Abstract: Does anything ever really “go away,” completely? This paper is a search for “real deletion,” and the metaphysics that must accompany real deletion. Why is that important? In artificial intelligence studies, researchers have offered a moving target for when artificial intelligence has been achieved. It began with the Turing test and has evolved through a thousand arguments (e.g., Dreyfuss’ What Computers Can’t Do, through Kurzweil’s “singularity” and into a hundred other criteria and thousands of discussions about what intelligence is and what it would mean to simulate or, as I favor, emulate it). This whole discussion is still just sorting through analogies to human intelligence, not approaching the thing itself, but good analogies must approach much more than analogous function: they must approach real indiscernibility. My arguments here will therefore be largely in the field of metaphysics and ontology, which is how I understand the word “real” in the phrase “real deletion.” I do not think that current researchers have rightly understood time and how it bears upon the criterion or. criteria of artificial intelligence. Hence, I offer “real deletion,” in the sense to be described, as the criterion. The AI argument has implications for all of metaphysics as it relates to the fundamental character of time.
{"title":"Real Deletion, Time, and Possibility","authors":"Randall Auxier","doi":"10.18276/aie.2023.62-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2023.62-01","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Does anything ever really “go away,” completely? This paper is a search for “real deletion,” and the metaphysics that must accompany real deletion. Why is that important? In artificial intelligence studies, researchers have offered a moving target for when artificial intelligence has been achieved. It began with the Turing test and has evolved through a thousand arguments (e.g., Dreyfuss’ What Computers Can’t Do, through Kurzweil’s “singularity” and into a hundred other criteria and thousands of discussions about what intelligence is and what it would mean to simulate or, as I favor, emulate it). This whole discussion is still just sorting through analogies to human intelligence, not approaching the thing itself, but good analogies must approach much more than analogous function: they must approach real indiscernibility. My arguments here will therefore be largely in the field of metaphysics and ontology, which is how I understand the word “real” in the phrase “real deletion.” I do not think that current researchers have rightly understood time and how it bears upon the criterion or. criteria of artificial intelligence. Hence, I offer “real deletion,” in the sense to be described, as the criterion. The AI argument has implications for all of metaphysics as it relates to the fundamental character of time.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67984525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The intellectual property theory of Kenneth E. Himma aims to vindicate natural rights to the "intellectual content of creations", which is believed to consist of abstract objects. Himma proposes a reformulation of John Locke's well-known argument in terms of value. He maintains that even if abstract objects preexist their alleged creation, then they are not yet ready for consumption until the access to them is provided by the labor of innovators and artists. He declares that making them available is an act of value creation that justifies granting intellectual property rights. In this paper several assumptions on which Himma's theory relies are identified and challenged. Against his claims, it is argued that no human labor can improve the availability of abstract objects. It is then demonstrated that "intellectual commons" cannot be "stocked" by human activities and that the alleged value creation cannot happen, because the concept of value is inapplicable to abstract objects. This derails Himma's IP justification. Finally the meaning of rights envisaged by Himma is investigated. It is shown that they cannot be exercised with respect to causally inert entities.
Kenneth E. Himma的知识产权理论旨在维护“创作的知识内容”的自然权利，这些内容被认为是由抽象的物体组成的。希马从价值的角度对约翰·洛克著名的观点进行了重新表述。他坚持认为，即使抽象对象在它们所谓的创造之前就存在，那么它们还没有准备好被消费，直到创新者和艺术家的劳动提供了对它们的访问。他宣称，提供这些知识产权是一种创造价值的行为，证明授予知识产权是正当的。本文对希马理论所依赖的几个假设进行了识别和挑战。与他的主张相反，有人认为，没有任何人类劳动可以提高抽象对象的可用性。然后证明了“知识公地”不可能被人类活动“储存”，所谓的价值创造不可能发生，因为价值概念不适用于抽象的对象。这详述了Himma的知识产权辩护。最后对希马所设想的权利的意义进行了考察。它表明，它们不能对因果惰性的实体行使。
{"title":"Inconsistencies in Himma's Intellectual Property Theory","authors":"Wojciech Gamrot","doi":"10.18276/aie.2023.63-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2023.63-05","url":null,"abstract":"The intellectual property theory of Kenneth E. Himma aims to vindicate natural rights to the \"intellectual content of creations\", which is believed to consist of abstract objects. Himma proposes a reformulation of John Locke's well-known argument in terms of value. He maintains that even if abstract objects preexist their alleged creation, then they are not yet ready for consumption until the access to them is provided by the labor of innovators and artists. He declares that making them available is an act of value creation that justifies granting intellectual property rights. In this paper several assumptions on which Himma's theory relies are identified and challenged. Against his claims, it is argued that no human labor can improve the availability of abstract objects. It is then demonstrated that \"intellectual commons\" cannot be \"stocked\" by human activities and that the alleged value creation cannot happen, because the concept of value is inapplicable to abstract objects. This derails Himma's IP justification. Finally the meaning of rights envisaged by Himma is investigated. It is shown that they cannot be exercised with respect to causally inert entities.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135840795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present paper concerns the Wittgenstein ontology project: an attempt to create a Semantic Web representation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The project has been in development since 2006, and its current state enables users to search for information about Wittgenstein-related documents and the documents themselves. However, the developers have much more ambitious goals: they attempt to provide a philosophical subject matter knowledge base that would comprise the claims and concepts formulated by the philosopher. The current knowledge representation technology is not well-suited for this task, and a non-standard approach is required. The creators of the Wittgenstein ontology project are aware of this fact; recently, they have been discussing conceptual devices adjusting the technology to their needs. The main goal of this paper is to present examples of a representation of philosophical content that make use of both the devices already proposed and some new inventions. The represented content comes from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; more specifically, its theses concerning the problems in philosophy of mathematics.
{"title":"Towards a Computational Ontology for the Philosophy of Wittgenstein: Representing Aspects of the Tractarian Philosophy of Mathematics","authors":"Jakub Gomułka","doi":"10.18276/aie.2023.63-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2023.63-02","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper concerns the Wittgenstein ontology project: an attempt to create a Semantic Web representation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The project has been in development since 2006, and its current state enables users to search for information about Wittgenstein-related documents and the documents themselves. However, the developers have much more ambitious goals: they attempt to provide a philosophical subject matter knowledge base that would comprise the claims and concepts formulated by the philosopher. The current knowledge representation technology is not well-suited for this task, and a non-standard approach is required. The creators of the Wittgenstein ontology project are aware of this fact; recently, they have been discussing conceptual devices adjusting the technology to their needs. The main goal of this paper is to present examples of a representation of philosophical content that make use of both the devices already proposed and some new inventions. The represented content comes from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; more specifically, its theses concerning the problems in philosophy of mathematics.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135841003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Image as a philosophical concept has a long and complex history that begins as early as antiquity. Christian scholars included it in their philosophical studies in the form of imago Dei. In this paper, the author analysed the works of St. Thomas Aquinas to determine the anthropological consequences that follow from the idea of human creation in the image of God. It was first established that man as a being created in the image of God participates through his intellect in God’s nature. Moreover, three stages of human participation in God were presented. Subsequently, the author defended the classical theory of Aquinas against contemporary reinterpretation of his thought. It was argued that Aquinas rightly claims that only the intellectual part of the human soul is, strictly speaking, created in God’s Image, while the human body (and other irrational creatures) resembles God in the likeness of a trace.
{"title":"Imago Dei in St. Thomas Aquinas: a philosophical and anthropological analysis of man created in the Image of God","authors":"Wojciech Kilan","doi":"10.18276/aie.2023.62-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2023.62-03","url":null,"abstract":"Image as a philosophical concept has a long and complex history that begins as early as antiquity. Christian scholars included it in their philosophical studies in the form of imago Dei. In this paper, the author analysed the works of St. Thomas Aquinas to determine the anthropological consequences that follow from the idea of human creation in the image of God. It was first established that man as a being created in the image of God participates through his intellect in God’s nature. Moreover, three stages of human participation in God were presented. Subsequently, the author defended the classical theory of Aquinas against contemporary reinterpretation of his thought. It was argued that Aquinas rightly claims that only the intellectual part of the human soul is, strictly speaking, created in God’s Image, while the human body (and other irrational creatures) resembles God in the likeness of a trace.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67985356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the classical approach culture is the opposite of nature, and man, as a world-transforming being, is the engine of civilization development. C. G. Jung's writings contain a non-classical concept of culture, according to which the collective unconscious determines the way of interpreting and understanding reality, and thus the development of culture. The psychiatrist considers man as a symbol-forming creature. He wrote about the "symbol drive" which causes the creation of symbols to happen spontaneously. There is a connection between the action of instincts, which have a biological basis, and the archetypal source of symbols. There are forces of nature in the unconscious - in particular, the libido and instincts. Culture arises between the unconscious and consciousness, and at the same time, the process of its development has a species-specific aspect.
{"title":"The Problem of Culture and Nature in Carl Gustav Jung’s Psychoanalytical Concept","authors":"Patrycja Neumann","doi":"10.18276/aie.2023.61-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2023.61-03","url":null,"abstract":"According to the classical approach culture is the opposite of nature, and man, as a world-transforming being, is the engine of civilization development. C. G. Jung's writings contain a non-classical concept of culture, according to which the collective unconscious determines the way of interpreting and understanding reality, and thus the development of culture. The psychiatrist considers man as a symbol-forming creature. He wrote about the \"symbol drive\" which causes the creation of symbols to happen spontaneously. There is a connection between the action of instincts, which have a biological basis, and the archetypal source of symbols. There are forces of nature in the unconscious - in particular, the libido and instincts. Culture arises between the unconscious and consciousness, and at the same time, the process of its development has a species-specific aspect.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67983634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self-interpretation and the problem of “strong valuation” in Charles Taylor’s philosophy","authors":"Mariusz Wojewoda","doi":"10.18276/aie.2022.57-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2022.57-04","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67980851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond the Reality Principle: On the Political Role of Imagination in Herbert Marcuse’s Libidinal Economy","authors":"Barbara Markowska-Marczak","doi":"10.18276/aie.2022.59-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2022.59-03","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67981987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Some accelerationist remarks on Marcuse’s drives theory and his dialectics of civilization","authors":"Andrzej Karalus","doi":"10.18276/aie.2022.59-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2022.59-02","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67982467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capitalocene, ecological economics of degrowth and philosophy of Herbert Marcuse","authors":"E. Bińczyk","doi":"10.18276/aie.2022.59-06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2022.59-06","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67983231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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