist silence and action in Luanda, the capital of Angola. The article explores how Angolan gender relations, informal labour and histories of protest unsettle the frame of a feminist manifesto, to argue for a place for active silence as a methodology for undoing the status quo of global constitutional expectations of how knowledge arrives at the global and transnational levels.
{"title":"Abandoning the idealized white subject of legal feminism: A manifesto for silence in a Lusophone register","authors":"G. Heathcote, Lucia Kula","doi":"10.1017/s2045381722000284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381722000284","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Through an account of white feminisms and white privilege, this article examines the tensions between local and international knowledge frames. The article considers the possibility of a feminist approach to global constitutionalism and argues for a twofold critique: first, a feminist interrogation of the dominance of a specifically male history of Western and Anglo-European knowledge frames; and second, a self-critique within feminist approaches to global legal regimes that acknowledges the complicity of mainstream feminist tools in the racist histories of knowledge production. To this end, the article examines the space of gender expertise to explore how this can be both an aperture for plural feminist encounters and a refinement of diverse feminist approaches into a form digestible by the contours of international institutions. To explore alternative, decolonized encounters, the article centres Lusophone African feminist silence and action in Luanda, the capital of Angola. The article explores how Angolan gender relations, informal labour and histories of protest unsettle the frame of a feminist manifesto, to argue for a place for active silence as a methodology for undoing the status quo of global constitutional expectations of how knowledge arrives at the global and transnational levels.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48827269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-30DOI: 10.1017/s2045381722000296
Juan F González Bertomeu
This article addresses the bastardization of constitutional law in Argentina and the corrosive power of legacies of authoritarianism. It offers a genealogy of the use by Argentina’s Supreme Court of self-restraint canons from the time when they were borrowed from the US Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century. Partly resulting from the country’s experiences with military rule, the court transformed or expanded these canons, which entailed a gradual depreciation of statutes as the (uneasy) cornerstone of constitutionalism. Based on a fresh dataset and employing narrative and network analysis, the article focuses on a slogan the court has invoked since the 1960s: invalidating a rule is a matter of extreme institutional gravity and hence a strategy of last resort. Under the 1976–83 dictatorship, the court applied the slogan to various rules, including those passed by the military. It thus invoked familiar canons outside its scope conditions, conveying an illusion of constitutional regularity by masking the abnormal in acceptable garb and contributing to the regime’s legitimation. While the democratic court abandoned the most blatant expressions of authoritarianism, connections persisted, manifesting in the frequent citations to the dictatorship court’s use of the slogan and its extension to any rule. Authoritarian legacies die hard.
{"title":"A measure of last resort: Pseudo-constitutionalism and the persistence of a self-restraint slogan in Argentina","authors":"Juan F González Bertomeu","doi":"10.1017/s2045381722000296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381722000296","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article addresses the bastardization of constitutional law in Argentina and the corrosive power of legacies of authoritarianism. It offers a genealogy of the use by Argentina’s Supreme Court of self-restraint canons from the time when they were borrowed from the US Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century. Partly resulting from the country’s experiences with military rule, the court transformed or expanded these canons, which entailed a gradual depreciation of statutes as the (uneasy) cornerstone of constitutionalism. Based on a fresh dataset and employing narrative and network analysis, the article focuses on a slogan the court has invoked since the 1960s: invalidating a rule is a matter of extreme institutional gravity and hence a strategy of last resort. Under the 1976–83 dictatorship, the court applied the slogan to various rules, including those passed by the military. It thus invoked familiar canons outside its scope conditions, conveying an illusion of constitutional regularity by masking the abnormal in acceptable garb and contributing to the regime’s legitimation. While the democratic court abandoned the most blatant expressions of authoritarianism, connections persisted, manifesting in the frequent citations to the dictatorship court’s use of the slogan and its extension to any rule. Authoritarian legacies die hard.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48367633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-07DOI: 10.1017/s2045381723000023
M. Lesch, Nina Reiners
The United Nations treaty bodies were established to monitor the implementation of human rights by states parties. Through ‘General Comments’ – legally non-binding clarifications of treaty obligations – they have also influenced the development of international human rights law – for example, on the right to life and climate impacts. We address this phenomenon by establishing a twofold argument. First, we argue that General Comments are used by the committees to informally shape international law. They deliberately act as human rights law-makers, knowing that international institutions, organizations and professionals in their network will subsequently refer to such instruments. Second, we argue that treaty bodies not only rely on their network once they have adopted their outcome, but the experts’ personal networks also shape the drafting process of General Comments. We develop and illustrate an analytical framework with two case studies of General Comments on the human right to water and the torture prohibition. The analysis demonstrates the need for external knowledge of both technical and legal aspects of the norms being interpreted. By addressing pressing human rights challenges, expert committees can shape the law in times of stagnation and resist contestation even from powerful states.
{"title":"Informal human rights law-making: How treaty bodies use ‘General Comments’ to develop international law","authors":"M. Lesch, Nina Reiners","doi":"10.1017/s2045381723000023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381723000023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The United Nations treaty bodies were established to monitor the implementation of human rights by states parties. Through ‘General Comments’ – legally non-binding clarifications of treaty obligations – they have also influenced the development of international human rights law – for example, on the right to life and climate impacts. We address this phenomenon by establishing a twofold argument. First, we argue that General Comments are used by the committees to informally shape international law. They deliberately act as human rights law-makers, knowing that international institutions, organizations and professionals in their network will subsequently refer to such instruments. Second, we argue that treaty bodies not only rely on their network once they have adopted their outcome, but the experts’ personal networks also shape the drafting process of General Comments. We develop and illustrate an analytical framework with two case studies of General Comments on the human right to water and the torture prohibition. The analysis demonstrates the need for external knowledge of both technical and legal aspects of the norms being interpreted. By addressing pressing human rights challenges, expert committees can shape the law in times of stagnation and resist contestation even from powerful states.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48037981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S2045381722000314
Susan Kang, Jonathan Havercroft, Jacob Eisler, A. Wiener, J. Shaw
Abstract In this editorial, we consider the ways in which liberal constitutionalism is challenged by and presents challenges to the climate crisis facing the world. Over recent decades, efforts to mitigate the climate crisis have generated a new set of norms for states and non-state actors, including regulatory norms (emission standards, carbon regulations), organising principles (common but differentiated responsibility) and fundamental norms (climate justice, intergenerational rights, human rights). However, like all norms, these remain contested. Particularly in light of their global reach, their specific behavioural implications and interpretations and the related obligations to act remain debatable and the overwhelming institutionalization of the neoliberal market economy makes clear and effective responses to climate change virtually impossible within liberal societies.
{"title":"Climate change and the challenge to liberalism","authors":"Susan Kang, Jonathan Havercroft, Jacob Eisler, A. Wiener, J. Shaw","doi":"10.1017/S2045381722000314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381722000314","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this editorial, we consider the ways in which liberal constitutionalism is challenged by and presents challenges to the climate crisis facing the world. Over recent decades, efforts to mitigate the climate crisis have generated a new set of norms for states and non-state actors, including regulatory norms (emission standards, carbon regulations), organising principles (common but differentiated responsibility) and fundamental norms (climate justice, intergenerational rights, human rights). However, like all norms, these remain contested. Particularly in light of their global reach, their specific behavioural implications and interpretations and the related obligations to act remain debatable and the overwhelming institutionalization of the neoliberal market economy makes clear and effective responses to climate change virtually impossible within liberal societies.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48963446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-27DOI: 10.1017/s2045381723000011
Benjamin Garcia Holgado, Raúl Sánchez Urribarrí
A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven court-packing occurs when politicians manipulate the composition of courts in order to assure a quick implementation of policies. Although this tends to negatively affect judicial independence, it is not per se a first step towards regime change. Second, regime-driven court-packing happens when politicians alter the composition of the courts with the goal of eroding democracy. In this case, court-packing’s negative effect on judicial independence has a systemic negative effect on different dimensions of liberal democracy. Relying on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, we conceptualize these two types of court-packing by comparing two cases: Carlos Menem (1989–99) in Argentina, seeking judicial support to carry out pro-market economic reforms, and Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) in Venezuela, seeking to control the judiciary in the context of democratic backsliding.
{"title":"Court-packing and democratic decay: A necessary relationship?","authors":"Benjamin Garcia Holgado, Raúl Sánchez Urribarrí","doi":"10.1017/s2045381723000011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381723000011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven court-packing occurs when politicians manipulate the composition of courts in order to assure a quick implementation of policies. Although this tends to negatively affect judicial independence, it is not per se a first step towards regime change. Second, regime-driven court-packing happens when politicians alter the composition of the courts with the goal of eroding democracy. In this case, court-packing’s negative effect on judicial independence has a systemic negative effect on different dimensions of liberal democracy. Relying on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, we conceptualize these two types of court-packing by comparing two cases: Carlos Menem (1989–99) in Argentina, seeking judicial support to carry out pro-market economic reforms, and Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) in Venezuela, seeking to control the judiciary in the context of democratic backsliding.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42012745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-17DOI: 10.1017/s2045381722000272
Róisín A Costello
This article interrogates the normative coherence of the label of ‘digital constitutionalism’. In particular, I argue that the use of the label ‘constitutionalism’ in digital contexts often conflates the practical realities of existing contractual governance models with the superficial appeal of constitutional structures. As a result, the label is misleading in both normative and qualitative terms as it obscures the true nature of the governance architectures to which it is applied, which are more appropriately understood as implementing a distinct genre of ‘private policy’.
{"title":"Faux ami? Interrogating the normative coherence of ‘digital constitutionalism’","authors":"Róisín A Costello","doi":"10.1017/s2045381722000272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381722000272","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article interrogates the normative coherence of the label of ‘digital constitutionalism’. In particular, I argue that the use of the label ‘constitutionalism’ in digital contexts often conflates the practical realities of existing contractual governance models with the superficial appeal of constitutional structures. As a result, the label is misleading in both normative and qualitative terms as it obscures the true nature of the governance architectures to which it is applied, which are more appropriately understood as implementing a distinct genre of ‘private policy’.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46490737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1017/s2045381722000302
Aylin Aydin-Cakir
Criticizing the insurance theory, this article asserts that to measure post-constitutional political uncertainty, one should consider not only the power distribution among the ‘political’ actors but the power distribution among all actors involved in the constitution-making process, including the public and civil society. Comparing the constitution-making processes of the constitutions of Egypt (2012) and Tunisia (2014), this study presents the duration of the constitution-making process as an alternative measure of power distribution among all actors. The theoretical framework asserts that the long constitution-making process increases the possibility of deliberation at the public level. That will help to develop trust among polarized political actors and improve political actors’ perception of the public as a credible control and constraint mechanism. This will ensure that the incoming government will respect the newly established institutions and lead to the establishment of an independent and powerful judiciary. In the second part of the article, to test this argument, I use a large dataset that covers information on the content and design processes of 140 countries’ most recent constitutions adopted between 1945 and 2018. The empirical results indicate that as the duration of the constitution-making increases, the number of constitutional guarantees for judicial independence also increases.
{"title":"Duration of the constitution-making process as an indicator of post-constitutional political uncertainty: The insurance theory revisited","authors":"Aylin Aydin-Cakir","doi":"10.1017/s2045381722000302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381722000302","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Criticizing the insurance theory, this article asserts that to measure post-constitutional political uncertainty, one should consider not only the power distribution among the ‘political’ actors but the power distribution among all actors involved in the constitution-making process, including the public and civil society. Comparing the constitution-making processes of the constitutions of Egypt (2012) and Tunisia (2014), this study presents the duration of the constitution-making process as an alternative measure of power distribution among all actors. The theoretical framework asserts that the long constitution-making process increases the possibility of deliberation at the public level. That will help to develop trust among polarized political actors and improve political actors’ perception of the public as a credible control and constraint mechanism. This will ensure that the incoming government will respect the newly established institutions and lead to the establishment of an independent and powerful judiciary. In the second part of the article, to test this argument, I use a large dataset that covers information on the content and design processes of 140 countries’ most recent constitutions adopted between 1945 and 2018. The empirical results indicate that as the duration of the constitution-making increases, the number of constitutional guarantees for judicial independence also increases.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48428461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-17DOI: 10.1017/s2045381722000223
Mariana Velasco-Rivera, Joel I Colón-Ríos
This article examines the development of the doctrine of the ‘permanent constituent power’ in Mexico. This doctrine reflects a long tradition in constitutional theory according to which the exercise of constituent power is a one-time event: once a constitution is adopted, there will be no legal mechanism in place for the exercise of the people’s original constitution-making authority. This view is nonetheless in tension with a notion that has also been historically embraced by liberal constitutionalism: that the people has an inalienable right to alter the form of government. The constitutional provisions that reflect that idea, we will see, can have important implications in terms of the nature and scope of the amending authority and, at the same time, point toward alternative mechanisms for the exercise of constituent authority. By closely examining the operation of those kinds of provisions in the Mexican constitution, we seek to illustrate a tension central to the liberal constitutional tradition and to suggest a way out of it. In so doing, we aim to draw some lessons from the Mexican case that can contribute to current discussions about constituent power and fundamental constitutional change in liberal constitutional orders.
{"title":"On the legal implications of a ‘permanent’ constituent power","authors":"Mariana Velasco-Rivera, Joel I Colón-Ríos","doi":"10.1017/s2045381722000223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381722000223","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the development of the doctrine of the ‘permanent constituent power’ in Mexico. This doctrine reflects a long tradition in constitutional theory according to which the exercise of constituent power is a one-time event: once a constitution is adopted, there will be no legal mechanism in place for the exercise of the people’s original constitution-making authority. This view is nonetheless in tension with a notion that has also been historically embraced by liberal constitutionalism: that the people has an inalienable right to alter the form of government. The constitutional provisions that reflect that idea, we will see, can have important implications in terms of the nature and scope of the amending authority and, at the same time, point toward alternative mechanisms for the exercise of constituent authority. By closely examining the operation of those kinds of provisions in the Mexican constitution, we seek to illustrate a tension central to the liberal constitutional tradition and to suggest a way out of it. In so doing, we aim to draw some lessons from the Mexican case that can contribute to current discussions about constituent power and fundamental constitutional change in liberal constitutional orders.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46419685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1017/s2045381722000259
Julia Drubel, Janne Mende
The question of whether global norms are experiencing a crisis allows for two concurrent answers. From a facticity perspective, certain global norms are in crisis, given their worldwide lack of implementation and effectiveness. From a validity perspective, however, a crisis is not obvious, as these norms are not openly contested discursively and institutionally. In order to explain the double diagnosis (crisis/no crisis), this article draws on international relations research on norm contestation and norm robustness. It proposes the concept of hidden discursive contestation and distinguishes it from three other key types of norm contestation: open discursive, open non-discursive and hidden non-discursive contestation. We identify four manifestations of hidden discursive contestation in: (1) the deflection of responsibility; (2) forestalling norm strengthening; (3) displaying norms as functional means to an end; and (4) downgrading or upgrading single norm elements. Our empirical focus is on the decent work norm, which demonstrates the double diagnosis. While it lacks facticity, it enjoys far-reaching verbal acceptance and high validity. Our qualitative analysis of discursive hidden contestation draws on two case studies: the International Labour Organization’s compliance procedures, which monitor international labour standards, and the United Nations Treaty Process on a binding instrument for business and human rights. Although both fora have different context and policy cycles, they exhibit similar strategies of hidden discursive contestation.
{"title":"The hidden contestation of norms: Decent work in the International Labour Organization and the United Nations","authors":"Julia Drubel, Janne Mende","doi":"10.1017/s2045381722000259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381722000259","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The question of whether global norms are experiencing a crisis allows for two concurrent answers. From a facticity perspective, certain global norms are in crisis, given their worldwide lack of implementation and effectiveness. From a validity perspective, however, a crisis is not obvious, as these norms are not openly contested discursively and institutionally. In order to explain the double diagnosis (crisis/no crisis), this article draws on international relations research on norm contestation and norm robustness. It proposes the concept of hidden discursive contestation and distinguishes it from three other key types of norm contestation: open discursive, open non-discursive and hidden non-discursive contestation. We identify four manifestations of hidden discursive contestation in: (1) the deflection of responsibility; (2) forestalling norm strengthening; (3) displaying norms as functional means to an end; and (4) downgrading or upgrading single norm elements. Our empirical focus is on the decent work norm, which demonstrates the double diagnosis. While it lacks facticity, it enjoys far-reaching verbal acceptance and high validity. Our qualitative analysis of discursive hidden contestation draws on two case studies: the International Labour Organization’s compliance procedures, which monitor international labour standards, and the United Nations Treaty Process on a binding instrument for business and human rights. Although both fora have different context and policy cycles, they exhibit similar strategies of hidden discursive contestation.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47974232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-23DOI: 10.1017/S2045381722000235
Lilach Litor
Abstract Collective labour rights, including the right to organize and strike, were recognized in the principles of the International Labour Organization (ILO) as fundamental rights. Despite their importance, different countries enacted legislation that included a ban on police organization in trade unions or a ban just on police strikes. The right of police officers to organize and strike is of particular importance nowadays at a time of increased public scrutiny and large-scale protests over incidents of extra-judicial killing by police. There is a need to recognize collective rights for police officers in order to improve working conditions and organizational justice at work for them as a way of moderating officers’ perspectives of public hostility and improving their capability to carry out their duties. Another benefit of recognizing a right to organize is the union’s capacity to advance important values, including avoiding racism and violence and assuring the compliance of individual officers with the ethics and code of conduct expected from police officers. This article seeks to address the unique topic of the linkage between the collective labour rights of police officers and varieties of constitutionalism in these critical times. It introduces two potential approaches in this regard: (1) global labour constitutionalism; and (2) militaristic labour constitutionalism. The former implements international standards set by the ILO as a basis for constitutionalism while the latter emphasizes domestic issues and the need to maintain the public order and security of citizens. The article examines the possibility of applying global labour constitutionalism as a basis for recognizing collective rights for police officers.
{"title":"Collective labour rights of police officers: Global labour constitutionalism and militaristic labour constitutionalism","authors":"Lilach Litor","doi":"10.1017/S2045381722000235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381722000235","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Collective labour rights, including the right to organize and strike, were recognized in the principles of the International Labour Organization (ILO) as fundamental rights. Despite their importance, different countries enacted legislation that included a ban on police organization in trade unions or a ban just on police strikes. The right of police officers to organize and strike is of particular importance nowadays at a time of increased public scrutiny and large-scale protests over incidents of extra-judicial killing by police. There is a need to recognize collective rights for police officers in order to improve working conditions and organizational justice at work for them as a way of moderating officers’ perspectives of public hostility and improving their capability to carry out their duties. Another benefit of recognizing a right to organize is the union’s capacity to advance important values, including avoiding racism and violence and assuring the compliance of individual officers with the ethics and code of conduct expected from police officers. This article seeks to address the unique topic of the linkage between the collective labour rights of police officers and varieties of constitutionalism in these critical times. It introduces two potential approaches in this regard: (1) global labour constitutionalism; and (2) militaristic labour constitutionalism. The former implements international standards set by the ILO as a basis for constitutionalism while the latter emphasizes domestic issues and the need to maintain the public order and security of citizens. The article examines the possibility of applying global labour constitutionalism as a basis for recognizing collective rights for police officers.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48183210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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