Pub Date : 2021-11-17DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.2004029
Matthias Pohlig
ABSTRACT It is usually taken for granted that intelligence organisations provide information for decision-making and that the knowledge produced in the process is therefore deeply utilitarian. Drawing on organisational sociology, this article draws on a case study of English intelligence efforts during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) to reflect critically on the assumed direct relationship between intelligence-gathering and political decision-making. In eighteenth-century England, intelligence frequently fulfilled other, often more symbolic functions, for example when access to intelligence was employed to legitimise individual actors. In this sense, intelligence was doubtlessly useful, albeit in other ways than generally postulated by intelligence theory. These observations strongly suggest a ‘missing dimension’ in the history of intelligence in other periods as well as intelligence theory more generally.
{"title":"The uses and utility of intelligence: the case of the British Government during the War of the Spanish Succession","authors":"Matthias Pohlig","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.2004029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.2004029","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is usually taken for granted that intelligence organisations provide information for decision-making and that the knowledge produced in the process is therefore deeply utilitarian. Drawing on organisational sociology, this article draws on a case study of English intelligence efforts during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) to reflect critically on the assumed direct relationship between intelligence-gathering and political decision-making. In eighteenth-century England, intelligence frequently fulfilled other, often more symbolic functions, for example when access to intelligence was employed to legitimise individual actors. In this sense, intelligence was doubtlessly useful, albeit in other ways than generally postulated by intelligence theory. These observations strongly suggest a ‘missing dimension’ in the history of intelligence in other periods as well as intelligence theory more generally.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"289 - 305"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44085989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-16DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1967656
Eleanor Leah Williams
Following revelations in the early 2000’s that agents Denis Donaldson and Stakeknife had been active in the Irish Republican movement, questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness of the UK’s intelligence war in Northern Ireland. Aaron Edwards’ latest book Agents of Influence provides a new contribution to this key debate. Whilst the broader literature on the IRA and the Peace Process has continued to address the debate surrounding who won the intelligence war, to date it has most notably been advanced by John Bew and Martyn Frampton, and more recently by Thomas Leahy. Agents of Influence contributes some enjoyable key features to the debate. Firstly, it provides a detailed explanation of the UK state’s intelligence mechanics during the Northern Ireland conflict, highlighting the subtle differences between agencies. The indepth understanding demonstrated is a welcome contribution to the field, and complements the work of Christopher Andrew. Edwards, like others before him, shines a light on the difficulties in coordination between different UK intelligence agencies from 1979 onwards. Moreover, he indicates that these issues were partly due to institutional competitiveness and different outlooks. Secondly, the book successfully showcases the challenges the intelligence agencies faced regarding the running of informers and agents. It highlights the ethical questions and debates surrounding informers and agents, and the challenges of balancing those concerns within the conflict. Indeed, the book implies that further guidance from politicians was needed in this field. Finally, Edwards’ range of new interview material used throughout the book is a standout feature. The author interviewed a large number of individuals from a wide range of backgrounds. A personal favourite of this reader were the extracts of interviews with Willie Carlin, a former agent for UK intelligence. Carlin’s testimony provides the reader with glimpses of the on-the-ground situation in Derry in the early 1980s. Agents of Influence argues that the IRA was defeated by the time they signed up to the Good Friday Agreement. However, contrary to Bew and Frampton, Edwards believes this was a ‘secret defeat’ as political intelligence played a major role. That is, agents of influence pushed UK state ideas of peace within the Republican movement, and within its inner-circle; protected the Republican leadership that was pro-peace; and, ensured that its critics were smeared. He acknowledges Leahy’s argument that intelligence did not influence the Republican movement’s armed or political strategy immensely during the conflict. Nonetheless, Edwards describes this argument as ‘just as one-dimensional as those which argue that agents – as just one intelligence-gathering tool – were chiefly responsible for bringing about the end of the IRA’s campaign’ (p. 226). To support the argument that the IRA was defeated, Edwards highlights the fact that they had to abandon the goal of a united Ir
{"title":"Agents of influence: Britain’s secret intelligence war against the IRA","authors":"Eleanor Leah Williams","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1967656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1967656","url":null,"abstract":"Following revelations in the early 2000’s that agents Denis Donaldson and Stakeknife had been active in the Irish Republican movement, questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness of the UK’s intelligence war in Northern Ireland. Aaron Edwards’ latest book Agents of Influence provides a new contribution to this key debate. Whilst the broader literature on the IRA and the Peace Process has continued to address the debate surrounding who won the intelligence war, to date it has most notably been advanced by John Bew and Martyn Frampton, and more recently by Thomas Leahy. Agents of Influence contributes some enjoyable key features to the debate. Firstly, it provides a detailed explanation of the UK state’s intelligence mechanics during the Northern Ireland conflict, highlighting the subtle differences between agencies. The indepth understanding demonstrated is a welcome contribution to the field, and complements the work of Christopher Andrew. Edwards, like others before him, shines a light on the difficulties in coordination between different UK intelligence agencies from 1979 onwards. Moreover, he indicates that these issues were partly due to institutional competitiveness and different outlooks. Secondly, the book successfully showcases the challenges the intelligence agencies faced regarding the running of informers and agents. It highlights the ethical questions and debates surrounding informers and agents, and the challenges of balancing those concerns within the conflict. Indeed, the book implies that further guidance from politicians was needed in this field. Finally, Edwards’ range of new interview material used throughout the book is a standout feature. The author interviewed a large number of individuals from a wide range of backgrounds. A personal favourite of this reader were the extracts of interviews with Willie Carlin, a former agent for UK intelligence. Carlin’s testimony provides the reader with glimpses of the on-the-ground situation in Derry in the early 1980s. Agents of Influence argues that the IRA was defeated by the time they signed up to the Good Friday Agreement. However, contrary to Bew and Frampton, Edwards believes this was a ‘secret defeat’ as political intelligence played a major role. That is, agents of influence pushed UK state ideas of peace within the Republican movement, and within its inner-circle; protected the Republican leadership that was pro-peace; and, ensured that its critics were smeared. He acknowledges Leahy’s argument that intelligence did not influence the Republican movement’s armed or political strategy immensely during the conflict. Nonetheless, Edwards describes this argument as ‘just as one-dimensional as those which argue that agents – as just one intelligence-gathering tool – were chiefly responsible for bringing about the end of the IRA’s campaign’ (p. 226). To support the argument that the IRA was defeated, Edwards highlights the fact that they had to abandon the goal of a united Ir","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"232 - 234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48459292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-28DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1960720
A. V. Grinëv
ABSTRACT Intentional or unintentional falsification of data, understatement of information, distortion of statistics, manipulation or invention of new facts are periodically encountered in official documents connected with Russian colonization of America. People in Alaska and St. Petersburg who managed the process of colonization, as well as the highest officials of the empire, resorted to such methods. Some falsifications were revealed during the time of Russian America, others continue their existence up to the present on the pages of the works of historians. The most negative effects resulted from falsifications based on which important and extremely rash management decisions were made. As an example, it is possible to cite the royal decree of 4 September 1821, which resulted in serious consequences for Russian America and the birth of the famous Monroe Doctrine in Washington, as well as press materials, documents, and notes of officials related to preparation for the sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867.
{"title":"Falsification in the sources of the history of Russian America and their effects","authors":"A. V. Grinëv","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1960720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1960720","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Intentional or unintentional falsification of data, understatement of information, distortion of statistics, manipulation or invention of new facts are periodically encountered in official documents connected with Russian colonization of America. People in Alaska and St. Petersburg who managed the process of colonization, as well as the highest officials of the empire, resorted to such methods. Some falsifications were revealed during the time of Russian America, others continue their existence up to the present on the pages of the works of historians. The most negative effects resulted from falsifications based on which important and extremely rash management decisions were made. As an example, it is possible to cite the royal decree of 4 September 1821, which resulted in serious consequences for Russian America and the birth of the famous Monroe Doctrine in Washington, as well as press materials, documents, and notes of officials related to preparation for the sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"124 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1960720","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46082227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-11DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1889278
Ben Wheatley
ABSTRACT The three armoured SS Sonderverbände (special units) Leibstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf which constituted the II SS Panzer Korps played a key role during the battle of Kursk (5.7–23.8.1943), first during Operation Citadel (5–16.7.43) and then (minus the Leibstandarte) during the defence of Kharkov (3–23.8.43). For the first time, as a result of a recent archival discovery (complete armoured inventories for 20.7.43 and 1.8.43), this article can give the exact number of armoured losses the II SS Panzer Korps sustained during Operation Citadel, which included the supposedly crippling armoured battle of Prokhorovka (12.7.43). The article also establishes the actual number of operational AFV that was available to the II SS Panzer Korps before, during and after Operation Citadel. Taken together this information allows for a detailed examination of Hitler’s strategy preceding the defence of Kharkov, including his decision to send the II SS Panzer Korps to the Mius Front (30.7–2.8.43).
{"title":"Citadel, Prokhorovka and Kharkov: The Armoured Losses of the II SS Panzer Korps Sonderverbände During the Battle of Kursk, July-August 1943","authors":"Ben Wheatley","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1889278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1889278","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The three armoured SS Sonderverbände (special units) Leibstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf which constituted the II SS Panzer Korps played a key role during the battle of Kursk (5.7–23.8.1943), first during Operation Citadel (5–16.7.43) and then (minus the Leibstandarte) during the defence of Kharkov (3–23.8.43). For the first time, as a result of a recent archival discovery (complete armoured inventories for 20.7.43 and 1.8.43), this article can give the exact number of armoured losses the II SS Panzer Korps sustained during Operation Citadel, which included the supposedly crippling armoured battle of Prokhorovka (12.7.43). The article also establishes the actual number of operational AFV that was available to the II SS Panzer Korps before, during and after Operation Citadel. Taken together this information allows for a detailed examination of Hitler’s strategy preceding the defence of Kharkov, including his decision to send the II SS Panzer Korps to the Mius Front (30.7–2.8.43).","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"121 - 170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1889278","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42055802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-03DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1882090
Ryan Shaffer
ABSTRACT This article explores the Samba spy scandal to understand Indian counterintelligence and inter-agency intelligence coordination. The scandal publicly emerged in 1979 when dozens of Indian military intelligence officers were arrested for being Pakistani spies. The article examines the accused men’s confessions of selling information to Pakistan’s Field Intelligence Unit and how later they said the admissions were false and provided under torture. Then it describes senior intelligence and military leaders airing their suspicions that the men were innocent as well as a significant statement from a Pakistani spy a decade later. However, a 2014 Supreme Court ruling officially ‘stamped’ the men spies without any hope for clearing their names. The article analyses primary sources, interviews, news articles and court rulings, concluding that the scandal reveals poor Indian military counterintelligence and a lack of inter-agency cooperation.
{"title":"Decoding the Samba spy scandal:false spies, counterintelligence and military intelligence in India","authors":"Ryan Shaffer","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1882090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882090","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores the Samba spy scandal to understand Indian counterintelligence and inter-agency intelligence coordination. The scandal publicly emerged in 1979 when dozens of Indian military intelligence officers were arrested for being Pakistani spies. The article examines the accused men’s confessions of selling information to Pakistan’s Field Intelligence Unit and how later they said the admissions were false and provided under torture. Then it describes senior intelligence and military leaders airing their suspicions that the men were innocent as well as a significant statement from a Pakistani spy a decade later. However, a 2014 Supreme Court ruling officially ‘stamped’ the men spies without any hope for clearing their names. The article analyses primary sources, interviews, news articles and court rulings, concluding that the scandal reveals poor Indian military counterintelligence and a lack of inter-agency cooperation.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"191 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1882090","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45615911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-25DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1892997
Kevin P. Riehle
ABSTRACT When Igor Gouzenko defected in September 1945, be brought with him a package of documents, supplemented by what he carried in his memory, that gave a clear picture of the types of agents Soviet military intelligence was tasked to recruit and the information the GRU sought from them. Historians differ on the role Gouzenko and his revelations played at the outset of the Cold War, some seeing it as pivotal, while others pay little attention to it at all. This article sits between those two poles to explore the question: what insights did Gouzenko's revelations give about GRU priorities--and thence Soviet priorities--at the end of World War II? This article examines the categories of information that the GRU sought, including military, science and technology, and political information. GRU collection of this information, the sources it targeted for recruitment, and the urgency it placed on clandestinity of handling those sources, revealed the military and political intelligence the Soviet Union sought to fight the next war. . Taken together, Gouzenko's material showed a Soviet Union that was preparing for war against the United States and Great Britain even before World war II ended.
{"title":"Soviet Intent at the Dawn of the Cold War: Igor Gouzenko’s Revelations About GRU Intelligence Taskings","authors":"Kevin P. Riehle","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1892997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1892997","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT When Igor Gouzenko defected in September 1945, be brought with him a package of documents, supplemented by what he carried in his memory, that gave a clear picture of the types of agents Soviet military intelligence was tasked to recruit and the information the GRU sought from them. Historians differ on the role Gouzenko and his revelations played at the outset of the Cold War, some seeing it as pivotal, while others pay little attention to it at all. This article sits between those two poles to explore the question: what insights did Gouzenko's revelations give about GRU priorities--and thence Soviet priorities--at the end of World War II? This article examines the categories of information that the GRU sought, including military, science and technology, and political information. GRU collection of this information, the sources it targeted for recruitment, and the urgency it placed on clandestinity of handling those sources, revealed the military and political intelligence the Soviet Union sought to fight the next war. . Taken together, Gouzenko's material showed a Soviet Union that was preparing for war against the United States and Great Britain even before World war II ended.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"216 - 233"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1892997","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43784795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-13DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1884791
J. Work
ABSTRACT Espionage driven acquisition of Western technology played a key role in the development of computer science and technology for Warsaw Pact services during the Cold War period. US, UK, and other Allied nations, recognized this new field was inextricably linked at its creation to cryptography, navigation, weapons guidance, and a host of other military and dual-use applications. As a result, the Free World powers imposed export control restrictions that were intended to embargo the transfer of equipment and knowledge, in order to preserve hard-won advantage that recent wartime experience had taught could be fleeting under the intense pressures of innovation and adaption in combat. Despite such controls, Soviet foreign intelligence services provided critical early access that led to duplication of systems that were to some degree comparable in purpose and quality from the outset, and loomed larger still in the long shadow of intended future R&D pathways. Western intelligence services were not blind to this behavior; through unique collection approaches and sustained analytic efforts, they sought to track the state of Soviet computing and its role in strategic, military, and economic applications. This effort was effectively the dawn of the cyber intelligence mission.
{"title":"Early intelligence assessments of COMBLOC computing","authors":"J. Work","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1884791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1884791","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Espionage driven acquisition of Western technology played a key role in the development of computer science and technology for Warsaw Pact services during the Cold War period. US, UK, and other Allied nations, recognized this new field was inextricably linked at its creation to cryptography, navigation, weapons guidance, and a host of other military and dual-use applications. As a result, the Free World powers imposed export control restrictions that were intended to embargo the transfer of equipment and knowledge, in order to preserve hard-won advantage that recent wartime experience had taught could be fleeting under the intense pressures of innovation and adaption in combat. Despite such controls, Soviet foreign intelligence services provided critical early access that led to duplication of systems that were to some degree comparable in purpose and quality from the outset, and loomed larger still in the long shadow of intended future R&D pathways. Western intelligence services were not blind to this behavior; through unique collection approaches and sustained analytic efforts, they sought to track the state of Soviet computing and its role in strategic, military, and economic applications. This effort was effectively the dawn of the cyber intelligence mission.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"172 - 190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1884791","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49481847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-11DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1889277
James D. Llewelyn
ABSTRACT The Imperial Japanese Army’s (IJA) Tokumu Kikan, or Special Service Organisations were special warfare units that specialised in HUMINT collection and fifth column activities. These small well-trained military-civilian elite units were force multipliers for the IJA, operating in China, as well as across Southeast Asia in support of Japan’s southward advance. Under central figures such as former chief of IJA intelligence, Lieutenant General Arisue Seizō, many wartime Tokumu Kikan personnel undertook a suite of new intelligence activities in the post-war period – inside Japan and in neighbouring countries – as Japan sought to manage its defeat and occupation, and rebuild its intelligence capabilities.
{"title":"The Imperial Japanese Army’s Tokumu Kikan – Special Service Organisations: Connections Between Wartime and Peacetime Intelligence Activities","authors":"James D. Llewelyn","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1889277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1889277","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Imperial Japanese Army’s (IJA) Tokumu Kikan, or Special Service Organisations were special warfare units that specialised in HUMINT collection and fifth column activities. These small well-trained military-civilian elite units were force multipliers for the IJA, operating in China, as well as across Southeast Asia in support of Japan’s southward advance. Under central figures such as former chief of IJA intelligence, Lieutenant General Arisue Seizō, many wartime Tokumu Kikan personnel undertook a suite of new intelligence activities in the post-war period – inside Japan and in neighbouring countries – as Japan sought to manage its defeat and occupation, and rebuild its intelligence capabilities.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"103 - 120"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1889277","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45857040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-11DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1884792
John Gilmour
ABSTRACT During the Second World War, neutral Sweden was regarded by Britain as an important source of intelligence but the activities and contribution of the Stockholm Military Attaché, Reginald Sutton-Pratt to the sourcing, management and communication of British military intelligence have not been previously assessed. Sutton-Pratt was a key figure in Anglo-Swedish ‘intelligence liaison,’ that enabled Britain to estimate the military capability of this neutral in the event of German invasion. Intelligence liaison required competences that facilitated cooperation between senior Swedish and British military officers to a perhaps surprising degree. Additionally, Sutton-Pratt maintained Norwegian sources that provided detailed intelligence about German deployment and activities in the occupied territory. He also sourced intelligence from escaped British POWs for MI9. Sutton-Pratt’s valuable position as an accredited attaché was threatened by his involvement in SIS and SOE operations but he avoided being recalled. In addition to his intelligence roles, he worked assiduously to contribute to the British war effort across a range of activities such as military supplies to Finland during the Winter War and prisoner exchange with the Germans.
{"title":"‘Heil England!’ Reggie Sutton-Pratt, British Military Attaché in Stockholm 1939-1945","authors":"John Gilmour","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1884792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1884792","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT During the Second World War, neutral Sweden was regarded by Britain as an important source of intelligence but the activities and contribution of the Stockholm Military Attaché, Reginald Sutton-Pratt to the sourcing, management and communication of British military intelligence have not been previously assessed. Sutton-Pratt was a key figure in Anglo-Swedish ‘intelligence liaison,’ that enabled Britain to estimate the military capability of this neutral in the event of German invasion. Intelligence liaison required competences that facilitated cooperation between senior Swedish and British military officers to a perhaps surprising degree. Additionally, Sutton-Pratt maintained Norwegian sources that provided detailed intelligence about German deployment and activities in the occupied territory. He also sourced intelligence from escaped British POWs for MI9. Sutton-Pratt’s valuable position as an accredited attaché was threatened by his involvement in SIS and SOE operations but he avoided being recalled. In addition to his intelligence roles, he worked assiduously to contribute to the British war effort across a range of activities such as military supplies to Finland during the Winter War and prisoner exchange with the Germans.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"20 - 38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1884792","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48662849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-11DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1889191
John A. Gentry
ABSTRACT The intelligence literature little addresses why national leaders purge their intelligence agencies as a variety of ‘reform’. Motives and consequences have varied dramatically over time, across countries, and by regime type. This article describes and assesses historical reasons for, and consequences of, intelligence purges. It applies these lessons to assess whether a purge might usefully address what some Americans consider to be the excessive independence of US intelligence agencies and their resultant insubordination to all modern presidents, especially to President Donald Trump.
{"title":"Purges of Intelligence Services: Motives, Methods, and Consequences","authors":"John A. Gentry","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2021.1889191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2021.1889191","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The intelligence literature little addresses why national leaders purge their intelligence agencies as a variety of ‘reform’. Motives and consequences have varied dramatically over time, across countries, and by regime type. This article describes and assesses historical reasons for, and consequences of, intelligence purges. It applies these lessons to assess whether a purge might usefully address what some Americans consider to be the excessive independence of US intelligence agencies and their resultant insubordination to all modern presidents, especially to President Donald Trump.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"22 1","pages":"77 - 97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2021.1889191","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46905085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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