The valuation of government debt is subject to strategic uncertainty, stemming from investors' sentiments. Pessimistic lenders, fearing default, bid down the price of debt. This leaves a government with a higher debt burden, increasing the likelihood of default and thus confirming the pessimism of lenders. This paper studies the interaction of monetary policy and debt fragility. It asks: do monetary interventions mitigate debt fragility? The answer depends in part on the nature of monetary policy, particularly the ability of the monetary authority to commit to future state contingent actions. With commitment to a state contingent policy, the monetary authority can indeed overcome strategic uncertainty. Under discretion, debt fragility remains unless reputation effects are sufficiently strong.
{"title":"Monetary Policy and Debt Fragility","authors":"Antoine Camous, Russell Cooper","doi":"10.3386/w20650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w20650","url":null,"abstract":"The valuation of government debt is subject to strategic uncertainty, stemming from investors' sentiments. Pessimistic lenders, fearing default, bid down the price of debt. This leaves a government with a higher debt burden, increasing the likelihood of default and thus confirming the pessimism of lenders. This paper studies the interaction of monetary policy and debt fragility. It asks: do monetary interventions mitigate debt fragility? The answer depends in part on the nature of monetary policy, particularly the ability of the monetary authority to commit to future state contingent actions. With commitment to a state contingent policy, the monetary authority can indeed overcome strategic uncertainty. Under discretion, debt fragility remains unless reputation effects are sufficiently strong.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"336 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122537363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper applies the probabilistic debt sustainability model developed for the euro area in Cline (2012, 2014) to sovereign debt in the United States and Japan. The results indicate that to avoid further increases in the expected ratio of public debt to GDP over the next decade, average annual primary deficits will need to be reduced by about 0.75 percent of GDP in the United States and by about 3 percent of GDP in Japan from the likely baselines as of mid-2014.
{"title":"Sustainability of Public Debt in the United States and Japan","authors":"W. Cline","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2516991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2516991","url":null,"abstract":"This paper applies the probabilistic debt sustainability model developed for the euro area in Cline (2012, 2014) to sovereign debt in the United States and Japan. The results indicate that to avoid further increases in the expected ratio of public debt to GDP over the next decade, average annual primary deficits will need to be reduced by about 0.75 percent of GDP in the United States and by about 3 percent of GDP in Japan from the likely baselines as of mid-2014.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130443922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current crisis has triggered significant debate concerning economic theory and policy. Largely absent from this debate is an informed discussion of the methods used by economists in analysing the economy and formulating their proposals. But method matters. This study challenges the notion that there is an “adversary system” within the context of debt, crisis and capital increase. The findings suggest that no such adversary system exists for most defendants in consumer debt cases. Instead, these cases exist. We argue theory and practice on 2014. United Internet capital increase case.
{"title":"Analyzing the Highways of Money: The Case of 2014. Crisis","authors":"Doc. Dr. Aleksandar Arsov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2499191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2499191","url":null,"abstract":"The current crisis has triggered significant debate concerning economic theory and policy. Largely absent from this debate is an informed discussion of the methods used by economists in analysing the economy and formulating their proposals. But method matters. This study challenges the notion that there is an “adversary system” within the context of debt, crisis and capital increase. The findings suggest that no such adversary system exists for most defendants in consumer debt cases. Instead, these cases exist. We argue theory and practice on 2014. United Internet capital increase case.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128359005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A dynamic model with credit under limited commitment is constructed, in which limited memory can weaken the effects of punishment for default. This creates an endogenous role for government debt in credit markets, and the economy can be non-Ricardian. Default can occur in equilibrium, and government debt essentially plays a role as collateral and thus improves borrowers' incentives. The provision of government debt acts to discourage default, whether default occurs in equilibrium or not.
{"title":"Credit Markets, Limited Commitment, and Government Debt","authors":"Francesca Carapella, Stephen D. Williamson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2417462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2417462","url":null,"abstract":"A dynamic model with credit under limited commitment is constructed, in which limited memory can weaken the effects of punishment for default. This creates an endogenous role for government debt in credit markets, and the economy can be non-Ricardian. Default can occur in equilibrium, and government debt essentially plays a role as collateral and thus improves borrowers' incentives. The provision of government debt acts to discourage default, whether default occurs in equilibrium or not.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133206597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The National Debt may be solved with a combination of Tax and Fiscal Policy using a law drafted in 1862.This paper reflects on the legal and economic solution to the National Debt. The National Debt is currently used as political football to give reason why funds should not be allocated to certain programs. In reality, the debt is primarily funds owed to ourselves. The United States faced a fiscal crisis in 1862 with the advent of the civil war. During this time, there was not enough money to fund a war or enough taxes to pay for an army. Congress invoked legislation to create a currency issued not by the Federal Reserve, but by the U.S. treasury department. This currency invoked a controversy that ended up in the Supreme Court of the United States.
{"title":"A Solution to the National Debt","authors":"Nicholas A. Paleveda","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2395543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2395543","url":null,"abstract":"The National Debt may be solved with a combination of Tax and Fiscal Policy using a law drafted in 1862.This paper reflects on the legal and economic solution to the National Debt. The National Debt is currently used as political football to give reason why funds should not be allocated to certain programs. In reality, the debt is primarily funds owed to ourselves. The United States faced a fiscal crisis in 1862 with the advent of the civil war. During this time, there was not enough money to fund a war or enough taxes to pay for an army. Congress invoked legislation to create a currency issued not by the Federal Reserve, but by the U.S. treasury department. This currency invoked a controversy that ended up in the Supreme Court of the United States.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126356746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We address the question of whether and how a sovereign should reduce its external indebtedness when default is a significant possibility, with a particular focus on whether a sovereign should buy back or dilute existing long-term sovereign bonds. Our main finding is that when reduction of debt is optimal, the sovereign should remain passive in the long-term bond market during the deleveraging process, retiring long-term bonds as they mature but never actively issuing or buying back these bonds. The only active margin is the short-term bond market, which involves partial roll over of such debt. Any active maturity management, as will typically be required to address rollover crisis risk, will be delayed until the end of the deleveraging process. We also show that there exist a set of Pareto improving debt restructurings in which maturities are shortened; however, these cannot be implemented by trading in competitive secondary markets.
{"title":"Take the Short Route: How to Repay and Restructure Sovereign Debt with Multiple Maturities","authors":"Mark Aguiar, M. Amador","doi":"10.3386/W19717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W19717","url":null,"abstract":"We address the question of whether and how a sovereign should reduce its external indebtedness when default is a significant possibility, with a particular focus on whether a sovereign should buy back or dilute existing long-term sovereign bonds. Our main finding is that when reduction of debt is optimal, the sovereign should remain passive in the long-term bond market during the deleveraging process, retiring long-term bonds as they mature but never actively issuing or buying back these bonds. The only active margin is the short-term bond market, which involves partial roll over of such debt. Any active maturity management, as will typically be required to address rollover crisis risk, will be delayed until the end of the deleveraging process. We also show that there exist a set of Pareto improving debt restructurings in which maturities are shortened; however, these cannot be implemented by trading in competitive secondary markets.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121274199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The German debt brake is often regarded as a great success story, and has therefore served as a role model for the Euro area and its fiscal compact. In this paper we fundamentally criticize the debt brake. We show that (1) it suffers from serious shortcomings, and its success is far from certain even from a mainstream point of view; (2) from a Post-Keynesian perspective, it completely neglects the requirements for fiscal policies of member-countries in a currency union and will prevent fiscal policy from contributing to the necessary rebalancing in the Euro area; and (3) alternative scenarios, which could avoid the deflationary pressures of the German debt brake on domestic demand and contribute to internally rebalancing the Euro area, are extremely unlikely, as they would have to rely on unrealistic shifts in the functional income distribution and/or investment and savings behavior in Germany.
{"title":"Fiscal Policy and Rebalancing in the Euro Area: A Critique of the German Debt Brake from a Post-Keynesian Perspective","authors":"Eckhard Hein, Achim Truger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2338491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2338491","url":null,"abstract":"The German debt brake is often regarded as a great success story, and has therefore served as a role model for the Euro area and its fiscal compact. In this paper we fundamentally criticize the debt brake. We show that (1) it suffers from serious shortcomings, and its success is far from certain even from a mainstream point of view; (2) from a Post-Keynesian perspective, it completely neglects the requirements for fiscal policies of member-countries in a currency union and will prevent fiscal policy from contributing to the necessary rebalancing in the Euro area; and (3) alternative scenarios, which could avoid the deflationary pressures of the German debt brake on domestic demand and contribute to internally rebalancing the Euro area, are extremely unlikely, as they would have to rely on unrealistic shifts in the functional income distribution and/or investment and savings behavior in Germany.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127288178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this chapter, we use a benchmark limited-commitment model to explore key issues in the economics of sovereign debt. After highlighting conceptual issues that distinguish sovereign debt as well as reviewing a number of empirical facts, we use the model to discuss debt overhang, risk sharing, and capital flows in an environment of limited enforcement. We also discuss recent progress on default and renegotiation; self-fulfilling debt crises; and incomplete markets and their quantitative implications. We conclude with a brief assessment of the current state of the literature and highlight some directions for future research.
{"title":"Sovereign Debt: a Review","authors":"Mark Aguiar, M. Amador","doi":"10.3386/W19388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W19388","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we use a benchmark limited-commitment model to explore key issues in the economics of sovereign debt. After highlighting conceptual issues that distinguish sovereign debt as well as reviewing a number of empirical facts, we use the model to discuss debt overhang, risk sharing, and capital flows in an environment of limited enforcement. We also discuss recent progress on default and renegotiation; self-fulfilling debt crises; and incomplete markets and their quantitative implications. We conclude with a brief assessment of the current state of the literature and highlight some directions for future research.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134136531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper identifies based on the monetary overinvestment (malinvestment) theories by Wicksell (1898), Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) monetary policy mistakes in large industrial countries issuing international currencies. It its argued that a benign neglect towards monetary policy reform in a world dominated by financial markets has led to a erosion of the allocation and signaling function of the interest rate, which has triggered an excessive rise of government debt and structural distortions in the world economy. The backlash of high government debt levels on monetary policy making is argued to lead to the hysteresis of low interest rates and high government debt levels. In this context, monetary reform is discussed with respect to the exit from low interest rates and high debt policies and a reform of the prevalent world monetary system. It is concluded that enhanced competition between dollar and euro as international currencies, which is refereed by East Asia, can be a promising approach towards a more stable world monetary system.
{"title":"The Global Move into the Zero Interest Rate and High Debt Trap","authors":"G. Schnabl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2315691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2315691","url":null,"abstract":"The paper identifies based on the monetary overinvestment (malinvestment) theories by Wicksell (1898), Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) monetary policy mistakes in large industrial countries issuing international currencies. It its argued that a benign neglect towards monetary policy reform in a world dominated by financial markets has led to a erosion of the allocation and signaling function of the interest rate, which has triggered an excessive rise of government debt and structural distortions in the world economy. The backlash of high government debt levels on monetary policy making is argued to lead to the hysteresis of low interest rates and high government debt levels. In this context, monetary reform is discussed with respect to the exit from low interest rates and high debt policies and a reform of the prevalent world monetary system. It is concluded that enhanced competition between dollar and euro as international currencies, which is refereed by East Asia, can be a promising approach towards a more stable world monetary system.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131082414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The goal of the present paper is to investigate not only the dynamics of the Greek public debt, but also the appropriate measures required for achieving fiscal consolidation. The empirical estimation is carried out using a macroeconomic dataset spanning the period 1980-2008 and both the 3SLS methodological approach on a theoretical model and the structural VAR methodology to perform forecast tests and to calibrate the future paths of the public debt variable up to 2020. The results suggest that only an aggressive growth policy could permit the country to achieve debt sustainability. The results are expected to have important implications to policy makers for designing effective macroeconomic policy in terms of achieving sustainable levels of public debt.
{"title":"Forcasting Fiscal Variables: Only a Strong Growth Plan Can Sustain the Greek Austerity Programs - Evidence from Simultaneous and Structural Models","authors":"N. Apergis, A. Cooray","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2275704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2275704","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of the present paper is to investigate not only the dynamics of the Greek public debt, but also the appropriate measures required for achieving fiscal consolidation. The empirical estimation is carried out using a macroeconomic dataset spanning the period 1980-2008 and both the 3SLS methodological approach on a theoretical model and the structural VAR methodology to perform forecast tests and to calibrate the future paths of the public debt variable up to 2020. The results suggest that only an aggressive growth policy could permit the country to achieve debt sustainability. The results are expected to have important implications to policy makers for designing effective macroeconomic policy in terms of achieving sustainable levels of public debt.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115179647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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