In the New-Keynesian model augmented with non-Ricardian households (breakdown of the Ricardian equivalence), the elasticity of aggregate demand to changes in real interest rate is linked non-linearly to the share of non-Ricardian households. Importantly, this dependence may result in an upward-sloping dynamic New-Keynesian IS curve. Using an extended fractionally cointegrated VAR model in a recursive framework, we empirically test this for the US from 1959 to 2024, finding a positive long-run relationship between consumption and interest rates from 1980 to 1992, and a negative one from 1993 onwards, with a stronger negative correlation after 2000. These results suggest shifts in asset market participation, altering equilibrium dynamics in the goods market. We analytically show that when non-Ricardian households surpass a certain threshold, output adjusts to excess supply rather than demand, imposing novel restrictions on the New-Keynesian Phillips curve to maintain equilibrium determinacy. These bounds on the New-Keynesian Phillips curve slope under varying inflation targeting rules offer a new perspective on monetary policy design.
Using Panel data, GMM and GLS econometric models, and a sample of six Mediterranean (MED) countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia) over the period 2002–2023, this paper assesses empirically the impact of financial inclusion on income inequality, poverty, and financial stability asymmetries in the MED region. While the empirical literature covering the region is relatively scarce, this paper adds to that literature by bridging a significant existing gap, especially in the aftermath of the recent financial and debt crises and the recent political and social turmoil that have been unfolding in several MED countries. Our empirical results show that financial inclusion decreases inequality but has no significant effect on poverty. Other empirical results show that while the empirical evidence indicates that enhanced financial integration is a contributing factor to financial instability in the MED region, an increase in financial inclusion and in population contributes positively to financial stability.
In this article, we apply three different specifications of a monetary policy rule to reveal the interest rate preferences of the national central bank governors of the euro area. These preferences are combined with information from the ECB rotation model to determine whether a central bank governor was allowed to vote at a certain meeting. Finally, we empirically test whether non-voting governors or specific countries are worse off when not allowed to vote compared to a situation where they have a voting right. Our results indicate that there are only very few occasions where this is indeed the case. Thus, we conclude that the current form of the rotation model in the euro area does not discriminate any national governor or country.