Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/S2045381721000216
Aytak Dibavar
Abstract This article argues that the tokenistic appropriation of categories such as gender and race have deprived them of their radical and transformative political and practical roots while facilitating their commodification as a luxury product that is consumed by the depoliticized and privileged. Such (ab)use of gender, as an analytical tool, similar to race and class, has been on the rise within progressive circles. However, with the rise of alt-right populism claiming to know and fight ‘feminism’, as well as the commodification of feminism by progressives, now more than ever a decolonial social reproductive theory is needed to help understand and delineate how women are oppressed in a plethora of intersectional ways based on race, class and ability among other traits, while engaging the specific material historical-constitutive structures, judicial-political and socio-economic dimensions of the world order, as well as the emergence of right-wing populism as white heteronormative backlash. This article argues for a feminist decolonial social reproductive theory that sees gender and racial hierarchy as part of capital’s dynamism (a product), which transforms the natural, social and material world, restructuring and evolving for the ordered extraction of surplus. Although this process may differ temporally and geographically, it nonetheless results in a constellation of class exploitation, governance and struggle that facilitates right-wing backlash and undermines the left’s response, thus obviating the need for decolonial social reproductive theory.
{"title":"(Re)Claiming gender: A case for feminist decolonial social reproduction theory","authors":"Aytak Dibavar","doi":"10.1017/S2045381721000216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381721000216","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article argues that the tokenistic appropriation of categories such as gender and race have deprived them of their radical and transformative political and practical roots while facilitating their commodification as a luxury product that is consumed by the depoliticized and privileged. Such (ab)use of gender, as an analytical tool, similar to race and class, has been on the rise within progressive circles. However, with the rise of alt-right populism claiming to know and fight ‘feminism’, as well as the commodification of feminism by progressives, now more than ever a decolonial social reproductive theory is needed to help understand and delineate how women are oppressed in a plethora of intersectional ways based on race, class and ability among other traits, while engaging the specific material historical-constitutive structures, judicial-political and socio-economic dimensions of the world order, as well as the emergence of right-wing populism as white heteronormative backlash. This article argues for a feminist decolonial social reproductive theory that sees gender and racial hierarchy as part of capital’s dynamism (a product), which transforms the natural, social and material world, restructuring and evolving for the ordered extraction of surplus. Although this process may differ temporally and geographically, it nonetheless results in a constellation of class exploitation, governance and struggle that facilitates right-wing backlash and undermines the left’s response, thus obviating the need for decolonial social reproductive theory.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"11 1","pages":"450 - 464"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46598228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1017/s2045381722000132
R. Houghton, Aoife O’Donoghue
Women use a multiplicity of forms and methods to articulate harms and claim political spaces. Among these are manifestos.1 Women’s manifestos are concomitant with both political convulsion and the enduring, mundane inequalities faced by women; they play a key role in feminist attempts to achieve political and legal ends.2 Manifestos are overtly political acts of legal/political performance; they are in dialogue with each other, with counter and anti-manifestos, and with the legal-political infrastructures they inhabit.3 Manifestos seek to fracture traditional understanding and practices of law, often in the guise of claiming constituent power and political space.
{"title":"Manifestos as constituent power: Performing a feminist revolution","authors":"R. Houghton, Aoife O’Donoghue","doi":"10.1017/s2045381722000132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381722000132","url":null,"abstract":"Women use a multiplicity of forms and methods to articulate harms and claim political spaces. Among these are manifestos.1 Women’s manifestos are concomitant with both political convulsion and the enduring, mundane inequalities faced by women; they play a key role in feminist attempts to achieve political and legal ends.2 Manifestos are overtly political acts of legal/political performance; they are in dialogue with each other, with counter and anti-manifestos, and with the legal-political infrastructures they inhabit.3 Manifestos seek to fracture traditional understanding and practices of law, often in the guise of claiming constituent power and political space.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42084359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-12DOI: 10.1017/S2045381722000156
Alon Harel, Adam Shinar
Abstract What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if they represent the people they govern. This article identifies two different conceptions of representation. Representation can be grounded either in the consent or the will of the citizens or when the constitution reflects the ‘real’ identity of the members of the nation. Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the constitution is legitimate because it promotes justice or, more generally, is grounded in reason. While constitutions are typically grounded both in claims to represent the people and in claims concerning the justness and wisdom of the constitutional provisions, we establish that there are two types of constitutions: constitutions that are primarily representational (e.g. the US Constitution) and constitutions that are primarily reason-based (e.g. the German Constitution). We also show that this distinction has important ramifications for how constitutions are drafted and ratified, and how they operate. One central implication is that the legitimacy of constitutions that make weak claims to representation – for example, constitutions that are imposed by foreign powers – can still be defended on reason-based grounds.
{"title":"Two concepts of constitutional legitimacy","authors":"Alon Harel, Adam Shinar","doi":"10.1017/S2045381722000156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381722000156","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if they represent the people they govern. This article identifies two different conceptions of representation. Representation can be grounded either in the consent or the will of the citizens or when the constitution reflects the ‘real’ identity of the members of the nation. Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the constitution is legitimate because it promotes justice or, more generally, is grounded in reason. While constitutions are typically grounded both in claims to represent the people and in claims concerning the justness and wisdom of the constitutional provisions, we establish that there are two types of constitutions: constitutions that are primarily representational (e.g. the US Constitution) and constitutions that are primarily reason-based (e.g. the German Constitution). We also show that this distinction has important ramifications for how constitutions are drafted and ratified, and how they operate. One central implication is that the legitimacy of constitutions that make weak claims to representation – for example, constitutions that are imposed by foreign powers – can still be defended on reason-based grounds.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"12 1","pages":"80 - 105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49212351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-12DOI: 10.1017/S204538172200020X
J. Erk
Abstract This article addresses the problématique of giving voice to homegrown traditions of constitutionalism in individual African countries. The scholarly discussion is combined with an applied concern about whether this could instil a wider grassroots embrace of the country’s constitution, thereby consolidating constitutionalism and ensuring longevity. The investigation is carried through the lens of two sub-categories of the concept of constitutional identity: a representative one that reflects a country’s particular political, social and cultural makeup, and an aspirational one that sets goals and ideals. The challenge, in both scholarly and applied terms, is how to ensure that a constitution instils a sense of public ownership by becoming more representative of a country’s underlying makeup while also giving voice to modern aspirations to protect and promote individual human rights, and in doing so, also becoming self-sustaining as the foundational basic law guiding future generations. Attention is paid not only to the forms of constitutions but also to their function in both reaching ideals (in the positive sense of success) and staving off pitfalls (in the negative sense of success). The article also discusses whether these are best achieved through gradual terms over time or through the sudden big bang of mega reforms.
{"title":"Aspirational and representative constitutional identity in Africa","authors":"J. Erk","doi":"10.1017/S204538172200020X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S204538172200020X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article addresses the problématique of giving voice to homegrown traditions of constitutionalism in individual African countries. The scholarly discussion is combined with an applied concern about whether this could instil a wider grassroots embrace of the country’s constitution, thereby consolidating constitutionalism and ensuring longevity. The investigation is carried through the lens of two sub-categories of the concept of constitutional identity: a representative one that reflects a country’s particular political, social and cultural makeup, and an aspirational one that sets goals and ideals. The challenge, in both scholarly and applied terms, is how to ensure that a constitution instils a sense of public ownership by becoming more representative of a country’s underlying makeup while also giving voice to modern aspirations to protect and promote individual human rights, and in doing so, also becoming self-sustaining as the foundational basic law guiding future generations. Attention is paid not only to the forms of constitutions but also to their function in both reaching ideals (in the positive sense of success) and staving off pitfalls (in the negative sense of success). The article also discusses whether these are best achieved through gradual terms over time or through the sudden big bang of mega reforms.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"12 1","pages":"154 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46607555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-10DOI: 10.1017/S2045381722000168
Michael Da Silva
Abstract ‘Practical’ approaches to human rights hold that analysis of legal human rights must attend to the practice(s) of international human rights law and that the nature and justification of international human rights is best determined by attending to their role(s) in international human rights law’s system of normative practices, not analogous moral rights outside it. These core tenets plausibly explain the apparent normativity of international human rights law despite controversies about the status of many ‘rights’ in the ‘International Bill of Rights’. Yet plausible practical approaches require clear and compelling accounts of which practices qualify as human rights practices. Most existing accounts view ‘responses’ to claims made in the name of the international legal community as key to the identification of human rights. Activities by domestic governments and non-governmental actors qualify as relevant practices. While understandable, these ‘responsive’ accounts of practice create more problems than they solve. This work accordingly promotes a largely unexplored account on which ‘human rights practices’ are strictly defined by international legal doctrine. This ‘doctrinal’ account of practice is most likely to maintain practical approaches to human rights’ potential benefits without generating an unduly expansive rights register or adopting strong theoretical commitments about the nature of law.
{"title":"Legal doctrine as human rights ‘practice’","authors":"Michael Da Silva","doi":"10.1017/S2045381722000168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381722000168","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract ‘Practical’ approaches to human rights hold that analysis of legal human rights must attend to the practice(s) of international human rights law and that the nature and justification of international human rights is best determined by attending to their role(s) in international human rights law’s system of normative practices, not analogous moral rights outside it. These core tenets plausibly explain the apparent normativity of international human rights law despite controversies about the status of many ‘rights’ in the ‘International Bill of Rights’. Yet plausible practical approaches require clear and compelling accounts of which practices qualify as human rights practices. Most existing accounts view ‘responses’ to claims made in the name of the international legal community as key to the identification of human rights. Activities by domestic governments and non-governmental actors qualify as relevant practices. While understandable, these ‘responsive’ accounts of practice create more problems than they solve. This work accordingly promotes a largely unexplored account on which ‘human rights practices’ are strictly defined by international legal doctrine. This ‘doctrinal’ account of practice is most likely to maintain practical approaches to human rights’ potential benefits without generating an unduly expansive rights register or adopting strong theoretical commitments about the nature of law.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"12 1","pages":"106 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49448833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-07DOI: 10.1017/S2045381722000193
Kelty McKerracher
Abstract The survival and resurgence of Indigenous legal orders and constitutional traditions in Canada, as elsewhere, disrupt the normative hegemony of the liberal state and articulate a constitutionalism that accounts for a plurality of laws. How can state and non-state legal orders interact across vastly different normative worlds? How can their interaction address the colonial power imbalance and what role should recognition play in this relationship? This article draws on the work of Ralf Michaels on relational legal pluralism and Aaron Mills on Anishinaabe constitutionalism to explore how a legally plural society must embrace Michaels’ challenge of constitutive external recognition: the idea that legal orders mutually constitute each other through recognition without interfering with each other’s factual status as law. External recognition is consistent with strong legal pluralism and is distinct from recognition within the multicultural liberal state, a form of weak legal pluralism and continued colonialism. Mills’ discussion of treaty, rather than contract, as a foundation for shared political community assists in imagining a constitutionalism with/in Canada in which distinct legal orders can mutually constitute each other without domination. Linkage norms may help to establish reciprocal relations among state law and Indigenous legal orders, and the enactment of such ‘tertiary rules of recognition’ from within Indigenous legal orders may itself shift the balance of power.
{"title":"Relational legal pluralism and Indigenous legal orders in Canada","authors":"Kelty McKerracher","doi":"10.1017/S2045381722000193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381722000193","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The survival and resurgence of Indigenous legal orders and constitutional traditions in Canada, as elsewhere, disrupt the normative hegemony of the liberal state and articulate a constitutionalism that accounts for a plurality of laws. How can state and non-state legal orders interact across vastly different normative worlds? How can their interaction address the colonial power imbalance and what role should recognition play in this relationship? This article draws on the work of Ralf Michaels on relational legal pluralism and Aaron Mills on Anishinaabe constitutionalism to explore how a legally plural society must embrace Michaels’ challenge of constitutive external recognition: the idea that legal orders mutually constitute each other through recognition without interfering with each other’s factual status as law. External recognition is consistent with strong legal pluralism and is distinct from recognition within the multicultural liberal state, a form of weak legal pluralism and continued colonialism. Mills’ discussion of treaty, rather than contract, as a foundation for shared political community assists in imagining a constitutionalism with/in Canada in which distinct legal orders can mutually constitute each other without domination. Linkage norms may help to establish reciprocal relations among state law and Indigenous legal orders, and the enactment of such ‘tertiary rules of recognition’ from within Indigenous legal orders may itself shift the balance of power.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"12 1","pages":"133 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46032429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1017/S2045381722000119
E. Rashwan
Abstract This article explores the transitional justice (TJ) dilemmas after revolutions have overthrown autocratic regimes through developing a model that uses a law and economics methodology. The article seeks to answer two questions: Why do post-revolution regimes resort to or ignore TJ policies towards former autocratic regimes? And why is it difficult to adopt and apply welfare-enhancing TJ mechanisms in practice, including popular suggestions within the TJ literature to portray the civil society organizations as the key solution to TJ dilemmas? To answer these questions, the article provides a theoretical positive analysis of the scenarios and dilemmas of TJ. It argues that TJ should function both as an internalization mechanism of negative externalities of the violations of the past-regime, and a form of constitutional arrangements as an ex ante incentives structure to prevent the repetition of these violations. However, due to asymmetric information problems, behavioural biases and the constitutional nature of TJ, the ‘TJ momentum’ precludes most of the traditional solutions for this principal–agent problem.
{"title":"The ugly truth behind transitional justice in the post-revolution phase: A constitutional law and economics analysis","authors":"E. Rashwan","doi":"10.1017/S2045381722000119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381722000119","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the transitional justice (TJ) dilemmas after revolutions have overthrown autocratic regimes through developing a model that uses a law and economics methodology. The article seeks to answer two questions: Why do post-revolution regimes resort to or ignore TJ policies towards former autocratic regimes? And why is it difficult to adopt and apply welfare-enhancing TJ mechanisms in practice, including popular suggestions within the TJ literature to portray the civil society organizations as the key solution to TJ dilemmas? To answer these questions, the article provides a theoretical positive analysis of the scenarios and dilemmas of TJ. It argues that TJ should function both as an internalization mechanism of negative externalities of the violations of the past-regime, and a form of constitutional arrangements as an ex ante incentives structure to prevent the repetition of these violations. However, due to asymmetric information problems, behavioural biases and the constitutional nature of TJ, the ‘TJ momentum’ precludes most of the traditional solutions for this principal–agent problem.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"12 1","pages":"30 - 58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46833297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-28DOI: 10.1017/S2045381722000120
A. Zysset
Abstract Scholars of global constitutionalism have recently come to examine international criminal law (ICL) and its associated institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court (the ICC). This article prolongs these efforts by pointing to and remedying two deficits of that project with particular emphasis on the Rome Statute crimes. First, how does one account for the role of the international trial in global constitutionalist terms? Second, can global constitutionalism insightfully explain the content and scope of these crimes – that is, both their substantive definition and the predominant modes of liability developed by the ICC? This article answers both questions affirmatively and offers an account of their nexus. It first shows that the Rome Statute crimes are often perpetrated through a hierarchically organized apparatus of control, and interprets their global constitutional significance via the principle of constituent power. It then makes use of Antony Duff’s relational account of criminal liability to offer an account of the international trial. In the international context, one can conceive of the trial as allowing state or state-like authorities to call each other to account, which renders justice to the core function of enabling and limiting political authority on which global constitutionalism centres.
{"title":"International crimes through the lens of global constitutionalism","authors":"A. Zysset","doi":"10.1017/S2045381722000120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381722000120","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scholars of global constitutionalism have recently come to examine international criminal law (ICL) and its associated institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court (the ICC). This article prolongs these efforts by pointing to and remedying two deficits of that project with particular emphasis on the Rome Statute crimes. First, how does one account for the role of the international trial in global constitutionalist terms? Second, can global constitutionalism insightfully explain the content and scope of these crimes – that is, both their substantive definition and the predominant modes of liability developed by the ICC? This article answers both questions affirmatively and offers an account of their nexus. It first shows that the Rome Statute crimes are often perpetrated through a hierarchically organized apparatus of control, and interprets their global constitutional significance via the principle of constituent power. It then makes use of Antony Duff’s relational account of criminal liability to offer an account of the international trial. In the international context, one can conceive of the trial as allowing state or state-like authorities to call each other to account, which renders justice to the core function of enabling and limiting political authority on which global constitutionalism centres.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"12 1","pages":"59 - 79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46250677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-16DOI: 10.1017/S2045381722000107
David Vitale, Raphaël Girard
Abstract This article adds nuance to current understandings of the relationship between the populist leader and the public by using the concept of trust. Merging the literature on populism with the growing scholarship on trust from philosophy, psychology and other social sciences, it argues that following on from the populist leader’s appeals to similarity, the populist–public relationship involves an intertwining of two forms of public trust: the public’s trust in the populist and the public’s trust in itself (what we term ‘public self-trust’). Contrary to what political and constitutional theorists have recognized as a tension between public self-trust and the public’s trust in its political representatives, we contend based on the scholarship on trust that in the populist–public relationship these two forms of trust can be mutually reinforcing. This mutual reinforcement, we suggest, has the potential to create a positive feedback loop of public trust that, given the value of public trust to political leaders, empowers the populist.
{"title":"Public trust and the populist leader: A theoretical argument","authors":"David Vitale, Raphaël Girard","doi":"10.1017/S2045381722000107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381722000107","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article adds nuance to current understandings of the relationship between the populist leader and the public by using the concept of trust. Merging the literature on populism with the growing scholarship on trust from philosophy, psychology and other social sciences, it argues that following on from the populist leader’s appeals to similarity, the populist–public relationship involves an intertwining of two forms of public trust: the public’s trust in the populist and the public’s trust in itself (what we term ‘public self-trust’). Contrary to what political and constitutional theorists have recognized as a tension between public self-trust and the public’s trust in its political representatives, we contend based on the scholarship on trust that in the populist–public relationship these two forms of trust can be mutually reinforcing. This mutual reinforcement, we suggest, has the potential to create a positive feedback loop of public trust that, given the value of public trust to political leaders, empowers the populist.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"11 1","pages":"548 - 570"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49325947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-21DOI: 10.1017/s2045381722000181
Jacob Eisler, Susan Kang, R. Forst, K. Kenkel, Helen Kinsella
Editorial Board Mathias Albert, University of Bielefeld, Germany Richard Bellamy, University College, London, UK Duncan Bell, University of Cambridge, UK Seyla Benhabib, Yale University, USA Armin v. Bogdandy, Max Planck Institute, Heidelberg, Germany Jutta Brunnée, University of Toronto, Canada Wen-Chen Chang, National Taiwan University, Taiwan Carlos Closa, Center for Public Goods and Policies, Madrid, Spain Jean L. Cohen, Columbia University, USA Yasmin Dawood, University of Toronto, Canada Gráinne de Búrca, New York University, USA Avigail Eisenberg, University of Victoria, Canada Karin Fierke, St Andrews University, UK Ezzedine Choukri Fishere, American University of Cairo, Egypt GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
{"title":"GCN volume 11 issue 2 Front matter","authors":"Jacob Eisler, Susan Kang, R. Forst, K. Kenkel, Helen Kinsella","doi":"10.1017/s2045381722000181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381722000181","url":null,"abstract":"Editorial Board Mathias Albert, University of Bielefeld, Germany Richard Bellamy, University College, London, UK Duncan Bell, University of Cambridge, UK Seyla Benhabib, Yale University, USA Armin v. Bogdandy, Max Planck Institute, Heidelberg, Germany Jutta Brunnée, University of Toronto, Canada Wen-Chen Chang, National Taiwan University, Taiwan Carlos Closa, Center for Public Goods and Policies, Madrid, Spain Jean L. Cohen, Columbia University, USA Yasmin Dawood, University of Toronto, Canada Gráinne de Búrca, New York University, USA Avigail Eisenberg, University of Victoria, Canada Karin Fierke, St Andrews University, UK Ezzedine Choukri Fishere, American University of Cairo, Egypt GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":" ","pages":"f1 - f2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47027018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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