Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to «microfoundations for macroeconomics», the literature on free banking contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma model. While there can be no general a priori presumption against the possible usefulness of game-theoretic concepts for Austrian theorizing, in the context of the debate on free banking such concepts and models have been used with varying degrees of perspicacity. One example which is elaborated in the paper is concerned with the interaction configuration between independent banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system, which has sometimes been modeled as a One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This conceptualization does not provide a sufficient argument for the in-concert overexpansion thesis, nor for the thesis that fractional-reserve free banking will tend to lead to the establishment of a central bank. The author drops the implicit assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the outcome matrix and the utility matrix. When it is acknowledged that banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system need not necessarily adopt a «myopic», self-regarding perspective but may recognize the long-run harmony of interests between the banking sector and society at large, a different conceptualization and a different matrix representation emerge. Key words: Economic Mechanism Design; Business Cycle Theory; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Free Banking. JEL codes: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39. Resumen: A pesar del carácter distintivo del enfoque austríaco de las «microfundaciones para la macroeconomía», la literatura sobre la banca libre contiene algunos argumentos que recurren a los conceptos y modelos de la teoría de juegos tales como el conocido modelo Dilema del Prisionero. A pesar de que no puede existir una presunción a priori sobre la posible utilidad de conceptos de la teoría de juegos para las teorías austríacas, en el contexto del debate sobre la banca libre tales conceptos y modelos han sido manejados con distintos grados de perspicacia. Un ejemplo elaborado en el documento comenta la configuración de interacción entre los bancos independientes en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, que a veces ha sido modelado como un juego de Dilema del Prisionero One-Shot. Esta conceptualización no ofrece suficientes argumentos para la tesis de la sobreexpansión in-concert, ni para la tesis de que un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria tendería a la creación de un banco central. El autor abandona la asunción implícita de que existe una correspondencia de uno a uno entre la matriz de resultado y la matriz de utilidad. Al reconocerse que los bancos en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria no deben adoptar necesariamente una perspectiva «miope» y egoísta, pero pueden reconocer la armonía de intereses a largo plazo entre el sector bancario y l
尽管奥地利学派的“宏观经济学的微观基础”方法具有鲜明的特点，但关于自由银行的文献中包含了许多利用博弈论概念和模型(如著名的囚徒困境模型)的论点。虽然没有一般的先验假设可以反对博弈论概念对奥地利学派理论的可能有用性，但在关于自由银行的辩论中，这些概念和模型已经以不同程度的洞察力被使用。本文所阐述的一个例子是，在一个没有部分准备金的银行体系中，独立银行之间的相互作用配置，有时被建模为一次囚徒困境博弈。这一概念并没有为一致过度扩张的论点提供充分的论据，也没有为部分准备金制度的银行将导致建立中央银行的论点提供充分的论据。作者放弃了结果矩阵和效用矩阵之间存在一对一对应关系的隐含假设。当人们认识到，在没有部分准备金的银行体系中，银行不一定需要采取“短视”、自我考虑的观点，而是可能认识到银行业与整个社会之间利益的长期和谐时，就会出现不同的概念和不同的矩阵表示。关键词:经济机制设计;经济周期理论;囚徒困境;免费的银行。JEL代码:D01、E31、E32、E42、E52、E58、E66、G18、K39。简历:一份关于carácter特别报告员austríaco关于关于“微观基础问题macroeconomía”的报告，一份关于自由银行的文献报告，一份关于关于“自由银行”的论点的报告，一份关于关于“问题的概念”的报告，一份关于teoría特别报告员关于“问题的问题”的报告。首先，我们要讨论的问题是:presunción，首先，我们要讨论的问题是:teoría，我们要讨论的问题是:teorías austríacas，我们要讨论的问题是:关于自由故事的概念，我们要讨论的问题是:模型，我们要讨论的问题是:关于自由故事的概念，我们要讨论的问题是:观点，我们要讨论的问题是:1 .在独立银行系统内建立一个独立银行系统，建立一个独立银行系统，建立一个独立银行系统，建立一个独立银行系统，建立一个独立银行系统，建立一个独立银行系统，建立一个独立银行系统，建立一个独立银行系统。Esta conceptualización没有足够的论据，可以通过下述方式论证:sobreexpansión在协调一致的情况下，可以通过下述方式论证:自由储蓄银行系统的论证:tendería和中央银行系统的论证:creación。作者放弃了“asunción implícita”的概念，但没有相应的概念，没有“结果矩阵”的概念，没有“效用矩阵”的概念。艾尔reconocerse洛银行在联合国sistema de螃蟹船自由反对珍藏fraccionaria没有岁以上制度necesariamente una perspectiva«miope»y egoista,佩罗含量reconocer la armonia德利益庄严的plazo el部门之间bancario y la皇家社会一般,surgen una conceptualizacion y representacion de la matriz distintas。Palabras clave: Diseño de mecanismo económico;Teoría del ciclo económico;监狱难题;螃蟹船自由。Códigos JEL: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39。
{"title":"Credit Expansion, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and Free Banking as Mechanism Design","authors":"L. Van Den Hauwe","doi":"10.52195/PM.V5I2.308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52195/PM.V5I2.308","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to «microfoundations for macroeconomics», the literature on free banking contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma model. While there can be no general a priori presumption against the possible usefulness of game-theoretic concepts for Austrian theorizing, in the context of the debate on free banking such concepts and models have been used with varying degrees of perspicacity. One example which is elaborated in the paper is concerned with the interaction configuration between independent banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system, which has sometimes been modeled as a One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This conceptualization does not provide a sufficient argument for the in-concert overexpansion thesis, nor for the thesis that fractional-reserve free banking will tend to lead to the establishment of a central bank. The author drops the implicit assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the outcome matrix and the utility matrix. When it is acknowledged that banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system need not necessarily adopt a «myopic», self-regarding perspective but may recognize the long-run harmony of interests between the banking sector and society at large, a different conceptualization and a different matrix representation emerge. \u0000Key words: Economic Mechanism Design; Business Cycle Theory; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Free Banking. \u0000JEL codes: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39. \u0000Resumen: A pesar del carácter distintivo del enfoque austríaco de las «microfundaciones para la macroeconomía», la literatura sobre la banca libre contiene algunos argumentos que recurren a los conceptos y modelos de la teoría de juegos tales como el conocido modelo Dilema del Prisionero. A pesar de que no puede existir una presunción a priori sobre la posible utilidad de conceptos de la teoría de juegos para las teorías austríacas, en el contexto del debate sobre la banca libre tales conceptos y modelos han sido manejados con distintos grados de perspicacia. Un ejemplo elaborado en el documento comenta la configuración de interacción entre los bancos independientes en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, que a veces ha sido modelado como un juego de Dilema del Prisionero One-Shot. Esta conceptualización no ofrece suficientes argumentos para la tesis de la sobreexpansión in-concert, ni para la tesis de que un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria tendería a la creación de un banco central. El autor abandona la asunción implícita de que existe una correspondencia de uno a uno entre la matriz de resultado y la matriz de utilidad. Al reconocerse que los bancos en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria no deben adoptar necesariamente una perspectiva «miope» y egoísta, pero pueden reconocer la armonía de intereses a largo plazo entre el sector bancario y l","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129361296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Difficulties in distinguishing between questions of law and questions of fact have led some to urge a pragmatic approach to the distinction (a distinction important in various areas of the law, and in particular in English administrative law). The pragmatic approach would ask which questions it is useful to treat as questions of law. I offer an analytical approach that seeks to explain which questions are questions of law. I defend the view that a question of application of statutory language is a question of law when the law requires a particular answer to it. The law requires one answer to the question of application (1) in a clear case of the application of the statutory language, and (2) when the court exercises its legal power to elaborate the law so as to require (or interprets the statutory standard to require) one answer.
{"title":"Questions of Law","authors":"Timothy Endicott","doi":"10.4324/9781315183770-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315183770-1","url":null,"abstract":"Difficulties in distinguishing between questions of law and questions of fact have led some to urge a pragmatic approach to the distinction (a distinction important in various areas of the law, and in particular in English administrative law). The pragmatic approach would ask which questions it is useful to treat as questions of law. I offer an analytical approach that seeks to explain which questions are questions of law. I defend the view that a question of application of statutory language is a question of law when the law requires a particular answer to it. The law requires one answer to the question of application (1) in a clear case of the application of the statutory language, and (2) when the court exercises its legal power to elaborate the law so as to require (or interprets the statutory standard to require) one answer.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"332 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115265076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We illustrate the properties of a competitive joint venture (CJV) institution as an alternative to traditional natural monopoly regulation of the distribution wires portion of the electricity supply chain. This CJV institution consists of an endogeneous ownership rule and a wires access charge determination rule, with wires use and control rights determined by a firm's market share in the downstream retail market. By exploiting the vertical structure of the electricity supply chain, this CJV institution can generate superior efficiency results in a model presented and analyzed here. The role of the regulator is one of ex post contractual enforcement; thus this institution is not prone to the information problems associated with traditional natural monopoly regulation. We demonstrate that first-best efficiency characterizes equilibrium in a pricing model without investment.
{"title":"Network Regulation Through Ownership Structure: An Application to the Electric Power Industry","authors":"F. Boffa, L. Kiesling","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1123772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1123772","url":null,"abstract":"We illustrate the properties of a competitive joint venture (CJV) institution as an alternative to traditional natural monopoly regulation of the distribution wires portion of the electricity supply chain. This CJV institution consists of an endogeneous ownership rule and a wires access charge determination rule, with wires use and control rights determined by a firm's market share in the downstream retail market. By exploiting the vertical structure of the electricity supply chain, this CJV institution can generate superior efficiency results in a model presented and analyzed here. The role of the regulator is one of ex post contractual enforcement; thus this institution is not prone to the information problems associated with traditional natural monopoly regulation. We demonstrate that first-best efficiency characterizes equilibrium in a pricing model without investment.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125290406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-08-03DOI: 10.1108/14720701211267793
A. Ashta, Ndeye Salimata Fall
Purpose – The extent to which microfinance succeeds varies greatly even among countries. The paper aims to look at why microfinance develops in some countries rather than others. It aims to identify institutional factors that can be introduced to enable microfinance to succeed in a country. Design/methodology/approach – A small-sample comparative approach is used, combined with correlation analysis. The research methodology was dictated by the need to find countries that are culturally similar and have the same regulation in order to be able to study other elements. Findings – The authors find that the success of microfinance is linked to its economic performance, in terms of both levels of per capita income and growth, as well as regulatory and public governance, with the amount of remittances being received in a country and with life expectancy at birth. Research limitations/implications – Different sources provide different data. So, the findings may not be robust but it is the best available data. Practical implications – The data shows a high correlation between aid and the development of microfinance and also more so between remittances and the growth of this sector. This has some implications for policies aiming at developing entrepreneurship through microfinance. Originality/value – Most papers when looking at the success of microfinance across regions have failed to take into account differences in cultures and regulations; thus there is a residual bias. The paper's originality stems from the fact that it explains the success of microfinance while controlling for cultural and regulatory factors, and also goes into public governance indicators. This kind of comparative institutional analysis has not been performed for this region.
{"title":"Institutional Analysis to Understand the Growth of Microfinance Institutions in West African Economic and Monetary Union","authors":"A. Ashta, Ndeye Salimata Fall","doi":"10.1108/14720701211267793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701211267793","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose – The extent to which microfinance succeeds varies greatly even among countries. The paper aims to look at why microfinance develops in some countries rather than others. It aims to identify institutional factors that can be introduced to enable microfinance to succeed in a country. Design/methodology/approach – A small-sample comparative approach is used, combined with correlation analysis. The research methodology was dictated by the need to find countries that are culturally similar and have the same regulation in order to be able to study other elements. Findings – The authors find that the success of microfinance is linked to its economic performance, in terms of both levels of per capita income and growth, as well as regulatory and public governance, with the amount of remittances being received in a country and with life expectancy at birth. Research limitations/implications – Different sources provide different data. So, the findings may not be robust but it is the best available data. Practical implications – The data shows a high correlation between aid and the development of microfinance and also more so between remittances and the growth of this sector. This has some implications for policies aiming at developing entrepreneurship through microfinance. Originality/value – Most papers when looking at the success of microfinance across regions have failed to take into account differences in cultures and regulations; thus there is a residual bias. The paper's originality stems from the fact that it explains the success of microfinance while controlling for cultural and regulatory factors, and also goes into public governance indicators. This kind of comparative institutional analysis has not been performed for this region.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124154310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is commonly asserted that innovation markets suffer from excessive intellectual property protections, which in turn stifle output. But empirical inquiries can neither confirm nor deny this assertion. Under the "agnostic" assumption that we cannot assess directly whether intellectual-property coverage is excessive, an alternative query is proposed: can the market assess if any "propertization outcome" is excessive and then undertake actions to yield a socially preferable outcome? Grounded in the "bottom up" methodology of new institutional economics, this process-based approach takes the view that innovator populations make rent-seeking investments that continuously "select" among a range of "innovation regimes" that trade off securing innovation gains (which tends to demand more property) against reducing transaction costs and associated innovation losses (which tends to demand less). If we can identify the conditions under which privately-interested investments in lobbying, enforcement, and transactional arrangements are likely to yield socially-interested propertization outcomes, then the underlying datum at issue - whether there is "too much" intellectual property - can be determined indirectly at some reasonable degree of approximation. This approach identifies a "property trap" effect where, under high coordination-cost conditions, the regime selection mechanism is prone to fail: litigation risk and associated transaction-cost burdens drive innovators to move "too fast" to implement a state-provided property regime. Conversely, under low coordination-cost conditions, the regime selection mechanism is prone to succeed: adversely-affected entities that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs have incentives to undertake actions that weaken property-rights coverage, including constrained enforcement, forming cooperative arrangements, or even forfeiting intellectual-property assets to the public domain. Counterintuitively, these relationships imply that large firms that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs tend to have the strongest incentives and capacities to take actions that correct overpropertization outcomes. Preliminary evidence is drawn from the semiconductor, financial-services and information-technology industries.
{"title":"Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes","authors":"Jonathan M. Barnett","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1273919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1273919","url":null,"abstract":"It is commonly asserted that innovation markets suffer from excessive intellectual property protections, which in turn stifle output. But empirical inquiries can neither confirm nor deny this assertion. Under the \"agnostic\" assumption that we cannot assess directly whether intellectual-property coverage is excessive, an alternative query is proposed: can the market assess if any \"propertization outcome\" is excessive and then undertake actions to yield a socially preferable outcome? Grounded in the \"bottom up\" methodology of new institutional economics, this process-based approach takes the view that innovator populations make rent-seeking investments that continuously \"select\" among a range of \"innovation regimes\" that trade off securing innovation gains (which tends to demand more property) against reducing transaction costs and associated innovation losses (which tends to demand less). If we can identify the conditions under which privately-interested investments in lobbying, enforcement, and transactional arrangements are likely to yield socially-interested propertization outcomes, then the underlying datum at issue - whether there is \"too much\" intellectual property - can be determined indirectly at some reasonable degree of approximation. This approach identifies a \"property trap\" effect where, under high coordination-cost conditions, the regime selection mechanism is prone to fail: litigation risk and associated transaction-cost burdens drive innovators to move \"too fast\" to implement a state-provided property regime. Conversely, under low coordination-cost conditions, the regime selection mechanism is prone to succeed: adversely-affected entities that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs have incentives to undertake actions that weaken property-rights coverage, including constrained enforcement, forming cooperative arrangements, or even forfeiting intellectual-property assets to the public domain. Counterintuitively, these relationships imply that large firms that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs tend to have the strongest incentives and capacities to take actions that correct overpropertization outcomes. Preliminary evidence is drawn from the semiconductor, financial-services and information-technology industries.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126522102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Miguel A. Ferreira, A. Keswani, A. Miguel, S. Ramos
We use a new data set to study the determinants of the performance of open--end actively managed equity mutual funds in 27 countries. We find that mutual funds underperform the market overall. The results show important differences in the determinants of fund performance in the USA and elsewhere in the world. The US evidence of diminishing returns to scale is not a universal truth as the performance of funds located outside the USA and funds that invest overseas is not negatively affected by scale. Our findings suggest that the adverse scale effects in the USA are related to liquidity constraints faced by funds that, by virtue of their style, have to invest in small and domestic stocks. Country characteristics also explain fund performance. Funds located in countries with liquid stock markets and strong legal institutions display better performance. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.
{"title":"The Determinants of Mutual Fund Performance: A Cross-Country Study","authors":"Miguel A. Ferreira, A. Keswani, A. Miguel, S. Ramos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.947098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.947098","url":null,"abstract":"We use a new data set to study the determinants of the performance of open--end actively managed equity mutual funds in 27 countries. We find that mutual funds underperform the market overall. The results show important differences in the determinants of fund performance in the USA and elsewhere in the world. The US evidence of diminishing returns to scale is not a universal truth as the performance of funds located outside the USA and funds that invest overseas is not negatively affected by scale. Our findings suggest that the adverse scale effects in the USA are related to liquidity constraints faced by funds that, by virtue of their style, have to invest in small and domestic stocks. Country characteristics also explain fund performance. Funds located in countries with liquid stock markets and strong legal institutions display better performance. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129928263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Intrinsically trustworthy agents never cheat. A society's willingness to trust and the quality of its institutions have their origins in the intrinsic trustworthiness of its citizens. Trustworthiness is the basis for maximizing output in economic exchange and in explaining differences in standards of living around the world. We measure intrinsic trustworthiness with a question from the World Values Survey and estimate its effect using a sample of 60 countries. We find that trustworthiness is important for output per capita and that the effect of trust is likely to come from trustworthiness.
{"title":"Trustworthiness and Economic Performance","authors":"Janice Boucher Breuer, John McDermott","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1314844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1314844","url":null,"abstract":"Intrinsically trustworthy agents never cheat. A society's willingness to trust and the quality of its institutions have their origins in the intrinsic trustworthiness of its citizens. Trustworthiness is the basis for maximizing output in economic exchange and in explaining differences in standards of living around the world. We measure intrinsic trustworthiness with a question from the World Values Survey and estimate its effect using a sample of 60 countries. We find that trustworthiness is important for output per capita and that the effect of trust is likely to come from trustworthiness.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"43 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133485363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By using game-theoretic language, this paper attempts to interpret the North's recent framework for institutional studies. Particularly relying on a foundational study of knowledge and culture in epistemic game theory, it clarifies three subtly different meanings of the beliefs used by North - behavioral, cultural, and elites' subjective - in the evolutions of institutions. It also suggests the ways to respond to the North's call for interdisciplinary approach by applying analytical tools of strategic complementarities and linked games.
{"title":"Understanding Douglss North in Game-Theoretic Language","authors":"M. Aoki","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1083790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1083790","url":null,"abstract":"By using game-theoretic language, this paper attempts to interpret the North's recent framework for institutional studies. Particularly relying on a foundational study of knowledge and culture in epistemic game theory, it clarifies three subtly different meanings of the beliefs used by North - behavioral, cultural, and elites' subjective - in the evolutions of institutions. It also suggests the ways to respond to the North's call for interdisciplinary approach by applying analytical tools of strategic complementarities and linked games.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125562043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-04-08DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199233762.003.0004
Gregory Jackson
A key theoretical and methodological issue for comparative scholars concerns the non-identical nature of actors across different institutional contexts. This paper reviews the relationship between actors and institutions within various strands of institutional theory, showing some emerging points of agreement among different social sciences disciplines regarding their co-generative or mutually constitutive nature. While actors' identities and interests are shaped by the broader institutional environment, institutions are equally the outcome of particular constellations of actors and their interactions. This understanding of institutions in terms of actor identities, interests, and constellations is illustrated with reference to industrial relations and corporate governance institutions. The paper also draws upon recent theories of action grounded in pragmatism to argue that institutions should be understood as an historical and non-deterministic context of action, wherein institutionalization can be usefully understood as a matter of degree. In particular, the ambiguity of institutionalized constraints and opportunities and the different strategic capacities of actors to enact institutionalized routines may give rise to more or less heterogeneous forms of organizational within different national business systems.
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Economists often casually assume that a school district and a city that share the same name also share the same territory, but in fact exactly congruent boundaries are rare. Using the overlap of school district and municipal boundaries available on Google Earth, I find that about two-thirds of medium-to-large American cities have boundaries that substantially overlap those of a single school district. The degree of overlap, however, varies greatly by region and state, ranging from nearly perfect congruence in New England, New Jersey, and Virginia, to hardly any in Illinois, Texas, and Florida. Larger and older municipalities tend to have boundaries that closely match those of a single school district. The latter sections of the paper attempt to explain why school districts diverge from municipal boundaries and why they sometimes ended up with county boundaries. Modern school districts are the product of consolidations of one-room school districts from 1900 to 1970. Contrary to much historical scholarship, I argue that, outside the South, these consolidations were consented to by local voters. They preferred districts whose boundaries conformed to their everyday interactions rather than formal units of government. The South ended up with county-based school districts because segregation imposed diseconomies of scale on district operations and required larger land-area districts. The conclusion offers a social capital reason for the durability of school-district boundaries.
{"title":"The Congruence of American School Districts with Other Local Government Boundaries: A Google-Earth Exploration","authors":"W. Fischel","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.967399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.967399","url":null,"abstract":"Economists often casually assume that a school district and a city that share the same name also share the same territory, but in fact exactly congruent boundaries are rare. Using the overlap of school district and municipal boundaries available on Google Earth, I find that about two-thirds of medium-to-large American cities have boundaries that substantially overlap those of a single school district. The degree of overlap, however, varies greatly by region and state, ranging from nearly perfect congruence in New England, New Jersey, and Virginia, to hardly any in Illinois, Texas, and Florida. Larger and older municipalities tend to have boundaries that closely match those of a single school district. The latter sections of the paper attempt to explain why school districts diverge from municipal boundaries and why they sometimes ended up with county boundaries. Modern school districts are the product of consolidations of one-room school districts from 1900 to 1970. Contrary to much historical scholarship, I argue that, outside the South, these consolidations were consented to by local voters. They preferred districts whose boundaries conformed to their everyday interactions rather than formal units of government. The South ended up with county-based school districts because segregation imposed diseconomies of scale on district operations and required larger land-area districts. The conclusion offers a social capital reason for the durability of school-district boundaries.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128521314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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