Pub Date : 2006-10-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0600200204
C. Gould
Robyn Eckersley’s book The Green State approaches political ecology from a helpfully critical perspective and presents some interesting arguments in favour of an ecologically aware yet still state-centered approach to dealing with global environmental problems. The brief analysis and critique that I undertake here will provide some opportunity to determine whether in fact political ecology can remain focused on the nation-state, however ‘green’, or whether we need a more fully transnational, or even global, approach to dealing with the weighty environmental issues that confront us. By way of appreciation, we can note Eckersley’s use of critical social theory, particularly Habermassian discourse theory, and conceptions of deliberative democracy to address political ecological issues. She brings a critical approach to bear on international relations theory as well, which she interprets in a social constructivist perspective. In dialectical fashion, her work (like that of several other theorists, including my own) seeks to mediate between liberal democratic and communitarian approaches, and she explores how this mediated position can be used to address ecological issues. As in my contemporaneous work Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (2004), Eckersley attempts to give due weight to considerations of membership as well as to ‘being affected’ by decisions and policies in order to resolve the question of who gets to participate in which decisions in an increasingly global context. Further, although Eckersley’s concerns are primarily with ecological democracy, she briefly recognizes the need for economic democracy as well. She also adopts a social ontology similar to the one that I introduced in Marx’s Social Ontology (1978), which conceptualizes individuals as fundamentally socially related (or mutually constituting, as what I call ‘individuals-in relations’) and understands these individuals as internally rather than externally related to each other. Eckersley
罗宾·埃克斯利(Robyn Eckersley)的《绿色国家》(The Green State)一书从一种有益的批判性视角来探讨政治生态学，并提出了一些有趣的论点，支持一种具有生态意识但仍以国家为中心的方法来处理全球环境问题。我在这里进行的简短分析和批评将提供一些机会，以确定政治生态学实际上是否可以继续关注民族国家，无论“绿色”如何，或者我们是否需要一种更全面的跨国，甚至全球的方法来处理我们面临的沉重的环境问题。通过欣赏，我们可以注意到埃克斯利使用批判社会理论，特别是哈伯马西的话语理论，以及协商民主的概念来解决政治生态问题。她对国际关系理论也提出了一种批判的方法，她从社会建构主义的角度对其进行了解释。以辩证的方式，她的工作(像其他一些理论家，包括我自己的)寻求在自由民主和社区主义方法之间进行调解，她探索了如何利用这种调解立场来解决生态问题。在我同时期的著作《民主与人权全球化》(2004)中，埃克斯利试图对成员的考虑以及受决策和政策的“影响”给予应有的重视，以便在日益全球化的背景下解决谁可以参与哪些决策的问题。此外，尽管埃克斯利主要关注生态民主，但她也简要地认识到经济民主的必要性。她还采用了一种类似于我在马克思的《社会本体论》(1978)中介绍的社会本体论，将个人概念化为基本的社会关联(或相互构成，正如我所说的“关系中的个人”)，并将这些个人理解为内部而不是外部相互关联。利
{"title":"Ecological Democracy: Statist or Transnational?","authors":"C. Gould","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0600200204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0600200204","url":null,"abstract":"Robyn Eckersley’s book The Green State approaches political ecology from a helpfully critical perspective and presents some interesting arguments in favour of an ecologically aware yet still state-centered approach to dealing with global environmental problems. The brief analysis and critique that I undertake here will provide some opportunity to determine whether in fact political ecology can remain focused on the nation-state, however ‘green’, or whether we need a more fully transnational, or even global, approach to dealing with the weighty environmental issues that confront us. By way of appreciation, we can note Eckersley’s use of critical social theory, particularly Habermassian discourse theory, and conceptions of deliberative democracy to address political ecological issues. She brings a critical approach to bear on international relations theory as well, which she interprets in a social constructivist perspective. In dialectical fashion, her work (like that of several other theorists, including my own) seeks to mediate between liberal democratic and communitarian approaches, and she explores how this mediated position can be used to address ecological issues. As in my contemporaneous work Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (2004), Eckersley attempts to give due weight to considerations of membership as well as to ‘being affected’ by decisions and policies in order to resolve the question of who gets to participate in which decisions in an increasingly global context. Further, although Eckersley’s concerns are primarily with ecological democracy, she briefly recognizes the need for economic democracy as well. She also adopts a social ontology similar to the one that I introduced in Marx’s Social Ontology (1978), which conceptualizes individuals as fundamentally socially related (or mutually constituting, as what I call ‘individuals-in relations’) and understands these individuals as internally rather than externally related to each other. Eckersley","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132457204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-10-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0600200203
J. Meadowcroft
Robyn Eckersley’s The Green State makes a notable contribution to green political theory as well as to more general debates about the evolution of the modern state, the future of democratic governance, and changing patterns of international interaction. The book’s argument is complex and multilayered, offering a normative vision of a ‘green state’ that has moved beyond existing democratic practices to embody the values of ‘ecological democracy’. Such a ‘transnational green democratic state’ is seen as constituting a critical link in a system of global ecological governance. The first part of Eckersley’s work explores three challenges to the project of greening the state. First, there is the ‘anarchic character’ of the existing state system, where insecurity and competition for resources drive states to engage in environmentally destructive behaviour. Second, there is ‘capitalist accumulation’ which leads states to endorse environmentally perverse growth-oriented policies. And third, there are the ‘democratic deficits’ of the liberal democratic state, particularly the ascendance of instrumental rationality and those liberal ‘dogmas’ that impede the protection of environmental goods. In each case Eckersley argues that it is possible to overcome these difficulties, and to transform existing realities. The normative theory of the green state is presented in more detail in the second half of the book, with an examination of the nature of ‘ecological democracy’, the role of civil society and the green public sphere, the evolution of transnational democracy, and the greening of sovereignty. Although the argument draws on many theoretical literatures – including work from international relations, liberal and neo-Marxist political theory, and environmental politics – the writings of Habermas play a particularly pivotal role. Central to Eckersley’s perspective is what she describes as the ‘ambit claim’ of ecological democracy – that all those affected by decisions about environmental risk (including people outside the territory over which the state holds
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Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0600200103
Elizabeth Frazer
The relationship between politics and ethics is problematic. A good deal of modern political philosophy, especially but not only the Rawlsian programme, can be read as concentrating on setting ethical limits to politics. The philosophical justification of values such as equality and liberty, or the validation of concepts such as right or law, are intended to constrain political power. Typically, recent liberal philosophy seeks to prescribe the content of constitutional or basic law, as Rawls does; or to prescribe the procedures that should generate legislation, as Habermas does. An alternative interpretation can be put on this relationship – that politics seeks to realize ethical values and principles that have been justified philosophically. Here the emphasis is on the substance of policy. And some political philosophy duly focuses on what is politically possible, attending to the gap between that and what is philosophically justified. That is, some political theory we might say concentrates on the political limits to ethics. All these variations on the theme share a presumption that ‘politics’ and ‘ethics’ are independent of one another, two distinct activities or modes of reasoning. Each of them can be engaged in quite without reference to the other. Equally, an actor engaged in one might be thinking about the other. Nevertheless they stand, as we might say, in an external relationship to each other. Thinking which separates ethics and politics in this way also frequently (although it need not) contrasts the two respectively as prescriptive and descriptive, or normative and positive, or as concerned with matters of value as opposed to matters of fact. Politics, according to such views, is a series of processes, practices and arrangements concerning the power to govern – getting it, keeping it, squandering it, using it, opposing it, and so on; while ethics is a series of norms or prescriptions – ‘oughts’ – governing the generality of our conduct regarding other persons and the world. ‘Is’ and ‘ought’ are logically quite distinct from each other, although
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Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0600200109
Ramon Das
{"title":"Book Review: Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State","authors":"Ramon Das","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0600200109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0600200109","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129581383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453x0600200101
{"title":"Notes on Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/1743453x0600200101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453x0600200101","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127980785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0600200106
L. Holt, B. Hilliard
Is bioethics up to the challenges facing modern medicine and twenty-first century American health care policy? Can bioethics adequately address existing and emerging dilemmas facing the global community? Until recently many observers, especially those working in the United States would have characterized such questions as misplaced, irrelevant, or even silly. After all, in its almost forty years of existence, both the philosophical underpinnings and practical applications of bioethics have enabled it to make significant strides in exploring, evaluating, and analyzing some of the most basic problems and dilemmas in medical care. Through various theoretical, methodological, and practical innovations bioethics has positively impacted the context in which individual patients and the public interact with health care professionals. This influence is reflected not only in the popularity of bioethics courses on university
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{"title":"Legitimacy in International Society Ian Clark ,Legitimacy in International Society(Oxford: University Press, 2005).","authors":"A. Lang","doi":"10.3366/PER.2006.2.1.93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/PER.2006.2.1.93","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121116620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State Luis Cabrera ,Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State(London and New York: Routledge, 2004).","authors":"Ramon Das","doi":"10.3366/PER.2006.2.1.97","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/PER.2006.2.1.97","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129806738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0600200104
B. Howe
Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) declaring the ‘end of history’ in 1989, and President George Bush (cited by Ross, 2002: 247), in a State of the Union Address in January of 1991, declaring a “New World Order ... to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom and the rule of law” caused a great stir and helped revitalize debate in this area, but they were essentially referring to liberal tenets that were decades, or even centuries old. The basic liberal argument is that at some point the world radically changed, forcing a re-evaluation of the nature of international interaction. In the brave new liberal world, the logic of cooperation takes over from the logic of competition and survival of the fittest. The promotion of shared values and interests supersedes the pursuit of selfish national interest, morality is placed at the centre stage of statecraft, and the basic human concern for the well being of others makes progress possible. Liberal beliefs do not make war unthinkable, but do challenge traditional assumptions of when it is justifiable to wage war. There is no more dramatic manifestation of liberal leadership than so-called ‘normative war-fighting’ or militarized humanitarian intervention. J. L. Holzgrefe (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003: 18) defines humanitarian intervention as ‘the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory is applied’. The concept of normative war-fighting or militarized humanitarian intervention is herein used in the same way, but with an additional and deliberate emphasis on the role of the military and the decision-makers commanding their deployment. This paper assesses the degree to which the triumph of Western liberal states in the Cold War has led to a new kind of international system,
弗朗西斯·福山(1989,1992)在1989年宣布“历史的终结”，乔治·布什总统(罗斯引用，2002:247)在1991年1月的国情咨文中宣布“世界新秩序……“为了实现人类的普遍愿望- -和平与安全、自由和法治”引起了巨大的轰动，并帮助恢复了这一领域的辩论，但它们实质上指的是几十年甚至几百年前的自由主义原则。自由主义的基本论点是，在某个时刻，世界发生了根本性的变化，迫使人们重新评估国际互动的本质。在这个美丽的自由新世界里，合作的逻辑取代了竞争和适者生存的逻辑。促进共同的价值观和利益取代了对自私的国家利益的追求，道德被置于治国方略的中心，人类对他人福祉的基本关切使进步成为可能。自由主义信仰并没有让战争变得不可想象，但它确实挑战了关于什么时候发动战争是正当的传统假设。没有什么比所谓的“规范的战争”或军事化的人道主义干预更能体现自由主义的领导力了。J. L. Holzgrefe (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003: 18)将人道主义干预定义为“一个国家(或国家集团)在未经其领土范围内的国家许可的情况下，跨越国界威胁或使用武力，旨在防止或结束对其本国公民以外的个人的普遍和严重侵犯基本人权的行为”。规范的战争或军事化的人道主义干预的概念在这里也以同样的方式使用，但对军队和指挥其部署的决策者的作用作了额外和有意的强调。本文评估了西方自由主义国家在冷战中的胜利在多大程度上导致了一种新的国际体系，
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Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0600200102
R. Vernon
Although broader ethnic or religious loyalties sometimes supervene, people all over the world attach special importance to the fate of their compatriots. How to measure the preferential factor is an intriguing question: perhaps we could measure the front-page space devoted to domestic and international matters respectively, or the extent of a foreign as opposed to a domestic disaster needed to cross the threshold of attention, or compare foreign-aid budgets with domestic welfare and social service expenditures. Some measures might yield a very high factor: perhaps compatriots are given a thousand times more weight, perhaps more, in some respects. But of course, even if compatriots were (implicitly) judged to be worth only (!) twice as much as others, we should still want to know why. Sometimes psychological reasons are given: it is argued, for example, that Rousseau was right to claim that human attachments weaken as they extend, that they must stop somewhere if they are to retain any motivating force and remain reliable (Orwin, 1996). We might, however, still want to know if we are justified in doing what we feel inclined to do. Moreover, Rousseau’s spatial model doesn’t fit the facts at all well. Quite often people give more weight to relatively large attachments than to relatively small ones; they send their children off to war, for example – a reminder of the important fact that compatriot preference needs to be justified in relation to smaller local attachments, as well as to whatever it is that global justice demands (Jones, 1999: 131-3; Moore, 2001: 47-50). That consideration has particular weight in light of views that partiality at the sub-national level is more readily justified than compatriot preference (Shue, 1988; Singer, 2004: 15-16). The enquiry attempted here is broader than some and narrower than others. It is broader than enquiries into the mutual obligations that arise within a society of a kind that we are assumed to admire: a liberal, liberal-democratic, republican, or egalitarian kind. Two refined recent treatments of compatriot preference have advanced excellent reasons for giving special weight to the mutual obligations
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