In this contribution, I discuss the so-called “unambitious view of legal normativity”, as it is specifically theorised by Brian Bix. While I agree with Bix that legal normativity should not be assumed to be reducible by default to moral normativity, I will argue that the normativity of law cannot be qualified as a sui generis form of normativity, for, pace Bix, the quality of legal normativity is best understood as genuine. That is, the normative claims the law makes on its subjects do address the general practical question: What ought we to do?
{"title":"A problem for the unambitious view of legal normativity","authors":"Stefano Bertea","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4542","url":null,"abstract":"In this contribution, I discuss the so-called “unambitious view of legal normativity”, as it is specifically theorised by Brian Bix. While I agree with Bix that legal normativity should not be assumed to be reducible by default to moral normativity, I will argue that the normativity of law cannot be qualified as a sui generis form of normativity, for, pace Bix, the quality of legal normativity is best understood as genuine. That is, the normative claims the law makes on its subjects do address the general practical question: What ought we to do?","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47712726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hans Kelsen y W. N. Hohfeld, desde diferentes tradiciones, han ofrecido dos contribuciones imprescindibles para el esclarecimiento de los conceptos juridicos basicos. Tras un breve repaso de sus propuestas, se analizaran algunos aspectos deficitarios de sus reconstrucciones a la luz de categorias desarrolladas por Eugenio Bulygin en diversos trabajos, en particular sus criticas al reduccionismo normativo, la imposibilidad de identificar las reglas que confieren potestades con prescripciones y la distincion entre normas y proposiciones normativas. Sobre tales bases, y tomando como punto de partida al concepto de deber juridico, se ofrecera finalmente un bosquejo de reconstruccion alternativa de la teoria de los conceptos juridicos basicos.
{"title":"Una revisión de la teoría de los conceptos jurídicos básicos","authors":"Claudina Orunesu, J. L. Rodríguez","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4481","url":null,"abstract":"Hans Kelsen y W. N. Hohfeld, desde diferentes tradiciones, han ofrecido dos contribuciones imprescindibles para el esclarecimiento de los conceptos juridicos basicos. Tras un breve repaso de sus propuestas, se analizaran algunos aspectos deficitarios de sus reconstrucciones a la luz de categorias desarrolladas por Eugenio Bulygin en diversos trabajos, en particular sus criticas al reduccionismo normativo, la imposibilidad de identificar las reglas que confieren potestades con prescripciones y la distincion entre normas y proposiciones normativas. Sobre tales bases, y tomando como punto de partida al concepto de deber juridico, se ofrecera finalmente un bosquejo de reconstruccion alternativa de la teoria de los conceptos juridicos basicos.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45113520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Standards which prescribe more than efficient precaution against physical harm and health injury are commonplace in American environmental, health and safety regulation. Yet these standards are now routinely decried as irrational. Welfare, we are told, is the ultimate and only value and it prescribes efficient precaution. This paper argues that, in both law and ordinary moral reasoning, the avoidance of harm has priority over the provision of benefit. Harm avoidance has a justified priority but that priority is rooted in the value of autonomy, not in the value of well-being. Serious physical harms impair the pursuit of a wide range of human ends and aspirations, and deny normal human lives to those whose powers are impaired. Only some gains and some values are important enough to justify the imposition of “significant risk” of devastating physical injury. The judgment here is not one of cost and benefit, but of comparable value.
{"title":"Principles of risk imposition and the priority of avoiding harm","authors":"Gregory C. Keating","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4406","url":null,"abstract":"Standards which prescribe more than efficient precaution against physical harm and health injury are commonplace in American environmental, health and safety regulation. Yet these standards are now routinely decried as irrational. Welfare, we are told, is the ultimate and only value and it prescribes efficient precaution. This paper argues that, in both law and ordinary moral reasoning, the avoidance of harm has priority over the provision of benefit. Harm avoidance has a justified priority but that priority is rooted in the value of autonomy, not in the value of well-being. Serious physical harms impair the pursuit of a wide range of human ends and aspirations, and deny normal human lives to those whose powers are impaired. Only some gains and some values are important enough to justify the imposition of “significant risk” of devastating physical injury. The judgment here is not one of cost and benefit, but of comparable value.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46808158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prescribir y definir","authors":"Gonzalo Villa Rosas","doi":"10.4000/revus.4950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.4950","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70593533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author proposes new arguments in favor of Alchourron and Bulygin’s theory presented in Normative Systems (1971), by showing how even paradigmatic examples of instantiation conflicts can be reframed as antinomies between general cases. He proceeds as follows. After a brief reconstruction of Alchourron and Bulygin’s analysis of normative conflicts, he introduces the notion of instantiation conflict and shows how authors such as Riccardo Guastini, Jorge Rodriguez, Pablo Navarro and others rely on that notion for pointing out the existence of a “special” category of normative conflicts, which are necessarily bound to individual, actual cases and, therefore, fall out of the scope of Alchourron and Bulygin’s analysis. The author maintains that, should they be right, several fundamental assumptions of Alchourron and Bulygin’s theory might be seriously questioned. Against this background he argues that a reductionist approach is feasible and closes the paper by trying to save one of the main intuitions that inspired the instantiation conflicts argument.
{"title":"Let’s talk about antinomies","authors":"Alessio Sardo","doi":"10.4000/revus.4089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.4089","url":null,"abstract":"The author proposes new arguments in favor of Alchourron and Bulygin’s theory presented in Normative Systems (1971), by showing how even paradigmatic examples of instantiation conflicts can be reframed as antinomies between general cases. He proceeds as follows. After a brief reconstruction of Alchourron and Bulygin’s analysis of normative conflicts, he introduces the notion of instantiation conflict and shows how authors such as Riccardo Guastini, Jorge Rodriguez, Pablo Navarro and others rely on that notion for pointing out the existence of a “special” category of normative conflicts, which are necessarily bound to individual, actual cases and, therefore, fall out of the scope of Alchourron and Bulygin’s analysis. The author maintains that, should they be right, several fundamental assumptions of Alchourron and Bulygin’s theory might be seriously questioned. Against this background he argues that a reductionist approach is feasible and closes the paper by trying to save one of the main intuitions that inspired the instantiation conflicts argument.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45192839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El objetivo del presente trabajo es sugerir que las cuestiones centrales relacionadas con el legislador no fueron abordadas en profundidad por Bulygin en el marco de su prolifica obra, conduciendo asi a algunas inconsistencias internas en su pensamiento. Me propongo sugerir, especificamente, que: i) el ideal de sistema juridico que sostiene en Normative Systems (sobre el cual se apoya toda su obra posterior) parece estar basado en el ideal del legislador racional; ii) el analisis de las lagunas normativas para Bulygin es dependiente de la existencia de un recorte en el sistema juridico, pero nunca queda claro si el recorte hace el interprete o el legislador; y iii) la inmensa relevancia dada a la existencia de una base axiomatica crea la necesidad de tomar posicion sobre quien es el que realmente la crea, si el interprete o el legislador, algo no hecho por Bulygin con claridad.
{"title":"El filósofo, el legislador, y el sistema","authors":"Julieta A. Rábanos","doi":"10.4000/revus.3799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3799","url":null,"abstract":"El objetivo del presente trabajo es sugerir que las cuestiones centrales relacionadas con el legislador no fueron abordadas en profundidad por Bulygin en el marco de su prolifica obra, conduciendo asi a algunas inconsistencias internas en su pensamiento. Me propongo sugerir, especificamente, que: i) el ideal de sistema juridico que sostiene en Normative Systems (sobre el cual se apoya toda su obra posterior) parece estar basado en el ideal del legislador racional; ii) el analisis de las lagunas normativas para Bulygin es dependiente de la existencia de un recorte en el sistema juridico, pero nunca queda claro si el recorte hace el interprete o el legislador; y iii) la inmensa relevancia dada a la existencia de una base axiomatica crea la necesidad de tomar posicion sobre quien es el que realmente la crea, si el interprete o el legislador, algo no hecho por Bulygin con claridad.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43583018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author analyses the distinction between the hyletic and the expressive conception of norms. His main goal is to reject Alchourron and Bulygin's thesis that these conceptions offer two incompatible solutions to one single problem. He argues that these conceptions deal with two different and partially independent issues. One issue regards the “genesis of norms”, that is, the process of their production. The other issue regards the “nature of norms” and, therefore, the product of that process. The author concludes that these conceptions aren’t necessarily incompatible, even though one’s proposed solution to one of the problems somehow conditions her response to the other problem.
{"title":"Two conceptions of norms","authors":"Riccardo Guastini","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4849","url":null,"abstract":"The author analyses the distinction between the hyletic and the expressive conception of norms. His main goal is to reject Alchourron and Bulygin's thesis that these conceptions offer two incompatible solutions to one single problem. He argues that these conceptions deal with two different and partially independent issues. One issue regards the “genesis of norms”, that is, the process of their production. The other issue regards the “nature of norms” and, therefore, the product of that process. The author concludes that these conceptions aren’t necessarily incompatible, even though one’s proposed solution to one of the problems somehow conditions her response to the other problem.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43880954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I examine critically some theses on the incompatibility and the implication between norms that appear in a well-known article by Bulygin on the conceptions of the logic of norms elaborated, respectively, by Weinberger and Kelsen. I also analyze Bulygin’s thesis according to which the expressive conception of norms, defended by Kelsen in the last part of his career, is perfectly capable of explaining the relationship of justification that mediates between general norms and particular norms (especially, between legislated norms and judicial decisions) and, being capable of this, cannot be accused of “irrationalism”, as Weinberger argues instead. This work is concluded by formulating a dilemma that Bulygin should face: either the notion of the satisfaction of norms is accepted and the “rationalism” of the expressive conception is saved, or this notion is rejected and with it also the possibility of “expressive” rationality in legal reasoning. | A prior version of this text was presented on 28 July 2015, at the Special Workshop “Bulygin’s Philosophy of Law”, XXVII IVR Congress, Washington, DC (USA).
{"title":"Incompatibility and entailment in the logic of norms","authors":"G. Ratti","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4763","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I examine critically some theses on the incompatibility and the implication between norms that appear in a well-known article by Bulygin on the conceptions of the logic of norms elaborated, respectively, by Weinberger and Kelsen. I also analyze Bulygin’s thesis according to which the expressive conception of norms, defended by Kelsen in the last part of his career, is perfectly capable of explaining the relationship of justification that mediates between general norms and particular norms (especially, between legislated norms and judicial decisions) and, being capable of this, cannot be accused of “irrationalism”, as Weinberger argues instead. This work is concluded by formulating a dilemma that Bulygin should face: either the notion of the satisfaction of norms is accepted and the “rationalism” of the expressive conception is saved, or this notion is rejected and with it also the possibility of “expressive” rationality in legal reasoning. | A prior version of this text was presented on 28 July 2015, at the Special Workshop “Bulygin’s Philosophy of Law”, XXVII IVR Congress, Washington, DC (USA).","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43631043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En este trabajo examino criticamente algunas tesis sobre la incompatibilidad y la implicacion entre normas que aparecen en un conocido articulo de Bulygin sobre las concepciones de la logica de normas de Weinberger y de Kelsen. Asimismo, me propongo analizar la tesis de Bulygin segun la cual la concepcion expresiva de las normas, defendida por el “ultimo” Kelsen, es perfectamente capaz de explicar la relacion de justificacion que media entre normas generales y normas particulares (especialmente, entre normas legisladas y decisiones judiciales) y, al ser capaz de esto, no puede ser acusada de “irracionalismo”, como en cambio arguye Weinberger. Este trabajo se concluye formulando un dilema que Bulygin deberia afrontar: o bien se acepta la nocion de satisfacibilidad de las normas y se salva el “racionalismo” de la concepcion expresiva, o bien se rechaza dicha nocion y con ella tambien la posibilidad de una racionalidad “expresiva” en el razonamiento juridico. | Una primera version de este trabajo fue presentada el 28 de julio de 2015 en el Special Workshop “Bulygin’s Philosophy of Law”, XXVII IVR Congress, Washington, DC (USA).
在这篇文章中，我们讨论了一些关于规范之间的不相容和含义的论文，这些论文出现在温伯格和凯森关于规范逻辑概念的著名文章中。我还打算分析论点concepcion Bulygin根据其中的规则,“最后”Kelsen封地,就完全能够解释关系justificacion一般标准和规则之间的个人,尤其是legisladas规则之间和司法裁决),这个不能被控“irracionalismo”另一方面,Weinberger。这个工作总结提出了一个两难Bulygin应该解决:要么同意nocion satisfacibilidad规则并挽救“理性主义”concepcion眼睛,要么拒绝快乐nocion和与她也是一个理性的可能性推理juridico“眼睛”。-这个工作是第一个版本在2015年7月28日提出的特别讲习班Bulygin’s Philosophy of Law”,XXVII动议的大会、Wa-shin-gton, DC(使用)。
{"title":"Incompatibilidad e implicación en la lógica de normas","authors":"Giovanni Battista Ratti","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4599","url":null,"abstract":"En este trabajo examino criticamente algunas tesis sobre la incompatibilidad y la implicacion entre normas que aparecen en un conocido articulo de Bulygin sobre las concepciones de la logica de normas de Weinberger y de Kelsen. Asimismo, me propongo analizar la tesis de Bulygin segun la cual la concepcion expresiva de las normas, defendida por el “ultimo” Kelsen, es perfectamente capaz de explicar la relacion de justificacion que media entre normas generales y normas particulares (especialmente, entre normas legisladas y decisiones judiciales) y, al ser capaz de esto, no puede ser acusada de “irracionalismo”, como en cambio arguye Weinberger. Este trabajo se concluye formulando un dilema que Bulygin deberia afrontar: o bien se acepta la nocion de satisfacibilidad de las normas y se salva el “racionalismo” de la concepcion expresiva, o bien se rechaza dicha nocion y con ella tambien la posibilidad de una racionalidad “expresiva” en el razonamiento juridico. | Una primera version de este trabajo fue presentada el 28 de julio de 2015 en el Special Workshop “Bulygin’s Philosophy of Law”, XXVII IVR Congress, Washington, DC (USA).","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48491051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ta prispevek obravnava vprasanje zavezujoce moci pravnega reda. Avtor ob tem opozori, da vec razlicnih teorij (naravnopravna doktrina, teoloska doktrina in pozitivnopravna znanost) veljavnost normativnega reda upravicuje na isti nacin, in sicer s predpostavko temeljne norme. V zakljucku avtor nato opise se enotnost državnih pravnih redov in mednarodnega prava, katerih skupni razlog za veljavnost prepozna v temeljni normi, ki obicajno ravnanje držav vzpostavlja kot pravodajno dejstvo. | To besedilo je prevod angleskega izvirnika Why should the law be obeyed?, ki je bil objavljen v avtorjevi knjigi What is justice? Justice, law, and politics in the mirror of science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).
{"title":"Zakaj je treba spoštovati pravo?","authors":"Hans Kelsen","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4886","url":null,"abstract":"Ta prispevek obravnava vprasanje zavezujoce moci pravnega reda. Avtor ob tem opozori, da vec razlicnih teorij (naravnopravna doktrina, teoloska doktrina in pozitivnopravna znanost) veljavnost normativnega reda upravicuje na isti nacin, in sicer s predpostavko temeljne norme. V zakljucku avtor nato opise se enotnost državnih pravnih redov in mednarodnega prava, katerih skupni razlog za veljavnost prepozna v temeljni normi, ki obicajno ravnanje držav vzpostavlja kot pravodajno dejstvo. | To besedilo je prevod angleskega izvirnika Why should the law be obeyed?, ki je bil objavljen v avtorjevi knjigi What is justice? Justice, law, and politics in the mirror of science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46167378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：