Pub Date : 2022-05-31DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2081771
Andrew Ward
ABSTRACT This paper analyses the Admiralty’s Monthly Intelligence Report for the opening period of the Cold War. The sources reveal how the Service adjusted to East-West confrontation. A picture emerges of an organisation gradually adapting to a new geopolitical reality, particularly the differences between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as maritime adversaries. Despite growing geopolitical tension, only in 1948 following the Corfu Channel incident and Soviet takeovers in Eastern Europe did Monthly Intelligence Report declare the Cold War as the new status quo.
{"title":"Has the Cold War started yet? Evidence from the Royal Navy’s Monthly Intelligence Report 1946–52","authors":"Andrew Ward","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2081771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2081771","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper analyses the Admiralty’s Monthly Intelligence Report for the opening period of the Cold War. The sources reveal how the Service adjusted to East-West confrontation. A picture emerges of an organisation gradually adapting to a new geopolitical reality, particularly the differences between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as maritime adversaries. Despite growing geopolitical tension, only in 1948 following the Corfu Channel incident and Soviet takeovers in Eastern Europe did Monthly Intelligence Report declare the Cold War as the new status quo.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48217305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-30DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2070356
Frank Leith Jones, G. Lester
ABSTRACT The Hughes-Ryan Amendment provided the foundation of modern intelligence oversight. It firmly established executive ownership of covert action, challenging the concept of internal plausible deniability. Moreover, it shifted the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in terms of intelligence, allowing Congress a toehold on what had been considered an almost purely executive branch function. While Hughes-Ryan’s importance is indisputable, its roots and catalyst have seldom been explored in detail. This article describes the political context of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, discusses how and why it was introduced and passed when it was, and explains the outcome of this legislation. It introduces a unique analytical framework to explain this process, exploring the dynamics of congressional behavior and institutional constraints to explain why the change that occurred, while definitive and impactful in the intelligence world, was limited in scope.
{"title":"The Hughes-Ryan Amendment and Intelligence Oversight: An Inflection Point in an Oppositional Relationship","authors":"Frank Leith Jones, G. Lester","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2070356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2070356","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Hughes-Ryan Amendment provided the foundation of modern intelligence oversight. It firmly established executive ownership of covert action, challenging the concept of internal plausible deniability. Moreover, it shifted the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in terms of intelligence, allowing Congress a toehold on what had been considered an almost purely executive branch function. While Hughes-Ryan’s importance is indisputable, its roots and catalyst have seldom been explored in detail. This article describes the political context of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, discusses how and why it was introduced and passed when it was, and explains the outcome of this legislation. It introduces a unique analytical framework to explain this process, exploring the dynamics of congressional behavior and institutional constraints to explain why the change that occurred, while definitive and impactful in the intelligence world, was limited in scope.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"276 - 295"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41713107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-18DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2036498
Elisabeth Fondren, J. Hamilton
ABSTRACT The Great War transformed propaganda as, indeed, it transformed warfare. Over the course of the conflict, from 1914 to 1918, propaganda became, for the first time, a pervasive, systematic instrument of every government that threw troops into battle. The belligerent governments employed similar approaches to shaping mass opinion. This study identifies nine laws of propaganda – that is, seminal characteristics and consequences – that emerged from the war and continue today. We draw on primary sources and unpublished materials located in political archives in the United States, Germany and Britain to explore the relationship between media, war, intelligence, and government publicity activities during 1914–1918.
{"title":"The Universal Laws of Propaganda: World War I and the Origins of Government Manufacture of Opinion","authors":"Elisabeth Fondren, J. Hamilton","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2036498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2036498","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Great War transformed propaganda as, indeed, it transformed warfare. Over the course of the conflict, from 1914 to 1918, propaganda became, for the first time, a pervasive, systematic instrument of every government that threw troops into battle. The belligerent governments employed similar approaches to shaping mass opinion. This study identifies nine laws of propaganda – that is, seminal characteristics and consequences – that emerged from the war and continue today. We draw on primary sources and unpublished materials located in political archives in the United States, Germany and Britain to explore the relationship between media, war, intelligence, and government publicity activities during 1914–1918.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"1 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49580342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-14DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2043039
V. H. C. von Lengeling
ABSTRACT Operation Bernhard was the largest money counterfeiting scheme of all time. The secret Nazi operation, set up in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp with a workforce of Jewish prisoners, produced many millions of near-perfect counterfeit British pounds with the aim of destabilizing the currency. The initial plan to airdrop the counterfeits over Britain was adapted to distribution on the ground all over Europe. While the production side of the operation has enjoyed coverage in academic and popular publications, scarcely anything is known about the distribution of the counterfeits. This vacuum in the history of Nazi Intelligence is the focus of this article. Historical network analysis was employed as this framework proved particularly useful where original source material is scarce. A graphic visualization of the distribution network further facilitates the understanding of a complex semi-structured arrangement of people under the control of the SS. Nazi officials passed fake pounds to agents who bought other currencies, gold, valuables, weapons, scarce materials, and information with it. The distribution of the counterfeit pounds was cause for the greatest embarrassment in the history of the Bank of England.
{"title":"The Distribution of Fake British Pounds in the Biggest Money Counterfeiting Scheme in History","authors":"V. H. C. von Lengeling","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2043039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2043039","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Operation Bernhard was the largest money counterfeiting scheme of all time. The secret Nazi operation, set up in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp with a workforce of Jewish prisoners, produced many millions of near-perfect counterfeit British pounds with the aim of destabilizing the currency. The initial plan to airdrop the counterfeits over Britain was adapted to distribution on the ground all over Europe. While the production side of the operation has enjoyed coverage in academic and popular publications, scarcely anything is known about the distribution of the counterfeits. This vacuum in the history of Nazi Intelligence is the focus of this article. Historical network analysis was employed as this framework proved particularly useful where original source material is scarce. A graphic visualization of the distribution network further facilitates the understanding of a complex semi-structured arrangement of people under the control of the SS. Nazi officials passed fake pounds to agents who bought other currencies, gold, valuables, weapons, scarce materials, and information with it. The distribution of the counterfeit pounds was cause for the greatest embarrassment in the history of the Bank of England.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"171 - 191"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44147852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2031522
Tobias P. Graf
ABSTRACT Throughout the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire presented the most formidable challenge to the House of Habsburg’s predominance in Europe. This imperial rivalry and the military conflict which it generated made it vital that the Holy Roman Emperor and his advisors were kept informed about their powerful adversary to receive advance warning of impending attacks. For this reason, intelligence formed an important aspect of the day-to-day activities of the Aulic War Council, created in 1556 to coordinate the military defence of the Habsburg–Ottoman border, as well as the Austrian-Habsburgs’ resident ambassadors in Istanbul. Sources surviving in the Viennese archives provide valuable insights into the collection and dissemination of relevant information, as well as the organisation built by the Habsburg diplomatic presence in the Ottoman capital. In particular, this article examines ambassadorial expenditure accounts which provide insights into the financial aspects of Austrian-Habsburg intelligence in the period 1580–1583 and demonstrates that the business of intelligence was pursued by the Habsburgs in a more professional and orderly manner than historians usually acknowledge. Indeed, it was woven into the very fabric of the Aulic War Council as well as the Austrian-Habsburg diplomatic presence in Istanbul.
{"title":"Knowing the ‘hereditary enemy’: Austrian-Habsburg intelligence on the Ottoman Empire in the late sixteenth century","authors":"Tobias P. Graf","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2031522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2031522","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Throughout the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire presented the most formidable challenge to the House of Habsburg’s predominance in Europe. This imperial rivalry and the military conflict which it generated made it vital that the Holy Roman Emperor and his advisors were kept informed about their powerful adversary to receive advance warning of impending attacks. For this reason, intelligence formed an important aspect of the day-to-day activities of the Aulic War Council, created in 1556 to coordinate the military defence of the Habsburg–Ottoman border, as well as the Austrian-Habsburgs’ resident ambassadors in Istanbul. Sources surviving in the Viennese archives provide valuable insights into the collection and dissemination of relevant information, as well as the organisation built by the Habsburg diplomatic presence in the Ottoman capital. In particular, this article examines ambassadorial expenditure accounts which provide insights into the financial aspects of Austrian-Habsburg intelligence in the period 1580–1583 and demonstrates that the business of intelligence was pursued by the Habsburgs in a more professional and orderly manner than historians usually acknowledge. Indeed, it was woven into the very fabric of the Aulic War Council as well as the Austrian-Habsburg diplomatic presence in Istanbul.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"268 - 288"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47505570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-15DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2041870
Graham Smyth
ABSTRACT For those who have speculated about the behaviour of the British people under Nazi rule, the Channel Islands have sometimes been used as a proxy, from which evidence can be selected to hypothesise about a Nazi-occupied Britain. In the area of collaboration, in particular, the historiography of the Channel Islands has been a victim of this flawed Anglo-centric approach. Looking at the evidence for the Channel Islands in their own right, this article looks at informing, as one of the most damaging and better-documented forms of collaboration, and asks: what kind of people were informers, what were their motives, and were they an integral part of a self-policing Nazi terror state? How did British Intelligence respond to informers on both professional and personal levels, and with what success did they investigate collaboration after the liberation of the Islands in May 1945? And how has the problematic evidence for informing, and by extension all collaboration, impacted perceptions of the Channel Islands under occupation?
{"title":"‘Loathsome people’: British informers in the Nazi-occupied channel Islands","authors":"Graham Smyth","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2041870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2041870","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For those who have speculated about the behaviour of the British people under Nazi rule, the Channel Islands have sometimes been used as a proxy, from which evidence can be selected to hypothesise about a Nazi-occupied Britain. In the area of collaboration, in particular, the historiography of the Channel Islands has been a victim of this flawed Anglo-centric approach. Looking at the evidence for the Channel Islands in their own right, this article looks at informing, as one of the most damaging and better-documented forms of collaboration, and asks: what kind of people were informers, what were their motives, and were they an integral part of a self-policing Nazi terror state? How did British Intelligence respond to informers on both professional and personal levels, and with what success did they investigate collaboration after the liberation of the Islands in May 1945? And how has the problematic evidence for informing, and by extension all collaboration, impacted perceptions of the Channel Islands under occupation?","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44565583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-07DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2022.2036006
Grigorij Serscikov
ABSTRACT This article describes the Soviet illegals intelligence program that was established one hundred years ago. It offers a brief overview of the Soviet intelligence organizations involved in illegal intelligence, the essence of the illegal work, and the main phases of an illegal intelligence operation. In this context, Japan presents an interesting example to analyze as it has always been in the focus of Soviet intelligence. Three cases of the Soviet illegals, little known to the historians in the West, who operated in Japan from the mid-1950s till the mid-1990s, are looked into in bigger detail. The article shows that both the KGB and the GRU used a wide range of tools and methods to dispatch and run their operatives in Japan while showing a high degree of ingenuity.
{"title":"The spies who came to the East: Soviet illegals in the post-World War II Japan","authors":"Grigorij Serscikov","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2022.2036006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2036006","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article describes the Soviet illegals intelligence program that was established one hundred years ago. It offers a brief overview of the Soviet intelligence organizations involved in illegal intelligence, the essence of the illegal work, and the main phases of an illegal intelligence operation. In this context, Japan presents an interesting example to analyze as it has always been in the focus of Soviet intelligence. Three cases of the Soviet illegals, little known to the historians in the West, who operated in Japan from the mid-1950s till the mid-1990s, are looked into in bigger detail. The article shows that both the KGB and the GRU used a wide range of tools and methods to dispatch and run their operatives in Japan while showing a high degree of ingenuity.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49522853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-22DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.2018821
Daniela Richterova
and individual story to the question of the overall intelligence impact against the IRA and whether that was a crucial factor leading to peace. Regardless of whether readers agree with Agents of Influence’s overall view of the impact of intelligence on the IRA, the book is a useful contribution to the field. It provides a nuanced understanding of how UK intelligence agencies operated, contributes to the debate surrounding the role of intelligence during the Troubles and provides a wealth of new material, particularly that provided by former UK intelligence operators and self-confessed IRA agents.
{"title":"A glance inside the monolith","authors":"Daniela Richterova","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.2018821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.2018821","url":null,"abstract":"and individual story to the question of the overall intelligence impact against the IRA and whether that was a crucial factor leading to peace. Regardless of whether readers agree with Agents of Influence’s overall view of the impact of intelligence on the IRA, the book is a useful contribution to the field. It provides a nuanced understanding of how UK intelligence agencies operated, contributes to the debate surrounding the role of intelligence during the Troubles and provides a wealth of new material, particularly that provided by former UK intelligence operators and self-confessed IRA agents.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"234 - 236"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42472043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-28DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.2021687
Evan Barnard, Loch k. Johnson, James Porter
ABSTRACT Science advisory groups have long played significant roles in federal policy- and decision-making. This article examines the history and importance of science advisory groups in conducting research and advising government administrations on matters of climate change risks and environmental security. Climate change will continue to act as a threat multiplier, amplifying these risks and their effects on security and society. The government science advisory group MEDEA and its contributions to environmental research and national, societal, and environmental security analysis are presented as a model of partnership between the scientific and intelligence communities. The history, research, and environmental expertise of the MEDEA program are discussed in the security context, including an examination of its relationship with the intelligence community. Finally, historical examples are provided to suggest how future science advisory groups can provide informed guidance and contribute to federal security objectives.
{"title":"Environmental security intelligence: the role of US intelligence agencies and science advisory groups in anticipating climate security threats","authors":"Evan Barnard, Loch k. Johnson, James Porter","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.2021687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.2021687","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Science advisory groups have long played significant roles in federal policy- and decision-making. This article examines the history and importance of science advisory groups in conducting research and advising government administrations on matters of climate change risks and environmental security. Climate change will continue to act as a threat multiplier, amplifying these risks and their effects on security and society. The government science advisory group MEDEA and its contributions to environmental research and national, societal, and environmental security analysis are presented as a model of partnership between the scientific and intelligence communities. The history, research, and environmental expertise of the MEDEA program are discussed in the security context, including an examination of its relationship with the intelligence community. Finally, historical examples are provided to suggest how future science advisory groups can provide informed guidance and contribute to federal security objectives.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41609933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.2019383
Christopher Smith
methods from the anti-terrorist campaign in Bengal, such as the use of agents and informers (in ports and on board ships) in an effort to penetrate the subaltern world of maritime smuggling’ (p. 266). Expanding the framework, Silvestri explains how police and civil servants used the expertise they gained against revolutionaries in Bengal to intelligence and insurgency in the British Caribbean, Ireland, London, North America, Palestine and Southeast Asia. He reviews lives of specific intelligence officers after working in Bengal and finds they continued their careers in new locations, taking their knowledge of ‘surveillance, information-gathering, and intelligence analysis’ that was ‘blended with paramilitary policing, coercive interrogation, and collective punishment’ to new places (p. 312). In the epilogue, Silvestri continues with this theme and briefly examines Bengal intelligence officers during the Second World War to demonstrate their contribution to the wartime effort. Silvestri successfully traces the development of imperial intelligence in Bengal, highlighting the nature of imperial power, the brutality of maintaining that power and intelligence’s global reach. He describes the mundane tasks of police intelligence in Bengal, but also the intricate transnational complexity of imperial intelligence in how colonial officers reacted to Bengali revolutionaries’ activities in India and beyond. One important aspect of intelligence and policing from this era not analysed was fingerprinting in Bengal (Silvestri briefly mentioned fingerprinting in one sentence on page 94). The role of colonialism and police in fingerprinting is notable as it was developed in Bengal during this period as a way for colonial authorities to distinguish between people who could not write their ‘names and are otherwise hardly distinguishable by Europeans.’ Nonetheless, the level of research was impressive with Silvestri drawing from contemporaneous first-hand accounts, newspapers and a large body of archival material from India, the United Kingdom and the United States. This highly recommended study will be useful to readers interested in colonial intelligence, terrorism and political violence, and South Asian history.
{"title":"Behind the enigma: the authorised history of GCHQ, Britain’s secret cyber-intelligence agency","authors":"Christopher Smith","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.2019383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.2019383","url":null,"abstract":"methods from the anti-terrorist campaign in Bengal, such as the use of agents and informers (in ports and on board ships) in an effort to penetrate the subaltern world of maritime smuggling’ (p. 266). Expanding the framework, Silvestri explains how police and civil servants used the expertise they gained against revolutionaries in Bengal to intelligence and insurgency in the British Caribbean, Ireland, London, North America, Palestine and Southeast Asia. He reviews lives of specific intelligence officers after working in Bengal and finds they continued their careers in new locations, taking their knowledge of ‘surveillance, information-gathering, and intelligence analysis’ that was ‘blended with paramilitary policing, coercive interrogation, and collective punishment’ to new places (p. 312). In the epilogue, Silvestri continues with this theme and briefly examines Bengal intelligence officers during the Second World War to demonstrate their contribution to the wartime effort. Silvestri successfully traces the development of imperial intelligence in Bengal, highlighting the nature of imperial power, the brutality of maintaining that power and intelligence’s global reach. He describes the mundane tasks of police intelligence in Bengal, but also the intricate transnational complexity of imperial intelligence in how colonial officers reacted to Bengali revolutionaries’ activities in India and beyond. One important aspect of intelligence and policing from this era not analysed was fingerprinting in Bengal (Silvestri briefly mentioned fingerprinting in one sentence on page 94). The role of colonialism and police in fingerprinting is notable as it was developed in Bengal during this period as a way for colonial authorities to distinguish between people who could not write their ‘names and are otherwise hardly distinguishable by Europeans.’ Nonetheless, the level of research was impressive with Silvestri drawing from contemporaneous first-hand accounts, newspapers and a large body of archival material from India, the United Kingdom and the United States. This highly recommended study will be useful to readers interested in colonial intelligence, terrorism and political violence, and South Asian history.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"307 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43552747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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