Pub Date : 2007-10-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300209
T. Michel
After 9/11, terrorism became a central concern of the social sciences, with anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and psychologists producing a vast amount of academic literature in the past few years. Most of these accounts deal with the implications, roots and possible countermeasures against the newly identified threat that has grown so strong after the end of the Cold War. But there is another side to this literature, produced by scholars of the humanities, a more abstract theoretical side that tries to identify the ideational framework in which the discourse on terrorism is situated. This review article will explore three contributions to this theoretical agenda which focus more on the philosophical intricacies expressed in acts of terror(ism). It will pay special attention to the perceived antagonism between modernity and its forces of reason and the clouded and superstitious realm of religious faith, as they relate to terrorism. In many instances the picture painted pitches rationality, the pursuit of reasonable action and the concomitant universalist project of modernity against a dark, medieval movement embodied in religiously motivated terrorism that tries to undermine the precious achievements of human liberty and freedom. In many accounts this conflict comes down to the old story of good versus evil. This depiction, however, can rightly be identified as overtly dichotomist and super ficial. The roots of both religion and reason are deeply intertwined and mirror each other in many ways. In this review, I consider three contributions to this debate that illuminate the abovementioned ideational background. The first publication we will consider is the much acclaimed book by Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror,
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Pub Date : 2007-10-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300205
Neil Hibbert
A prominent feature of the ongoing politics of welfare state restructuring is the development of workfare policies, defined as the attachment of a work condition to entitlement to basic income support. Workfare rejects unconditional rights of social citizenship, which formed the basis of social democratic political reforms and advocacy throughout the twentieth century. Nevertheless, workfare has received notable theoretical justification from egalitarian political theorists. This paper addresses four egalitarian arguments for workfare: the arguments from recipient self-respect, rational paternalism, fair reciprocity, and equal opportunity for active citizenship. It attempts to demonstrate the tensions between each and egalitarian justification, and it is argued that none of the arguments successfully ground workfare policies in an egalitarian framework.
{"title":"Is Workfare Egalitarian?","authors":"Neil Hibbert","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300205","url":null,"abstract":"A prominent feature of the ongoing politics of welfare state restructuring is the development of workfare policies, defined as the attachment of a work condition to entitlement to basic income support. Workfare rejects unconditional rights of social citizenship, which formed the basis of social democratic political reforms and advocacy throughout the twentieth century. Nevertheless, workfare has received notable theoretical justification from egalitarian political theorists. This paper addresses four egalitarian arguments for workfare: the arguments from recipient self-respect, rational paternalism, fair reciprocity, and equal opportunity for active citizenship. It attempts to demonstrate the tensions between each and egalitarian justification, and it is argued that none of the arguments successfully ground workfare policies in an egalitarian framework.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129838766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-10-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300204
Stephen W. Welch
The paper advances an interpretation of political scandal and its place in democratic politics, taking the scandals of the ‘Watergate era” in American politics as its evidential basis. The interpretation focuses on an aspect of political scandal that has been neglected in existing treatments, namely the politically constructed rather than epistemologically simple nature of scandalous ‘exposure”. The career of the ‘smoking gun” in the Watergate era provides illustration. The paper goes on to relate political scandal as both symptom and stimulus to trends in late-modern democratization concerning ‘hyperpolitics” (political contestation at all stages of the decision-making process) and ‘meta-information’ (information about the providers of information). On this basis, the generalization of scandal politics as a typical mode of democratic politics is suggested.
{"title":"Political Scandal and the Politics of Exposure: From Watergate to Lewinsky and beyond","authors":"Stephen W. Welch","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300204","url":null,"abstract":"The paper advances an interpretation of political scandal and its place in democratic politics, taking the scandals of the ‘Watergate era” in American politics as its evidential basis. The interpretation focuses on an aspect of political scandal that has been neglected in existing treatments, namely the politically constructed rather than epistemologically simple nature of scandalous ‘exposure”. The career of the ‘smoking gun” in the Watergate era provides illustration. The paper goes on to relate political scandal as both symptom and stimulus to trends in late-modern democratization concerning ‘hyperpolitics” (political contestation at all stages of the decision-making process) and ‘meta-information’ (information about the providers of information). On this basis, the generalization of scandal politics as a typical mode of democratic politics is suggested.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"341 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123596318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-06-01DOI: 10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.144
J. Finlayson
This article outlines a critique of the currently widespread assessment that the there is nothing at issue in Habermas Rawls debate. It shows what is wrong with this assessment and explains how it arose. Finally it attempts to outline what is really at issue in the Habermas Rawls debate, and se tthe debate in the wider framework of Kantian justifications of political norms.
{"title":"The Habermas Rawls dispute Redivivus","authors":"J. Finlayson","doi":"10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.144","url":null,"abstract":"This article outlines a critique of the currently widespread assessment that the there is nothing at issue in Habermas Rawls debate. It shows what is wrong with this assessment and explains how it arose. Finally it attempts to outline what is really at issue in the Habermas Rawls debate, and se tthe debate in the wider framework of Kantian justifications of political norms.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127860835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300111
J. Finlayson
This article re-examines the Habermas-Rawls debate. It contends that what is at issue in this dispute has largely been missed. The standard view that principle (U) and the original position form a useful point of comparison between their respective theories and that the dispute between them can be fruitfully understood on this basis is rejected. I show how this view has arisen and why it is wrong. The real issue between them lies in their respective accounts of the justification of political norms, and in their competing conceptions of legitimacy. I show how these two concepts connect. I distinguish between methodological disputes arising from the differences in approach that each takes to the questions of political legitimacy and political justification, and substantive issues about whether, and if so how moral (and ethical) reasons are germane to the justification of political norms.
{"title":"The Habermas-Rawls Dispute Redivivus","authors":"J. Finlayson","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300111","url":null,"abstract":"This article re-examines the Habermas-Rawls debate. It contends that what is at issue in this dispute has largely been missed. The standard view that principle (U) and the original position form a useful point of comparison between their respective theories and that the dispute between them can be fruitfully understood on this basis is rejected. I show how this view has arisen and why it is wrong. The real issue between them lies in their respective accounts of the justification of political norms, and in their competing conceptions of legitimacy. I show how these two concepts connect. I distinguish between methodological disputes arising from the differences in approach that each takes to the questions of political legitimacy and political justification, and substantive issues about whether, and if so how moral (and ethical) reasons are germane to the justification of political norms.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124695580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453x0700300101
{"title":"Notes on Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/1743453x0700300101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453x0700300101","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130484243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300107
G. Banham
This piece presents an account of Kant's notion of provisional right and connects this conception to his defence of two principles of publicity. The argument is to the effect that understanding the notion of provisional right will enable us to comprehend the Kantian picture of the state of nature, the basis of the transition from such a state to the civil condition and also his treatment of international right. The paper also presents the sketch of a Kantian theory of normatively justified institutions.
{"title":"Publicity and Provisional Right","authors":"G. Banham","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300107","url":null,"abstract":"This piece presents an account of Kant's notion of provisional right and connects this conception to his defence of two principles of publicity. The argument is to the effect that understanding the notion of provisional right will enable us to comprehend the Kantian picture of the state of nature, the basis of the transition from such a state to the civil condition and also his treatment of international right. The paper also presents the sketch of a Kantian theory of normatively justified institutions.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121555034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300106
H. Williams
This paper provides an outline of Kant's ideas on international right showing how they derive from his general view of law and showing how they relate to his cosmopolitan ideal of hospitality, his views on colonialism and the vexed issue of intervention in the internal politics of other states. It can be shown — based on his ideal of hospitality and good state practice — that Kant is reluctant to recommend intervention by advanced states (and any putative international community) in the affairs of other states and societies even where those societies have not attained a settled, civil status. This is not to imply that we should be indifferent to the situation of other peoples, but rather that we should encourage them to find their own way to a more advanced condition. We can best encourage them by setting and abiding by rigorous standards of law both domestically and internationally that create the possibility of a wholly legally regulated international system. War should be regarded as neither a desirable nor, ultimately, a legitimate means of pursuing foreign policy.
{"title":"II. Kant's Political Philosophy: Kantian Cosmopolitan Right","authors":"H. Williams","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300106","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an outline of Kant's ideas on international right showing how they derive from his general view of law and showing how they relate to his cosmopolitan ideal of hospitality, his views on colonialism and the vexed issue of intervention in the internal politics of other states. It can be shown — based on his ideal of hospitality and good state practice — that Kant is reluctant to recommend intervention by advanced states (and any putative international community) in the affairs of other states and societies even where those societies have not attained a settled, civil status. This is not to imply that we should be indifferent to the situation of other peoples, but rather that we should encourage them to find their own way to a more advanced condition. We can best encourage them by setting and abiding by rigorous standards of law both domestically and internationally that create the possibility of a wholly legally regulated international system. War should be regarded as neither a desirable nor, ultimately, a legitimate means of pursuing foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125786797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300109
Stephen de Wijze
The paper examines a specific charge against Rawls's political liberalism, namely that the manner in which it uses the notion of reasonableness renders it a form of secular fundamentalism. The paper begins with an examination of what Rawls means by his notion of ‘the reasonable’ and briefly outlines its role in his version of political liberalism. This leads to a discussion of the different meanings of ‘secular fundamentalism’ and how it is specifically used in its criticism of Rawls's ‘justice as fairness’. The essay then offers two arguments to show that the charge of secular fundamentalism cannot be sustained due to a deep misunderstanding of the derivation and use of the notion of reasonableness as well as the context, scope, and aims of Rawls's political liberalism in particular and the project of political liberalisms more generally.
{"title":"III. Contemporary Kantians: Shamanistic Incantations? Rawls, Reasonableness and Secular Fundamentalism","authors":"Stephen de Wijze","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300109","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines a specific charge against Rawls's political liberalism, namely that the manner in which it uses the notion of reasonableness renders it a form of secular fundamentalism. The paper begins with an examination of what Rawls means by his notion of ‘the reasonable’ and briefly outlines its role in his version of political liberalism. This leads to a discussion of the different meanings of ‘secular fundamentalism’ and how it is specifically used in its criticism of Rawls's ‘justice as fairness’. The essay then offers two arguments to show that the charge of secular fundamentalism cannot be sustained due to a deep misunderstanding of the derivation and use of the notion of reasonableness as well as the context, scope, and aims of Rawls's political liberalism in particular and the project of political liberalisms more generally.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115930010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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