Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.109
S. Wijze
Abstract The paper examines a specific charge against Rawls's political liberalism, namely that the manner in which it uses the notion of reasonableness renders it a form of secular fundamentalism. The paper begins with an examination of what Rawls means by his notion of ‘the reasonable’ and briefly outlines its role in his version of political liberalism. This leads to a discussion of the different meanings of ‘secular fundamentalism’ and how it is specifically used in its criticism of Rawls's ‘justice as fairness’. The essay then offers two arguments to show that the charge of secular fundamentalism cannot be sustained due to a deep misunderstanding of the derivation and use of the notion of reasonableness as well as the context, scope, and aims of Rawls's political liberalism in particular and the project of political liberalisms more generally.
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Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453x0700300103
Garrath Williams
This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges ‘in our own case’, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice.
{"title":"I. Kant's Moral Philosophy: Judges in Our Own Case: Kantian Legislation and Responsibility Attribution","authors":"Garrath Williams","doi":"10.1177/1743453x0700300103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453x0700300103","url":null,"abstract":"This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges ‘in our own case’, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122786492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper provides an outline of Kant's ideas on international right showing how they derive from his general view of law and showing how they relate to his cosmopolitan ideal of hospitality, his views on colonialism and the vexed issue of intervention in the internal politics of other states. It can be shown – based on his ideal of hospitality and good state practice – that Kant is reluctant to recommend intervention by advanced states (and any putative international community) in the affairs of other states and societies even where those societies have not attained a settled, civil status. This is not to imply that we should be indifferent to the situation of other peoples, but rather that we should encourage them to find their own way to a more advanced condition. We can best encourage them by setting and abiding by rigorous standards of law both domestically and internationally that create the possibility of a wholly legally regulated international system.War should be regarded as neither a ...
{"title":"Kantian Cosmopolitan Right","authors":"H. Williams","doi":"10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.57","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper provides an outline of Kant's ideas on international right showing how they derive from his general view of law and showing how they relate to his cosmopolitan ideal of hospitality, his views on colonialism and the vexed issue of intervention in the internal politics of other states. It can be shown – based on his ideal of hospitality and good state practice – that Kant is reluctant to recommend intervention by advanced states (and any putative international community) in the affairs of other states and societies even where those societies have not attained a settled, civil status. This is not to imply that we should be indifferent to the situation of other peoples, but rather that we should encourage them to find their own way to a more advanced condition. We can best encourage them by setting and abiding by rigorous standards of law both domestically and internationally that create the possibility of a wholly legally regulated international system.War should be regarded as neither a ...","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127532444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300105
S. Baiasu
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I critically examine two dominant Kantian views of practical justification and argue that they cannot provide an appropriate account of the normative force of moral and political principles. Secondly, as the main reason for these unsuccessful attempts, I identify a certain (by now standard) interpretation of Kant's account of practical judgement. Finally, I point to some of the differences between this interpretation and Kant's own claims on practical judgement, in order to suggest an alternative approach; I also note the tension between slogans, like ‘political, not metaphysical” or ‘we must stay philosophically on the surface’, on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal this alternative approach must make to some elements of Kant's metaphysics.
{"title":"Kantian Metaphysics and the Normative Force of Practical Principles","authors":"S. Baiasu","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300105","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I critically examine two dominant Kantian views of practical justification and argue that they cannot provide an appropriate account of the normative force of moral and political principles. Secondly, as the main reason for these unsuccessful attempts, I identify a certain (by now standard) interpretation of Kant's account of practical judgement. Finally, I point to some of the differences between this interpretation and Kant's own claims on practical judgement, in order to suggest an alternative approach; I also note the tension between slogans, like ‘political, not metaphysical” or ‘we must stay philosophically on the surface’, on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal this alternative approach must make to some elements of Kant's metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127083707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300104
Alison Hills
The principle of right is Kant's main formulation of the rules of politics, and it has obvious affinities with the moral law. Do we have moral reasons to obey the principle? I argue that we may have moral reasons to obey the principle ourselves, but not coercively to enforce it. Do we have prudential reasons to obey the principle? I argue that we do not have reasons based on happiness, but that we may have prudential reasons of a wholly different, but distinctively Kantian kind. These may be reasons both to obey the principle ourselves and to enforce it.
{"title":"The Principle of Right: Practical Reason and Justification in Kant's Ethical and Political Philosophy","authors":"Alison Hills","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300104","url":null,"abstract":"The principle of right is Kant's main formulation of the rules of politics, and it has obvious affinities with the moral law. Do we have moral reasons to obey the principle? I argue that we may have moral reasons to obey the principle ourselves, but not coercively to enforce it. Do we have prudential reasons to obey the principle? I argue that we do not have reasons based on happiness, but that we may have prudential reasons of a wholly different, but distinctively Kantian kind. These may be reasons both to obey the principle ourselves and to enforce it.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129684835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300110
F. Peter
Critics and defenders of Rawls' idea of public reason have tended to neglect the relationship between this idea and his conception of democratic legitimacy. I shall argue that Rawls' idea of public reason can be interpreted in two different ways, and that the two interpretations support two different conceptions of legitimacy. What I call the substantive interpretation of Rawls' idea of public reason demands that it applies not just to the process of democratic decision-making, but that it extends to the substantive justification of democratic decisions. I shall argue against this interpretation and suggest a procedural interpretation instead. On this view, public reason is invoked when it comes to the political justification of the principles that should govern the process of democratic decision-making, but not — at least not directly — in relation to the content of public deliberation.
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Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0700300108
P. Niesen
For Kant, the contents of cosmopolitan law are to be ‘limited’ to non-citizens' subjective rights to hospitality. Although hospitality yields universal and far-reaching communicative rights, its limits may seem overly restrictive at first. I argue that this narrow focus is intended to fend off justifications for colonial occupation that could otherwise draw support from Kant's own doctrine of private law. Kantian hospitality is further limited in that it does not cover all forms of communicative exchange. As can be shown from his endorsement of China's and Japan's protectionist policies, Kant is not averse to limiting cosmopolitan citizens' commercial speech. In conclusion, I discuss rivalling interpretations of Kant's justification of hospitality. I argue that this justification cannot rest exclusively on the innate human right to freedom, but must draw on facts about the world as well.
{"title":"Colonialism and Hospitality","authors":"P. Niesen","doi":"10.1177/1743453X0700300108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1743453X0700300108","url":null,"abstract":"For Kant, the contents of cosmopolitan law are to be ‘limited’ to non-citizens' subjective rights to hospitality. Although hospitality yields universal and far-reaching communicative rights, its limits may seem overly restrictive at first. I argue that this narrow focus is intended to fend off justifications for colonial occupation that could otherwise draw support from Kant's own doctrine of private law. Kantian hospitality is further limited in that it does not cover all forms of communicative exchange. As can be shown from his endorsement of China's and Japan's protectionist policies, Kant is not averse to limiting cosmopolitan citizens' commercial speech. In conclusion, I discuss rivalling interpretations of Kant's justification of hospitality. I argue that this justification cannot rest exclusively on the innate human right to freedom, but must draw on facts about the world as well.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133772723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges ‘in our own case’, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice.
{"title":"Judges in our own case:Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution","authors":"Garrath Williams","doi":"10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.8","url":null,"abstract":"This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges ‘in our own case’, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice.","PeriodicalId":381236,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Ethics Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125286936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.3366/PER.2007.3.1.129
F. Peter
Abstract Critics and defenders of Rawls' idea of public reason have tended to neglect the relationship between this idea and his conception of democratic legitimacy. I shall argue that Rawls' idea of public reason can be interpreted in two different ways, and that the two interpretations support two different conceptions of legitimacy. What I call the substantive interpretation of Rawls' idea of public reason demands that it applies not just to the process of democratic decision-making, but that it extends to the substantive justification of democratic decisions. I shall argue against this interpretation and suggest a procedural interpretation instead. On this view, public reason is invoked when it comes to the political justification of the principles that should govern the process of democratic decision-making, but not – at least not directly – in relation to the content of public deliberation.
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Pub Date : 2006-10-01DOI: 10.1177/1743453X0600200202
J. Vogler
The Green State is an important book, not least because it appreciates that the state, in one form or another, is still the focus of loyalties and political authority and that this will continue to be the case within any time frame likely to be relevant to human survival. The specifics are debatable, but if we take seriously predictions on climate change and fresh water scarcity, we are speaking of a period within the span of the current century. The International Energy Agency has calculated that world energy-related CO emissions will rise by 62% between the present and 2030 and at some point in the early 2020s developing country emissions will surpass those of the OECD states (IEA, 2004). Finding a way of restricting total emissions to a level that does not entail dangerous mean temperature increases in excess of 2 C, through the involvement of both developing and developed states, provides the agenda for current international discussion of the post-2012 evolution of the Kyoto Protocol and for the wider consideration of the future of the UN climate regime. Clearly the existing interpretation of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’between developed and developing states cannot persist and some means will have to be found to direct their growth along a sustainable path. It is difficult to envisage this in terms other than those of inter-governmental cooperation and Eckersley is surely correct in asserting that action by states is essential. With the relatively extended time horizon of political change and the ever-diminishing one of environmental crisis, we simply do not have the luxury of anticipating fundamental institutional change. The state is ‘the only game in town’ and it is therefore vital to investigate the ways in which it might plausibly become greener. At the heart of Eckersley’s work is a sensitivity to the possibilities of such a change and to the accumulating evidence of the reconstruction of the character of at least some of the more developed states in the contemporary global system. It thus proceeds without sliding into the anti-statism and green idealism that has characterized much of the debate in which state authority is, either transformed
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