The conventional interpretation of the pari passu clause found in sovereign debt contracts depends on whether the claim is secured or unsecured. We are told that ratable payments pari passus would be reserved for secured debts only (the idea being that each creditor should get an equally proportional share of the collateral pie). Unsecured debt transactions should not make such a promise of payments equality, would go the argument, with the proper meaning of pari passu in such context being just a pledge not to legally subordinate among similarly-situated creditors. I have found a 1920s example of a pro-rata payments pari passu promise for unsecured sovereign debt. This high-profile case (a critical component of the crucial post-World War I intergovernmental debt restructuring negotiations) can be added to the ever growing list of samples of sovereign ratable payments pari passus that have been found out there. A veritable flood of ratability (both from ancient and current sources) that contrasts sharply with the current efforts by many leading academics, lawyers, policymakers, and financiers to have ratable payments erased from the sovereign debt land. The 1920s pari passu described here is relevant not only due to the unsecured nature of the debt (we had been told that such pari passu was not supposed to exist), but also because it allows us to muse about the presence of the clause in pure sovereign-on-sovereign debt transactions. We wonder: does sovereign-on-sovereign lending carry pari passu clauses? what kind of parity would sovereign creditors enjoy amongst themselves? should the meaning and interpretation of pari passu differ, just because of the differing nature of the lenders? While this last question is not definitively tackled, it seems clear that the 1920s pari passu (authored by none other than Winston Churchill) can provide us with important teachings about the mysterious two Latin words. Above all, and when combined with other similar evidence, the main conclusion may be that the chimerical unsecured ratable payments pari passu, the Unicorn, the Area 51, the Loch Ness Monster of the sovereign debt markets, may have been much more real than presumed.
{"title":"Churchill's Pari Passu","authors":"Pablo Triana","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2846778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2846778","url":null,"abstract":"The conventional interpretation of the pari passu clause found in sovereign debt contracts depends on whether the claim is secured or unsecured. We are told that ratable payments pari passus would be reserved for secured debts only (the idea being that each creditor should get an equally proportional share of the collateral pie). Unsecured debt transactions should not make such a promise of payments equality, would go the argument, with the proper meaning of pari passu in such context being just a pledge not to legally subordinate among similarly-situated creditors. I have found a 1920s example of a pro-rata payments pari passu promise for unsecured sovereign debt. This high-profile case (a critical component of the crucial post-World War I intergovernmental debt restructuring negotiations) can be added to the ever growing list of samples of sovereign ratable payments pari passus that have been found out there. A veritable flood of ratability (both from ancient and current sources) that contrasts sharply with the current efforts by many leading academics, lawyers, policymakers, and financiers to have ratable payments erased from the sovereign debt land. The 1920s pari passu described here is relevant not only due to the unsecured nature of the debt (we had been told that such pari passu was not supposed to exist), but also because it allows us to muse about the presence of the clause in pure sovereign-on-sovereign debt transactions. We wonder: does sovereign-on-sovereign lending carry pari passu clauses? what kind of parity would sovereign creditors enjoy amongst themselves? should the meaning and interpretation of pari passu differ, just because of the differing nature of the lenders? While this last question is not definitively tackled, it seems clear that the 1920s pari passu (authored by none other than Winston Churchill) can provide us with important teachings about the mysterious two Latin words. Above all, and when combined with other similar evidence, the main conclusion may be that the chimerical unsecured ratable payments pari passu, the Unicorn, the Area 51, the Loch Ness Monster of the sovereign debt markets, may have been much more real than presumed.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124523939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The most prominent Italian theorist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Antonio de Viti de Marco, accepted David Ricardo’s proposition that an extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. Despite this common point of analytical departure, their theories of public debt diverged sharply. In this divergence, moreover, lies a fundamental gulf between two distinct analytical schemes for connecting the micro and macro levels of analysis. Ricardo treated macro aggregates as analytical primitives, with individual action being induced from those aggregates. In sharp contrast, de Viti took individual variables as primitive, with aggregate conditions being induced from interaction among those individual variables. Within de Viti’s framework of a fully cooperative state, public debt would be self-extinguishing. De Viti also recognized that democracies were never exclusively cooperative, as continuing competition among elites striving for power would enable politically dominant groups to pass cost onto the remainder of society, thereby operating as a de facto form of default.
19世纪末和20世纪初最著名的意大利理论家安东尼奥·德·维蒂·德·马可(Antonio de Viti de Marco)接受了大卫·李嘉图(David Ricardo)的主张，即特别税收和公共贷款是等价的。尽管分析出发点相同，但他们对公共债务的理论却大相径庭。此外，在这种分歧中，存在着连接微观和宏观分析水平的两种截然不同的分析方案之间的根本鸿沟。李嘉图将宏观集合视为分析原语，个体行为由这些集合诱导。与之形成鲜明对比的是，de Viti将个体变量视为原始变量，并通过这些个体变量之间的相互作用诱导出聚合条件。在德维提提出的一个完全合作的国家框架内，公共债务将会自我熄灭。德·维提还认识到，民主从来不是完全合作的，因为精英们争夺权力的持续竞争将使政治上占主导地位的群体把成本转嫁给社会的其余部分，从而作为一种事实上的违约形式运作。
{"title":"De Viti De Marco vs. Ricardo on Public Debt: Self Extinction or Default?","authors":"G. Eusepi, R. Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2776984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776984","url":null,"abstract":"The most prominent Italian theorist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Antonio de Viti de Marco, accepted David Ricardo’s proposition that an extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. Despite this common point of analytical departure, their theories of public debt diverged sharply. In this divergence, moreover, lies a fundamental gulf between two distinct analytical schemes for connecting the micro and macro levels of analysis. Ricardo treated macro aggregates as analytical primitives, with individual action being induced from those aggregates. In sharp contrast, de Viti took individual variables as primitive, with aggregate conditions being induced from interaction among those individual variables. Within de Viti’s framework of a fully cooperative state, public debt would be self-extinguishing. De Viti also recognized that democracies were never exclusively cooperative, as continuing competition among elites striving for power would enable politically dominant groups to pass cost onto the remainder of society, thereby operating as a de facto form of default.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121943322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-01DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/10939.003.0011
Eiji Fujii
Currency mismatch makes a debtor country suffer from domestic depreciation by magnifying the burden of its external debt. Because external debt can be repaid by exporting more than importing, a crucial channel for inducing recovery is net exports. However, the argument that domestic depreciation correspondingly boosts net exports is not warranted if currency compositions differ substantially between debt and trade. This study examines the association between the debt revaluation and trade competitiveness gain effects of exchange rate fluctuations for middle- and low-income countries. The empirical results suggest that currency-compositional discord between debt and trade has significant welfare implications.
{"title":"External Debt and International Trade: Another Mismatch","authors":"Eiji Fujii","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/10939.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10939.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Currency mismatch makes a debtor country suffer from domestic depreciation by magnifying the burden of its external debt. Because external debt can be repaid by exporting more than importing, a crucial channel for inducing recovery is net exports. However, the argument that domestic depreciation correspondingly boosts net exports is not warranted if currency compositions differ substantially between debt and trade. This study examines the association between the debt revaluation and trade competitiveness gain effects of exchange rate fluctuations for middle- and low-income countries. The empirical results suggest that currency-compositional discord between debt and trade has significant welfare implications.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132967979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the political economy of after merger effects of the large scale municipal amalgamations in the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg in the early 1970s. By exploiting the huge variance in the amalgamation process in terms of number of participating municipalities, municipality size or amalgamation strategy we identify considerable common pool effects. Amalgamations can create a common pool, as the former independent municipalities have now access to more resources. Common pool exploitation is stronger the more municipalities participate and when municipalities amalgamate by annexation. Additionally, voter involvement is lower in amalgamated municipalities.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Municipal Amalgamation - Evidence of Common Pool Effects and Local Public Debt","authors":"Benedikt S. L. Fritz, Lars P. Feld","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2727112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2727112","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the political economy of after merger effects of the large scale municipal amalgamations in the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg in the early 1970s. By exploiting the huge variance in the amalgamation process in terms of number of participating municipalities, municipality size or amalgamation strategy we identify considerable common pool effects. Amalgamations can create a common pool, as the former independent municipalities have now access to more resources. Common pool exploitation is stronger the more municipalities participate and when municipalities amalgamate by annexation. Additionally, voter involvement is lower in amalgamated municipalities.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124548275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the issue of the Greek public debt from different perspectives. We provide a historical discussion of the accumulation of Greece's public debt since the 1960s and the role of public debt in the recent crisis. We show that the austerity imposed since 2010 has been unsuccessful in stabilizing the debt while at the same time taking a heavy toll on the Greek economy and society. The experience of the last six years shows that the country's public debt is clearly unsustainable, and therefore a bold restructuring is needed. An insistence on the current policies is not justifiable either on pragmatic or on moral or any other grounds. The experience of Germany in the early post-World War II period provides some useful hints for the way forward. A solution to the Greek public debt problem is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the solution of the Greek and wider European crisis. A broader agenda that deals with the malaises of the Greek economy and the structural imbalances of the eurozone is of vital importance.
{"title":"The Greek Public Debt Problem","authors":"M. Nikiforos, D. Papadimitriou, G. Zezza","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2781682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2781682","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the issue of the Greek public debt from different perspectives. We provide a historical discussion of the accumulation of Greece's public debt since the 1960s and the role of public debt in the recent crisis. We show that the austerity imposed since 2010 has been unsuccessful in stabilizing the debt while at the same time taking a heavy toll on the Greek economy and society. The experience of the last six years shows that the country's public debt is clearly unsustainable, and therefore a bold restructuring is needed. An insistence on the current policies is not justifiable either on pragmatic or on moral or any other grounds. The experience of Germany in the early post-World War II period provides some useful hints for the way forward. A solution to the Greek public debt problem is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the solution of the Greek and wider European crisis. A broader agenda that deals with the malaises of the Greek economy and the structural imbalances of the eurozone is of vital importance.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117117350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-11-01DOI: 10.1016/J.JBANKFIN.2016.06.005
Hanwen Chen, H. Huang, Gerald J. Lobo, Chong Wang
{"title":"Religiosity and the Cost of Debt","authors":"Hanwen Chen, H. Huang, Gerald J. Lobo, Chong Wang","doi":"10.1016/J.JBANKFIN.2016.06.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JBANKFIN.2016.06.005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119210653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-30DOI: 10.5709/ce.1897-9254.164
N. Ribeiro, Susana Jorge
The objective of this research is to analyze whether the political-ideological situation of municipalities affects their debt level, considering evidence from Portugal for the period 2004-2013. A static panel data model is applied, incorporating factors such as political ideology, political-electoral cycle, governance format, coincidence of the political parties between Local Executive and Local Assembly and coincidence of the political parties between the Local Executive and Central Government. An additional variable to control the effects of the economic crisis between 2008 and 2010 is also considered. Based on the assumptions of the public choice theory, findings show a statistically significant relationship for the political-electoral cycle, allowing the conclusion that, given the evidence from Portuguese municipalities, debt increases in election years. Nevertheless, this is the only factor in the political-ideological circumstances that was found to be relevant in its effect on local authorities’ debt levels. It is also clear that the financial crisis in the period 2008-2010 likewise had a positive impact.The paper contributes to the strengthening of the debate on the association between municipalities’ political circumstances and debt, namely, in regards to strategic (electoral) debt cycles in local government.
{"title":"Political-Ideological Circumstances and Local Authorities’ Debt: Evidence From Portuguese Municipalities","authors":"N. Ribeiro, Susana Jorge","doi":"10.5709/ce.1897-9254.164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5709/ce.1897-9254.164","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this research is to analyze whether the political-ideological situation of municipalities affects their debt level, considering evidence from Portugal for the period 2004-2013. A static panel data model is applied, incorporating factors such as political ideology, political-electoral cycle, governance format, coincidence of the political parties between Local Executive and Local Assembly and coincidence of the political parties between the Local Executive and Central Government. An additional variable to control the effects of the economic crisis between 2008 and 2010 is also considered. Based on the assumptions of the public choice theory, findings show a statistically significant relationship for the political-electoral cycle, allowing the conclusion that, given the evidence from Portuguese municipalities, debt increases in election years. Nevertheless, this is the only factor in the political-ideological circumstances that was found to be relevant in its effect on local authorities’ debt levels. It is also clear that the financial crisis in the period 2008-2010 likewise had a positive impact.The paper contributes to the strengthening of the debate on the association between municipalities’ political circumstances and debt, namely, in regards to strategic (electoral) debt cycles in local government.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"291 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121829074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulated fund holdings of emerging market stocks and bonds have grown significantly in the past decade. This growth is part of a broader trend of investors seeking greater exposure to emerging markets, and these flows have supported strong growth in emerging economies. From 2010 to 2014, emerging market economies received cumulative gross portfolio capital flows of $1.4 trillion. A small fraction of those inflows — less than $200 billion — came from regulated funds. New empirical results in this report suggest that there are three main reasons that regulated fund are unlikely to pose systemic risk to emerging markets. First, regulated fund holdings of emerging market securities remain a small portion of the total value of the stocks and bonds of emerging market countries. Second, while regulated funds represent a sizable part of the foreign investor base in emerging market countries, they are a stable investor base. Third, regulated fund holdings are diversified across a wide number of emerging economies, which limits the effects of their portfolio transactions on any particular country. In monthly data, returns on emerging market securities are explained by factors other than funds’ net purchases of emerging market stocks and bonds — most significantly by capital flows from other (non-fund) foreign investors. Also, in weekly data, regulated funds’ net purchases of emerging market securities do not drive returns. Weekly data show that while net purchases respond with a lag to returns on emerging market securities, those purchases do not have a persistent effect on future returns.
{"title":"Regulated Funds, Emerging Markets, and Financial Stability","authors":"Chris Plantier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2592260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2592260","url":null,"abstract":"Regulated fund holdings of emerging market stocks and bonds have grown significantly in the past decade. This growth is part of a broader trend of investors seeking greater exposure to emerging markets, and these flows have supported strong growth in emerging economies. From 2010 to 2014, emerging market economies received cumulative gross portfolio capital flows of $1.4 trillion. A small fraction of those inflows — less than $200 billion — came from regulated funds. New empirical results in this report suggest that there are three main reasons that regulated fund are unlikely to pose systemic risk to emerging markets. First, regulated fund holdings of emerging market securities remain a small portion of the total value of the stocks and bonds of emerging market countries. Second, while regulated funds represent a sizable part of the foreign investor base in emerging market countries, they are a stable investor base. Third, regulated fund holdings are diversified across a wide number of emerging economies, which limits the effects of their portfolio transactions on any particular country. In monthly data, returns on emerging market securities are explained by factors other than funds’ net purchases of emerging market stocks and bonds — most significantly by capital flows from other (non-fund) foreign investors. Also, in weekly data, regulated funds’ net purchases of emerging market securities do not drive returns. Weekly data show that while net purchases respond with a lag to returns on emerging market securities, those purchases do not have a persistent effect on future returns.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129255499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the present paper an empirical analysis will point out that Government Debt as a percentage of GDP has a negative impact on the Italian economy regarding economic growth. Data are taken from Eurostat. The elaboration of these panel data is made feasible by means of the Eviews software package.
{"title":"Government Debt and Economic Growth. The Case of Italy.","authors":"M. Georgiou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2564439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2564439","url":null,"abstract":"In the present paper an empirical analysis will point out that Government Debt as a percentage of GDP has a negative impact on the Italian economy regarding economic growth. Data are taken from Eurostat. The elaboration of these panel data is made feasible by means of the Eviews software package.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"402 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126678423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-12DOI: 10.4337/9781784716776.00015
Shen Wei
Local government debts in China come into the global spotlight due to its massive volume. This article is primarily concerned with the deep causes of and potential solutions to local government debts in China. An attempt is made to understand the causes of local government debts through various dynamic elements of China’s public and fiscal finance, including revenue collection, allocation of government responsibility, fiscal expenditure and fiscal transfer within the central and local governments. Local governments’ spending patterns reveal a deep and fundamental flaw in the overall governance structure, which necessitates a more comprehensive reform tackling the root problems underlying the local government debt crisis in China.
{"title":"The Logic (or Illogic) of China's Local Government Debts Out of Control - Law, Governance or Other Perspectives","authors":"Shen Wei","doi":"10.4337/9781784716776.00015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781784716776.00015","url":null,"abstract":"Local government debts in China come into the global spotlight due to its massive volume. This article is primarily concerned with the deep causes of and potential solutions to local government debts in China. An attempt is made to understand the causes of local government debts through various dynamic elements of China’s public and fiscal finance, including revenue collection, allocation of government responsibility, fiscal expenditure and fiscal transfer within the central and local governments. Local governments’ spending patterns reveal a deep and fundamental flaw in the overall governance structure, which necessitates a more comprehensive reform tackling the root problems underlying the local government debt crisis in China.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129319649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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