The Global Competitiveness Report, the State of Responsible Competitiveness and the Global Corruption Barometer elaborate annually a countries ranking that emphasize the progress or regress of each country. Using this reports the paper try to make a clusters analysis of world country by responsible competitiveness, national competitiveness and corruption. The main idea of this paper is to split the countries in three categories of clusters – innovators, asserters and beginners – in relation between responsible competitiveness and national competitiveness – and – stars, asserters and beginners – in relation between corruption and national competitiveness. Within the three clusters, countries may be able to improve their performance through real and suitable policies.
{"title":"Cluster of Countries Analysis by Responsible Competitiveness, National Competitiveness and Corruption","authors":"M. Herciu","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1258938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1258938","url":null,"abstract":"The Global Competitiveness Report, the State of Responsible Competitiveness and the Global Corruption Barometer elaborate annually a countries ranking that emphasize the progress or regress of each country. Using this reports the paper try to make a clusters analysis of world country by responsible competitiveness, national competitiveness and corruption. The main idea of this paper is to split the countries in three categories of clusters – innovators, asserters and beginners – in relation between responsible competitiveness and national competitiveness – and – stars, asserters and beginners – in relation between corruption and national competitiveness. Within the three clusters, countries may be able to improve their performance through real and suitable policies.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133682246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-08-14DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6281.2008.00262.x
Sven Modell, F. Wiesel
Public sector organizations have increasingly been subject to varying forms of marketization, ranging from competitive contracting to a more general conception of citizens or users as customers or consumers regardless of whether such economic factors prevail. Drawing on neo-institutional sociology (NIS) and other advances in economic sociology, we examine such marketization efforts as an institutionally embedded phenomenon with particular reference to how it is implicated in the performance measurement practices (PMPs) of two state agencies in Sweden. This reveals how PMPs are embedded in only partly consistent institutional logics and under what circumstances such practices can be reconciled. Some PMPs, especially those grounded in efficiency concerns, tend to play an important constitutive role in operating-level practices, partly as a result of also being embedded in regulatory pressures. Other PMPs, imbued with symbolic meanings signifying a more customer-oriented rationale, only seem to approach such a status if they are dis-embedded from the ‘global’ practices in which they originate and re-embedded in evolving PMPs dominated by efficiency concerns. We discuss the implications of these findings for emerging research into practice variations embedded in competing logics in institutional fields and for policy development.
{"title":"Marketization and Performance Measurement in Swedish Central Government: A Comparative Institutionalist Study","authors":"Sven Modell, F. Wiesel","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6281.2008.00262.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6281.2008.00262.x","url":null,"abstract":"Public sector organizations have increasingly been subject to varying forms of marketization, ranging from competitive contracting to a more general conception of citizens or users as customers or consumers regardless of whether such economic factors prevail. Drawing on neo-institutional sociology (NIS) and other advances in economic sociology, we examine such marketization efforts as an institutionally embedded phenomenon with particular reference to how it is implicated in the performance measurement practices (PMPs) of two state agencies in Sweden. This reveals how PMPs are embedded in only partly consistent institutional logics and under what circumstances such practices can be reconciled. Some PMPs, especially those grounded in efficiency concerns, tend to play an important constitutive role in operating-level practices, partly as a result of also being embedded in regulatory pressures. Other PMPs, imbued with symbolic meanings signifying a more customer-oriented rationale, only seem to approach such a status if they are dis-embedded from the ‘global’ practices in which they originate and re-embedded in evolving PMPs dominated by efficiency concerns. We discuss the implications of these findings for emerging research into practice variations embedded in competing logics in institutional fields and for policy development.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115597107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Axiomatic property theory represent all society as set of interacted owners. There are determined three initial notions, they are - "owner", "object" and "possession". All owners - a usual citizen, a family, a public organization, a business firm or even the state - are represented absolutely identical. Having property, owners can do various actions with it - using acts or interactions with other owners. Any owner's action can be described in easy visual view. Using act - is intentional changes of state of objects. Whichever using acts are made by owner with his property, it is changes only the state of objects, but not their belonging. Possession of objects can be changed only as result of interaction with exterior owners. Voluntary interaction is concerted changes of possession of cooperating owners. In the theory are used notions of justice and morality. Justice means identity of owners and determines symmetry of the organization of all society. Morality is defined as a certain characteristic of owners actions - the owner's actions, which are not lead to increase of a compulsions level in a society - are moral. All social knowledges, in particular - economy, political science and morality - are built on the single axiomatic base. Many social tasks can be solved deductively as logical consequence of the axioms. Decisions of some actual tasks are adduced.
{"title":"Axiomatic Property Theory","authors":"D. Boyarkin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1220342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1220342","url":null,"abstract":"Axiomatic property theory represent all society as set of interacted owners. There are determined three initial notions, they are - \"owner\", \"object\" and \"possession\". All owners - a usual citizen, a family, a public organization, a business firm or even the state - are represented absolutely identical. Having property, owners can do various actions with it - using acts or interactions with other owners. Any owner's action can be described in easy visual view. Using act - is intentional changes of state of objects. Whichever using acts are made by owner with his property, it is changes only the state of objects, but not their belonging. Possession of objects can be changed only as result of interaction with exterior owners. Voluntary interaction is concerted changes of possession of cooperating owners. In the theory are used notions of justice and morality. Justice means identity of owners and determines symmetry of the organization of all society. Morality is defined as a certain characteristic of owners actions - the owner's actions, which are not lead to increase of a compulsions level in a society - are moral. All social knowledges, in particular - economy, political science and morality - are built on the single axiomatic base. Many social tasks can be solved deductively as logical consequence of the axioms. Decisions of some actual tasks are adduced.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130382748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a simple production function to show that the economic performance of a group of African countries in 2007 depended on three broad sources: domestic resources, governance, and global links. The results reveal that investment plays the most important part. The effects of education (knowledge) as a component of human capital is modest, while the health (life expectancy) part of human capital is negative. At the aggregate level external relations, measured as openness, are positively correlated with per capita income. However, disaggregated as integration, aid dependency, and net tourism, all three global links have a negative effect on performance. Also, two indicators of institutional quality (governance) show that average improvement in the quality of institutions has helped economic performance. Considering different dimensions of institutions, the rule of law, and safety and security of property rights are the most constraining aspects of institutions in this group of countries. The findings leave enough room technical for fine-tuning and sophisticated estimators, which cautions interpretation. However, it seems clear that developing countries do better improving domestic resources and institutions than relying for performance on external relations, even though such links cannot be dismissed lightly.
{"title":"Domestic Resources, Governance, Global Links, and the Economic Performance of Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"V. Amavilah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1359944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1359944","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a simple production function to show that the economic performance of a group of African countries in 2007 depended on three broad sources: domestic resources, governance, and global links. The results reveal that investment plays the most important part. The effects of education (knowledge) as a component of human capital is modest, while the health (life expectancy) part of human capital is negative. At the aggregate level external relations, measured as openness, are positively correlated with per capita income. However, disaggregated as integration, aid dependency, and net tourism, all three global links have a negative effect on performance. Also, two indicators of institutional quality (governance) show that average improvement in the quality of institutions has helped economic performance. Considering different dimensions of institutions, the rule of law, and safety and security of property rights are the most constraining aspects of institutions in this group of countries. The findings leave enough room technical for fine-tuning and sophisticated estimators, which cautions interpretation. However, it seems clear that developing countries do better improving domestic resources and institutions than relying for performance on external relations, even though such links cannot be dismissed lightly.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124072061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-08-07DOI: 10.1108/14757700810874100
Ehsan H. Feroz, S. Goel, R. Raab
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to show the applicability of data envelopment analysis (DEA) in arriving at an unbiased account of relative performance in a set of companies, using the pharmaceutical industry as an example. Design/methodology/approach - A DEA-based income efficiency measure of business performance for the pharmaceutical industry is computed. The pharmaceutical industry, which includes many multinational corporations with complex governance problems, and the strategies that allowed firm efficiency rankings to change over time, over ten recent years, are analyzed. Findings - The analyses indicate that the inclines and declines in DEA efficiency rankings are related to the strategic choices made by the upper management. Research limitations/implications - The paper attempted to trace firm behavior Practical implications - The approach may be ideal to evaluate strategic managers (CEOs, general managers, and presidents) by board of directors, since it relates multiple performance indices to a meta-measure of performance. Another group of beneficiaries include sector financial analysts. The approach adds a new dimension to sector analysis, to compare specific industries and identify the relative rankings of firms on multiple performance indices. Originality/value - The paper demonstrates the usefulness of DEA in performance governance measurement by applying it to the pharmaceuticals industry.
{"title":"Performance Measurement for Accountability in Corporate Governance: A Data Envelopment Analysis Approach","authors":"Ehsan H. Feroz, S. Goel, R. Raab","doi":"10.1108/14757700810874100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/14757700810874100","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to show the applicability of data envelopment analysis (DEA) in arriving at an unbiased account of relative performance in a set of companies, using the pharmaceutical industry as an example. Design/methodology/approach - A DEA-based income efficiency measure of business performance for the pharmaceutical industry is computed. The pharmaceutical industry, which includes many multinational corporations with complex governance problems, and the strategies that allowed firm efficiency rankings to change over time, over ten recent years, are analyzed. Findings - The analyses indicate that the inclines and declines in DEA efficiency rankings are related to the strategic choices made by the upper management. Research limitations/implications - The paper attempted to trace firm behavior Practical implications - The approach may be ideal to evaluate strategic managers (CEOs, general managers, and presidents) by board of directors, since it relates multiple performance indices to a meta-measure of performance. Another group of beneficiaries include sector financial analysts. The approach adds a new dimension to sector analysis, to compare specific industries and identify the relative rankings of firms on multiple performance indices. Originality/value - The paper demonstrates the usefulness of DEA in performance governance measurement by applying it to the pharmaceuticals industry.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123300224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While the importance of institutions for explaining cross-country income differences is widely recognized, comparatively little is known about the origins of economic institutions. One strand of the literature emphasizes cultural differences while another points at exogenous environmental factors such as mortality and climate. Both are supported by some empirical evidence. I reconcile the two schools of institutional origins by proposing a theory of self-selection of colonists to different geographic destinations. Exogenous characteristics such as climate, mortality and factor differences determine which type of settler decides to move to a particular colony. Settler type, in turn, shapes the institutional quality of the new country. The model is used to confirm observed regularities reported by previous researchers. Furthermore, robust new evidence is presented in support of this selection process. The results suggest that any theory of colonial development that does not take selection into account will be incomplete.
{"title":"Colonial Heritage and Economic Development","authors":"Andrea Asoni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1208154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1208154","url":null,"abstract":"While the importance of institutions for explaining cross-country income differences is widely recognized, comparatively little is known about the origins of economic institutions. One strand of the literature emphasizes cultural differences while another points at exogenous environmental factors such as mortality and climate. Both are supported by some empirical evidence. I reconcile the two schools of institutional origins by proposing a theory of self-selection of colonists to different geographic destinations. Exogenous characteristics such as climate, mortality and factor differences determine which type of settler decides to move to a particular colony. Settler type, in turn, shapes the institutional quality of the new country. The model is used to confirm observed regularities reported by previous researchers. Furthermore, robust new evidence is presented in support of this selection process. The results suggest that any theory of colonial development that does not take selection into account will be incomplete.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"327 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128958577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The social performance of fiscal redistributive mechanisms in Canada continues to receive a growing interest from politicians and research scientists. The aim of this paper is to assess the evolution of social classes in Canada and to check whether the market and governmental redistribution factors have affected their evolution during the last decade. We focus on the dynamic of inequality, polarization and progressivity of the fiscal system. The results of this study confirm the effectiveness of governmental redistributive mechanism to decrease inequality and polarization significantly and to maintain the middle social class at the detriment of the poorest one. The other evidence concerns the chronic increase in population share and wellbeing of the rich class. Finally, the progressivity of fiscal sytem has registered a significant increase during the last few years.
{"title":"Social Classes, Inequality and Redistributive Policies in Canada","authors":"A. Araar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1263501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1263501","url":null,"abstract":"The social performance of fiscal redistributive mechanisms in Canada continues to receive a growing interest from politicians and research scientists. The aim of this paper is to assess the evolution of social classes in Canada and to check whether the market and governmental redistribution factors have affected their evolution during the last decade. We focus on the dynamic of inequality, polarization and progressivity of the fiscal system. The results of this study confirm the effectiveness of governmental redistributive mechanism to decrease inequality and polarization significantly and to maintain the middle social class at the detriment of the poorest one. The other evidence concerns the chronic increase in population share and wellbeing of the rich class. Finally, the progressivity of fiscal sytem has registered a significant increase during the last few years.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122613729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a framework that explains non-rationality in non-repeated games. In our framework a player i adopts a binding "persona" - a temporary utility function --- that they honestly signal before play. By adopting a "non-rational" persona, i may cause changes in their opponents' behavior that increases $i$'s true utility. We use this framework to explain experimental data in the Traveler's Dilemma and to show how cooperation can arise in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). We then predict a crowding out phenomenon in the PD. We also predict a tradeoff between the robustness and the benefit of cooperation in the PD.
{"title":"Schelling Formalized: Strategic Choices of Non-Rational Personas","authors":"D. Wolpert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1172602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1172602","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a framework that explains non-rationality in non-repeated games. In our framework a player i adopts a binding \"persona\" - a temporary utility function --- that they honestly signal before play. By adopting a \"non-rational\" persona, i may cause changes in their opponents' behavior that increases $i$'s true utility. We use this framework to explain experimental data in the Traveler's Dilemma and to show how cooperation can arise in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). We then predict a crowding out phenomenon in the PD. We also predict a tradeoff between the robustness and the benefit of cooperation in the PD.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"134 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123446109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we use a large database of more than 3,700 strategic relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they govern their relationships combining both relational and formal elements. We argue that these two dimensions might be complements or substitutes depending on the characteristics of the relationships as well as the reputations of contracting partners. More precisely, we posit that the formal dimension of the relationship might help to equilibrate hazards between partners increasing cooperation as well as the reputations of the contracting parties acting as hostages. Our empirical results confirm our predictions and thus suggest that competing theoretical frameworks focusing on informal or formal agreements might not tell the entire story. Our results, by showing how those dimensions might complete or be a substitute for each other, shed new light on previous empirical works on this issue.
{"title":"Enhancing Cooperation in Interfirm Relationships: The Role of Reputation and (In)Formal Agreements","authors":"J. Beuve, Stéphane Saussier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1258342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1258342","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we use a large database of more than 3,700 strategic relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they govern their relationships combining both relational and formal elements. We argue that these two dimensions might be complements or substitutes depending on the characteristics of the relationships as well as the reputations of contracting partners. More precisely, we posit that the formal dimension of the relationship might help to equilibrate hazards between partners increasing cooperation as well as the reputations of the contracting parties acting as hostages. Our empirical results confirm our predictions and thus suggest that competing theoretical frameworks focusing on informal or formal agreements might not tell the entire story. Our results, by showing how those dimensions might complete or be a substitute for each other, shed new light on previous empirical works on this issue.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132129934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Not for Profit Organizations (NPOs) are the subject of a relevant debate by scholars, politicians and public opinion. The European Commission issued ten years ago a Communication regarding the promotion of associations' and foundations' role, the problems and the challenges they have to face to improve their actions and to be able to better operate in a European context. Some efforts were done to measure economic dimensions of third sector by Research centres and international institutions while there is a remarkable lack of homogeneity concerning NPOs' accounting regulation in the European Union. Each country has its own accounting regulatory system, strongly depending by civil and tax laws; this reduces both NPO's disclosure and prevents scholars to comprehend the real state of social economy system at European level and their financial performance. Moreover it makes NPOs' chance to operate in a foreign country into the enlarged EU very difficult and make difficult an homogeneity in NPOs treatment at European level. A European agenda to support the accountability development in the third sector should define a minimum common framework for institutional and governance features, financial accounting and social accountability for different kinds of NPO, beginning starting from the different national regulations. In particular an hypothesis of European NPOs' framework for financial reporting (a first step to a better accountability) has to consider different regulations in order to: a) legal entities form in which NPOs have constituted instituted in EU countries end and their regulations (specific for NPOs or general for commercial entities); b) accounting and auditing obligations (keep accounting records, prepare annual accounts, provide financial reporting) and audit them; c) mandatory annual report provided by the NPOs (mission statement, asset and liability statement, statement of financial activities, explanatory notes, trustees report); d) disclosure of accounts disclosure (make the accounts available to the public on request or deposit it in a public register); e) accounting principles for NPOs (cash or accrual basis, light regulation for smaller entities, IFRs implementation); f) a model for NPOs financial performance evaluation based on financial statement (significant ratio in accounting aggregates). To define a common framework we start from a comparison matching between Spanish, Italian, and English regulations (law and practice) applied to NPOs to highlight similarities and differences. The paper is the first step of a wider research whose final goal is a meeting path to a common accounting framework for non profit organizations in European Union.
{"title":"Improving NPOs' Accountability in the Enlarged EU: Towards a Common Framework for Financial Reporting in European NPOs","authors":"Claudio Travaglini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1247143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1247143","url":null,"abstract":"Not for Profit Organizations (NPOs) are the subject of a relevant debate by scholars, politicians and public opinion. The European Commission issued ten years ago a Communication regarding the promotion of associations' and foundations' role, the problems and the challenges they have to face to improve their actions and to be able to better operate in a European context. Some efforts were done to measure economic dimensions of third sector by Research centres and international institutions while there is a remarkable lack of homogeneity concerning NPOs' accounting regulation in the European Union. Each country has its own accounting regulatory system, strongly depending by civil and tax laws; this reduces both NPO's disclosure and prevents scholars to comprehend the real state of social economy system at European level and their financial performance. Moreover it makes NPOs' chance to operate in a foreign country into the enlarged EU very difficult and make difficult an homogeneity in NPOs treatment at European level. A European agenda to support the accountability development in the third sector should define a minimum common framework for institutional and governance features, financial accounting and social accountability for different kinds of NPO, beginning starting from the different national regulations. In particular an hypothesis of European NPOs' framework for financial reporting (a first step to a better accountability) has to consider different regulations in order to: a) legal entities form in which NPOs have constituted instituted in EU countries end and their regulations (specific for NPOs or general for commercial entities); b) accounting and auditing obligations (keep accounting records, prepare annual accounts, provide financial reporting) and audit them; c) mandatory annual report provided by the NPOs (mission statement, asset and liability statement, statement of financial activities, explanatory notes, trustees report); d) disclosure of accounts disclosure (make the accounts available to the public on request or deposit it in a public register); e) accounting principles for NPOs (cash or accrual basis, light regulation for smaller entities, IFRs implementation); f) a model for NPOs financial performance evaluation based on financial statement (significant ratio in accounting aggregates). To define a common framework we start from a comparison matching between Spanish, Italian, and English regulations (law and practice) applied to NPOs to highlight similarities and differences. The paper is the first step of a wider research whose final goal is a meeting path to a common accounting framework for non profit organizations in European Union.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115867320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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