Abstract The aim of the present study is to analyze the framing of the group of citizens referred to as “desolates” in the Czech nationwide media. Using the method of discourse analysis on a sample of media texts from the period October 2022 – March 2023, we identified two types of framing present in media discourse: (i) frame of desolates as disobedient citizens, (ii) frame of desolates as concerned citizens. Meanwhile, the basic nodal point of this discourse is the enforcement of the social norm of the “correct” and “suitable” citizen, on which both identified frames are based. The two frames interact simultaneously with each other – the former functions to define “desolates” as a socially and politically undesirable phenomenon, while the latter reactively defends “desolates” as “concerned ordinary citizens”.
{"title":"The Framing of the “Desolate” in Czech Nationwide Media","authors":"Michaela Fikejzová, Martin Charvát","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of the present study is to analyze the framing of the group of citizens referred to as “desolates” in the Czech nationwide media. Using the method of discourse analysis on a sample of media texts from the period October 2022 – March 2023, we identified two types of framing present in media discourse: (i) frame of desolates as disobedient citizens, (ii) frame of desolates as concerned citizens. Meanwhile, the basic nodal point of this discourse is the enforcement of the social norm of the “correct” and “suitable” citizen, on which both identified frames are based. The two frames interact simultaneously with each other – the former functions to define “desolates” as a socially and politically undesirable phenomenon, while the latter reactively defends “desolates” as “concerned ordinary citizens”.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135389430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the foreign policy of Hungary by looking at the emotional underpinnings of the relationship between Fidesz and Germany. Inspired by the ‘emotional turn’ in social sciences in general, and IR in particular, this paper charts the changing ways in which Fidesz politicians (both in government and opposition) have perceived Germany and German politics on an emotional level since 1990. We show how a mostly positive emotional climate before 2010 slowly turned into anger, culminating in repeated allusions to Germany’s Nazi past. The main question is: how can we account for the fluctuations in the way Fidesz politicians have perceived Germany over the past three decades? While ‘rational’ policy disagreements have certainly played a part (i.e. on migration), they cannot explain on their own the ever intensifying anger on the part of Fidesz decision-makers, especially as the two countries are still close political and economic partners and share a wide range of common interests. Complementing rational approaches, we propose that ‘collective narcissism’ informs the general emotional disposition of key Fidesz figures since 2014, leading to a continuing estrangement between the successive Orbán governments and its German partners.
{"title":"From Respect to Nazi Allusions: The Changing Emotional Climates of Fidesz Towards Germany after 1990","authors":"András Hettyey","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the foreign policy of Hungary by looking at the emotional underpinnings of the relationship between Fidesz and Germany. Inspired by the ‘emotional turn’ in social sciences in general, and IR in particular, this paper charts the changing ways in which Fidesz politicians (both in government and opposition) have perceived Germany and German politics on an emotional level since 1990. We show how a mostly positive emotional climate before 2010 slowly turned into anger, culminating in repeated allusions to Germany’s Nazi past. The main question is: how can we account for the fluctuations in the way Fidesz politicians have perceived Germany over the past three decades? While ‘rational’ policy disagreements have certainly played a part (i.e. on migration), they cannot explain on their own the ever intensifying anger on the part of Fidesz decision-makers, especially as the two countries are still close political and economic partners and share a wide range of common interests. Complementing rational approaches, we propose that ‘collective narcissism’ informs the general emotional disposition of key Fidesz figures since 2014, leading to a continuing estrangement between the successive Orbán governments and its German partners.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135587782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In a complex information environment, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents a major challenge to the communication of political leaders throughout the world. The objective of this article is to analyse the frames and sentiments used by German chancellor Olaf Scholz, employing a novel data set of his Twitter communication (N = 612) during the Russian invasion of Ukraine between 24 February 2022 and 24 February 2023. A combination of computational text analysis approaches with natural language processing (NLP) techniques was used, including the Valence Aware Dictionary and the sentiment Reasoner (VADER) model for sentiment analysis and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) for topic modelling. This research investigates the prevalent frames and emotions in the chancellor’s communication, providing valuable insights into the German government’s stance and strategic communication during this critical geopolitical event. The results of the study revealed that the chancellor used the frames ‘effects of the Ukraine invasion’, ‘climate & environment’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘Russian aggression’ and communicated with positive sentiments. By examining the chancellor’s Twitter communication, this study contributes to the understanding of political communication in the digital era, particularly in the context of international crises, and offers implications for policymakers, scholars and the broader public.
{"title":"Frames and sentiments of the Twitter communication by German Chancellor Scholz during the Russian invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Stefan Nisch","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a complex information environment, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents a major challenge to the communication of political leaders throughout the world. The objective of this article is to analyse the frames and sentiments used by German chancellor Olaf Scholz, employing a novel data set of his Twitter communication (N = 612) during the Russian invasion of Ukraine between 24 February 2022 and 24 February 2023. A combination of computational text analysis approaches with natural language processing (NLP) techniques was used, including the Valence Aware Dictionary and the sentiment Reasoner (VADER) model for sentiment analysis and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) for topic modelling. This research investigates the prevalent frames and emotions in the chancellor’s communication, providing valuable insights into the German government’s stance and strategic communication during this critical geopolitical event. The results of the study revealed that the chancellor used the frames ‘effects of the Ukraine invasion’, ‘climate & environment’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘Russian aggression’ and communicated with positive sentiments. By examining the chancellor’s Twitter communication, this study contributes to the understanding of political communication in the digital era, particularly in the context of international crises, and offers implications for policymakers, scholars and the broader public.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135587784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Committees of inquiry in the Austrian National Council gained a significant upgrade through a reform in 2015: for the first time, a parliamentary minority can now demand the establishment of a committee of inquiry. This reform meant not only a strengthening of control rights, but also an increase in parliamentary investigations in Austria. The aim of this article is to shed light on the parliamentary perspective and to deepen the understanding of investigative committees. In this way, it is to be shown which potentials, but also weaknesses, can be found in the investigative instrument from the MPs’ point of view. A first-time survey of members of committees of inquiry showed that the perceptions of the reform and the democratic benefits differed greatly between the governing party ÖVP and the opposition party SPÖ. The increasing polarisation of the political debate also led to a further divergence in the approval or rejection of the investigative instrument. These developments may not only result in a weakening of the investigative instrument, but also directly challenge parliamentary democracy.
{"title":"The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry in the Austrian National Council – Influence and Impact from the Perspective of the Austrian National Council Members","authors":"Matthias Keppel","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Committees of inquiry in the Austrian National Council gained a significant upgrade through a reform in 2015: for the first time, a parliamentary minority can now demand the establishment of a committee of inquiry. This reform meant not only a strengthening of control rights, but also an increase in parliamentary investigations in Austria. The aim of this article is to shed light on the parliamentary perspective and to deepen the understanding of investigative committees. In this way, it is to be shown which potentials, but also weaknesses, can be found in the investigative instrument from the MPs’ point of view. A first-time survey of members of committees of inquiry showed that the perceptions of the reform and the democratic benefits differed greatly between the governing party ÖVP and the opposition party SPÖ. The increasing polarisation of the political debate also led to a further divergence in the approval or rejection of the investigative instrument. These developments may not only result in a weakening of the investigative instrument, but also directly challenge parliamentary democracy.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135587786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A crucial role in the primary socialisation is played by parents who are upbringing and educating children about various aspects of life. They also significantly influence child’s knowledge and experience of the digital media through examples, conversations and experiences. However, the process of media education has become a challenging task for parents to achieve. As current fastpaced processes of digitization are constantly changing, adults themselves are often faced with figuring out and adopting new ways of digital media related behaviours and attitudes. In past decade expert recommendations and guidelines on screen exposure and media education of children have been widely disseminated aiming to support parents in their choices in conducting media education of their children. In this article we confirm that parent’s familiarity with the expert recommendations regarding the use of media for children results in a significantly lower screen exposure of their preschool children and in higher frequency of implementing beneficial media education practices.
{"title":"Parent empowerment can change media education","authors":"Mateja Rek","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A crucial role in the primary socialisation is played by parents who are upbringing and educating children about various aspects of life. They also significantly influence child’s knowledge and experience of the digital media through examples, conversations and experiences. However, the process of media education has become a challenging task for parents to achieve. As current fastpaced processes of digitization are constantly changing, adults themselves are often faced with figuring out and adopting new ways of digital media related behaviours and attitudes. In past decade expert recommendations and guidelines on screen exposure and media education of children have been widely disseminated aiming to support parents in their choices in conducting media education of their children. In this article we confirm that parent’s familiarity with the expert recommendations regarding the use of media for children results in a significantly lower screen exposure of their preschool children and in higher frequency of implementing beneficial media education practices.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135389418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In the last decade, the Czech Republic’s foreign and security policy were destabilised with the activities of external actors, with Russia in the leading role, and also internal actors who followed the Russian and pro-Kremlin propaganda and disinformation campaigns and/or actively participated in such subversive activities. After 2015, within the set of crises and their securitisation, the disinformation network in Czechia was developed using the social media and the so-called alternative online media for the dissemination of disinformation, misinformation, fake news and chain mails including and disseminating these campaigns. As far as the leading persons in the executive belonged to the disinformers, the government did not develop working strategies against the disinformation campaigns as the new hybrid threat until 2021. At the end of 2021, the new government of Prime Minister Petr Fiala commenced in the Czech Republic with a new strategy regarding the hybrid threats, including disinformation. The one-year plan to establish the systemic platform for the struggle against such threats was challenged with the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The surprisingly strong response to disinformation campaigns after February 24, 2022, suggested a more systematic approach by the government against fake news and incitement to hatred. A year and a half on, however, we are seeing a stalling in place.
{"title":"Struggle against Disinformation in the Czech Republic: Treading the Water","authors":"Ladislav Cabada","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the last decade, the Czech Republic’s foreign and security policy were destabilised with the activities of external actors, with Russia in the leading role, and also internal actors who followed the Russian and pro-Kremlin propaganda and disinformation campaigns and/or actively participated in such subversive activities. After 2015, within the set of crises and their securitisation, the disinformation network in Czechia was developed using the social media and the so-called alternative online media for the dissemination of disinformation, misinformation, fake news and chain mails including and disseminating these campaigns. As far as the leading persons in the executive belonged to the disinformers, the government did not develop working strategies against the disinformation campaigns as the new hybrid threat until 2021. At the end of 2021, the new government of Prime Minister Petr Fiala commenced in the Czech Republic with a new strategy regarding the hybrid threats, including disinformation. The one-year plan to establish the systemic platform for the struggle against such threats was challenged with the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The surprisingly strong response to disinformation campaigns after February 24, 2022, suggested a more systematic approach by the government against fake news and incitement to hatred. A year and a half on, however, we are seeing a stalling in place.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135389309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The paper’s key puzzle is the variation in lockdown-related democratic decline in the region of Central and Southeast Europe given the incumbents’ ideological and regime (dis)similarity. Why did similar regimes not respond to the pandemic in the same manner by using the opportunity to grab more executive power and diminish the authority of other institutions? While some argue that a state of emergency provides an ideal opportunity for democratic decline due to reduced costs, others believe that autocratic regimes with a ‘pre-existing condition for autocracy’ are more vulnerable. To contribute to this discussion, I examine three examples from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) during the pandemic-related state of emergency and lockdowns of 2020 and 2021. I consider several relevant factors, the most important of which is the prospect of winning the next election. To erode democracy, autocratic incumbents must feel insecure about the outcome of the next election to use the opportunity created by the state of emergency. If they are uncertain of victory, they may prefer to expand their executive powers during the state of emergency, thus undermining democracy.
{"title":"Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe","authors":"Dušan Pavlović","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper’s key puzzle is the variation in lockdown-related democratic decline in the region of Central and Southeast Europe given the incumbents’ ideological and regime (dis)similarity. Why did similar regimes not respond to the pandemic in the same manner by using the opportunity to grab more executive power and diminish the authority of other institutions? While some argue that a state of emergency provides an ideal opportunity for democratic decline due to reduced costs, others believe that autocratic regimes with a ‘pre-existing condition for autocracy’ are more vulnerable. To contribute to this discussion, I examine three examples from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) during the pandemic-related state of emergency and lockdowns of 2020 and 2021. I consider several relevant factors, the most important of which is the prospect of winning the next election. To erode democracy, autocratic incumbents must feel insecure about the outcome of the next election to use the opportunity created by the state of emergency. If they are uncertain of victory, they may prefer to expand their executive powers during the state of emergency, thus undermining democracy.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135587781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The article deals with the rise of populism in connection with the functioning of the media and the role of media literacy in the receptivity of citizens to populist messages. The assumption is that the media play a dual role in this context: on the one hand, they make people susceptible to populist messages, and on the other hand, they can train them to become resistant to them. The quality of media communication affects the level of media literacy, i.e. the ability of people to understand and reflect on messages that are being disseminated by mass media, both traditional and online ones. The author claims that media literacy is the main protection against negative media phenomena such as disinformation and fake news. At the same time, it makes citizens resilient to those political messages that contain these elements on which populist politics is often based.
{"title":"Populism, Media Messaging, and Media Literacy","authors":"Matevž Tomšič","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article deals with the rise of populism in connection with the functioning of the media and the role of media literacy in the receptivity of citizens to populist messages. The assumption is that the media play a dual role in this context: on the one hand, they make people susceptible to populist messages, and on the other hand, they can train them to become resistant to them. The quality of media communication affects the level of media literacy, i.e. the ability of people to understand and reflect on messages that are being disseminated by mass media, both traditional and online ones. The author claims that media literacy is the main protection against negative media phenomena such as disinformation and fake news. At the same time, it makes citizens resilient to those political messages that contain these elements on which populist politics is often based.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135389311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Leadership, as the most important function of management, involves dealing with people and interpersonal aspects through motivating, achieving better productivity, people’s satisfaction, a favourable working climate and a balance of effectiveness and efficiency, with the aim of achieving the organization’s goals in a changing environment. Now that in modern management the focus is on soft variables and people, their needs and desires, the question arises what are the challenges and opportunities of leading different generations in a business environment that differ from each other in their values, attitudes and behaviours? The authors will analyse the above through three components of leadership, motivation, leadership styles and communication. There are currently four generations in the working population: Baby Boomers, Generation X, Generation Y and Generation Z. If the consideration is extended to top management at the national level and to political leadership, it is expected that the challenges and opportunities of leading different generations are even more complex, because the working population is joined by the Traditionalist generation, which is retired, but also by the Alpha generation, whose entry into the working population expected in a few years. Additionally, political leadership encompasses a nation’s entire populace as well as all of its social issues in an indirect manner. In addition to generational differences, leadership is also faced with the challenge of a changing environment, which is quite unstable nowadays and thus poses an even greater challenge to leadership.
{"title":"Challenges and Opportunities of Leading Different Generations – the Case of Slovenia","authors":"Marina Pajić Ivanović, Janez Kolar","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Leadership, as the most important function of management, involves dealing with people and interpersonal aspects through motivating, achieving better productivity, people’s satisfaction, a favourable working climate and a balance of effectiveness and efficiency, with the aim of achieving the organization’s goals in a changing environment. Now that in modern management the focus is on soft variables and people, their needs and desires, the question arises what are the challenges and opportunities of leading different generations in a business environment that differ from each other in their values, attitudes and behaviours? The authors will analyse the above through three components of leadership, motivation, leadership styles and communication. There are currently four generations in the working population: Baby Boomers, Generation X, Generation Y and Generation Z. If the consideration is extended to top management at the national level and to political leadership, it is expected that the challenges and opportunities of leading different generations are even more complex, because the working population is joined by the Traditionalist generation, which is retired, but also by the Alpha generation, whose entry into the working population expected in a few years. Additionally, political leadership encompasses a nation’s entire populace as well as all of its social issues in an indirect manner. In addition to generational differences, leadership is also faced with the challenge of a changing environment, which is quite unstable nowadays and thus poses an even greater challenge to leadership.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135389434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The authors are testing the patterns of geographical representation in single nationwide district closed-list PR systems, in the framework of an earlier study made by Latner and McGann (2005), who suggested that MPs mostly reside in central metropolitan areas, as well as in distant regions, to the detriment of descriptive representation of areas adjacent to the capital. In this way, spatial distance serves as an incentive for parties to nominate lists comprised mostly of candidates from metropolitan urban centres who can easily reach the mid-distance municipalities for campaigning and constituency service, but also of those candidates residing in peripheral regions in which there is some sort of political or ethno-cultural saliency, prompting the voters to prefer their local candidates over capital city politicians. Authors are offering a novel approach of measuring and comparing spatial distance to the data on representation of local administrative units and regional subdivisions of four countries (Montenegro, Netherlands, Serbia and Slovakia). While the findings indeed indicate overrepresentation of capital cities and underrepresentation of neighbouring areas, the representation of peripheral areas is not significantly pronounced and seemingly depends more on a contextual case-to-case basis than on a general pattern related to spatial distance producing political or ethno-cultural saliency.
{"title":"Spatial Distance and Representation in Closed PR List: Revisiting the U-Curve Argument","authors":"Dejan Bursać, Dušan Radujko","doi":"10.2478/pce-2023-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The authors are testing the patterns of geographical representation in single nationwide district closed-list PR systems, in the framework of an earlier study made by Latner and McGann (2005), who suggested that MPs mostly reside in central metropolitan areas, as well as in distant regions, to the detriment of descriptive representation of areas adjacent to the capital. In this way, spatial distance serves as an incentive for parties to nominate lists comprised mostly of candidates from metropolitan urban centres who can easily reach the mid-distance municipalities for campaigning and constituency service, but also of those candidates residing in peripheral regions in which there is some sort of political or ethno-cultural saliency, prompting the voters to prefer their local candidates over capital city politicians. Authors are offering a novel approach of measuring and comparing spatial distance to the data on representation of local administrative units and regional subdivisions of four countries (Montenegro, Netherlands, Serbia and Slovakia). While the findings indeed indicate overrepresentation of capital cities and underrepresentation of neighbouring areas, the representation of peripheral areas is not significantly pronounced and seemingly depends more on a contextual case-to-case basis than on a general pattern related to spatial distance producing political or ethno-cultural saliency.","PeriodicalId":37403,"journal":{"name":"Politics in Central Europe","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135587775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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