Pub Date : 2022-09-29DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2131029
Joseph Russell-Hawkins
{"title":"The Hot Cold War: the mounting influence of the USSR on British intelligence in Palestine, 1945-1948 (and the misconception of intelligence failure as a root cause of the Mandate’s demise)","authors":"Joseph Russell-Hawkins","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2131029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2131029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49119420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-13DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2121901
Euan Tyndall
{"title":"Fear and Loathing in Luhansk","authors":"Euan Tyndall","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2121901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2121901","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44428573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-04DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2116861
Declan O'Reilly
ABSTRACT In 1945, the British arrested Horst Kopkow, a Gestapo Referent, or desk officer, tasked with countering British and Russian sabotage in Hitler’s empire. Despite being co-responsible for the demise of hundreds of Allied parachute agents, the British Secret Intelligence Service faked Kopkow’s death and gave him freedom in exchange for his unrivalled understanding of Soviet espionage in Western Europe, particularly the famed Red Orchestra. The value of Kopkow’s information is still being debated, but it was sufficiently important for SIS to protect Kopkow from war crimes investigators. Western intelligence agencies have, since the 1980s, been censured for utilising ex-Nazis in the initial Cold War, precisely because their wartime roles were still unclear. With the partial release of MI5 records on Kopkow in 2000, some attempt to gauge the value and degree of his collaboration is possible.
{"title":"Interrogating the Gestapo: SS-Sturmbannführer Horst Kopkow, the Rote Kapelle and Post-war British Security Interests","authors":"Declan O'Reilly","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2116861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2116861","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In 1945, the British arrested Horst Kopkow, a Gestapo Referent, or desk officer, tasked with countering British and Russian sabotage in Hitler’s empire. Despite being co-responsible for the demise of hundreds of Allied parachute agents, the British Secret Intelligence Service faked Kopkow’s death and gave him freedom in exchange for his unrivalled understanding of Soviet espionage in Western Europe, particularly the famed Red Orchestra. The value of Kopkow’s information is still being debated, but it was sufficiently important for SIS to protect Kopkow from war crimes investigators. Western intelligence agencies have, since the 1980s, been censured for utilising ex-Nazis in the initial Cold War, precisely because their wartime roles were still unclear. With the partial release of MI5 records on Kopkow in 2000, some attempt to gauge the value and degree of his collaboration is possible.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"192 - 215"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48686762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2141976
I. Iordanou
ABSTRACT Contrary to more rudimentary espionage networks created by rulers (and their rivals) in various parts of early modern Europe, by the sixteenth century, early modern Venice had created a remarkable, centrally organised state intelligence organisation, the Venetian secret service. This was built on a rigid organisational hierarchy and branched out into distinct communication networks. This article describes, in detail, the structure and function of the Venetian secret service, dwelling on how it was administered and managed by the Council of Ten, Venice’s infamous spy chiefs. To explore the early modern organisational and managerial practices on which this service was premised, the article borrows theoretical concepts deriving from the disciplines of Intelligence Studies, Sociology, Organisation Studies, and Management, which it weaves together with archival sources and relevant literature. In doing so, the article explores some of the methodological challenges of studying the phenomenon of early modern intelligence organisation. Ultimately, the article puts forth the argument that systematised intelligence and espionage are not ‘modern’ phenomena, as conventional wisdom dictates, but date back to the early modern era.
{"title":"The secret service of Renaissance Venice: intelligence organisation in the sixteenth century","authors":"I. Iordanou","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2141976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2141976","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Contrary to more rudimentary espionage networks created by rulers (and their rivals) in various parts of early modern Europe, by the sixteenth century, early modern Venice had created a remarkable, centrally organised state intelligence organisation, the Venetian secret service. This was built on a rigid organisational hierarchy and branched out into distinct communication networks. This article describes, in detail, the structure and function of the Venetian secret service, dwelling on how it was administered and managed by the Council of Ten, Venice’s infamous spy chiefs. To explore the early modern organisational and managerial practices on which this service was premised, the article borrows theoretical concepts deriving from the disciplines of Intelligence Studies, Sociology, Organisation Studies, and Management, which it weaves together with archival sources and relevant literature. In doing so, the article explores some of the methodological challenges of studying the phenomenon of early modern intelligence organisation. Ultimately, the article puts forth the argument that systematised intelligence and espionage are not ‘modern’ phenomena, as conventional wisdom dictates, but date back to the early modern era.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"251 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47140609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2141977
Tobias P. Graf, Charlotte Backerra
ABSTRACT This introduction to the special issue ‘Case Studies in Early Modern European Intelligence’ provides an overview of scholarship on the history of intelligence in the early modern period. Examining outstanding research contributions to the field, it highlights the potential of early modern European history to contribute to a refinement of the methodology and theory of intelligence history as a whole. In light of the contributions made by the articles collected in this special issue, we argue that intelligence history as a discipline will benefit from an increased dialogue between scholars working on different periods. We therefore invite historians of intelligence to study the early modern period and historians of the early modern period to study intelligence.
{"title":"Case studies in early modern European intelligence","authors":"Tobias P. Graf, Charlotte Backerra","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2141977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2141977","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This introduction to the special issue ‘Case Studies in Early Modern European Intelligence’ provides an overview of scholarship on the history of intelligence in the early modern period. Examining outstanding research contributions to the field, it highlights the potential of early modern European history to contribute to a refinement of the methodology and theory of intelligence history as a whole. In light of the contributions made by the articles collected in this special issue, we argue that intelligence history as a discipline will benefit from an increased dialogue between scholars working on different periods. We therefore invite historians of intelligence to study the early modern period and historians of the early modern period to study intelligence.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"237 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43976254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-11DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2111486
Bahri Gashi, N. Brovina
{"title":"The regional context of intelligence services in the parliamentary system: A comparative study of the Western Balkans","authors":"Bahri Gashi, N. Brovina","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2111486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2111486","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45130648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-25DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2105056
Ryan Shaffer
The Afghanistan File is a first-hand account of Saudi Arabia’s involvement with the Mujahideen during and after the Afghan-Soviet War by Prince Turki AlFaisal AlSaud and Michael Field. The son of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (1906–1975), Prince Turki served as head of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) for 24 years from 1977 to 2001 and later served as Saudi ambassador to the United Kingdom and United States. Prince Turki explains that during his time as GID head, ‘almost’ the entire time he was ‘above all’ focused on Afghanistan (p. xvii). He credits King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (1924–2015), then a crown prince, with the idea for writing the memoir, quoting him as commenting that people in other countries gave their perspectives but there was no Saudi book to rebut false claims about Saudi Arabia. Beyond Prince Turki’s memories, the books also draw on other figures who were interviewed for the book, including former Afghan and Saudi intelligence officers. Prince Turki sees his intelligence work on Afghanistan consisting of three phases. The first is Saudi Arabia, through the GID, aiding the Mujahideen resistance against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1992. Most of the book is centred around this subject with Prince Turki detailing his travels, interactions, and specific meetings with Afghani, American, Pakistani and Saudi leaders as well as others, such as his ‘former press adviser’ Jamal Khashoggi (1958–2018) (who is also thanked in the acknowledgements). The book begins with Prince Turki describing the day the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the conversations he held with other governments. Notably, Pakistan was particularly concerned about the Soviet Union also occupying parts of Pakistan and the impact of an India-friendly government in Kabul. He details, for example, meeting the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan (1924–1988), in Riyadh during 1980 and days later Saudi Arabia sending $2 million in cash to the Pakistani government to be spent ‘as it wished’ (p. 6). Subsequently, American officials, at the insistence of Pakistani President General Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988), worked with Prince Turki and other Saudi officials to match funds for the resistance and purchase weapons. Prince Turki also describes aspects of Saudi bureaucratic culture, writing: ‘It tends to be the Kingdom’s policy to have just one department and one small team of people around the head of that department handling any particular issue’ (p. 12). He further notes that he authorized ‘every payment’ made by the GID and how the selection of a spokesperson for the Mujahideen came from his orders of putting the leaders in a conference room and forcing them to speak with a single voice. The total sum tallied for Saudi government expenditures to the Mujahideen was $2.71 billion, not including private donations.
《阿富汗档案》是由图尔基·阿尔费萨尔·阿尔沙特王子和迈克尔·菲尔德撰写的关于沙特阿拉伯在阿富汗-苏联战争期间和之后参与圣战者的第一手资料。图尔基王子是沙特阿拉伯费萨尔国王(1906-1975)的儿子，从1977年到2001年，图尔基王子担任沙特阿拉伯情报总局(GID)局长长达24年，后来担任沙特驻英国和美国大使。图尔基王子解释说，在他担任GID负责人期间，“几乎”整个时间他都“首先”关注阿富汗(第17页)。他将撰写回忆录的想法归功于沙特阿拉伯国王阿卜杜拉(1924-2015)，当时是王储，引用他的评论，其他国家的人们给出了他们的观点，但没有沙特书反驳关于沙特阿拉伯的虚假说法。除了图尔基王子的回忆，这些书还引用了为这本书采访的其他人物，包括前阿富汗和沙特情报官员。图尔基王子认为他在阿富汗的情报工作分为三个阶段。第一个是沙特阿拉伯，通过GID，在1979年到1992年期间帮助圣战者抵抗苏联。这本书的大部分内容都围绕着这个主题，图尔基王子详细介绍了他的旅行、互动以及与阿富汗、美国、巴基斯坦和沙特领导人以及其他国家领导人的具体会面，比如他的“前新闻顾问”贾马尔·卡舒吉(Jamal Khashoggi, 1958-2018)(在致谢中也对他表示了感谢)。书的开头，图尔基王子描述了苏联入侵阿富汗的那一天，以及他与其他政府的对话。值得注意的是，巴基斯坦特别关注苏联也占领巴基斯坦部分地区以及喀布尔一个对印度友好的政府的影响。例如，他详细描述了1980年在利雅得会见三军情报局局长阿赫塔尔·阿卜杜勒·拉赫曼·汗(Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan, 1924-1988)，几天后沙特阿拉伯向巴基斯坦政府提供了200万美元现金，让其“随心所愿”(第6页)。随后，在巴基斯坦总统齐亚·哈克将军(Zia-ul-Haq, 1924-1988)的坚持下，美国官员与图尔基王子和其他沙特官员合作，为抵抗组织筹集资金并购买武器。图尔基王子还描述了沙特官僚文化的各个方面，他写道:“王国的政策往往是只有一个部门，在该部门负责人周围有一个小团队处理任何特定问题”(第12页)。他进一步指出，GID的“每一笔付款”都是他授权的，而圣战者的发言人是如何从他的命令中挑选出来的，即把领导人放在会议室里，强迫他们用一个声音说话。沙特政府对圣战者的支出总额为27.1亿美元，这还不包括私人捐款。
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Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2099189
Mika Suonpää
ABSTRACT This article discusses Swedish and British security officialdom with a focus on information-management techniques in a pre-electronic information order. It examines the challenges security officials faced in investigating a Finnish sea captain suspected of espionage during the Second World War. Information about him emanated from three communication contexts – a police station, an interrogation centre, and an immigration office. The British security establishment was confronted with information asymmetries; although information about the case existed in the files, it was not available to officials working in different temporal and geographical settings. There were also marked differences between the bureaucratic cultures of Swedish and British security agencies regarding assessment and reporting of security information. The article shows that the captain worked for the German military intelligence and maintained contact with British officials in Stockholm, but was never imprisoned. On the basis of this case, four suspect interrogation survival strategies can be delineated: playing the victim, seeking favour by flattery, bold exaggeration and appeals to ideological congruence. To some extent, these survival strategies contradict the conventional wisdom in criminal-psychological research on the behaviour of guilty suspects. Rather than keeping stories simple, the sea captain inundated the interrogators with bizarre details to avoid detection.
{"title":"Swedish and British security officialdom, a suspected spy, and information management in the era of the Second World War","authors":"Mika Suonpää","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2099189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2099189","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article discusses Swedish and British security officialdom with a focus on information-management techniques in a pre-electronic information order. It examines the challenges security officials faced in investigating a Finnish sea captain suspected of espionage during the Second World War. Information about him emanated from three communication contexts – a police station, an interrogation centre, and an immigration office. The British security establishment was confronted with information asymmetries; although information about the case existed in the files, it was not available to officials working in different temporal and geographical settings. There were also marked differences between the bureaucratic cultures of Swedish and British security agencies regarding assessment and reporting of security information. The article shows that the captain worked for the German military intelligence and maintained contact with British officials in Stockholm, but was never imprisoned. On the basis of this case, four suspect interrogation survival strategies can be delineated: playing the victim, seeking favour by flattery, bold exaggeration and appeals to ideological congruence. To some extent, these survival strategies contradict the conventional wisdom in criminal-psychological research on the behaviour of guilty suspects. Rather than keeping stories simple, the sea captain inundated the interrogators with bizarre details to avoid detection.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45011081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2099190
Benjamin J. Lyman
ABSTRACT From 1965 to 1970, the United States Army executed a widespread program of surveillance of civilian political activity within the United States. The program’s originator was the US Army Intelligence Command, a geographically widespread counterintelligence organization built for the mission of protecting the army from foreign intelligence adversaries. Within Intelligence Command, this mission engendered an organizational culture that valued supporting the army above all else, including regulatory and legal restrictions. When the domestic disorders of the late 1960s necessitated repeated federal responses, Intelligence Command became the primary instrument for collecting information related to civil disturbances. Imbued with this culture, counterintelligence agents across the country conducted continuous surveillance of individuals, groups, and activities across the political spectrum. Yet, even when later exposed and under intense public scrutiny, Intelligence Command’s mission focus never wavered, thereby demonstrating the danger when the culture of an intelligence organization clashes with its legal limits.
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Pub Date : 2022-05-31DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2080922
Uwe Backes
ABSTRACT The reporting practice of domestic intelligence services is one of the sparse researched areas of democracy protection in European constitutional states. This article aims to lay a foundation for more detailed investigations by placing the already better explored German observation and reporting activities in the European context. To this end, it pools the results of investigations, a considerable part of them legal, evaluates the published reports and spreads the findings of a series of interviews with representatives of the security authorities and academic experts.
{"title":"Governmental reporting practice on extremism – Germany in comparison","authors":"Uwe Backes","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2080922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2080922","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The reporting practice of domestic intelligence services is one of the sparse researched areas of democracy protection in European constitutional states. This article aims to lay a foundation for more detailed investigations by placing the already better explored German observation and reporting activities in the European context. To this end, it pools the results of investigations, a considerable part of them legal, evaluates the published reports and spreads the findings of a series of interviews with representatives of the security authorities and academic experts.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45344152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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