Pub Date : 2021-02-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1883932
John Gilmour
This is a complex and rewarding book about a complex and rewarding character whose service in World War II spanned intelligence, special operations and field combat, in Scandinavia, London and Ital...
{"title":"Mysteriet Malcolm Munthe. Churchills Agent I Norden.’ (The mystery of Malcolm Munthe, Churchill’s Nordic agent)","authors":"John Gilmour","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1883932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1883932","url":null,"abstract":"This is a complex and rewarding book about a complex and rewarding character whose service in World War II spanned intelligence, special operations and field combat, in Scandinavia, London and Ital...","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"246 - 247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1883932","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45104448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-03DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1884793
Liam Kane
ABSTRACT This article provides the first account of air intelligence in the South West Pacific Area during the Second World War. Centring on the organisational aspects of intelligence-gathering, analysis, and dissemination, it brings the Directorate of Intelligence within the combined Royal Australian Air Force-US Army Air Force Allied Air Forces into sharp focus. This article argues that Australian-American cooperation in air intelligence was shaped by strategic circumstances, the balance of Allied air forces in the theatre, and personal relations between intelligence personnel. Though cooperation in air intelligence largely ended on a sour note in late 1944 when the Australians were largely excluded from the US-led second Philippines campaign and the Directorate of Intelligence was essentially dissolved, this article demonstrates that the Directorate became a sophisticated, if under-appreciated, intelligence organisation by mid-1943.
{"title":"Allied Air Intelligence in the South West Pacific Area, 1942-1945","authors":"Liam Kane","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1884793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1884793","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article provides the first account of air intelligence in the South West Pacific Area during the Second World War. Centring on the organisational aspects of intelligence-gathering, analysis, and dissemination, it brings the Directorate of Intelligence within the combined Royal Australian Air Force-US Army Air Force Allied Air Forces into sharp focus. This article argues that Australian-American cooperation in air intelligence was shaped by strategic circumstances, the balance of Allied air forces in the theatre, and personal relations between intelligence personnel. Though cooperation in air intelligence largely ended on a sour note in late 1944 when the Australians were largely excluded from the US-led second Philippines campaign and the Directorate of Intelligence was essentially dissolved, this article demonstrates that the Directorate became a sophisticated, if under-appreciated, intelligence organisation by mid-1943.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"39 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1884793","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43145743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1882119
Charlotte Yelamos
Simon Ball offers an intriguing look into Britain’s intelligence history through the lens of internally published agency histories. The book is a product of Ball’s AHRC-funded project (in collabora...
{"title":"Secret history: writing the rise of Britain’s intelligence services","authors":"Charlotte Yelamos","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1882119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882119","url":null,"abstract":"Simon Ball offers an intriguing look into Britain’s intelligence history through the lens of internally published agency histories. The book is a product of Ball’s AHRC-funded project (in collabora...","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"122 - 123"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882119","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41972209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-31DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1882100
Chris Northcott
ABSTRACT Peter Gill asks if technology can solve MI5’s problem ‘not of determining “unknown unknowns” but, rather, identifying the very few tens from thousands of “knowns” who might attack at very short notice?’ MI5’s ‘data-washing exercise’ (‘Operation CLEMATIS’) could be the solution to this problem, but it also raises ethical questions. The data-washing exercise is a ‘process devised by MI5 to identify activity of renewed intelligence interest conducted by closed SOIs [Subjects of Interest], using targeted data exploitation and other automated techniques’. It succeeded in identifying Salman Abedi, the Manchester Arena bomber, ‘as one of a small number of individuals, out of a total of more than 20,000 closed SOIs, who merited further examination’. A meeting, scheduled before the attack, was arranged for 31 May 2017 to consider Abedi’s case. Unfortunately, the attack happened on 22 May.
{"title":"Research note. ‘Introducing MI5’s “data-washing exercise”’","authors":"Chris Northcott","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1882100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882100","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Peter Gill asks if technology can solve MI5’s problem ‘not of determining “unknown unknowns” but, rather, identifying the very few tens from thousands of “knowns” who might attack at very short notice?’ MI5’s ‘data-washing exercise’ (‘Operation CLEMATIS’) could be the solution to this problem, but it also raises ethical questions. The data-washing exercise is a ‘process devised by MI5 to identify activity of renewed intelligence interest conducted by closed SOIs [Subjects of Interest], using targeted data exploitation and other automated techniques’. It succeeded in identifying Salman Abedi, the Manchester Arena bomber, ‘as one of a small number of individuals, out of a total of more than 20,000 closed SOIs, who merited further examination’. A meeting, scheduled before the attack, was arranged for 31 May 2017 to consider Abedi’s case. Unfortunately, the attack happened on 22 May.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"113 - 121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882100","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47607977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-31DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1882121
Ryan Shaffer
Michael Silvestri explores imperial intelligence’s evolution and response to Bengali revolutionaries in British India and beyond. In particular, he examines ‘the emergence of modern police intellig...
{"title":"Policing ‘Bengali terrorism’ in India and the world: imperial intelligence and revolutionary nationalism, 1905–1939","authors":"Ryan Shaffer","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1882121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882121","url":null,"abstract":"Michael Silvestri explores imperial intelligence’s evolution and response to Bengali revolutionaries in British India and beyond. In particular, he examines ‘the emergence of modern police intellig...","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"306 - 307"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882121","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46063278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-29DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1882091
V. H. C. von Lengeling
ABSTRACT German Intelligence History during the Nazi time remains a neglected field in academic research while there are still actors of the German Resistance (Widerstand) against the Nazi regime about whom very little is known. Original documentary sources are scarce, and even more so for lesser-known Germans whose life straddled both Intelligence and Widerstand, while working within the heart of Nazi terror. Egon Lengeling (1905–1945) was a family man, an exemplary official at the Foreign Intelligence Office of the Reich Security Headquarters in Berlin, and he managed several acts of resistance using his position. However, the Gestapo arrested Lengeling in June 1944 and he was imprisoned until February 1945, when he disappeared. The framework of an ego network within an historical network analysis is applied through which it is possible to determine some of Lengeling’s roles and motives. This ego network analysis serves as an example of how to illuminate the activities of other lesser-known actors of the Nazi Intelligence and participants with the Widerstand in cases where source material is scarce.
{"title":"Resistance within the heart of Nazi Terror: the case of Egon Lengeling","authors":"V. H. C. von Lengeling","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1882091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882091","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT German Intelligence History during the Nazi time remains a neglected field in academic research while there are still actors of the German Resistance (Widerstand) against the Nazi regime about whom very little is known. Original documentary sources are scarce, and even more so for lesser-known Germans whose life straddled both Intelligence and Widerstand, while working within the heart of Nazi terror. Egon Lengeling (1905–1945) was a family man, an exemplary official at the Foreign Intelligence Office of the Reich Security Headquarters in Berlin, and he managed several acts of resistance using his position. However, the Gestapo arrested Lengeling in June 1944 and he was imprisoned until February 1945, when he disappeared. The framework of an ego network within an historical network analysis is applied through which it is possible to determine some of Lengeling’s roles and motives. This ego network analysis serves as an example of how to illuminate the activities of other lesser-known actors of the Nazi Intelligence and participants with the Widerstand in cases where source material is scarce.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"135 - 152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882091","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42108675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-27DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1882120
J. Rushton
From its peculiar republicanism to its floating city, Renaissance Venice had a reputation for doing things differently. In Venice’s Secret Service: Organising Intelligence in the Renaissance, Ioann...
{"title":"Venice’s secret service: organising intelligence in the renaissance","authors":"J. Rushton","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1882120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882120","url":null,"abstract":"From its peculiar republicanism to its floating city, Renaissance Venice had a reputation for doing things differently. In Venice’s Secret Service: Organising Intelligence in the Renaissance, Ioann...","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"244 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882120","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42604207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1864863
A. Claver
ABSTRACT This paper addresses urgent information needs in today’s unsettled cyber domain. Dealing with complex cyber questions decision-makers will arguably benefit from an alternative analytical point of view. Academic research has shown that decisions benefit from assessments and advice based upon differing points of view. Devil’s advocacy, which criticizes established positions, and offers alternative perspectives to any given argument based upon the same inputs, is one established instrument to try to achieve this. The paper explores analytical lessons learned within the Israeli military system as a result of the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The unexpected outbreak of war showed the urgent need for improvements in assessment and decision-making processes. A ‘devil’s advocate shop’ was subsequently set up within Israeli military intelligence. The prolonged Israeli experience with devil’s advocacy might serve its purpose in the virtual world. This requires re-transformation of the Devil’s Advocacy concept into a Cyber tool in order to protect decision-makers from cognitive pitfalls and offering them a better perspective of complex cyber issues at stake.
{"title":"Devil’s advocacy and cyber space. In support of quality assurance and decision making","authors":"A. Claver","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1864863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1864863","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper addresses urgent information needs in today’s unsettled cyber domain. Dealing with complex cyber questions decision-makers will arguably benefit from an alternative analytical point of view. Academic research has shown that decisions benefit from assessments and advice based upon differing points of view. Devil’s advocacy, which criticizes established positions, and offers alternative perspectives to any given argument based upon the same inputs, is one established instrument to try to achieve this. The paper explores analytical lessons learned within the Israeli military system as a result of the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The unexpected outbreak of war showed the urgent need for improvements in assessment and decision-making processes. A ‘devil’s advocate shop’ was subsequently set up within Israeli military intelligence. The prolonged Israeli experience with devil’s advocacy might serve its purpose in the virtual world. This requires re-transformation of the Devil’s Advocacy concept into a Cyber tool in order to protect decision-makers from cognitive pitfalls and offering them a better perspective of complex cyber issues at stake.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"88 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1864863","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43198459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-05DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1826813
Dafydd Townley
ABSTRACT In 1975, Senator Frank Church led the first US Senate review of the conduct of the United States intelligence community, popularly known as the Church Committee. The committee identified a plethora of constitutional abuses by the intelligence community in the early Cold War that shocked the nation, and initiated wholesale reform of congressional intelligence oversight. Conservative critics used Church’s subsequent campaign for the Democratic Party presidential nomination in 1976 as evidence of his use of the investigation to further his presidential aspirations. Using newly-discovered archival evidence and oral history interviews, this article establishes that such conclusions are erroneous, and that Church knowingly sacrificed his ambitions to maintain the committee’s public standing. Furthermore, it argues that contemporary and later criticism of Church’s conduct was aimed at negating the impact of the Church Committee’s report and protecting the intelligence community from unwanted reform.
{"title":"Too responsible to run for president: Frank Church and the 1976 presidential nomination","authors":"Dafydd Townley","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1826813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826813","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In 1975, Senator Frank Church led the first US Senate review of the conduct of the United States intelligence community, popularly known as the Church Committee. The committee identified a plethora of constitutional abuses by the intelligence community in the early Cold War that shocked the nation, and initiated wholesale reform of congressional intelligence oversight. Conservative critics used Church’s subsequent campaign for the Democratic Party presidential nomination in 1976 as evidence of his use of the investigation to further his presidential aspirations. Using newly-discovered archival evidence and oral history interviews, this article establishes that such conclusions are erroneous, and that Church knowingly sacrificed his ambitions to maintain the committee’s public standing. Furthermore, it argues that contemporary and later criticism of Church’s conduct was aimed at negating the impact of the Church Committee’s report and protecting the intelligence community from unwanted reform.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"213 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1826813","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45855637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-20DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1746144
Giliam de Valk, Onno Goldbach
ABSTRACT Science and intelligence analysis have a different methodological setting. In science a phenomenon is explained in a general sense, it is in the first place aimed at to explain and to contribute to theory. For that the value of the α is the most critical one: you want to keep the number of incorrect relationships as low as possible. Intelligence analysis is in the first place aimed at not to miss a possible threat. In that research, the value of the β is the most critical one: you want to keep the number of missed relationships as low as possible. Yet, many analytic techniques have been developed in science. These have not been calibrated in order not to miss a relationship. Also reasoning – logic – needs to be reformulated, and calibrated from an α to a β approach. Tooling is needed for a research design into the unknowns.
{"title":"Towards a robust β research design: on reasoning and different classes of unknowns","authors":"Giliam de Valk, Onno Goldbach","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1746144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1746144","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Science and intelligence analysis have a different methodological setting. In science a phenomenon is explained in a general sense, it is in the first place aimed at to explain and to contribute to theory. For that the value of the α is the most critical one: you want to keep the number of incorrect relationships as low as possible. Intelligence analysis is in the first place aimed at not to miss a possible threat. In that research, the value of the β is the most critical one: you want to keep the number of missed relationships as low as possible. Yet, many analytic techniques have been developed in science. These have not been calibrated in order not to miss a relationship. Also reasoning – logic – needs to be reformulated, and calibrated from an α to a β approach. Tooling is needed for a research design into the unknowns.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"20 1","pages":"72 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1746144","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47684934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}