Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S2045381720000234
R. Abeyratne
Abstract This article examines how global constitutional norms are received and reconfigured by South Asian judiciaries. It makes two central claims. First, it argues that India, as the largest state in the region, acts as a filter through which Bangladesh and Sri Lanka receive both structural and rights-based global norms. Second, it contends that Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan courts adopt distinct approaches to the Indian case law. While Bangladesh mostly converges with the Indian jurisprudence, Sri Lanka engages with it but does not wholly adopt its conclusions. The article puts forward a preliminary explanation for these distinct approaches based on differences in the constitutional structures and political histories of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka vis-à-vis India.
{"title":"Global constitutionalism reconfigured through a regional lens","authors":"R. Abeyratne","doi":"10.1017/S2045381720000234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381720000234","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines how global constitutional norms are received and reconfigured by South Asian judiciaries. It makes two central claims. First, it argues that India, as the largest state in the region, acts as a filter through which Bangladesh and Sri Lanka receive both structural and rights-based global norms. Second, it contends that Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan courts adopt distinct approaches to the Indian case law. While Bangladesh mostly converges with the Indian jurisprudence, Sri Lanka engages with it but does not wholly adopt its conclusions. The article puts forward a preliminary explanation for these distinct approaches based on differences in the constitutional structures and political histories of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka vis-à-vis India.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"10 1","pages":"331 - 350"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47950423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S2045381721000174
Surabhi Chopra
Abstract This article examines the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines’ provisions on social and economic rights and welfare. It considers how the 1987 Constitution fits within the post-liberal paradigm of ‘transformative’ constitutional texts that emerged during democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s. It then analyses how the Supreme Court of the Philippines responded to the constitutional call for egalitarian socio-economic reform in the first fifteen years after the People Power revolution. The article highlights how the 1987 Constitution envisions far-reaching, progressive socio-economic change, and incorporates both social and economic rights as well as open-ended policy goals in this regard. The article argues that this hybrid approach to distributive justice creates a distinctive set of interpretive challenges for the judiciary. It then argues that the Philippine Supreme Court’s approach to these provisions in the years following the transition to democracy was perfunctory and somewhat inchoate. The court affirmed its jurisdiction over these provisions, but did not develop meaningful standards or principles in relation to them. The article points out that transformative constitutional texts place difficult demands on the judiciary in relation to social and economic rights. They prompt the judiciary into unfamiliar domains. At the same time, institutional legitimacy – including legitimacy on questions of distributive justice – requires judges to sustain the sense of a cogent boundary between constitutional law and politics. The article argues that these challenges were heightened in the Philippines by the textual ambiguity of the 1987 Constitution as well as the relative dearth of jurisprudential resources at the time. It concludes by considering the implications of the Philippines experience for the design of transformative constitutions.
{"title":"The Constitution of the Philippines and transformative constitutionalism","authors":"Surabhi Chopra","doi":"10.1017/S2045381721000174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381721000174","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines’ provisions on social and economic rights and welfare. It considers how the 1987 Constitution fits within the post-liberal paradigm of ‘transformative’ constitutional texts that emerged during democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s. It then analyses how the Supreme Court of the Philippines responded to the constitutional call for egalitarian socio-economic reform in the first fifteen years after the People Power revolution. The article highlights how the 1987 Constitution envisions far-reaching, progressive socio-economic change, and incorporates both social and economic rights as well as open-ended policy goals in this regard. The article argues that this hybrid approach to distributive justice creates a distinctive set of interpretive challenges for the judiciary. It then argues that the Philippine Supreme Court’s approach to these provisions in the years following the transition to democracy was perfunctory and somewhat inchoate. The court affirmed its jurisdiction over these provisions, but did not develop meaningful standards or principles in relation to them. The article points out that transformative constitutional texts place difficult demands on the judiciary in relation to social and economic rights. They prompt the judiciary into unfamiliar domains. At the same time, institutional legitimacy – including legitimacy on questions of distributive justice – requires judges to sustain the sense of a cogent boundary between constitutional law and politics. The article argues that these challenges were heightened in the Philippines by the textual ambiguity of the 1987 Constitution as well as the relative dearth of jurisprudential resources at the time. It concludes by considering the implications of the Philippines experience for the design of transformative constitutions.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"10 1","pages":"307 - 330"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47452020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-25DOI: 10.1017/s2045381721000113
Janne Mende
The contestation of global governance institutions can strengthen or weaken, as well as transform, them. This article analyses the productive potential of contestation and justification of global governance institutions by examining the multiple authorities that are invoked as auxiliaries in the process. It studies the (re-)construction of these authorities by dissecting authority into three components: power, legitimacy and connection to public interests. Empirically, the article focuses on the issue area of business and human rights, examining the highly contested process of drafting a binding instrument in the United Nations Treaty Process. The analysis shows that the success of the Treaty Process not only hinges on its direct reaction to contestation, but also on its ability to (re-)construct the multiple related authorities. Ultimately, the article argues that the contestation of global governance institutions involves (re-)constructing multiple authorities. This demonstrates how contestation can also affect global governance institutions, actors and norms beyond the specific field of deliberation.
{"title":"The contestation and construction of global governance authorities: A study from the global business and human rights regime","authors":"Janne Mende","doi":"10.1017/s2045381721000113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381721000113","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The contestation of global governance institutions can strengthen or weaken, as well as transform, them. This article analyses the productive potential of contestation and justification of global governance institutions by examining the multiple authorities that are invoked as auxiliaries in the process. It studies the (re-)construction of these authorities by dissecting authority into three components: power, legitimacy and connection to public interests. Empirically, the article focuses on the issue area of business and human rights, examining the highly contested process of drafting a binding instrument in the United Nations Treaty Process. The analysis shows that the success of the Treaty Process not only hinges on its direct reaction to contestation, but also on its ability to (re-)construct the multiple related authorities. Ultimately, the article argues that the contestation of global governance institutions involves (re-)constructing multiple authorities. This demonstrates how contestation can also affect global governance institutions, actors and norms beyond the specific field of deliberation.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s2045381721000113","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47253918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-21DOI: 10.1017/S2045381721000101
I. Bantekas
Abstract A state should be deemed to be enjoying fiscal sovereignty where it is effectively empowered, without pressure or coercion, to make all policy decisions required to run the state machinery and satisfy the fundamental needs of its people (at the very least), both individual and collective. A state’s effective policy and decision-making power is effectively curtailed where: (1) it has been substituted in these functions by a third state or an organ of that state; (2) it is prevented from taking a particular action, such as unilateral default; (3) it is forced to violate fundamental domestic laws, including its constitution or the result of a referendum; or (4) external pressure is exerted against its government and institutions, with the aim of creating volatility and uncertainty concerning its finances so it succumbs to such pressure.
{"title":"The contractualization of fiscal and parliamentary sovereignty: Towards a private international finance architecture?","authors":"I. Bantekas","doi":"10.1017/S2045381721000101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381721000101","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A state should be deemed to be enjoying fiscal sovereignty where it is effectively empowered, without pressure or coercion, to make all policy decisions required to run the state machinery and satisfy the fundamental needs of its people (at the very least), both individual and collective. A state’s effective policy and decision-making power is effectively curtailed where: (1) it has been substituted in these functions by a third state or an organ of that state; (2) it is prevented from taking a particular action, such as unilateral default; (3) it is forced to violate fundamental domestic laws, including its constitution or the result of a referendum; or (4) external pressure is exerted against its government and institutions, with the aim of creating volatility and uncertainty concerning its finances so it succumbs to such pressure.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"11 1","pages":"139 - 159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S2045381721000101","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42920141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-23DOI: 10.1017/S2045381721000058
Benjamin Alemparte
Abstract Before neoliberalism became global, it was an intellectual project that had a particular view of the power of constitutions to limit sovereign states, anchor economic freedoms and protect markets from democratic pressures for greater equality. In Latin America and the developing world, neoliberalism has long been identified with the political economy of the Washington Consensus. However, the comprehensive study of its legal foundations and institutional arrangements is still an area of limited scholarly attention. This article attempts to advance in that direction. By examining the work of Friedrich A. Hayek, Milton Friedman and James M. Buchanan, it explores a theory of neoliberal constitutionalism within Chile, the so-called first neoliberal laboratory. These authors visited the country during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–90), and were connected with top Chilean authorities as part of their global ambitions to implement their theoretical agendas in real-world scenarios. The article argues that Chile’s constitution-making process between 1973 and 1980 offered an on-site experiment in introducing neoliberal’s radical economic transformation. It addresses how the dictatorship’s natural law-based rule of law principles were compatible with the neoliberal constitutional ideology by supporting a distinctive view of the state’s role and designing the innovative institutional arrangements necessary to guarantee the market’s priority in the structural and rights dimension of the 1980 Constitution. In the wake of Chile’s recent constitutional change agenda, this article not only contributes to the existing debate by reflecting on the ideological origins of the still-persistent constitutional neoliberal features, but also works as a case study for evaluating new global turns towards authoritarian neoliberal politics.
{"title":"Towards a theory of neoliberal constitutionalism: Addressing Chile’s first constitution-making laboratory","authors":"Benjamin Alemparte","doi":"10.1017/S2045381721000058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381721000058","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Before neoliberalism became global, it was an intellectual project that had a particular view of the power of constitutions to limit sovereign states, anchor economic freedoms and protect markets from democratic pressures for greater equality. In Latin America and the developing world, neoliberalism has long been identified with the political economy of the Washington Consensus. However, the comprehensive study of its legal foundations and institutional arrangements is still an area of limited scholarly attention. This article attempts to advance in that direction. By examining the work of Friedrich A. Hayek, Milton Friedman and James M. Buchanan, it explores a theory of neoliberal constitutionalism within Chile, the so-called first neoliberal laboratory. These authors visited the country during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–90), and were connected with top Chilean authorities as part of their global ambitions to implement their theoretical agendas in real-world scenarios. The article argues that Chile’s constitution-making process between 1973 and 1980 offered an on-site experiment in introducing neoliberal’s radical economic transformation. It addresses how the dictatorship’s natural law-based rule of law principles were compatible with the neoliberal constitutional ideology by supporting a distinctive view of the state’s role and designing the innovative institutional arrangements necessary to guarantee the market’s priority in the structural and rights dimension of the 1980 Constitution. In the wake of Chile’s recent constitutional change agenda, this article not only contributes to the existing debate by reflecting on the ideological origins of the still-persistent constitutional neoliberal features, but also works as a case study for evaluating new global turns towards authoritarian neoliberal politics.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"11 1","pages":"83 - 109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S2045381721000058","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45018727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-11DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0006
S. Issacharoff
This chapter discusses the judicial oversight of democracy. Three cases indicate how courts act as guarantors of constitutional democracy, suggesting ways they could react to current populist challenges. First, from India, the basic structures decisions set forth the principle that certain constitutional changes, even if procedurally proper, can go too far in undermining the fundamental character of a democratic order. This series of decisions also claims for the judiciary the power and duty to judge when an amendment oversteps this line. Next, the South African Constitutional Court's decision rejecting the draft constitution to replace the apartheid system establishes that protections against untrammelled majority rule are among these basic features of constitutional democracy. Last, a decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia to disallow a president from running for a third term goes to how courts can protect competition in the political process. Rejecting a properly enacted constitutional amendment that would have permitted a president to run for a third term, the Court feared lack of rotation in office would chill political debate and contestation. Together, these decisions articulate a distinct challenge for apex courts confronting a challenge to the democratic process itself.
{"title":"Courts as Guarantors of Democracy","authors":"S. Issacharoff","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the judicial oversight of democracy. Three cases indicate how courts act as guarantors of constitutional democracy, suggesting ways they could react to current populist challenges. First, from India, the basic structures decisions set forth the principle that certain constitutional changes, even if procedurally proper, can go too far in undermining the fundamental character of a democratic order. This series of decisions also claims for the judiciary the power and duty to judge when an amendment oversteps this line. Next, the South African Constitutional Court's decision rejecting the draft constitution to replace the apartheid system establishes that protections against untrammelled majority rule are among these basic features of constitutional democracy. Last, a decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia to disallow a president from running for a third term goes to how courts can protect competition in the political process. Rejecting a properly enacted constitutional amendment that would have permitted a president to run for a third term, the Court feared lack of rotation in office would chill political debate and contestation. Together, these decisions articulate a distinct challenge for apex courts confronting a challenge to the democratic process itself.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72968070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-11DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0002
Andrei Marmor
This chapter describes the tension between democratic decision-making procedures and constitutional judicial review. It shows that the liberal values that justify a democratic self-government may also vindicate some limits on majoritarian decision-making procedures, but not necessarily in the form of the current constitutional regimes. The chapter argues that constitutional courts are not a necessary feature of a liberal regime. It also acknowledges that democratic decision-making has many defects. These defects concern the fate of persistent vulnerable minorities, the tendency towards short-sightedness, a similar tendency to downplay people's rights and liberties for the sake of greater economic gains or in the force of external threats, and finally the dangers of populism and anti-liberal politics gaining ground within a democratic system. The chapter then depicts courts as essentially conservative institutions which are not — and cannot be — as counter-majoritarian as depicted by legal scholars, mainly because their legitimacy and the acceptance of their decisions depends on the people. It contends that the acceptance and efficacy of judicial review is context dependent, but that some fights still need to be fought in the political, not the legal arena.
{"title":"Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and Democracy","authors":"Andrei Marmor","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes the tension between democratic decision-making procedures and constitutional judicial review. It shows that the liberal values that justify a democratic self-government may also vindicate some limits on majoritarian decision-making procedures, but not necessarily in the form of the current constitutional regimes. The chapter argues that constitutional courts are not a necessary feature of a liberal regime. It also acknowledges that democratic decision-making has many defects. These defects concern the fate of persistent vulnerable minorities, the tendency towards short-sightedness, a similar tendency to downplay people's rights and liberties for the sake of greater economic gains or in the force of external threats, and finally the dangers of populism and anti-liberal politics gaining ground within a democratic system. The chapter then depicts courts as essentially conservative institutions which are not — and cannot be — as counter-majoritarian as depicted by legal scholars, mainly because their legitimacy and the acceptance of their decisions depends on the people. It contends that the acceptance and efficacy of judicial review is context dependent, but that some fights still need to be fought in the political, not the legal arena.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75760910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-11DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0018
M. Ndulo
This chapter illustrates the role of international and foreign law in domestic constitutional law. Through the case analysis of South Africa (a post conflict state) and the United States (often seen as a country that is not too friendly to international and foreign legal systems), it discusses the role of international and foreign law in reconciling the regional development of the rule of law in a country, by working closely together with domestic constitutional law. The domestic courts both in the United States and South Africa, whenever they deem it appropriate, do consider international and foreign law in the resolution of disputes before them. The conditions under which each jurisdiction may resort to foreign or international law, as well as the criteria used for taking them into consideration, vary. However, most importantly, this practice should be encouraged as it promotes the uniform interpretation of international law and the progressive advancement of norms world-wide, which are aspects that are especially important in the field of human rights.
{"title":"International and Foreign Law in Domestic Constitutional Law","authors":"M. Ndulo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0018","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter illustrates the role of international and foreign law in domestic constitutional law. Through the case analysis of South Africa (a post conflict state) and the United States (often seen as a country that is not too friendly to international and foreign legal systems), it discusses the role of international and foreign law in reconciling the regional development of the rule of law in a country, by working closely together with domestic constitutional law. The domestic courts both in the United States and South Africa, whenever they deem it appropriate, do consider international and foreign law in the resolution of disputes before them. The conditions under which each jurisdiction may resort to foreign or international law, as well as the criteria used for taking them into consideration, vary. However, most importantly, this practice should be encouraged as it promotes the uniform interpretation of international law and the progressive advancement of norms world-wide, which are aspects that are especially important in the field of human rights.","PeriodicalId":37136,"journal":{"name":"Global Constitutionalism","volume":"2015 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82620620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S2045381720000027
B. Tamanaha
Abstract This commentary on Jeremy Waldron’s essay, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Courts’, applies a holistic perspective on the rule of law and judging situated within a broader complex of surrounding social, cultural, economic and political factors and institutions.
本文对杰里米·沃尔德伦(Jeremy Waldron)的文章《法治与法院的角色》(The Rule of Law and roles of Courts)进行了评论，从整体的角度来看待法治和审判，并将其置于更广泛的社会、文化、经济和政治因素与制度的复杂环境中。
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