Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1016360
Loretta Capeheart
{"title":"Academic Free Speech: Making a Federal Case Of It","authors":"Loretta Capeheart","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2015.1016360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016360","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016360","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60482827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1016361
Adrienne E. Hacker Daniels
{"title":"Social Media in Academe: The Case of David Guth at the University of Kansas","authors":"Adrienne E. Hacker Daniels","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2015.1016361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016361","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016361","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60482901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1016362
S. Smith
As we celebrate the centennial of the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration on Academic Freedom and Tenure, those core principles are still essential, but the changing administrative regime of higher education institutions has put them at risk. The dramatic increase in the number and percentage of contingent faculty positions— those on annual or term contracts rather than tenured or tenure-track appointment—undermines academic freedom in teaching, research, and public service. Where academic freedom was once fought and secured against specific charges or external pressures from particular ideological forces, the threat is now more insidious and structural from within the academy as well as outside interests. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the forces and circumstances that have led to cuts in public funding for public universities and the growing reliance on private funds with motives and priorities that have often compromised the mission, priorities, and core academic values of the scholarly enterprise of both public and private institutions. The increasingly ubiquitous market-driven education policy and its consequences have been argued quite well by others. The point I wish to address is the seismic shift to contingent faculty and the stagnant or reduced number of tenure and tenure-track faculty. The argument is always economic exigence rather than any claim that it improves the quality of education. Administrators resist approving tenure track lines to save money by hiring contingent faculty with lower salaries and reduced benefits. At the same time, this alleged policy of scrimping has done nothing to slow the growth of the number of administrators and their salaries, an obvious point without mentioning the salaries and contracts of athletic coaches. Only faculty salaries and positions seem to be fodder in the losing battle to hold down the cost of tuition and fees for our students. Contingent appointments have comprised a majority of all faculty positions for more than a decade. While adjuncts, lecturers, instructors, post-docs, and visiting faculty members are valuable, even essential, they are not particularly valued by
{"title":"Contingent Faculty and Academic Freedom in the Twenty-First Century","authors":"S. Smith","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2015.1016362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016362","url":null,"abstract":"As we celebrate the centennial of the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration on Academic Freedom and Tenure, those core principles are still essential, but the changing administrative regime of higher education institutions has put them at risk. The dramatic increase in the number and percentage of contingent faculty positions— those on annual or term contracts rather than tenured or tenure-track appointment—undermines academic freedom in teaching, research, and public service. Where academic freedom was once fought and secured against specific charges or external pressures from particular ideological forces, the threat is now more insidious and structural from within the academy as well as outside interests. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the forces and circumstances that have led to cuts in public funding for public universities and the growing reliance on private funds with motives and priorities that have often compromised the mission, priorities, and core academic values of the scholarly enterprise of both public and private institutions. The increasingly ubiquitous market-driven education policy and its consequences have been argued quite well by others. The point I wish to address is the seismic shift to contingent faculty and the stagnant or reduced number of tenure and tenure-track faculty. The argument is always economic exigence rather than any claim that it improves the quality of education. Administrators resist approving tenure track lines to save money by hiring contingent faculty with lower salaries and reduced benefits. At the same time, this alleged policy of scrimping has done nothing to slow the growth of the number of administrators and their salaries, an obvious point without mentioning the salaries and contracts of athletic coaches. Only faculty salaries and positions seem to be fodder in the losing battle to hold down the cost of tuition and fees for our students. Contingent appointments have comprised a majority of all faculty positions for more than a decade. While adjuncts, lecturers, instructors, post-docs, and visiting faculty members are valuable, even essential, they are not particularly valued by","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016362","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60483051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1016359
D. Cloud
Critical intellectuals are unfortunately accustomed to intentional, institutional censorship and precarious academic labor as threats to the freedom to research, teach, and speak their minds. However, alongside these material forces of exclusion and silencing, we must consider ideological conditions as threats to academic freedom. As a case in point, “civility” is what rhetorical scholar Michael McGee describes as an “ideograph”: a shorthand word or phrase that captures and organizes community around prevailing ideological commitments. “Civility”—the basis of universal, rule-governed cooperation—is a widely takenfor-granted good in capitalist society. However, the call for civility masks the presence of contending interests and inequality. Those who call attention to antagonism definitionally violate the rules of civility and are subject to legitimated sanction. The ideology of civility is thus a significant threat to academic freedom. In what follows, I support this argument first with a historical and etymological discussion of the term “civility.” Then I will discuss the increasing deployment of this term to discipline critical intellectuals, particularly Steven Salaita. I conclude with a discussion of resistance to this ideological frame and the oppressive actions that it justifies.
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Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1019214
Jason Del Gandio
{"title":"A Question of Sex: Feminism, Rhetoric, and Differences That Matter","authors":"Jason Del Gandio","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2015.1019214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2015.1019214","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2015.1019214","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60483140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1021506
Ellada Gamreklidze
This study seeks to reveal whether certain patterns can be traced in the current US Supreme Court decisions pertaining to First Amendment protection of speech. It reviews how the Roberts Court applied the philosophy of effective self-governance and its principles in its speech-related decisions and looks at what opinions were provided by the majority, and concurring and dissenting Justices. The study shows that the Roberts Court seems to be especially prone to arguing its holdings in terms of political speech values and especially protective of political speech as applied to the cases concerning campaign funding.
{"title":"Freedom of Speech in US Supreme Court Justices’ Opinions: Political Speech Protection as Applied by the Roberts Court","authors":"Ellada Gamreklidze","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2015.1021506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2015.1021506","url":null,"abstract":"This study seeks to reveal whether certain patterns can be traced in the current US Supreme Court decisions pertaining to First Amendment protection of speech. It reviews how the Roberts Court applied the philosophy of effective self-governance and its principles in its speech-related decisions and looks at what opinions were provided by the majority, and concurring and dissenting Justices. The study shows that the Roberts Court seems to be especially prone to arguing its holdings in terms of political speech values and especially protective of political speech as applied to the cases concerning campaign funding.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2015.1021506","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60482927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1016357
John K. Wilson
{"title":"Academic Freedom and a Tale of Two Dismissals","authors":"John K. Wilson","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2015.1016357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016357","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016357","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60483122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1016358
Matthew Abraham
What is the concept of academic freedom, what are the justifications for its existence, and to whom does it belong? These are important questions to ask in determining what, if any, special protections accrue for those performing academic work. Academic freedom is “the freedom to pursue the academic profession according to the standards of that profession” according to Robert Post and Matthew Finkin in their book The Common Good. The standards of the profession are developed, maintained, and policed by other disciplinary practitioners, who are best situated to evaluate the scholarly activities that conform to disciplinary criteria and merit academic freedom protections. The justification of this freedom for academics resides in the importance of the academic task for the betterment of society and the promotion of the common good. The uniqueness of the academic task, as this argument goes, requires special privileges; academic freedom is among them. That academic freedom is for academics goes without saying, of course, but what is its nature, its parameters, and what exactly does it guarantee and to whom? The little discussion of academic freedom within American case law seems to recognize it more as an institutional than individual right, as recent rulings on affirmative actions policies illustrate. In other words, the academic institution may decide who may teach, what will be taught and who will be admitted for study. This conception of academic freedom seems to place academic freedom in the hands of administrators instead of faculty. One may argue that academic freedom is as elusive as ever, with conceptions of it ranging from a professional guild privilege, to identifying it as an ingredient in producing societal revolution. How has a professional concept, seemingly reserved for academics, become so contested and ill-defined and misunderstood, even among academics themselves? In his Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to Revolution, Stanley Fish identifies five “schools of academic freedom,” which are meant to represent
什么是学术自由的概念，它存在的理由是什么，它属于谁?在确定对从事学术工作的人有什么特别保护时，这些都是需要问的重要问题。根据罗伯特·波斯特(Robert Post)和马修·芬金(Matthew Finkin)在《共同利益》(the Common Good)一书中的说法，学术自由是“根据该职业的标准从事学术职业的自由”。专业标准是由其他学科从业者制定、维护和监督的，他们最适合评估符合学科标准和值得学术自由保护的学术活动。学者享有这种自由的理由在于学术任务对于改善社会和促进共同利益的重要性。这种观点认为，学术任务的独特性需要特殊的特权;学术自由就是其中之一。当然，学术自由是学者的，这是不言而喻的，但它的本质是什么，它的参数是什么，它到底保证什么，向谁保证?美国判例法中关于学术自由的少量讨论似乎更多地将其视为一种制度权利，而非个人权利，正如最近有关平权行动政策的裁决所表明的那样。换句话说，学术机构可以决定谁可以教，教什么，谁可以被录取。这种学术自由的概念似乎将学术自由置于管理者而不是教师的手中。有人可能会争辩说，学术自由一如既往地难以捉摸，其概念从专业协会特权到将其视为产生社会革命的一个因素。一个看似为学术界保留的专业概念是如何变得如此有争议、定义不清和误解的，甚至在学术界内部也是如此?在《不同版本的学术自由:从专业主义到革命》一书中，斯坦利·费什(Stanley Fish)指出了五种“学术自由流派”
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Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1019285
Casey Carmody, D. Pritchard
Laws protecting newsgathering vary among US states, yet comparative studies of state press law are rare. Focusing on journalist’s privilege, this study hypothesized that policy liberalism and public support for journalistic confidentiality would predict the strength of a state’s journalist’s privilege. The hypotheses involving policy liberalism and public opinion were supported. The study’s findings suggest that states with higher levels of policy liberalism tend to create journalistic confidentiality protections, which may serve as a mechanism for government accountability. This finding also supports previous research suggesting that policy liberalism plays an important role in state newsgathering laws.
{"title":"Policy Liberalism, Public Opinion, and Strength of Journalist’s Privilege in the American States","authors":"Casey Carmody, D. Pritchard","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2015.1019285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2015.1019285","url":null,"abstract":"Laws protecting newsgathering vary among US states, yet comparative studies of state press law are rare. Focusing on journalist’s privilege, this study hypothesized that policy liberalism and public support for journalistic confidentiality would predict the strength of a state’s journalist’s privilege. The hypotheses involving policy liberalism and public opinion were supported. The study’s findings suggest that states with higher levels of policy liberalism tend to create journalistic confidentiality protections, which may serve as a mechanism for government accountability. This finding also supports previous research suggesting that policy liberalism plays an important role in state newsgathering laws.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2015.1019285","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60483285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2015.1016355
Steve Macek
{"title":"The Perilous State of Academic Freedom in the Twenty-First Century","authors":"Steve Macek","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2015.1016355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016355","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2015.1016355","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60483117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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